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If Person A delivers drugs to Person B at the latter's request, Person A is liable for drug trafficking-a serious offense in many jurisdictions. However, the liability of Person B for drug trafficking is unclear as much may depend on Person B's intention with the drugs. The Singaporean Courts recently had to grapple with this issue in Liew Zheng Yang v. Public Prosecutor and Ali bin Mohamad Bahashwan v. Public Prosecutor and other appeals. Prior to these two cases, the position in Singapore was clear-Person B should be liable for drug trafficking as an accessory to Person A, in line with Singapore's strong stance against drug offenses. However, since these cases, the Singaporean Courts have taken a contrary position and held that Person B may not be liable if the drugs were for his/her own consumption. This Article examines the law with respect to this drug conspiracy offense in Singapore, looking at its history, the primary legislation and similar cases. It also scrutinizes the judicial reasoning in the two cases above and considers whether this can be reconciled with the Courts' prior position on the issue. In this analysis, the Article also investigates the position taken in other comparable common law jurisdictions-including the UK, Australia, Canada and the United States-and concludes that the Singaporean Courts' reasoning in the aforementioned two cases may not be tenable and warrant a reexamination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, Singapore amended its Misuse of Drugs to give courts hearing capital drug trafficking cases the discretion to replace the default death penalty with life imprisonment and caning, provided that the accused person can show that he was merely a drug courier and the prosecution certifies that he had substantively assisted the authorities in disrupting drug trafficking activities. The Singapore High Court and Court of Appeal have since made important pronouncements on the 2012 amendments, but several challenges remain: first, whether the privilege against self-incrimination has been further eroded; secondly, whether an accused person can invoke the statutory relief of being a courier only at sentencing; thirdly, whether it is appropriate to leave the certification decision solely to the prosecution; and finally, whether guidelines as to when the death sentence is appropriate should have been prescribed. These challenges ought to be given serious legislative or judicial consideration as the criminal justice system in Singapore continues to evolve in response to changing public perceptions of due process and crime control. The first three challenges, in particular, may have important ramifications for potentially innocent accused persons as it is submitted that the law as it stands may incentivise some of them to plead guilty from the outset to maximise their chances of avoiding the death penalty. As there are still a number of jurisdictions that retain the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking offences, this article may also be of comparative interest, especially since there appears to be a dearth of literature on the discretionary death penalty for drug offences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case Public Prosecutor v. Mas Swan bin Abnan and another, wherein Malaysians Mas Swan and the other named Roshamima were arrested and charged under section (s.) 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act in Singapore. The court examined the Evidence Act that permits the admission of a similar fact evidence to prove the state of mind of the accused. The court reviewed the previous circumstances similar to that of the case and issued judgment based on similar fact evidence.

In this article the author offers view on a court case in Singapore wherein the defendant was sentenced to death after being convicted for trafficking 47.27 grams of diamorphine into the country. The author presents an argument that the unanimous judgement of the Court of Appeal of Singapore is an attempt to protect the Constitution from its colonial history. He notes that the defendant never argued that the right to life under the Constitution's art 9(1) forbids the capital punishment.