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While union presence and joint regulation of work and employment has declined, the state maintains a key role in directly regulating employment standards in areas including health and safety, minimum wage enforcement and subcontracting. Based on an empirical study of enforcement agencies in Britain, this article argues that the nature of regulatory work and its reshaping by both exogenous and endogenous pressures ultimately influences the impact of regulation itself and how it is enforced. Major shifts in the skills, knowledge and networks critical to the nature of labour inspection work parallel developments within the workplaces they are responsible for regulating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK Financial Conduct Authority has developed and implemented policies targeting individuals for regulatory non‐compliance in the post‐2008 crisis period. This article develops a tripartite framework that differentiates between individual–firm, regulator–individual, and regulator–firm interactions to capture the complexity of these enforcement proceedings. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders, administrative decisionmaking observations, and documentary analysis, it outlines the process of individualizing responsibility for non‐compliance and finds that this approach poses evidential and investigative challenges for the regulator as a result of individual and corporate responses. The evidence shows that individuals are more likely than firms to engage in an adversarial response to an investigation rather than to settle. At the same time, through an inverse process of "corporatization" of the enforcement proceedings, firms may employ resources and strategies aimed at obscuring individual responsibility or binding together more closely the corporate and the individual case. The article concludes that the prospects of a successful outcome in investigating individuals depend not only on regulators' activities but also on corporate responses and on which managers are considered assets to the firm and which may be thrown to the wolves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 are fatally flawed notwithstanding the apparent rigour of the process which produced them. These Regulations were the product of considerable deliberation following a sensitively executed public inquiry yet, it is argued, they rely too heavily on the rhetoric of criminal law while failing to take into account the competing norms for compliance and the impact of NHS budget constraints. Further, they push the CQC towards a heavy-handed deterrence approach to enforcement, which will increase hostility between regulatees and the inspectorate, and ultimately reduce the scope for developing the transparency about failures which is sorely needed in the NHS. This article challenges the contemporary wisdom that it is primarily knee-jerk regulatory responses that suffer from fatal flaws of this nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]