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This article argues that while India is preparing for the contingency of a two-front war against China and Pakistan, its procurement and arms production policies make it problematic for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy (IN) to meet these challenges. IAF doctrine is not aligned to its current capabilities and is, therefore, largely speculative. Further, due to budgetary shortfalls in its modernization efforts, the IAF will find it difficult to fulfill its stated doctrinal role against China or Pakistan. On the other hand, the Indian Navy's doctrine is better aligned with its objectives and capabilities. The IN can carry out its doctrine of sea control against the Pakistani Navy, but will have to adopt a sea denial posture against China because of the rapid growth of the PLA Navy's force and capabilities. Given their slow pace of modernization, neither service will be able to decisively counter the Chinese military. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses consortia that were formed among donor nations to provide economic development aid to selected recipient nations in the 1980's. Such donor organizations enabled multilateral development cooperation and long-term planning, as well as knowledge transfer. The author concludes that although the consortia were politically sensible they were short-lived. The examples of consortium-based donor countries' development efforts are exemplified in the countries of India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia.

Discusses the testing of the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan. Reaction of Pakistan on the nuclear testing activities conducted by India; Factors that contributed to the decision of India to test its nuclear weapons; Impact of the nuclear tests of Pakistan; Policy of the U.S. on the nuclear weapons testing of India and Pakistan.

The article focuses on the issue about the importance of recognizing the dangers of a nuclear confrontation by India and Pakistan and the need to stabilize their nuclear options. The nuclear forces they are likely to develop is small in size, localized rather than extra-regional, and recessed rather than deployed. In developing the Lahore process, India and Pakistan could agree to place restrictions on specific categories of nuclear weapons, or at least on their deployment. At the international level, the legal regime needs to be reshaped to fit realities and recognize the three de facto nuclear-weapons states which are democratic states that have shown responsible behavior.