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The UK’s Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 makes it an offence to deliberately stir up hatred against people on religious grounds. For its supporters, the Act offers necessary protection to a range of groups that are vulnerable to the harmful effects of incitement of hatred against them. For its critics, by contrast, the offence it creates is an illegitimate restriction on freedom of expression. In the first half of this article, I shall examine four particular aspects of the offence of incitement to hatred, namely the role of religious beliefs, the notion of threatening words or behaviour, the need to prove intention, and the protection of freedom of expression. Here it will be shown that the Act was undermined by the legislators’ desire to appease the critics who were concerned about its effects on freedom of expression. In the second half of this article, I shall argue that it is possible to strengthen the offence of incitement to religious hatred without threatening legitimate freedom of expression. In order to make this argument, I shall utilize Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. Put in his terms, my thesis is that, since incitement to religious hatred may cause one or more harms of misrecognition, it may in some instances be legitimately restricted. My conclusion will be that placing this constraint on freedom of expression is one way, amongst numerous others, in which ethno-religious diversity may be appropriately accommodated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To understand the politics of recognition, one must conceive of it as a politics of representation. Like representation, recognition proceeds at once in a constative and a performative mode, whereby they bring into being what is simultaneously represented or recognized. This structure has paradoxical implications. The politics of recognition is also a politics of representation in the sense that it always involves questions such as, Which representations are recognized? Whose representations are they? The reverse is also true: the politics of representation involves recognition because representatives and representations must be recognized in order to gain authority. In short, we can examine recognition as representation, and there is no recognition without representation, and vice versa. This is demonstrated through a reading of a recent British legal case, Begum, where the issue at stake concerned which representation of Islam should form the basis for the recognition of Islam in the school uniform policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Increasing criticism has accompanied the rising numbers of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) imposed. In this short paper we review some of our own recent research findings in conjunction with other recent commentaries to question whether the declared intentions behind the introduction of the ASBO are being achieved in practice. We argue that there are a number of fundamental problems with ASBO enforcement. We conclude by urging for the resurrection of a critical and reflective practice in community safety policy development and implementation and for a recognition that there are more just and effective alternatives to our current, seemingly 'enforcement led', interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses about Great Britain's honours system. It discusses thirteen different levels of honour and recognition, elaborately ranked and graded. During the first half of the twentieth century, this exceptionally elaborate system codified and tied together Great Britain's vast imperial realm: that was both its purpose and its justification. The Great Britain's honours system now combines genuine antiquity with late nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial invention. The Order of the Bath was established in 1725 and is awarded at three levels, the Order of the British Empire was founded in 1917 and consists of five levels, the Companions of Honour was created in the same year and carries with it no title.