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This paper examines management forecast errors in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses of New Zealand firms and subsequent management explanations for earnings forecast errors in recent years. New Zealand has several unique features and recent changes that are worthy of research, including the requirement for management to make forecasts; a requirement to explain differences between forecast and actual; and a recent change that provides the voluntary opportunity to obtain a negative assurance opinion on forecasts. Using hand‐collected IPO data between 1998 and 2014, we find that firms that include a negative assurance opinion on the prospective financial information in the prospectus have more accurate earnings and cash flow forecasts. We investigate the subsequent explanations for forecast errors, which are mandated by a financial reporting standard. We show that management tends to attribute negative and large forecast errors to external causes rather than their own actions. Our findings have implications for regulators and investors in New Zealand and other settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mandatory disclosure--the idea that companies must be legally required to disclose certain, specified information to public investors--is the first principle of modern securities law. Despite the high costs it imposes, mandatory disclosure has been well defended by legal scholars on two theoretical grounds: 'Agency costs' and 'information underproduction.' While these two concepts are a good fit for secondary markets (where investors trade securities with one another), this Article shows that they are largely irrelevant in the context of primary markets (where companies offer securities directly to investors). The surprising result is that primary offerings--such as an IPO--may not require mandatory disclosure at all. This profound insight calls into question the fundamental premises of the Securities Act of 1933 and similar laws governing primary offerings around the world. Reform of these rules could lead to a new age of simplified, low-cost primary offerings to the public, something that is already happening in New Zealand through its equity crowdfunding market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Racehorse trainers operate unregulated asset management businesses in which the assets owned by outside clients compete with those owned by trainers for the latter's time, care, and attention. However, market mechanisms appear to deal effectively with the resulting agency problem in situations where it matters most. In a sample of 8,000 racehorses and their associated stables, we find that client-owned horses do indeed perform worse than their trainer-owned counterparts in small stables that have relatively few outside clients but that the reverse is true in large stables where client-owners provide much of the trainer's income: agents with more to lose apparently behave better. Moreover, they appear to have good reasons for behaving better: client-owned horses that underperform are more likely to be transferred to another stable, thereby causing a loss of income for the original trainer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper reports an investigation of the returns obtained on a listed portfolio of entrepreneurial companies comparing these with a portfolio of listed small businesses and the stock market overall. The initial findings produce counter-intuitive results in that the returns on the portfolio of entrepreneurial companies appear to be less than those for other small companies and for the market overall. Further, initial public offerings of entrepreneurial companies appear to be overpriced and suffer a price decline post-listing that takes approximately a year and a half to recover. An implication of such results is that money will not flow to the entrepreneurial firms, which may have unfavourable longer-term consequences for economic growth. Various government polices are directed towards achieving sustainable economic growth through the smaller business sector and encouraging these businesses to expand and list on the stock exchange. The overpricing of IPOs and lower returns are not likely to encourage investor support for the entrepreneurial companies, making it difficult for these policies to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents information on the changes experienced by several business enterprises in New Zealand after doing an initial public offering. Pumpkin Patch; Just Water International; Mike Pero Mortgages; CanWest MediaWorks.

The article discusses reasons why small to mid-cap businesses in New Zealand should list on the share market. Privacy, fear of losing control and cost are the main reasons why companies avoid listing. However, trust in the market is now growing following an overhaul of the regulatory framework. New Zealand is also seeing a return of retail investors and the growth of initial public offering (IPO) pipeline.

The author offers opinions on finance in New Zealand. A 24.2 percent in the NZX50 Gross Index stock price index for 2012 is hailed and largely attributed to the work of New Zealand Stock Exchange chief executive officers Tim Bennett and Mark Weldon. Increases in corporations which are going public and in mergers and acquisitions of companies are said to pose the risk of a stock market bubble.