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An interview with Stanford University professor emeritus and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies senior fellow William Perry is presented. Topics discussed include the potential withdrawal of Russia from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty due to its development of nuclear delivery systems, recommended steps for the U.S. government in enhancing the global moratorium against nuclear testing, and the alleged breach by Russia on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The article reports that the issue of chemical weapons use in Syria caused disagreement among participants at the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conference in The Hague, Netherlands from April 8 to 19, 2013. United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that a UN investigation will be launched on the alleged use of chemical weapons by rebels. Russia had reservations about the investigation. Also mentioned is the failure to reach consensus on the use of incapacitants.

The article reports on the debate among members of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) over the distribution of inspections, at the meeting in The Hague held on November 29 to December 3, 2010. Delegates argued over the number of inspections for different inspection categories, particularly for other chemical production facilities. Member states also reached a compromise for the 2011 budget for the CWC. Another issue that was debated was the CWC's 2012 deadline for Russia and the U.S. to complete the destruction of their stockpiles of chemical weapons.

The article reports on the signing of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) by the government of Russia and the U.S. The agreement calls for a switch to fast-neutron reactors, and that the protocol caps total U.S. funding for the effort at the 400 million U.S. dollars that was previously pledged by the U.S. The protocol allocated 300 million U.S. dollars from the total budget for development and construction activities and it also aims to achieve a disposition rate of no less than 1.3 metric tons per year of disposition plutonium.

The article focuses on the request of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama to increase the funding for the programs designed to strengthen the nuclear material and security in Russia. It states that the increase in funding intends to secure the warheads and weapons-usable material possessed by the Russian navy and Strategic Rocket Forces, and to strengthen the safeguards system. Moreover, the budget request also aims to build a mixed-oxide (MOX) fabrication plant in South Carolina.

The article focuses on a statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov regarding Russia's plan on not to attend the nuclear security summit meeting in 2016. Topics include Russia's questioning on the need for the meeting as political commitments by the participants have been implemented, criticizing the creation of working groups aimed at devising guidelines for international bodies, and the social crisis in Ukraine.

The article reports on the frustration over the pace of Syria's removal of chemical weapons materials for overseas destruction. Syrian authorities are said to be in negotiations with some countries on a revised timetable for the removal effort. The U.S. government thinks that the Syrians are more than capable of moving the chemicals to Latakia in Syria on a shorter timetable. Syria and Russia have argued that the civil war in Syria is a main cause of the holdup in shipping out the chemicals.

The article reports that a U.S. official foresees that the conclusion of verification arrangements between Russia and the U.S. for the agreement on weapons disposition of surplus plutonium, could take place in December 2012. In 2011, the two countries agreed that each side commits itself to the disposition of about 34 metric tons of plutonium from their weapons stockpile. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will reportedly carry out the monitoring and inspections.

The article reports that Chemical Weapons Convention parties have approved a document reaffirming the importance of the treaty's deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. Despite the support, convention parties did not say whether countries that fail to meet the April 2012 deadline will be punished under the terms of the pact. Russia and the U.S., two of the countries that have the largest chemical stockpiles, have admitted that they will not be able to meet the deadline.

The article reports on the decision of U.S. President Barack Obama to resubmit a U.S.-Russian civil nuclear pact that revived questions over the nuclear and missile-related assistance provided by Russia to Iran. It is noted that Russia has been known to have supported Iran build its missile development programs. The arguments raised by supporters and opponents of the resubmittal of the agreements are also examined.

The article reports on the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors to Russia's low-enriched uranium (LEU) plan. It aims to provide countries an alternative to uranium-enrichment programs by supplying fuel at the market price. It mentions that Mohamed ElBaradei, former director-general of IAEA, and President Barack Obama supported the proposal. The IAEA board states that LEU will only serve as a back-up solution when there is problem in the fuel market.

The article focuses on the report of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the proposed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia. According to GAO, the pact is flawed and should be improved through interagency coordination and written procedures. The report was made from the request of Representatives John Dingell and Bart Stupak in May 2008 regarding the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement.

The article discusses the U.S. Energy Department's review of its activities involving Russia after Russia's actions against Ukraine. Topics include the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) implementation of its responsibilities in nuclear security and nonproliferation work in Russia, the Russian government's actions wherein it is possibly taking control of certain parts of Ukraine and the assurance of the U.S. government that nuclear security cooperation is still ongoing.

The article focuses on the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles to be completed on April 29, 2012 as set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is expected that Russia and the U.S. will not be able to eliminate the weapons by that date. The ambassadors to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) stress that these countries need to reassure that they will abolish their stockpiles in a safe and timely way.

The article reports on an announcement by the U.S. Department of Energy's National Security Administration (NNSA) regarding the shipment of more than 450 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuel from Poland to Russia.

The article reports on the decision of the U.S. government to increase the aid it grants to Russia in destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons. It highlights the help by the U.S. to Russia's Shchuchýe chemical weapons destruction facility, and how this move comes in contrast to the policy of expenditure caps set by the former U.S. President George W. Bush. It also details how the increase in aid was made in response to the request made by the Russian government to help it meet the guidelines set on it by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The article reports that Russia will not meet with the Chemical Weapons Convention's April 2012 deadline to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons. Rogelio Pfirter, director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), reveals that Russia has estimated that they would complete the destruction by 2015. Paul Walker, director of security and sustainability at Global Green USA, states that Russia is putting safety and cautiousness ahead of speed and deadlines.