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Copyright of Historia i Polityka is the property of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the role of the European Union (EU) in facilitating concessions between member states which, paradoxically, pursue discrepant foreign interests. First, the article develops a theoretical framework for the under‐researched Europeanization model of cross‐loading. Here, strategic socialization, experiential learning, and policy transfer conceptualize how national actors adopt cooperative practices from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into their bilateral level. Meanwhile, rational institutionalism and the politics of scale help theorize tactical coalition‐ and consensus‐building specifically between discrepant national interests, with regard to states' complementary influence capabilities within the CFSP. Second, the article tests cross‐loading to confirm Poland's conciliatory Russia policy in 2008–14 as an EU‐induced concession to Germany. Arguably, Poland who pursued its strategic interests in the Eastern Partnership tactically adopted Germany's approach towards developing parallel EU–Russia policies. Poland thus recognized German skills to build consensus on the Eastern Partnership with stronger and Russian‐oriented member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Polish Journal of Management Studies is the property of Czestochowa University of Technology, Faculty of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyses the extent to which the Jagiellonian idea still has a discernible influence over contemporary Polish foreign policy. More particularly, it addresses the question whether this tradition in some way still informs Poland's approach towards its eastern neighbours that possess territories that once belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The paper argues that it is possible to discern the legacy (or afterlife) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth when it comes to the way in which Poland manages its relations with its eastern neighbours. The civilizing mission that was once associated with the Jagiellonian idea can still be seen in Poland's efforts to promote democracy and liberal values in the East; this is most evident in the contribution that Poland has made to the European Union's Eastern Partnership. Nevertheless, differing collective memories among these states also continue to cause tensions between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poland is commonly regarded as the “diamond in the ring of friends” of Ukraine among EU Member States. This article examines the evolution of Poland’s sponsorship of Ukraine at the European level up until fall 2015, with some reflections on later developments. Drawing on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including semi-structured expert interviews, the article examines Poland’s policy along the lines of preferences and interests, institutions and procedures, and strategies and actions. The findings reveal persistent continuity despite considerable change in relevant context conditions. The end—Poland’s aim to support Ukraine’s European future—has remained intact over the decades, with only slight modification. Yet the understanding of the most efficient means—strategies and institutional structures—to achieve this end has altered, indicating a change in outlook. A number of nuances regarding the influence of Poland’s EU membership on Poland’s and EU’s Eastern neighborhood and specifically Ukraine policies, as well as the role of Ukraine-related developments, contribute to various strands in the literature on the relationship between EU policies towards the post-Soviet space and Central and Eastern European member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on foreign policy think tanks have too often remained disconnected from the analysis of foreign policy outcomes. Yet, investigating the development, functions and influence of think tanks can provide valuable insights into the context in which foreign policy is formulated. The Czech Republic and Poland represent interesting comparative cases in this regard: while Polish think tanks are more numerous and tend to be better placed in international rankings, they are less involved in the policymaking process than their Czech counterparts. This contrast has mainly to do with the sociology of foreign policy elites and the role of political parties in both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When in the year 2009 Radoslaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, architects of the Eastern Partnership project, launched the ambitious scheme of bringing the six post-Soviet countries closer to the EU, they could hardly predict that in nearly five years the tremendous diplomatic, political efforts to design an effective soft power approach would find itself on the verge of failure. In this relation, Poland's role in bringing the EaP countries under the umbrella of the project long before becoming the EU member, however, most productively since joining the organization, could not be underestimated. Despite a complicated historical legacy with some of the EaP members, namely, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Poland together with the Baltic countries turned out to be a vocal proponent of bringing the former ones under the initiative, aiming to empower them with the leverage against Russia's successful efforts to destabilize the region and preserve domination in its immediate neighbourhood. Nevertheless, taking into account the changes in Poland's political climate, namely, victory of the Law and Justice Party in both presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015 as well as its pessimist stance towards effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership project, the question arises whether Poland's voice still matters in the future of the EaP and whether it sees itself as the moving force of the project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers an overview of the position of the Visegrad Group in the history of Central- Eastern Europe. The Group emerged in the 14th Century as a coalition of three medieval kingdoms: Poland, Bohemia and Hungary. Towards the end of the century, Poland favoured an alliance with Lithuania, motivated by the conflict of both states with the Teutonic Order. The shift involved a personal union under the Jagiellonian dynasty, which in the course of time evolved into an actual union (the Union of Lublin, 1569) creating the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów). Nationalist ideology, which emerged after the partitions of the Commonwealth towards the end of the 18th Century, resulted in the disintegration of entire Central-Eastern Europe into nation states formed on the basis of ethnic differences. The present study have aimed to verify the potential of the cultural contribution of the Visegrad Group and the Eastern Alliance for the development of European integration processes. The influence of these groups of countries in the external environment in the development of European civilization has been presented in terms of historiosophical. Today, the former medieval partners are members of the European Union, where they revive the Visegrad Group in order to pursue their narrow interests, thus affecting the progress of European integration. Unlike the Visegrad Group there is Easter Alliance perceived as a bloc of countries with a potential for introducing progressive ideas for a constructive development of the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Transformations in Business & Economics is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Intellectual Economics is the property of Intellectual Economics / Mykolas Romeris University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Visegrad inter-state cooperation among the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia has faced numerous near-death experiences since its official birth in 1991. Furthermore, it has faced two challenges since the four member-countries' accession to the EU in 2004. Then Visegrad was eulogized, considered deceased by many precisely for having achieved the apparently ultimate aim of EU membership. Second, having purposefully stated rumours of its death, Visegrad has since 2008 been confronted by issues from outside and ones well beyond its size - the Obama presidency and its apparent abandonment of Central and Eastern Europe in its "reset" strategy towards Moscow; a post-Lisbon EU agenda; strategic reorientations in NATO; and both the general, that is, global, financial crisis and particularly within the EU and regarding the Euro. This article, by contrast, contends that the fundamental changes and challenges that Visegrad has faced enhanced the Group's clear and successful strategy. It identifies and elaborates that strategy, drawing also selectively and thematically on the Group's historical experience since 1991. These strategies include targeted rather than broad selection of aims; retaining an exclusive membership while also inventing variable and flexible mechanisms for adding non-member countries to help them pursue specific initiatives. Through a study of annual Group Presidency agendas and reports, high-level and ministerial meeting declarations and media and secondary source analysis and interviews with National Coordinators, the article con- tends that the Group continues to promote realistic aims, and provides a unique platform for exercising them. This study concludes that Visegrad, despite the outside challenges remains effective in raising awareness, advancing smaller-scale policies and influencing EU policy towards the Western Balkans and European Partnership (EaP) countries, as well as achieving specific Visegrad initiatives with those states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since its accession to the European Union, Poland had a reputation of a troublemaker country, that still harbored historical resentments. However in recent years, Poland, confident in its economic growth, has deployed a more pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, not only becoming an Eastern leader to its neighbor but a fully regional power, with wide geopolitical goals and ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the main principles that underpin Polish foreign policy towards its Eastern neighbours, focusing on the attributes of Poland's latest contribution to the European Union's (EU) policies - the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The article argues that the main attributes of the EaP are not only the outcome of Polish security concerns, but are also deeply rooted in Polish national identity. After years of communist rule, Polish national identity has been in a process of reconstruction, not only through the "return to Europe", but also through the re-establishment of closer bonds with its Eastern neighbours. At the same time, the Eastern Partnership provides the means for Poland to redefine its role in the political landscape of the EU and to infiltrate its national identity and ideals into the EU's political reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the link between the adaptation of national executives and diplomats to the EU and the capacity of a state to influence EU foreign policy outcomes. It argues that, in the case of Poland, the politicization of the domestic administrative structures before 2004 constrained the ability of the state to impact on the EU's external agenda after the enlargement. It also claims that a rapid adaptation to the EU occurred only after the Polish accession to the EU, as the will to influence the EU's policy towards Eastern Europe was a main driver for changes in the national diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]