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This article takes a close look at how the United States used the funding of scientific research in Sweden as a hegemonic and propaganda tool in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows that non-aligned Sweden functioned just as much as a node in the international science network set up by the Americans after the Second World War as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. These funds were awarded mainly to an elite network of prominent Swedish scientists. The article sheds interesting light on the controversies of such funding in Sweden during the cold war and adds important knowledge about Swedish–American relations during the cold war. The article argues that this Swedish scientific elite co-produced US hegemony in Sweden by actively seeking out American military funding and by making use of it. It also argues that US funding was intended to portray the United States as an altruistic patron of science in the world and thus serve American propagandistic purposes as well. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article deals with the relations between perhaps Sweden's most influential publicist during the Cold War, the professor of political science and editor-in-chief of Sweden's largest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter 1946-1959, Herbert Tingsten, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a CIA-sponsored organisation gathering the elite of the world's non-communist leftist intellectuals, Congress for Cultural Freedom and its Swedish sub-branch called 'Svenska kommitten for kulturens frihet' (SKfKF). Tingsten was a professor of political science at University of Stockholm from 1935 to 1946 and then editor-in-chief of Sweden's largest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter from 1946 to 1959. It argues that parts of Tingsten's work both as an opinion maker and as a scholar was part of a symbiotic relationship with the CCF and the SKfKF. Tingsten was the foremost propagator for the 'end of ideology' thesis in Sweden and the article argues that this campaign was inspired by the CCF's advancement of this idea in the 1950s and 1960s. Tingsten was personally acquainted with several CCF intellectuals and he visited several of the CCF's conferences. The article also makes the case that Tingsten helped the CCF and the SKfKF's causes and furthered their agendas in a number of ways during his time as editor-in-chief of DN. For example, Tingsten allowed the SKfKF to use DN as a platform for presenting its ideas and programmes to a broader public. The article thus shows how the CCF network of intellectuals influenced opinion making in non-aligned Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that previous research into how Sweden came to be eligible to purchase armaments in the United States in the early Cold War has misread the historical evidence. Instead of there being a change in US policy in early 1950, as has been argued by several Cold War scholars, this article states that it was the incremental changes of Sweden's security policy that eventually made the US government view the Swedes as possible non-aligned allies in the Cold War. The difference is crucial. The Swedish adherence to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) embargo is a critical factor when trying to understand the perceived change in the US policy, because this was a confirmation of the Swedish consent to US hegemony in Western Europe. Furthermore, this article argues that, contrary to what prior research has assumed, it was never part of US policy to get Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT or NATO later). The evidence for assuming that this was ever a US policy objective is simply lacking. The article thus presents a much needed re-evaluation of US-Swedish security relations during the late 1940s and early 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the US government's efforts to curb the Swedish ball bearing producer SKF's exports to the East early in the Cold War, 1950-1952, and interprets this process within the framework of hegemony theory. In doing this, the article makes use of previously unutilised US archival material. The period up to mid-1951 saw increasing US pressure upon Sweden and SKF to consent to US hegemony by abiding by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) embargo. To achieve its objectives US policymakers developed a flexible 'carrot and stick' approach, and the article adds considerable detail regarding the US government's handling of SKF. US tolerance and flexibility was dependent upon Swedish consent to American hegemony in Western Europe, which was received through the signing of the Stockholm agreement - a hegemonic apparatus through which Sweden's abidance by the embargo was handled - in mid-June 1951. A small amount of exports was accepted by Washington as long as the main US objective - to deny the Eastern Bloc strategic technology - was adhered to by SKF. The article also reveals the lack of policy coordination in the Swedish government, and the conflicts between the government and SKF regarding the responsibility for adhering to the embargo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All through the 1950s and 1960s NATO had secretly utilized a secret flight path, called Amber Nine, over the southwestern part of Sweden. The Swedish government condoned the frequent overflights, despite the fact that Sweden was at the time professing to follow a policy of neutrality in the power struggle between the two superpowers. This article argues that the frequent American use of Amber Nine should be viewed as a materialization of Sweden's consent to US hegemony, and that Amber Nine effectively made Swedish airspace and airports a part of NATO's infrastructure. It also makes the case that the arrangement contributed to the eradication of the credibility of Sweden's policy of neutrality, and that NATO's routine use of a flight path over Sweden, a non-NATO country, warrants a reinterpretation of Sweden's role in the Cold War on NATO's northern flank, as well as challenging the definition of the NATO alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The Iberian Slug, Arion lusitanicus Mabille (Stylomatophora: Arionidae), has developed into a destructive pest in Swedish gardens and orchards over the past 10–20 years. Many attempts to eradicate this pest have been made using a variety of different methods. The aim of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of two different types of homemade traps made from simple, inexpensive materials (plastic PET bottle or an ice-cream box) compared to one type of commercially sold trap (Slugtrap® IT-PAC AB, Sweden) used with bait and beer as attractants. Experiments were carried out on a private property outside Lund, Sweden, over a period of 7 days. The results showed that a homemade trap, i.e. a box trap, can be as efficient as a commercial trap, particularly due to their similar design. In contrast, the homemade bottle trap was not very successful. Additionally, it was discovered that the bait used in the commercial traps did not increase the number of slugs trapped. It was concluded that the beer was the main slug attractant. Ultimately this study suggests a low-cost alternative for small scale to the rather expensive commercially sold traps. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Objective: The European Thyroid Imaging Reporting and Data System (EU-TIRADS) allows for selective fine needle aspiration cytology (FNAC). In 2017, EU-TIRADS was implemented as part of a nationwide standardized care bundle for thyroid cancer in Western Sweden with a population of approximately 1.7 million. The objective of this study was to investigate the clinical value of EU-TIRADS attempting to reduce the number of unnecessary FNACs in referred patients with thyroid nodules., Methods: The study cohort consisted of all patients referred to Sahlgrenska University Hospital due to a palpable, newly detected or growing thyroid nodules or a positron emission tomography-positive finding for examination with thyroid ultrasound and selective cytology between 2018 and 2022. Medical records on EU-TIRADS classification, corresponding FNAC results, and histopathologic diagnosis were retrospectively collected. Adherence to the EU-TIRADS guidelines, use of selective FNAC, and rate of malignancy in patients who underwent surgery were assessed., Results: In total, 1246 thyroid nodules in 990 patients were evaluated. The distributions of EU-TIRADS 2 to 5 (number [percentage]) for all examined nodules were 63 (5%), 462 (37%), 443 (36%), and 278 (22%), respectively. FNAC was omitted in 7% of the investigated patients. FNAC was performed in 124 nodules (10%) despite not fulfilling the EU-TIRADS criteria or absence of positron emission tomography-positive findings. The rate of malignancy was 33% and 1/50 in patients who underwent "unnecessary" FNAC., Conclusion: Implementation of EU-TIRADS in routine management of thyroid nodules led to the selective use of FNAC; however, the clinical impact was limited. This study provides real-world data on the value and magnitude of diagnostic improvement by implementing EU-TIRADS in clinical practice., Competing Interests: Disclosure The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose., (Copyright © 2024 AACE. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Purpose: The aim of this study was to analyse prescription refill, re-hospitalisation, total mortality, mortality because of suicide and attempted suicide among patients who were taking various types of antipsychotics., Methods: A population-based cohort study analysed all patients (n=26046) in Sweden who had been treated for schizophrenia from 2006 to 2009 with regard to re-hospitalisation and prescription refill for various types of antipsychotic treatment. A case-control study nested within the cohort analysed all-cause mortality, mortality because of suicide and attempted suicide in relation to antipsychotic use. The study adjusted for history of hospitalisation for psychiatric and medical care, attempted suicide and use of antidepressants., Results: Aripiprazole users were the only ones who showed significantly lower all-cause risks of death, but so few events occurred among users of this relatively new drug that the results should be interpreted with caution. Clozapine users showed lower odds of death by suicide (odds ratio [OR]=0.45 [95%CI 0.20-0.98]) and of attempted suicide (OR=0.44 [0.28-0.70]) than haloperidol users after adjustment for age, sex and year of discharge. Olanzapine users showed approximately the same favourable pattern. Patients who used clozapine were most likely to refill prescriptions and had lower rates of re-hospitalisation. Only one death and 23 cases of agranulocytosis were reported compared with 223 suicides and 831 suicide attempts. An etiologic fraction calculation suggests that the use of clozapine rather than traditional drugs could have prevented 95 suicide attempts during the period., Conclusion: Clozapine and olanzapine reduce the risk of suicide, attempted suicide and re-hospitalisation., (Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)