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John Locke intervened in two major debates in which the issue of species featured: (1) the question of whether species designations are based on real essences or only nominal essences (discussed in theEssay), and (2) the debate over the recoinage of English currency in the 1690s, in which Locke argued for a restoration of silver depleted by widescale clipping (discussed in his economic writings published between 1692–95). This article investigates Locke's position on the recoinage and considers alternative proposals in the period, including those which advocated the introduction of a ‘new species’ of money in the form of credit, based on land. Locke opened the space, philosophically, for innovations in defining money, but endorsed a narrower conception of money as silver by weight alone (not by its stamp or denomination). His rationale for doing so exposes his attachment to shared systems of measurement, intersubjective agreement and ways of stabilizing meaning by reference to external criteria (in this case, the weight of silver, a measure that functioned internationally). This suggests a pattern of attempting to constrain the nominalism that his system otherwise foregrounded. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyzes the stability of bimetallism for countries operating in integrated bullion markets that enact different legal ratios. I articulate a new theoretical framework to demonstrate that two countries can both be bimetallic only if they coordinate their legal ratios. The theoretical framework is applied to the mid-eighteenth century when London's legal ratio was 3.8 percent higher than that of Amsterdam. I find that Amsterdam was effectively on the bimetallic standard, whereas London was on a de facto gold standard. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Benjamin Disraeli described Thomas Attwood as a 'provincial banker labouring under a financial monomania'. The leader of the Birmingham Political Union, Attwood's Warwickshire accent and support for a paper currency were widely derided at Westminster. However, the themes of Attwood's brief parliamentary career were shared by the other men who represented Birmingham in the early- and mid-Victorian period. None of these MPs were good party men, and this article illuminates the nature of party labels in the period. Furthermore, it adds a new dimension to the historical understanding of debates on monetary policy and shows how local political identities and traditions interacted with broader party identities. With the exception of Richard Spooner, who was a strong tory on religious and political matters, the currency men are best described as popular radicals, who consistently championed radical political reform and were among the few parliamentary supporters of the 'People's Charter'. They opposed the new poor law and endorsed factory regulation, a progressive income tax, and religious liberty. Although hostile to the corn laws they believed that free trade without currency reform would depress prices, wages and employment. George Frederick Muntz's death in 1857 and his replacement by John Bright marked a watershed and the end of the influence of the 'Birmingham school'. Bright appropriated Birmingham's radical tradition as he used the town as a base for his campaign for parliamentary reform. He emphasized Birmingham's contribution to the passing of the 1832 Reform Act but ignored the currency reformers' views on other matters, which had often been at loggerheads with the 'Manchester school' and economic liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the management of sterling currency in Great Britain between 1964 and 1967, exploring the pound's devaluation. It examines the Labour Party government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the views of Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan. The author comments on Great Britain's financial relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the U.S. Other topics considered include the Bank of England and the British Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and international liquidity.

The article offers development news related to finance in Great Britain. Accordingly, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)'s consultation paper (CP09/10) "Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services" has made its appearance in the wake of the publication of the Turner Review. Also, FSA is said to have clearly been open to the notion that there should be a degree flexibility for firms with different sizes from the larger banks. It also acknowledges the risk of possible incomplete international alignment.

Why has Britain declined to adopt the single currency? The conventional view holds that there are multiple political and economic barriers to British entry into monetary union-large fractions of public opinion, business leaders, and the Conservative party oppose entry; Britain's economic cycle is not synchronized with that of the euro-zone; adoption of the single currency would harm foreign trade and investment; British political institutions make it difficult to muster support for such a move, and so on. I argue that policy failure is a more important influence on British economic policy. Major changes occur when extant policy fails and there exists an alternative policy idea that both explains this failure persuasively and prescribes a new and more effective way forward. A British government might advocate euro membership if the current framework for policy in Britain - central bank independence with a floating exchange rate - fails, and policies pursued by the European Central Bank address the source of this failure. This combination would also lead many politicians, business leaders, and voters to see the advantages of euro membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addresses the issue of Great Britain's potential membership of the single European currency (SEC). Advantages and disadvantages of British membership of the SEC; Considerations that should be examined by the British government prior to deciding on the issue of SEC.