Search

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Relying on Russian chronicle sources of the fifteenth century, this paper argues that beginning with Vasilii II in 1432, the grand principality of Moscow mirrored the political structure of its overlords, the Golden Horde. The most recent work by Mongolists and Turkologists on ruling traditions and state structures of the Mongol khanates show that the successor states to the Chingisid empire were ruled not by an autocratic khan but by a council of four qarachi beys, heads of the four leading clans. The selection of the teenager, Vasilii II, as grand prince of Moscow in 1432 was a decision made by a coalition of three of the four qarachi beys in order to weaken a rival bey, and simultaneously also weakened the rulership of the grand prince of Moscow by increasing the power of the boyar and princely clans surrounding him. However, the political model the princely clans-plus-grand prince was effective and flexible and later facilitated the rise of Moscow over its former rivals and overlords. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies is the property of International Strategic Research Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Russian economic reformers of the early 1990s believed that integration with the global economy would facilitate the construction of a market economy and the reconstruction of the Russian state by helping to break down economic interests inherited from the USSR. However, the global economy did not act as an agent of transformation in Russia. Russia's reintegration with the global economy became narrowly focused on the sale of treasury bills to finance the budget deficit as attempts to stabilize state finances in 1996-7 made Russian financial markets attractive to foreign investors. There was, however, no underlying change in the government's economic fortunes and attempts at stabilizing state finances engendered political conflict. As a result, Russia was exposed to changes in world markets and the rouble collapsed in August 1998. The devastation of the Russian economy as a consequence of these developments means that the Russian state is the only force that can lead reform. However, it is in such a weak position that its ability to act as an agent of change is doubtful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]