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The condition of state party organizations is unclear. Some argue they are declining, whereas others argue they are making a comeback. Some of the ambiguity stems from incomplete information, but some of it stems from changes in the organization of the “state party.” New organizations have emerged and our organizational assessments have not incorporated the changing reality. The traditional state party committees have been joined by legislative party campaign committees, and party resources have become more dispersed. The state party organization is no longer defined by just the traditional state party organization. This article presents a comprehensive case study of these changes. It examines the condition and growth of all state party organizations m New York across three election cycles. The legislative party committees are better financed than the traditional state party committees, and they play a major role in financing state legislative candidates. The focus, it appears, should be as much on the legislative party campaign committees as on the traditional state party committees when trying to understand the condition of state party organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely argued that legislative resources enable incumbents to increase their margins of victory. Changes within the New York Senate provide an opportunity to assess this thesis. Within a few years during the early 1970s, legislative resources increased substantially and abruptly. The legislative budget increased, a legislative office building opened, and district offices were established. There were also strong political motivations for the Senate legislative parties to become more concerned with retaining incumbent legislators. This analysis assesses changes in electoral margins from 1950 to 1990 and finds a distinct change in average margins of victory after the early 1970s. In addition, in the era after 1974, legislators experienced significantly larger sophomore surges. The greatest increases were among those whose initial elections were close, a finding which suggests that resources are targeted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative campaign committees have come to play a significant role in some US states. They raise large sums of money and have the potential to play a dominant role in individual races. They also have the potential to shape party fortunes, depending on how well they use these funds. The question is: are they able to discipline themselves to use the resources effectively? To be effective, parties must be able to limit their spending to close races, and to use their funds to support non-incumbents who may become future party members. Parties must also be able to withdraw funds from incumbents as margins of victory shift. This analysis assesses how New York legislative campaign committees distribute their money and whether they are able to withdraw funds in subsequent elections from incumbents who do not need them. The years 1984-90 are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While incumbents in legislative races generally raise more money than challengers do, the important question is how money is related to vote outcomes. This analysis explores that relationship in New York state Senate races and examines how change in control of a chamber might affect individual and party finance activities. Republicans control the New York Senate by a small margin; it is the only state institution that the Republicans have controlled since 1974, and their general position has been eroding in recent decades. Within this context, few legislative races are close, and therefore attention focuses on a few races. Because the political parties play a major role in the management of campaign resources, they can create an organized, coherent response to this situation, and the evidence indicates that they do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom is that incumbents have an enormous advantage in raising campaign funds and that it is difficult for challengers to acquire resources to run a campaign. This description is largely true of New York legislative races, but the situation is modified to some degree by the closeness of races and the strategies of political parties in distributing their resources. Challengers raise more money when races are close, and parties in New York allocate their funds heavily to "marginals" (whether challengers or incumbents), thereby somewhat offsetting the advantages of incumbents. These practices reflect the policies whereby political parties seek to build their bases in the legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]