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This article examines the problem of academic freedom in a rather unlikely area: accounting and historical accounting research. It discusses some cases in the United States and the United Kingdom where accounting research led to controversy and tells the story of a PhD student (the author) sued for libel in 1986 for his research concerning a policy issue, the subject of public debate, and related to conflicts of interest for directors of a mutual organization (a building society) and their use of its funds. It shows how 'managerial diversion' was discovered, how the libel suit was successfully defended and how the law was changed. While academic independence issues have always existed and across disciplines, the case and discussion largely relate to the 1980s in the United Kingdom when universities suffered savage cutbacks in public funding and the imposition of 'reforms'. The case study illustrates, and the article discusses these issues as they relate to the state of modern universities and the pressures on academics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the fraudulent sale of stocks and shares in shell companies by boiler rooms in order to defraud UK investors. It examines the law, the way boiler rooms are organised, the types of companies and scams used, and the markets involved including penny shares, US Regulation S stocks and the Over-the-Counter markets. It also examines the record of the UK regulators, primarily the Financial Conduct Authority (previously the Financial Services Authority) in acting against firms and individuals they had ‘authorised’, and other prosecutors in criminal actions against the perpetrators (usually unauthorised brokers running boiler rooms). The paper makes the point that whilst the public purse bears the costs of prosecution and compensation, the quasi-regulators (the professionals adding credence to a scheme) have rarely been pursued either as parties to a fraud or sued for negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is only recently that market abuse, of which insider dealing is a form, has been unlawful in the UK. The general impression is that insider dealing is common, that the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the main regulator, is aware of this but is unable, except in the most obvious of cases, to prosecute at the criminal level. The picture is less clear for other forms of market abuse and the evidence as to their frequency of occurrence is conflicting. As a result we are unable to assess the extent to which these go unchecked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been estimated that deregulation of US S&Ls will cost the US taxpayer $500bn in terms of the compensation paid out for the resulting scandals and failures. In contrast, the deregulation of UK building societies, "although initially followed by a series of scandals and losses of $1bn., eventually resulted in substantially increased profitability. The social effects in the UK have been quite different to those in the US. As a result of the increased importance placed on profitability as opposed to mutuality, many homeowners have had their properties repossessed, and investors been mis-sold unsuitable investments. However, UK building societies, by a mixture of good luck and judgement, have avoided the principal regulatory pitfalls, which beset the S&Ls in terms of bankruptcies and fraud. This paper seeks to explain these different post-deregulation experiences. It extends to the UK the looting model of Akerlof and Romer (1993) and the managerial diversion model of Nichols (1972) which went so far to explain and anticipate, respectively, the US experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the bidding associated with mergers, highlighting evidence from the United Kingdom. Reference to studies conducted by R. Roll in 1986; In-depth look at the merger bidding process; Detailed information on the game-theoretic approach; Hypothesis that the generosity of the merger terms increases the probability of acceptance; Problems associated with the `analogy' of an auction and a merger bid.

The use of MDA and related techniques has been examined here mainly from the perspective of predictive ability. It has been argued that the stability of the model, in various respects, is the single most important consideration, and that various improvements to the way in which it is usually devised have been discussed. The use of the industry-relative ratio was advocated and was illustrated by means of some UK data giving a reasonably high prediction success rate. Unfortunately, because of the subsequent market crash this could not be reasonably tested over a later period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on building society mergers in Great Britain. The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies has actively encouraged mergers between the smaller societies throughout the 1970s. Many building society chiefs have embraced his views and have used them as reasons for their societies actively searching out takeover victims. In fact commentators frequently talk nowadays of a dozen or so building societies as the eventual state. Such views have been rarely challenged and the merger movement has been largely ignored as a public issue. However the empirical evidence concerning industrial mergers more generally and related theories of merger activity, suggest that there is often no economic case for such merger mania and that such activity may be explained in terms of simple managerial motives of self-interest. The empirical evidence shows that while acquiring firms on average are more profitable, and acquired firms less so, it is not correct to infer that the combined unit will retain above average profitability. Subsequent to the merger, acquiring firms in Great Britain have tended to reductions in profitability.

Discusses some of the issues concerning the evolving structure of the building society industry in Great Britain during the 1970s. Discussion of the economics and the constitution of the movement; Development of a behavioral hypotheses; Variations in building societies' operations.