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This article identifies the salient lessons from three specific periods-the Graeco-Roman, Atlantic piracy and its extension into the Indian Ocean during the early Seventeenth Century, and piracy off China during the Ch'ing dynasty--that can most usefully inform the counter-piracy effort off Somalia. It makes the point that piracy's sinuous character has always given rise to conceptual and definitional difficulties; but that while law has had an important voice in piracy matters since Roman times it has never been the only voice. It suggests that modem pirate hunters, by treating piracy as akin to a domestic criminal activity, have shackled the effectiveness of violent suppression which their historical predecessors found so useful, while at the same time undervaluing the fundamental roles of politics and economics in piracy formation and the continuous struggle to make the seas safe for legitimate commerce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the navies operating to suppress piracy off Somalia are operating in what is effectively a policy vacuum. So long as that vacuum persists, piracy may be restricted but not eliminated. The financial cost of the naval presence far outweighs what it costs the pirate gangs to mount attacks. There is no shortage of young Somali men willing to risk their lives at sea for what for them are vast rewards. The United States Navy is the final guarantor of global maritime security. Allowing the pirates to continue will diminish that guarantee. The effect will be to encourage, or force, other nations to strengthen their navies, which could challenge the U.S. Navy's position across a broader range of capabilities than merely those of maritime security. The price is too high to pay. Pirate success is predicated on cooperation with Somali clan structure and clan elders. It will begin to be eradicated once the United States and its international partners are prepared to work through the same channels. The acceptance of this lesson, albeit tentative, needs to be encouraged within the United States. America's partners need to accept that lesson also. All international parties need to recognize that the naval effort will work only in conjunction with a policy that strikes a hardheaded bargain with political forces within Somalia that trade political legitimacy and economic assistance for clear progress toward political stability, reduced corruption, and piracy elimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the problem of piracy in Somalia which is reportedly increasing with maritime hijackings. It mentions that cooperation among nearby states is needed specifically between Eritrea and Ethiopia to save Somalia from pirates. Organizations such as the Arab League and the African Union are more interested in political problems there than piracy. The United Nation's Security council has passed many resolutions in which it authorizes states to take necessary measures to curb it.

The article reports that the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved Resolution 1816, permitting mandated countries to enter Somali waters for the purpose of combating piracy. This resolution seems to represent a major advance in international efforts to provide the maritime security that Somalia itself cannot. Nevertheless, logistical and legal considerations are likely to limit the effectiveness of international operations, and a major improvement in maritime security is unlikely.