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The alleged lower standard of the rights of the accused under the Rome Statute compared to those guaranteed by the US Constitution was one of the most important areas of criticism of the Rome Statute by American scholars. This criticism was made in the early 2000s and was based on the text of the Rome Statute alone, before any ICC jurisprudence existed. This article draws on the 20 years of operation of the ICC to ascertain whether the judicial interpretation and application of the procedural rights of the defendant, guaranteed under the Rome Statute, have made them more compatible with their counterparts under the US Constitution. The premise of this article is that the 20 years of interpretation and application of those rights may have strengthened them to the point where the gap between the procedural guarantees under the Rome Statute and the US Constitution has become negligible. This, in turn, would make the early criticism of the ICC system obsolete, at least insofar as the legal argument is concerned. Accordingly, this paper examines existing jurisprudence of the ICC in the areas of prosecutorial disclosure obligations, admission of evidence and the examination of witnesses. This is for several reasons: firstly, the selected three rights were among those criticised by American scholars in the early 2000s as falling short of what was required under the US Constitution; secondly, unlike some other criticised rights, which reflect the ICC's institutional design and, therefore, are unlikely to change in scope, the selected three are relatively vaguely phrased, thus making it possible to transform their meaning through judicial interpretation; thirdly, the selected rights have been sufficiently elaborated on by the ICC through case law so as to carry a meaning exceeding what the Rome Statute alone provides. The findings of the study indicate that inasmuch as the ICC's jurisprudence has moved some aspects of the three areas under examination towards their counterparts under the US Constitution, the procedural rights of the defendant before American courts generally remain more robust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay elaborates on Article 124 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which allows states parties to deny the Court jurisdiction over war crimes for a maximum period of seven years, upon signing the Statute. The article firstly, touches upon the provision from an historical point of view. Secondly, it addresses the reasons and effects of the two declarations invoking the article that have been made so far reflects the practical side of the provision. The body of the essay exemplifies the arguments in favour of both deletion and retention of Article 124, as proposed by states parties of the International Criminal Court and NGOs. It argues that states parties should decide to remove the provision from the Statute, due to its discrepancy with the preamble of the Statute, the concessive conjunction of its existence and its relative lack of use. The essay concludes with addressing the remaining procedural constraints of deletion of the provision, seeking to clarify the future consequences such a deletion might entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]