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The article discusses the highlights of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Advanced Research Workshop held in Moscow, Russia from October 25-25, 2005. Participants examined nuclear security culture from a variety of angles. Among the issues discussed at the meetings were organizational culture, the relationship between security and safety at nuclear installations, and motives and incentives that promote security culture.

The article presents two case studies that were developed to illustrate the point that a group of unscrupulous employees including managers and lower ranking operators, acting in collusion, can effectively divert and steal valuable materials at their workplace despite security and anti-theft precautions. It shows that a good security culture could have prevented such acts. One case describes the criminal operation at nuclear weapons facility Elektrokhimpribor and another at a gold refining plant, both in Russia.

The article presents a training curriculum for top managers of nuclear industries in Russia intended to reinforce their assumption of vulnerability as a prerequisite for introducing a healthy security culture as well as to provide the state-of-the-art managerial tools necessary to implement this culture in practical terms. The applicability of each module depends on the mission of the specific facility, the prevailing risk assessment and time allotted for training.

Over the past several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of “nuclear security culture” so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. A 2001 IAEA report titled “Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities” identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security. In February 2005, at their summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster nuclear security, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems. In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. Since that time, IAEA member states worked on a concept, definition and guidelines for developing and implementing a robust security culture at nuclear facilities worldwide. The Nato Advanced Research Workshop “Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards,” which gathered in Moscow in the fall of 2005, brought together almost 100 experts from over 30 countries to discuss these issues and present their views with the hope to contribute to the IAEA's work and facilitate better nuclear security culture worldwide. During the two-day workshop the participants examined several analytical questions: 1. What properties of nuclear security culture are universally applicable across national and cultural boundaries? How can these properties be communicated to representatives from a wide variety of regional and national traditions? 2. How does nuclear security culture fit into a nation's overall professional culture? How can improvements to security culture be made to improve an organization's overall performance? How can leaders be persuaded to “buy into” security culture? 3. What differences and similarities are there between the following regions with regard to security culture: (a) the United States, the European Union, and Japan; (b) Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Central Europe; (c) China and East Asia; (d) South Asia; and (e) Latin America? What national variations are there? 4. How can various interested parties – nuclear managers, governments, international institutions – use the similarities among national and regional professional cultures to raise overall standards of security culture? How can they work around differences in national and regional culture? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the joint statement on national security cooperation by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin dated February 24, 2005. The Presidents announce their intention to expand and deepen cooperation on nuclear security and emergency response capability to deal with the consequences of a nuclear/radiological incident. They promise to work together to ensure the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540 and early adoption of an International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism.