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The EU and its Member States have taken unprecedented collective steps to support Ukraine militarily. That has not yet translated into a stronger momentum to further cooperation between their own defence forces, however. Ideally, Member States would integrate national capabilities into large multinational formations. NATO's New Force Model could provide an extra stimulus to that end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military conflict provoked by the Russian Federation in Ukraine has created major imbalances in international security. In this fluid and unpredictable security environment, the defence industry has reacted promptly, increasing production and export of military equipment and modern weapon systems to counterbalance the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. The data analysed indicate the Russian Federation's continuing concern to make significant defence investments, including in the defence complex, which reveals its interest in continuing the military conflict in Ukraine. As for the Euro-Atlantic states, they are trying to counter the threat posed by the Russian Federation by supplying Ukraine with high-performance military equipment, while investing in their militaries to supplement the weapons supplied to Ukraine. After the outbreak of the military conflict in Ukraine, Romania has managed to increase its exports of arms and ammunition, creating favourable conditions for profitable partnerships with large companies in the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, Romania has increased its defence budget allocation to 2.5% of GDP, and there are discussions to further increase this percentage in the coming period. A substantial part of this budget allocation is earmarked for the procurement of modern military equipment to NATO standards for the Romanian armed forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's war on Ukraine has upended the European security order. Ukraine has requested EU membership, unprecedented sanctions have been imposed on Russia, European countries have shipped weapons and munitions to Ukraine and NATO has shored up its military presence. Despite such action, is it possible to speak of a transformative moment or 'Zeitenwende' for EU security and defence? This article analyses the state of EU integration in defence since the war on Ukraine. Drawing on hypotheses developed under 'new intergovernmentalism', this article analyses how EU Member State preferences in defence and intergovernmental-supranational dynamics are being shaped by the war. In particular, the article probes how supranational and intergovernmental institutions have reacted to the war and how domestic preferences have fed into recent EU defence efforts. In doing so, the article provides a preliminary assessment of the state of EU integration in defence since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece reviews the contributions of this special edition noting comments and insights into the rapidly changing politics of the Arctic. It highlights how the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a profound impact on the High North, its peoples and its security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, beginning on the 24th of February (2/24) 2022, is emerging as a consequential landmark in international order, signaling the potential beginning of an era dominated by acute geopolitical antagonism, economic ambiguity and global uncertainty. This introductory research note focuses on the political and economic dimensions of the ongoing war in Ukraine and interprets their impact on European security and international order. It initially examines post-Cold War security perceptions, which were characterised by significant European reductions in defence expenditure, and then explores the financial dynamics of the conflict that has presented the urgent need for the immediate reconsideration of defence investments and security perceptions. The latter part of this note focuses on the dilemmas arising from this high-intensity proxy war of attrition, in reality between Russia and the West. Beyond the ethical, political, and financial questions regarding the European role in the war, pivotal questions about the potential outcomes of the conflict are addressed. These include the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons to save Russian pride from embarrassing compromises, and the further escalation of the conflict, through the provision of strategic support to Moscow by Asian powers, that may consequently threaten a schism between the East and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of the research lies in the fact that for Ukraine at the current stage it is important to restore a stable economic state in the post-war period and further implement innovative processes in the economy, which have been suspended in our country due to the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, after its completion. The authors of the article analyzed the main factors that affect both the economy of the state itself, as well as those factors that affect its security system, including the economic one, under the conditions of the influence of negative factors of emergency situations of various origins on it. The authors of the article focused on the fact that ensuring the effective functioning of the civil defence system is necessary for the stabilization and support of the state economy, as well as the implementation of its development strategies since its main task is to reduce or eliminate the negative consequences caused by man-made, anthropogenic, environmental force majeure, of a natural or military nature. The purpose of the study is to analyze the above-mentioned factors of emergency situations and their impact on the economy, as well as to develop practical recommendations for preventive measures in the defined area. To achieve the set goal and task of the research, the authors used a wide range of general scientific and special methods. The results of the study were the statement that the economy of any state functions under the influence of both internal and external factors that directly affect all links of the economic system: banking, monetary, tax, financial, innovative, and one of the main effective. One of the ways to ensure its stability is the introduction and implementation of an effective system of civil protection. The authors also noted that the economic system of the state and the system of civil defence are interdependent, and their functioning in the state takes place in the aggregate of those factors of economic, social, cultural and political conditions that currently exist in one or another state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of International Relations / Medzinarodne Vztahy is the property of University of Economics in Bratislava, Faculty of International Relations and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland quickly applied for NATO membership. This step is not necessarily that drastic should Finland's security policy development in the long term be examined with one's focus set on a gradually-developed defence policy. It represents an important continuity in security policy, but also played a central role in advancing Finland's steps to becoming NATO members. On the basis of different studies and accounts, the following points seem to be critical in constructing a preliminary narrative about Finland's road to the Alliance. After the Second World War, Finland's western relations became dependent on its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Finland was aware that it could not expect any support from the West as regards its security. Despite a security policy based on recognising facts, and the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union, the eastern neighbour was seen as the main, and, later on, the only military threat on the basis of history and Finland's vulnerable geopolitical position. The threat, however, was concealed by so-called "doubletalk" in security policy discourse until the 2010s. In this context, state defence was developed to be an independent and modern territorial defence, ultimately there to defend against a large-scale invasion. Finland's defence enjoyed high legitimacy and confidence in society, especially from the 1970s. Security policy was raised above normal politics to be a kind of super-politics with a strong political consensus. When the Cold War ended and Finland joined the European Union, defence policy and the defence establishment got a leading role in working an approaching NATO. Finland's opportunities to conduct stabilisation policy in its close neighbourhood were seen as being limited, especially after Russia adopted a self-asserting foreign and security policy towards the West after 2007. At the same time, the subsequently increased cooperation, networking, and integration stimulated perceptions about western defence dependence. This increased emphasis on defence actually turned people's attention to the extra security that NATO membership might provide. Applying for NATO, however, required the shock of a Russian invasion of Ukraine before the Finnish public was ready to see the risks of NATO membership as being less than that of its benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of International Relations / Medzinarodne Vztahy is the property of University of Economics in Bratislava, Faculty of International Relations and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The war is ready to emerge in Ukraine. We have the full information coming from the Western offi cials, specially the American ones, pronounced by State Secretary Anthony Blinken in the Security Council1 or by the President in front of the European leaders. America has chosen to use all the instruments for deterring Russia to move to war and has even sacrifi ce valuable intelligence in order to show that every move is well known. So that it wasn’t a surprise that Friday, on 18 February, we had the announcement that Putin decided the invasion and Sunday evening that orders of action have been delivered to the Russian units, once the BelarusRussia huge snap exercise has been prolonged due to evolutions in Donbas2 . It is interesting to see that the information war has begun as well as the war for narratives, credibility, legitimacy, hearts and minds of the worldʼs citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Eunomia is the property of Eunomia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of Social Sciences / Roczniki Nauk Społecznych is the property of Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawla II and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Perceptions of threat from Russia's military activities in Ukraine and President Trump's critical attitude towards NATO have put the idea of a common European army on the agenda of European politics. Do these strategic threat perceptions also influence public support for the creation of a common European army? Previous research has largely overlooked strategic threat perceptions as individual-level determinants of public support for a common European army. This article explores the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and support for a common European army at the individual level of analysis with representative German survey data from 2018. The multivariate analysis shows that perceiving Russia's military activities in Ukraine as a threat to Germany's security, and U.S. foreign and security policy as a threat to the cohesion of NATO significantly increases support for the creation of a common European army, even when the influence of numerous other determinants is controlled for. The findings highlight the importance of considering strategic threat perceptions in future analyses of public opinion on European defence cooperation and integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hereby article aims at reviewing the following elements: actions of the Russian Federation which have shaped the current security context in Europe, since 2014 up to present day – the WHAT; the main reason for its actions on NATO’s Eastern Flank – the WHY; and how the North-Atlantic Alliance chose to respond to Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine, in 2014 – the HOW, asking the legitimate question if the deterrence and defence measures taken so far are enough to provide collective security for all Allies on the Eastern Flank. With Russia’s switch from a NATO partner to a state with an aggressive position on the Allied Eastern Flank, with the aim of regaining the power it once held, as well as its actions against Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, this paper will conclude on the necessity for NATO to have a clear strategy on Russia’s assertive actions on the Eastern Flank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since independence, Ukrainian politicians and public opinion have been evenly split between those who desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic (EU and NATO), community and those who gravitate toward Eurasia (Russia and CIS). During the 1990s, Ukraine was able to have it both ways. Now they no longer can. Not only is Russia more autocratic and meddling, aggravating Ukrainian political instability, but also many Europeans find Ukraine less appealing as a potential (NATO-EU) integration partner. Under these circumstances, the challenge is to provide Ukraine with sufficient time to consolidate democratic governance and to develop a consensus on its strategic direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problems of global international security increasingly depend on high-tech solutions, computer systems and information technologies, which are aimed at adapting the security and defence of countries to new realities and challenges in the context of hybrid wars and the Covid-19 pandemic. In this context, this volume of "Information & Security" presents six original articles addressing development in NATO the European Union, and Ukraine, focusing on the challenges in attempts to align Ukrainian concepts and standards to established good practice in the experience of the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]