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We analyze a range of future scenarios for Russia related to the Ukraine War. Although regime change is a publicly-stated objective for several leaders of NATO countries, we find very little prospect for it. The Russian economy has largely evaded the effects of the sanctions. Despite enormous casualties and incompetence in the management of the war, both Putin and the war remain popular with the Russian public. Contrary to most analysis to date, the Wagner Group mutiny of June 2023 is not an indication of Putin’s weakness, but his strength. The coercive mechanisms of the Russian state remain intact. Indeed, they have grown stronger. Finally, there is little to no prospect for the emergence of a significant antiwar movement. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Putin is likely to remain in power. Western leaders should begin to grapple with this unpleasant reality and its policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to clarifying the relationship between the Cossacks and foreign soldiers in the military campaigns of False Dmitry I and False Dmitry II during the Time of Troubles in Russia in the early 17th century. Foreign mercenaries made up the bulk of False Dmitry I's army at the beginning of the invasion of Russia. The Ukrainian Cossacks were hired by Jerzy Mniszech; they supposedly played a supporting role. Jerzy Mniszech and the impostor's mercenaries departed from Russia after an unsuccessful siege of Novgorod-Seversky fortress; later their army was reinforced by twelve thousand military personnel mainly consisting of the Zaporozhian and other rebellious serving Cossacks. The Don army swore allegiance to the impostor after the mutiny near Kromy during the triumphal march on Moscow. At that time, foreign soldiers acted as the impostor's guard; however, they did not play a major role in the Uprising of Bolotnikov. The main driving force was the part of the service class that showed up. Free Cossack troops -- the Don, Zaporozhye, Yaitsky and most of the Tersk -- did not take part in the Uprising of Bolotnikov. The foreign army appeared under the banners of the "miraculously saved Tsar Dmitry" immediately after False Dimitri II was proclaimed Tsar. In the spring of 1608, Prince Roman Rozhinsky's foreign soldiers seized the leadership of the rebel movement and used the Bolotnikov Cossacks to suppress popular uprisings in the Zamoskovye and Pomeranian cities. After the invasion of King Sigismund III Vasa's troops and the subsequent collapse of the Tushino camp, tensions between the mercenaries and the Cossacks escalated into open clashes. The small foreign army formed in the imposter's Kaluga camp clearly played a subordinate role, and after the death of False Dmitry II they finally left the scene. By the summer of 1611, the foreign soldiers who had returned to the service of the king and the Russian Cossacks who had been actively involved in the Zemstvo militia had finally become irreconcilable enemies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A reprint of the article "Solzhenitsyn and the February 1917 Revolution" by Viktor Maslov, which appeared in Issue 3, 2008 of the "In Defense of Science" journal is presented. It explores the Revolution of February 1917 in Russia which centered in Petrograd that involved armed clashes and mass demonstrations. It also tackles the need for scientists to study the statistics of mutinies and rebellions to be able to advance historical processes' mathematical modeling.

The present article describe a hard life peoples, who lived in a labour camp in USSR (Kengir). They must work almost all day in high temperature (camp was in Asia), they often were thirsty and hungry. In 1954, as a results of cases baseless, solder’s attacks on “political” prisoners, part of them started a mutiny. Interested, that in this spontaneously action, to participated a group of criminal prison’s too (400-th persons), although they don’t like a zheks. Unfortunately, detachment of soviet army to stamp a revolt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A biography of Russian naval officer and revolutionary Peter Petrovich Schmidt is presented, with emphasis given to his role in a large 1905 naval insurrection in Sevastopol, Ukraine. Despite his involvement in the mutiny, the author also explains Schmidt's hope for a peaceful transition to democracy in Russia. He held a childhood love of Russian literature and studied political economy. His experiences during the Russo-Japanese War are also explained.

Six weeks after the Armistice was signed in 1918, a contingent of Canadian soldiers mobilized for battle in a new theatre of war - Siberia. The day of their departure, 21 December 1918, Quebecois conscripts in the 259th Battalion of the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force mutinied in Victoria, BC. Latent discontent was translated into collective resistance in an encounter with the radical section of British Columbia's working class. National and class cleavages converged, revealing deep tensions in Canadian society. The historical antagonism between French and English combined with the socialist tradition of British Columbia's labour movement. The Siberian Expedition provides a compelling window into military and working-class history, and also the social history of Canada and Quebec. Decades before the Cold War, geopolitical patterns were being forged in the unlikely setting of the Russian Far East, and Victoria emerged as a battleground in this conflict. Motivated by diverse aims - military, diplomatic, economic, ideological - Canada and its allies fought on behalf of White forces in the Russian Civil War. Angered by conscription and profiteering, British Columbia's labour movement aligned itself with the Russian revolution and launched a vigorous campaign against Allied intervention. In December 1918, this clash of social forces erupted into mutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Red Navy did not operate in isolation from the world during the first years of the Soviet experiment, direct contacts in the manner of the Red Army did not occur. The Red Navy's role was limited, and thus its foreign contacts were also limited. One thing which the archival evidence makes clear is that the mutiny at Kronstadt seemed to have no impact on the Navy's Foreign Department's activities; there was no suspicion of "foreign" agitation during this episode. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This case study is concerned with discussing the dual nature of military power, the material and the moral; and it shows how moral power in fact played a decisive role in the February revolution in Russia in 1917. There are four parts to the argument. Firstly, the introduction, where the problems addressed in the paper as well as its theoretical framework are outlined. The second part is a brief account of events during the first four days of the February revolution, and an extended treatment of the soldiers' mutiny on the fifth day; in addition the strength of the soldiers' solidarity is compared with that of the workers' solidarity. In the third part existing explanations for the mutiny are examined and critically assessed, and an alternative explanation is developed. Finally the relevance of the study for some wider theoretical issues is briefly discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]