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In this article, we offer an analysis of point-source water pollution governance in the European agri-food sector. Specifically, we tackle the case study of the wine industry in Aragon (Spain) through the lenses of the networks of action situations approach. We unveil key strategic decisions of wine producers in relation to compliance with water discharge regulations and explore the feasibility and effectiveness of potential solutions. According to our quantitative and qualitative analyses, the problem of peak load discharges in the sector can be explained by the strategic behavior of wine producers in the context of enforcement deficits, as well as by particularities of the wine production process, and controversies around the construction and management of public treatment plants. Coordination among wine producers and public treatment plant managers to invest in in-house treatment infrastructure or to smooth discharges out so they fit the capacity of treatment plants would be a promising solution; however, economic incentives and tightened enforcement of discharge regulations would also be necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coordination in the public sector among interdependent policies is considered crucial for their effectiveness. However, while coordination has been studied for decades, conceptual approaches to understand the functional and temporal dimensions of policy coordination are lacking. This paper attempts to address these gaps by integrating governance functions and action situations into the analysis of the policy cycle, thereby introducing the notion of holistic coordination. We argue that this approach is useful to get a more differentiated understanding of where and why coordination across the policy cycle breaks down, and to capture the political economy of policy-making. Empirically, we undertake an illustrative case study of the European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) implementation in the Guadalquivir river basin, Spain, focusing on measures to reduce agricultural water consumption. We find that the failure to reach agreed policy objectives of reduction of water consumption can be traced back to the way governance functions were addressed and coordinated within action situations and across the overall policy cycle. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the lack of holistic coordination can be seen as an outcome of deliberate decisions by public actors involved in the policy, taken already at the beginning of the policy cycle. Thereby, expected benefits that agricultural water users associated with the policy have been deliberately increased, while their related expected costs have been decreased. Ultimately, this made the policy objective to reduce agricultural water consumption less credible and the policy more acceptable to water users and a powerful agricultural lobby. • Analysis of coordination of governance functions across the policy cycle. • Exploring holistic coordination to understand temporal and functional dimensions of policy coordination. • Approach uncovers coordination failures and the political economy of policy-making. • Illustrative case study of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) implementation in the Guadalquivir river basin, Spain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conditions that contribute to institutional robustness of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) regimes are well understood; however, there is much less systematic evidence regarding whether and how CBNRM regimes adapt to changing environments. We address this question by exploring drought adaptation of 37 irrigation associations in northern Spain. For this purpose, we adopt the distinction between "generic" and "specific adaptation institutions" and explore whether and how these institutions combine across different types of irrigation systems. We obtained data from a survey delivered to the 37 associations, governmental records, and interviews with representatives of the associations and public officials. We then used hierarchical cluster analysis to classify the irrigation systems into types, followed by qualitative comparative analysis to explore associations between the adaptation institutions and drought adaptation across the types of systems. According our results, CBNRM regimes adapt to droughts through different combinations of institutions (i.e., different paths to drought adaptation). However, specific adaptation institutions such as water transfers are more relevant during droughts (i.e., to allocate scarcity), whereas generic adaptation institutions such as monitoring and collective choice arrangements play a role both during and in the aftermath of droughts (i.e., to build compliance with and redesign specific adaptation institutions). Also, we did not find an alignment between the two types of institutions and types of irrigation system; however, one type of system (i.e., the "Asian" type) shows a larger number of drought adaptation paths than the other (i.e., the "American" type). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Government policy shall address the strategic nature of local resource use decisions. • Local resource users face linked coordination, prisoner's dilemma, and zero-sum/externality situations. • Governments shape the behavior of local resource users via bundles of policy instruments. • Policy instruments contribute to local collective action via a handful of mechanisms. This paper presents a diagnostic approach to the role and capacity of governments to facilitate local collective action and alleviate environmental problems. The paper adds to a nascent scholarship aiming to conciliate theories on "governance by government" and "governance by self-organization". We adopt two premises for that purpose: (1) policy instruments shall be tailored to the strategic nature of local resource management decisions; and (2) such nature is not static and can be modified via governmental policies. We first build on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to characterize the decision-making situations that local resource users face and the local rules that shape said situations. Then, based on common pool resource (CPR) and policy instrument choice theory, we identify four mechanisms through which different policy instruments can facilitate local collective action (change in payoffs and their perception, reduction of transaction costs, reduction of uncertainty, and normative consonance). This analytical approach is then applied to four illustrative cases of water management in Germany, France, Greece and Spain. As shown, local resource users are embedded in not one but many overlapping decision-making situations. In this context, the promotion of collective action is rarely accomplished via a single policy instrument or mechanism but via bundles of them. Also, the paper illustrates the importance of understanding how governmental policies modify the structure of rules and incentives that affect local resource users, potentially facilitating local collective action and the solution of environmental problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success of a common property regime can be partially judged on the basis of its ability to handle extreme events that stress its capacity for cooperation. This paper compares the performance of 38 irrigation associations in a large irrigation area in Spain during a severe drought as a test of hypotheses derived from property right theories. The case is particularly interesting because it contains a transferable quota institution that can potentially strengthen the effectiveness of common property regimes in scarcity conditions. According to the results the use of transferable quotas across associations can contribute to cooperation and drought performance. In this context, performance is higher when the associations enjoy (1) effective monitoring systems, (2) experience and legitimate leaders, and (3) facilitative biophysical conditions like soil water holding capacity. The analysis also suggests that biophysical properties like soil water holding capacity may compensate for weaker monitoring or leadership, and vice-versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]