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It is often claimed that the rules of contributory negligence apply to unreasonable claimant conduct that occurs prior to or contemporaneously with the defendant’s wrong, whereas the rule of avoidable losses (failure to mitigate) applies to unreasonable claimant conduct that occurs after the defendant’s wrong. Others argue that this distinction is normatively indefensible, since both doctrines are concerned with whether the claimant acted unreasonably in his or her own interests, and that the consequences of such conduct ought therefore to be the same regardless of when it occurs relative to the defendant’s wrong. In this article, I demonstrate that both views are flawed, and that the preferable distinction rests simply on whether the claimant’s unreasonable conduct (i) contributes to the claimant’s damage (contributory negligence) or (ii) increases the indirect losses that flow from that damage (the rule of avoidable losses). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the R. v Ahmad and Fields case that was presented before the British Supreme Court when Ahmad appealed that 12.6 million pounds of money being fraudulently reclaimed by the an exporting company from Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs by way of Value Added Tax (VAT). Topics discussed include the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), benefits from criminal conduct, and process of asset recovery into the legal system.

The article focuses on stamp duty land tax in Great Britain. Topics include chargeable consideration, declarations of trust, and the law surrounding leasebacks. Information is provided on just and reasonable apportionment, sales of real property, and the constitutionality of transfer tax on transactions.

The article discusses sentences given to several criminal cases in Great Britain. The case R. v. Bowling involves an appellant pleading guilty to two counts of engaging sexual activity in the presence of a child, where the judge ordered the appellant to not work with children and could not go within 100 metres of school premises. The author said that the sentencing judge had a wide range of alternative orders to prevent the appellant from using his car to commit further offences, including making an order under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.1C.