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There are some important ambiguities in discussions about the implications of "evidence-based practice", both for educational research and for the work of teachers. In this paper we explore several of these through examining the Evidence-based Practice in Science Education (EPSE) study--part of the Teaching and Learning Research Programme (TLRP), a major UK research initiative that is explicitly committed to improving the contribution of educational research to policymaking and practice. The field of science education is in some ways a critical case, given that the notion of evidence-based practice treats scientific research as a privileged source of evidence. We examine the assumptions built into the EPSE study, and how these relate to the classical medical model of evidence-based practice, and to some other approaches to educational research that are concerned with closing the gap with practice. (Contains 14 notes.)

In their rejoinder to our article about their work on evidence-based science education, Millar "et al." (2008) claim that we misrepresented their position, and that our argument was false or unclear in key respects. In this brief reply we argue that their criticisms are misdirected, and that they fail to engage in the sort of dialogue that is necessary if the important problems surrounding the relationship between research and educational practice are to be resolved.

In recent years, increasing emphasis has come to be placed, both by researchers and by policy-makers, on the adequacy of primary teachers' subject knowledge of science. Within research, this emphasis has been linked to the rise of constructivist ideas about the significance of establishing children's prior conceptions of scientific concepts for effective teaching. In this article, I examine two constructivist approaches to teachers' adequacy of subject knowledge within UK research on primary science education. In each case, I provide a critique of the assumptions they make about the nature of knowledge and how it develops. I do this from a sociocultural perspective, which views knowledge and learning as necessarily situated within communities of practice. My aim is to assess the implications of this perspective for understanding teachers' adequacy of subject knowledge. (Contains 4 notes.)

There are some important ambiguities in discussions about the implications of 'evidence-based practice', both for educational research and for the work of teachers. In this paper we explore several of these through examining the Evidence-based Practice in Science Education (EPSE) study—part of the Teaching and Learning Research Programme (TLRP), a major UK research initiative that is explicitly committed to improving the contribution of educational research to policymaking and practice. The field of science education is in some ways a critical case, given that the notion of evidence-based practice treats scientific research as a privileged source of evidence. We examine the assumptions built into the EPSE study, and how these relate to the classical medical model of evidence-based practice, and to some other approaches to educational research that are concerned with closing the gap with practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, increasing emphasis has come to be placed, both by researchers and by policy-makers, on the adequacy of primary teachers' subject knowledge of science. Within research, this emphasis has been linked to the rise of constructivist ideas about the significance of establishing children's prior conceptions of scientific concepts for effective teaching. In this article I examine two constructivist approaches to teachers's adequacy of subject knowledge within UK research on primary science education. In each case I provide a critique of the assumptions they make about the nature of knowledge and how it develops. I do this from a sociocultural perspective, which views knowledge and learning as necessarily situated within communities of practice. My aim is to assess the implications of this perspective for understanding teachers' adequacy of subject knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]