Search

The article looks at the disappearance of Libyan SA-24 man-portable air defense systems (Manpads), manufactured in Russia, and the arrest of a Chinese national who Russian investigators say was trying to buy information on the Russian SA-20 heavy anti-aircraft system. U.S. officials question how many SA-24s and other Manpads were in Libya and U.S. Army Africa Command chief Carter Ham says that intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft will be used to find missing weapons.

The article reports on Sukhoi's T-50, a stealthy fifth-generation Russian fighter to rival the U.S. F-22. The fighter's first flight was conducted on January 29, 2010 from the KnAAPO facility in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The fighter shows resemblances to the F-22 Raptor, but retains its Su-27 features. Despite the stealth-related features of the fighter, Western analysts question whether Sukhoi can develop and deliver the aircraft by 2015 as promised.

The article reports on the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to develop and field next-generation nonkinetic, or limited effects in response to the evolution of cyber-warfare. According to information-technology officials, attack capabilities are receiving attention and funding because of the persistent threat posed by Russian and Chinese cyberterrorists. Information is also presented on the Suter series of electronic attack experiments at Nellis AFB.

The article explores Georgia's relative success against the Russian air force and the failure of Syria's Russian-made air defenses against the Israeli air force. U.S. analysts suggest that the simplicity of the Georgian air defenses, with far less dependence on networking, made it tougher to knock out or blind major parts of the system. The exploitability of Russian-designed and -built defenses was demonstrated in 2007 when the Israeli air force totally shut down Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site.

The article offers information on Russia's F-117s. The Russians bought their F-117 stealth fighter in pieces from the Serbs after it was shot down during the Kosovo conflict. At the time of the aircraft's loss, U.S. Navy and Air Force operators said single F-117s had been flying the same route out of Serbian territory every night.

This article looks at implication of the technical success of the U.S. intercept of a satellite. However, following this success, the U.S. Congress has launched its own warning against any further anti-satellite efforts. On the other hand, Russian officials condemned the mission as a poorly disguised test of an anti-satellite capability for use against other countries for military, political and, possibly, financial gain.

Focuses on the Russian-made surface-to-air missiles that are hard to track and target electronically by U.S. aircraft. Features of the communication method used by the weapons; Major tool for understanding the working of the system; Need for precision targeting.

The article discusses the 2011 Libyan Conflict and Russia's sale of SA-24 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to Libya. The missiles are described, noting their sophistication, countermeasures resistance, performance, and lethality. Libya's use of the SA-24s influenced a U.S. decision to use EA-18G Growler airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft over Libya.

The article deals with the issue of the effectiveness of radars and stealth aircraft. It cites the development of a new generation of stealth that will be seen in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the U.S. Navy's new Unmanned Combat Air System. It discusses the development of the active electronically scanned array radars by the U.S., French, British and Russian governments.