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Social partners (trade unions and employers' associations [EA]) and their representativeness can shape labour institutions and economic and social outcomes in many countries. In this paper, we argue that, when examining social partners' representativeness, it is important to consider both affiliation rates and dissimilarity measures. The latter concerns the extent to which affiliated and non‐affiliated firms or workers are distributed similarly across relevant dimensions, including firm size. In our analysis of the European Company Survey, we find that affiliation density and dissimilarity measures correlate positively across countries, particularly in the case of EA in which we focus. This result also holds across EA when we use more detailed, firm population data for Portugal. We conclude that higher affiliation densities do not necessarily correspond to more representative social partners as they can involve greater dissimilarity between affiliated and non‐affiliated firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many countries, jobseekers are entitled to unemployment benefits (UBs) only if they have previously worked a minimum period of time. This institutional feature creates a sharp change in the disutility from unemployment at UB eligibility and may distort the duration of jobs. In this paper, we evaluate this eligibility effect using a regression discontinuity approach. Our evidence is based on longitudinal social security data from Portugal, where jobseekers are required to work a relatively long period to collect UBs. We find that monthly transitions from employment to unemployment increase by 10% as soon as the eligibility condition is met. This result is driven entirely by transitions to subsidised unemployment, which increase by 20%, as non-subsidised unemployment is not affected. The effects are even larger for the unemployed with high UB replacement ratios or those who meet the eligibility condition from multiple short employment spells. These transitions deserve greater attention from UB agencies and public employment services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many governments extend the coverage of collective agreements to workers and employers that were not involved in their bargaining. These extensions may address co‐ordination issues but may also distort competition by imposing sector‐specific minimum wages and other work conditions that are not suitable for some firms and workers. In this article, we analyse the impact of such extensions along several economic margins. Drawing on the worker‐ and firm‐level monthly data for Portugal, a country where extensions have been widespread, and the scattered timing of the extensions, we find that, while continuing workers experience wage increases following an extension, formal employment in the relevant sectors falls, on average, by 2 per cent. These results increase by about 25 per cent across small firms and are driven by reduced hirings. In contrast, the employment and wage bills of independent contractors, who are not subject to labour law or collective bargaining, increase by over 1 per cent following an extension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many countries, collective bargaining coverage is enhanced by government-issued extensions that widen the reach of collective agreements beyond their signatory parties to all firms and workers in the sector. This paper analyzes the causal impact of extensions using a natural experiment in Portugal that resulted in a sharp and unanticipated decline in the extension probability of agreements. Our results, based on a regression discontinuity design, indicate that extensions had a negative impact on employment growth. This effect is concentrated among nonaffiliated firms, which may reflect the limited representativeness of employer associations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the debate on the labor-market consequences of globalization, we adopt an original approach toward the identification of the wage differences between foreign and domestic firms: worker mobility. Using matched employer-employee panel data for Portugal, we consider virtually all spells of interfirm mobility over a period of 10 yr. We find that foreign firms offer significantly more generous wage policies, although there is also a (smaller) selection effect. The results are robust to the consideration of displaced workers, wage growth differences in the new firms, and different subsets of workers. ( JEL J31, J63, F23) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do workers benefit from the education of their co-workers? We examine this question first by introducing a model of learning, which argues that educated workers may transfer part of their general skills to uneducated workers, and then by examining detailed matched employer–employee panel data from Portugal. We find evidence of large firm-level social returns (between 14% and 23%), much larger than standard estimates of private returns, and of significant returns accruing to less educated workers but not to their more educated colleagues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents evidence about the effects of dismissals-for-cause requirements, a specific component of employment protection legislation that has received little attention. I study a quasi-experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal: out of the 12 paragraphs in the law that dictated the costly procedure required for dismissals for cause, eight did not apply to small firms. Using matched employer-employee longitudinal data and difference-in-differences methods, I examine the impact of that differentiated change in firing costs upon several variables. The results do not indicate robust effects on job or worker flows, although some estimates suggest an increase in hirings. However, firms that gain flexibility in their dismissals exhibit sizable increases in their relative performance. This finding suggests that reducing firing costs of the type studied here increases workers' effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose -- The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of a causal nature about the relationship between wages and churning ("excessive" worker turnover). Design/methodology/approach -- Matched employer-employee panel data from Portugal, covering the period 1986-2000 are used in the study. Econometric methods are also used, including random effects tobit models, fixed effects and instrumental variables. Findings -- Unlike in previous research (which typically does not consider causal relationships), the paper presents evidence that wages do not necessarily decrease the amount of churning. If employers are forced to increase pay, they may respond by hiring different workers. Detailed evidence about the nature of job and worker flows and churning levels across industries is presented. Research limitations/implications -- Future research should examine the paths of workers whose wages are affected by collective bargaining. Practical implications -- The paper provides additional evidence that effort may not be particularly sensitive to wages in some industries/occupations. The should be a better understanding of role of wages in personnel policies. Originality/value -- This paper is probably the first that seeks to examine the causal relationship between wages and churning. The results will be of interest to labour economists and human resource management experts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents evidence that real wage cyclicality can be a particularly heterogeneous parameter, depending on different worker characteristics and also on the specific stage of the business cycle. Using matched employer–employee panel data for Portugal covering the period 1986–2004, real wages are shown to be considerably more procyclical during recessions than during expansions, resulting in relatively moderate overall levels of cyclicality (about −0.6). However, most of the procyclicality during downturns is shown to be driven by the younger employees, as older workers appear to be insulated from the business cycle. Moreover, movers between firms typically display higher cyclicality than workers that stay in the same firm, regardless of whether the latter move or not between job levels. Most results also hold when considering basic wages instead of total wages, except that the procyclicality of movers during downturns is substantially higher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]