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Hydrogen-fuelled technologies for home heating and cooking may provide a low-carbon solution for decarbonising parts of the global housing stock. For the transition to transpire, the attitudes and perceptions of consumers must be factored into policy making efforts. However, empirical studies are yet to explore potential levels of consumer heterogeneity regarding domestic hydrogen acceptance. In response, this study explores a wide spectrum of consumer responses towards the prospect of hydrogen homes. The proposed spectrum is conceptualised in terms of the 'domestic hydrogen acceptance matrix', which is examined through a nationally representative online survey conducted in the United Kingdom. The results draw attention to the importance of interest and engagement in environmental issues, knowledge and awareness of renewable energy technologies, and early adoption potential, as key drivers of domestic hydrogen acceptance. Critically, strategic measures should be taken to convert hydrogen scepticism and pessimism into hope and optimism by recognising the multi-dimensional nature of consumer acceptance. To this end, resources should be dedicated towards increasing the observability and trialability of hydrogen homes in proximity to industrial clusters and hubs, where the stakes for consumer acceptance are highest. Progress towards realising a net-zero society can be supported by early stakeholder engagement with the domestic hydrogen acceptance matrix. • Domestic hydrogen acceptance entails a spectrum of multi-dimensional responses. • Interest and engagement in environmental issues enhances hydrogen acceptance. • Knowledge and awareness of renewables promotes hydrogen optimism. • Consumer innovativeness is associated with support for hydrogen homes. • Consumer-orientated research can help steer the domestic hydrogen transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The energy transition and achieving net-zero goals were viewed as a straight road – in some quarters. Still, with the realities on the ground, energy security has emerged as another path governments must earnestly consider. The government of the United Kingdom has backed, and committed itself to achieving, a greener and clean-energy society through various policies and laws. However, the Russian–Ukraine crisis has raised a vital question of energy security for the government. This paper looks pragmatically at some issues and opportunities for the UK government. Energy security issues are not peculiar to the UK; many countries are saddled with these energy problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internal structure and architecture of evaporite sequences is often overlooked, with attention frequently concentrating on the external geometries that salt bodies form. The availability of extensive 3D seismic data affords the opportunity to interpret the internal structures within these evaporite sequences and comprehensively characterise the different structural facies over large areas. This paper concentrates on the Zechstein Supergroup evaporite deposits within the Southern North Sea of the United Kingdom's Continental Shelf. This analysis of the internal structural complexity and stratigraphic heterogeneity utilises 26,000 km2 of 3D seismic data together with over 96 wells from the Southern North Sea. Characterisation of the different structural facies present was undertaken alongside mapping their spatial distribution to understand the relationship they have with one another and the structural evolution that may have been taken. This work has (1) characterised and mapped six different internal structural facies present within the Zechstein with increasing levels of deformation; (2) shown the internal lithological heterogeneity is indicative of variations in the vertical strength profile of layered evaporite sequences; (3) discontinuous high‐amplitude reflections within the Zechstein are as a result of the geometries being too steeply dipping for the seismic data to image; and (4) the ability to possibly predict the internal heterogeneity of areas of poorly imaged salt, such as within large diapiric salt structures, from surrounding structural facies. These findings suggest that there is significant internal complexity even within areas of the basin with minor mobilisation to the external salt geometry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the world is still in the grasp of COVID‐19, countries are contemplating how to get their economies back on their feet. With a unique opportunity to do so in a sustainable manner, there is an urgent need to revisit the governance of climate change. Opportunities are clearly there: the resurgence in top‐down policies in the pandemic might spill‐over to climate governance; green economic stimuli might cause an increase in market‐based approaches; or an increased focus on solidarity, inclusion and collective buy‐in may drive more inclusive network‐based governance. Using the classic trichotomy of hierarchy, market and network governance, we have analysed the findings of 60 interviews with expert representatives from government, industry and third sector parties in the UK and the Netherlands. Their consideration of the key policies and measures needed to help the transition forward point towards a clear desire for a more hierarchical approach. In addition, mixing the three approaches, especially market and hierarchy, is considered the best way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United Kingdom reduces its CO2 emissions in order to meet its 2050 net zero greenhouse gas targets, there will be a significant evolution of the UK's energy mix. The reliance on hydrocarbons will decrease while there is predicted to be an increase in low carbon energy sources such as renewables and nuclear. In order to decarbonise and achieve the net zero emissions targets while concurrently producing enough energy to provide for national energy needs, large‐scale, low carbon energy generation projects need to be developed alongside energy storage facilities to provide flexibility within a low carbon energy supply. Robust CCUS programmes will need be developed in order to capture and store unavoidable carbon dioxide emissions. The subsurface geology of the UK provides opportunities for the development of low carbon energy generation, energy storage and CCS, and the Upper Permian Zechstein Supergroup deposited in eastern England and offshore in the Southern North Sea is a potential host for these new developments. In NE England, salt cavern gas storage sites have been developed in thick Zechstein evaporites since the mid 20th centrury. In this paper we present new isopach maps and well correlation panels which will help to outline optimal locations for the development of additional salt caverns for gas storage. A review of the Zechstein Supergroup indicates that it does not exhibit great potential for the development of CCS, due both to its complex reservoir characteristics and to difficulties with both subsurface imaging and monitoring. However thick Zechstein evaporites could provide an excellent seal for CO2 storage in the underlying Lower Permian Rotliegend Group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental sustainability and energy transition, especially the renewable energy transition, have become critical concerns of nations throughout the world in recent decades. The sustainable and eco‐friendly technologies have led to more sustainable methodologies, substantial stewardship of our natural resources, and the conversion to renewable energy sources, all of which have been demonstrated to benefit the environment significantly. However, prior studies have overlooked the ecological sustainability and energy transition effects of green technology innovation. Therefore, this study endeavored to investigate the role of green innovation (lnGRN) and financial globalization (lnFIG) on the sustainability of the environment (lnEFT) and energy transition (lnENT) in the United Kingdom using quarterly data for the period from 1995 to 2020. The study applied the time‐varying (bootstrapping) rolling window technique, which can retrieve casual associations among variables at different periods of sub‐samples. Besides this, the method is advantageous for addressing the non‐consistency of parameters and eliminating the pre‐test distortion. The novel Bootstrap Rolling‐Window full‐sample causality technique results demonstrate that lnGRN and lnFIG have unidirectional causality toward lnEFT and lnENT. Furthermore, the bootstrap rolling‐window subsamples in the final stage indicate that lnGRN and lnFIG mitigate lnEFT, whereas lnGRN and lnGDP enhance energy transition. On the other hand, lnGDP and lnETX contribute to environmental deterioration, while lnFIG hinders the energy transition. Several important policy implications are derived from the results to encourage financial globalization, green innovation technologies, renewable energy resources consumption, and environmental taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to still be able to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement, global net greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced to zero by the middle of the century. One decisive step towards this goal will be phasing out coal. The UK has led the way as one of the first countries to not only phase out coal by 2024, but also set a net zero target for 2050. Based on 22 expert interviews, we analyse which objectives, actors, and contextual factors were relevant for the two decisions, and which continuities emerge in UK climate policy. We find that the coal phase-out was not primarily driven by the decision to phase out coal in 2015, but by policies (e.g., the CO 2 price) and other contextual factors (e.g., the old coal fleet) that were not initially associated with the phase-out. The recommendations by the Committee on Climate Change, a general political mood calling for more climate protection, and the Conservative Party's desire to show climate protection ambitions played an important role in the net zero decision. Continuities driving both decisions can be seen in the relevance of scientific expertise in UK politics, strong social movements, favourable cost arguments, and a political consensus emerging among the relevant political parties. From a climate justice perspective, however, industrialised nations such as the UK should become carbon neutral sooner than 2050, given the historical responsibility for carbon emissions and economic preconditions that countries in the Global South do not have. • The UK was a frontrunner in adopting a coal phase-out for 2024 and a net zero target for 2050. • The political economy context of both decisions is characterised by three main objectives relating to the "energy trilemma." • The decline in coal was initiated by earlier policies (e.g. the CO 2 price) rather than by the coal phase-out decision itself. • The net zero decision was driven by public protests, a cross-party consensus and Theresa May's desire to secure her legacy. • Both processes show the relevance of scientific advice, political consensus, and public protests for UK climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe's two largest economies – Germany and the UK – are phasing out coal from electricity production as part of European efforts to fulfil increased climate policy ambitions that require comprehensive energy system transitions. German and UK governments varied in the ways they sought support from diverse societal interests to make the transition socially acceptable and politically feasible. Drawing on 22 expert interviews and process-tracing methods, this paper compares and explains how political and economic institutional differences influenced efforts to balance energy transition concerns, like speed and cost-effectiveness with justice for companies, workers and communities most adversely affected by the transition. We find that the increasing attention to just transition perspectives after the Paris Agreement affected the design of coal phase-out processes in different ways in the two countries. Just transition concerns were given priority by policymakers in Germany, but more so if they overlapped with the interests of incumbents. In the end, politically powerful stakeholders dominated the policy outcome. In the UK, policymakers and stakeholders gave only weak attention to just transition concerns, mainly because coal's market position had collapsed. Coal interests did not have strong representation in the decision-making process. But we find that just transition concerns are likely to gain more attention in the UK because a more challenging transition away from gas will take place over the next two decades. Key policy insights Policymakers must balance the objective of a fast decarbonization process against two other important concerns: cost-effectiveness and a just transition. Political-economic institutional design and capacity shape the extent to which just transition concerns are given weight in coal phase-out processes. State capacity for including just transition concerns in coal phase-out processes is higher when political and economic institutions strongly mediate government-stakeholder interaction in the policy process, and broad stakeholder participation increases the political feasibility and legitimacy of policy change. In Germany, the government's attention to just transition concerns was strong because broad stakeholder representation in the formal process, and transition assistance policies to target potential losers in the transition, became crucial to enhance the legitimacy of coal phase-out policies. In the UK, cost-effectiveness trumped just transition concerns in the coal phase-out process, but just transition issues have increasing salience and will likely become pertinent in the upcoming gas phase-out process because more jobs and key economic interests are at stake. Our findings are relevant for policymakers in countries struggling with balancing speed, cost-effectiveness and just transition concerns in similar transition processes: phasing out coal, gas, or oil from their energy system. The findings may also inform future energy transition research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the COVID crisis, the Netherlands and the UK were embarking on national energy transitions away from fossil fuel systems. However, the arrival of the pandemic unequivocally altered the trajectory of energy transitions on a global scale. Every country in the world is now grappling with the twin challenges of the COVID crisis and the climate crisis, and there is a grave risk that the short-term demands of the former could eclipse the vital long-term actions needed to address the latter. While there is optimism that green economic recoveries will propel energy transitions through investments, there is an urgent need to assess and address any new policy barriers which COVID poses to achieving them. To do so, in the summer of 2020, researchers conducted pairs of interviews with 30 experts within the social and energy sectors, involving government, industry and third sector stakeholders. Key research questions sought to identify the policy barriers acting – inadvertently or otherwise – to disrupt that balance between tackling COVID and the energy transition, and the mechanisms available to restore the necessary equilibrium. Through a structured analysis of policy barriers to the energy transition post-COVID, we assess its delivery in both countries. We derive a new taxonomy and definition of policy barriers. We also generate a suite of 10 policy recommendations, which were placed in priority order by the interviewees themselves. The paper concludes with observations on those recommendations, the differences noted between the two countries, and the validity of using policy barriers for policy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is increasingly recognised that the future energy system will be digitalised, and that end-user engagements with this system will be digitally mediated by smart ICT. The digitalisation of the energy system promises significant benefits, but also risks replicating and entrenching persistent inequalities in the ability of households to access adequate energy services. Focusing on a case study of the United Kingdom, this paper explores the links between energy system digitalisation, digital exclusion, and energy poverty, with the wider aim of sketching out a research agenda for understanding the risks, opportunities, and inequalities latent within the transition to a digitalised energy system. Drawing on a review of relevant literatures, the concept of social relations developed by Hargreaves and Middlemiss (2020), and a thematic analysis of a stakeholder workshop, the paper identifies five areas of focus for further research and analysis: 1) the role of financial exclusion and asset affordability in shaping digital inclusion and exclusion, 2) time and temporality, 3) the role of trust in shaping engagements with digital technologies, 4) language, literacy, and communication, and 5) the uneven impacts of digital exclusion on different social groups. The paper concludes with reflections on the practical challenges and implications of pursuing this agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the primary emphasis on the tensions that platform organizations face between both for‐profit and environmental value‐creation goals, we know very little about the managerial drivers and mechanisms through which they realize multiple goals. Based on a qualitative, inductive case study of a UK‐based digital platform's business model, we uncover the role of business model design. We find that the emphasis managers put on either the redistribution or the accessibility design theme shapes the environmental and financial value‐creation, respectively and that a hybrid business model (i.e., realizing both for‐profit and for‐purpose value‐creation) hinges on their integration. Two managerial drivers—strategic synergies and dynamic coupling—enable platform organizations to increase integration. We contribute to the literatures on hybrid business models, paradox, and business models for sustainability, suggesting that digital platforms not only create, but can actively manage the environmental paradox by integrating multiple design themes within hybrid business models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Application of the extended energy-economy green investment barrier model (GIBM). • The macroeconomics of a policy scenario to close the green finance gap are evaluated. • Closing the green finance gap leads to additional macroeconomic co-benefits. • The introduction of additional energy transition policies are recommended. Reaching the UK net-zero emissions target translates into substantial investment requirements into low-carbon energy infrastructure. However, investors are currently not investing sufficiently in renewable energy capacity, leading to the so-called green finance gap. Current energy-economy models generally do not reveal the macroeconomic implications of policies aimed at scaling-up green finance for energy transitions. In the light of this background, we extend the energy-economy Green Investment Barrier Model with the insights from a systematic literature review to investigate the macroeconomic implications of a policy scenario designed to close the green finance gap in combination with and without a scenario to decarbonise the power sector. We also compare the achieved results with studies focusing on a similar research question. We find that the closing the green finance gap policy scenario alongside a low-carbon power scenario leads to the co-benefits of lower power system costs and unemployment, and increases in GDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The UK's and Germany's coal phase-out pathways diverge in timing and measures. • Different powers of actor groups contribute to diverging trends in UK and Germany. • Influential German coal corporations and unions slow down coal's decline. • Energy security concerns, domestic mining and economic dependence create resistance. • Reducing the influence incumbents have on policy making might enable coal phase-out. Political decisions and trends regarding coal use for electricity generation developed differently in the UK and Germany, despite being subject to relatively similar climate protection targets and general political and economic conditions. The UK agreed on a coal phase-out by 2024. In Germany, a law schedules a coal phase-out by 2038 at the latest. This paper investigates reasons for the different developments and aims to identify main hurdles and drivers of coal phase-outs by using the Triple Embeddedness Framework. The comparative case study approach reveals that policy outcomes regarding coal consumption are deeply influenced by several actor groups, namely, coal companies, unions, environmental NGOs, and the government. The most discussed aspects of a coal phase-out in both countries are energy security concerns, whether coal is mined domestically, (regional) economic dependence, as well as the relative power of actors with vested interests in coal consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Systematic literature review on green energy investments barriers. • Evaluation interviews with financial investors, advisers or experts. • Green investment barriers are found to be interrelated and to form a complex system. • A systems perspective as theoretical framework for successful long-term policy intervention is recommended. • A systems approach supports the exploitation of synergies, whilst avoiding adverse side effects. Meeting its climate policy objectives requires the UK to rapidly decarbonise its energy sector. This demands high levels of investments into low carbon energy infrastructure, which are currently not undertaken at required scale, leading to a green finance gap. We explore (1) key investment barriers, (2) a theoretical framework for investigation and (3) possible solutions, drawing on a review of academic literature and policy reports, and interviews conducted with financial investors and experts. Our study confirms that policy uncertainty and short-termism in the financial system are the two main investment barriers. Our results show that identified barriers form a complex system characterised by path-dependency, lock-in and non-linearity. We recommend the adoption of systems theory as an analytical framework to inform the related policy debate and propose the expansion or development of sustainable investment vehicles as a useful near-term solution while preparing a long-term policy intervention based on a systems perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We argue that emotional geography adds a missing dimension to energy geography. • We use oral history to discuss how atmospheres arise in a mining energy system. • We show the affectual agency of the energy system in everyday production of space. • We argue that exploring emotion and affect is key for managing energy transitions. In this paper, we make a case for bringing energy geography into closer dialogue with emotional geography, and argue that doing so has the potential to greatly improve our understanding of energy systems and their intersection with everyday life, bringing essential but often overlooked aspects into view. We draw on research carried out as part of an arts and humanities-based project in South Wales (UK), a region once dominated by coal extraction. We present and discuss material from sixteen oral histories recorded with long-standing members of the village of Ynysybwl. Reading their accounts through the lens of emotional-affective constructs reveals not only participants' emotions about aspects of energy production and consumption, but also the atmospheres and affects arising within and out of the energy system. This brings to light the affectual agency of the energy system as an infrastructure assemblage and its role in everyday production of space. Related to this, it surfaces essential aspects of experiences of energy system change. We argue that recognising and exploring affect and emotion is crucial for energy geography as it continues to explore the functionings of energy systems, and energy transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current discourse on the transition to a decarbonized energy system future is dominated by renewable energy solutions. Initial conditions for this transition may vary across different regions and countries. There are, however, also opportunities for innovative solutions that utilize other low‐carbon energy sources and technology mix. Sustainable development is a contested concept and varies with priorities attached to social, economic, and environmental goals. Therefore, the one‐size‐fits‐all type of solution paradigm needs to be broadened, to accelerate action in the short to medium term. Our argument is that natural gas can be an important complementary transition fuel to support renewable energy in the short‐ and medium‐term transition phases. This means that the goal of zero fossil fuel as a short‐ and medium‐term solution needs to be reconsidered. This takes us to the next argument that innovation and upgraded technology in the low‐carbon fossil fuel sector will provide an important impetus for low‐carbon transition, which we see as a phase lasting until the middle of the century. However, the transition toward a sustainable energy future of gas‐fueled solutions has challenges from the social, technical, economic, geographical, and political points of view. Suitable local solutions should, however, also be assessed. These should take into consideration infrastructure, local demands, resources, and economic aspects as well as national energy policies. An analysis based on the experiences of four countries, both developed and developing, is presented in this study. The countries selected for this study can be placed in two categories: those with an abundance of natural gas reserves (Iran and Norway) and those that are import‐dependent (India and UK). The cross‐country analysis will help us to understand the realistic challenges and opportunities of natural gas as a transition fuel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transport-related activities represented 34% of the total carbon emissions in the UK in 2022 and heavy-duty vehicles (HGVs) accounted for one-fifth of the road transport greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Currently, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) are considered as suitable replacements for diesel fleets. However, these technologies continue to face techno-economic barriers, creating uncertainty for fleet operators wanting to transition away from diesel-powered internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs). This paper assesses the performance and cost competitiveness of BEV and FCEV powertrain solutions in the hard-to-abate HGV sector. The study evaluates the impact of battery degradation and a carbon tax on the cost of owning the vehicles. An integrated total cost of ownership (TCO) model, which includes these factors for the first time, is developed to study a large retailer's HGV fleet operating in the UK. The modelling framework compares the capital expenditures (CAPEX) and operating expenses (OPEX) of alternative technologies against ICEVs. The TCO of BEVs and FCEVs are 11% to 33% and 37% to 78% higher than ICEVs; respectively. Despite these differences, by adopting a longer lifetime for the vehicle it can effectively narrow the cost gap. Alternatively, cost parity with ICEVs could be achieved if BEV battery cost reduces by 56% or if FCEV fuel cell cost reduces by 60%. Besides, the pivot point for hydrogen price is determined at £2.5 per kg. The findings suggest that BEV is closer to market as its TCO value is becoming competitive, whereas FCEV provides a more viable solution than BEV for long-haul applications due to shorter refuelling time and lower load capacity penalties. Furthermore, degradation of performance in lithium-ion batteries is found to have a minor impact on TCO if battery replacement is not required. However, critical component replacement and warranty can influence commercial viability. Given the high costs, we propose financial incentives and vehicle tax reforms to reduce costs of critical components that will encourage the roll-out of zero emission HGVs. • TCO model employs real-world fleet data to compare HGV powertrain technologies. • Maximising vehicle lifetime is key to reduce the TCO gap and get closer to parity. • BEVs have a TCO 11%–33% higher than ICEVs. • FCEVs have a TCO 37%–78% higher than ICEVs. • Degradation in lithium-ion batteries is found to have a minor impact on TCO value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zero‑carbon electricity is a pre-requisite for decarbonisation of the wider economy and many scenarios envisage rapid expansion of renewables. IEA estimates a need to double the annual rate of investment to 2030. A rapid transition to low carbon electricity creates a risk to investors because projects being financed now will generate their revenue in a zero‑carbon electricity system for which there is no track record of price formation. Although the cost of renewable power has fallen greatly, future revenues from renewables are still affected by market price risks that are often outside the control of generators. If risks are difficult to quantify, they may be mis-priced, leading to inefficient premiums being added to the cost of capital, which could increase the overall cost of the transition. In this context many countries around the world provide support for low carbon energy, such as the UK Contracts for Difference. In this paper we investigate exposure to price risk caused by uncertainty over the mix of technologies used to achieve decarbonisation, which we term 'transition risk', and how this varies under different technology mixes, and for different policy regimes. We show that exposing investors to transition risk could increase the cost of delivering the renewables needed for a zero‑carbon electricity system by around 25% or £7bn/year compared to policy options that reduce exposure to wholesale market price risk. The paper concludes that as long as transition risks remain high, de-risking policy mechanisms can help to minimise the overall cost of achieving net-zero. • We characterise the current stage of the low-carbon transition as a 'build phase', requiring large volumes of investment • Uncertainty over the final physical state of the decarbonised system causes significant financial risk to investors • 'Contracts for difference' (CfDs) help to manage this 'transition risk' and reduce the cost of capital for projects • Exposing projects fully to transition risk could increase costs by a third, and raise the cost of transition by £7bn per year [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain’s gas system developed in the early 1800s. Over the past two centuries the system and its local, national and international networks have experienced much socio-technical innovation, governance changes and six key transitions. Since the Climate Change Act of 2008, it faces a seventh challenging transition as the UK moves uncertainly towards a low-carbon energy system, including decarbonising electricity, heat and transport. The paper explores: the origins of the system by Murdoch, Boulton and Watt; the early 19th century development of local gas networks; innovative responses to, inter alia, the challenge of incandescent electric light from the 1880s, including the expansion of the customer base and the development and active promotion of cooking and heat services – the growth, fragmentation and incoherence of the industry between the two World Wars; the post-war period that saw the industry nationalised in 1948, as the multi-fuel economy developed; the institutional, technical and social challenges associated with the conversion to North Sea natural gas in the 1960s; and innovation and change in response to the challenges that flowed from the privatisation of British Gas in 1987. The paper shows how examining past processes of innovation, transition and transformation through the lens of institutional ‘governance logics’ helps appreciate the challenges faced by system actors, technologies, institutions and regulators in the past and offers insights into the issues posed by the low-carbon transition. The paper begins by outlining some analytical concepts used in the analysis. We then examine the regime’s six past transitions. The paper concludes by considering what insights these past experiences suggest for a seventh transition towards a low-carbon economy, for the future governance of the UK gas system and its networks and particularly for natural gas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the make-up and the limitations of a multi-level governance approach in tackling issues of fuel poverty and energy transition connected to poverty in England. Although the English planning framework offers unparalleled opportunities for innovative governance arrangements, and although much has been done in this area by national and local authorities, there are important limitations to how English cities are tackling fuel poverty and energy transition in a context of energy transition coupled with deprivation. The case analysed is an archetypical formerly industrial city dealing with socio-economic and spatial regeneration issues and transferable lessons can be learned. The questions addressed in this paper are: How does a former industrial city in Northwestern Europe deal with energy transition in the face of relatively high levels of deprivation? What is the governance of energy transition in the case and how does it help deprived citizens achieve energy security, if at all? This paper relies on extensive fieldwork research, interviews with several stakeholders and policy analysis carried out for the 7th Framework PLEEC Project (Planning for Energy Efficient Cities). Preliminary conclusions point at the failing of governance arrangements to include vulnerable actors and the inadequacy of solutions found for deprived or vulnerable households in the renting sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small-scale, decentralized and community-owned renewable energy is widely acknowledged to be a desirable feature of low carbon futures, but faces a range of challenges in the context of conventional, centralized energy systems. This paper draws on transition frameworks to investigate why the UK has been an inhospitable context for community-owned renewables and assesses whether anything fundamental is changing in this regard. We give particular attention to whether political devolution, the creation of elected governments for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, has affected the trajectory of community renewables. Our analysis notes that devolution has increased political attention to community renewables, including new policy targets and support schemes. However, these initiatives are arguably less important than the persistence of key features of socio-technical regimes: market support systems for renewable energy and land-use planning arrangements that systemically favour major projects and large corporations, and keep community renewables to the margins. There is scope for rolling out hybrid pathways to community renewables, via joint ownership or through community benefit funds, but this still positions community energy as an adjunct to energy pathways dominated by large, corporate generation facilities. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a societal level exergy analysis approach developed to analyse transitions in the way that energy is supplied and contributes to economic growth in the UK, the US, Austria and Japan, throughout the last century. We assess changes in exergy and useful work consumption, energy efficiency and related GDP intensity measures of each economy. The novel data provided elucidate certain characteristics of divergence and commonality in the energy transitions studied. The results indicate that in each country the processes of industrialization, urbanisation and electrification are characterised by a marked increase in exergy and useful work supplies and per capita intensities. There is a common and continuous decrease in the exergy intensity of GDP. Moreover for each country studied the trend of increasing useful work intensity of GDP reversed in the early 1970s coincident with the first oil crisis. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Renewable energy (RE) is one of the most popular public policy orientations worldwide. Compared to some other countries and continents, Europe has gained an early awareness of energy and environmental problems in general. At the theoretical level, free-market environmentalism indicates that based on the principle of private property rights, with fewer state interventionist and regulation policies, entrepreneurs, as the driving force of the market economy, can provide better services to meet the necessity of offering RE to protect the environment more effectively. Previous studies have revealed that Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have made some progress in using the market to develop RE. However, this research did not analyze the three countries' RE conditions from the perspective of free-market environmentalism. Based on our review of the principles of free-market environmentalism, this paper originally provides an empirical study of how Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have partly conducted free-market-oriented policies to successfully achieve their policy goal of RE since the 1990s on a practical level. In particular, compared with Germany and Denmark, the UK has maintained a relatively low energy tax rate and opted for more pro-market measures since the Hayekian-Thatcherism free-market reform of 1979. The paper also discovers that Fredrich A. Hayek's theories have strongly impacted its energy liberalization reform agenda since then. Low taxes on the energy industry and electricity have alleviated the burden on the electricity enterprises and consumers in the UK. Moreover, the empirical results above show that the energy enterprises play essential roles in providing better and more affordable RE for household and industrial users in the three sampled countries. Based on the above results, the paper also warns that state intervention policies such as taxation, state subsidies, and industrial access restrictions can impede these three countries' RE targets. Additionally, our research provides reform agendas and policy suggestions to policymakers on the importance of implementing free-market environmentalism to provide more efficient RE in the post-COVID-19 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Future imaginaries of energy systems are important in how the transition to a decarbonised energy system is governed. • Demonstrator projects do not just reflect assumptions about the systems they are part of; they also test the credibility of these future imaginaries. • Values and visions linked to demonstrator projects can provide sources of critical reflection on the credibility of system imaginaries. • Data from a flexible energy systems project in south Wales, UK shows how experts are involved in the production of these localised imaginaries. Decarbonising the energy system means moving from a centralised, fossil fuel-dependent one to one based primarily on renewable energy. Visions of whole system change focus on socio-technical concepts like electrification and flexibility, rather than single technologies such as nuclear or solar. The role that technological niches might play in relation to such systemic socio-technical visions is under-researched. Traditionally, technological niches are thought to nurture new 'proto-regimes', supported by coherent visions of how technologies will help solve problems within existing socio-technical regimes. However, the relationship between socio-technical visions like flexibility and individual demonstrator projects is more complex. Interviews with experts from the FLEXIS energy systems project (south Wales, UK) show how future visions associated with a range of demonstrator projects are being developed against the backdrop of a system-level vision of a flexible, multi-vector energy system. Interview data also shows how the development of visions for demonstrators draws on social learning about place and societal values overlooked in systemic visions. Such social learning can incorporate critical reflection on key assumptions that underlie dominant system-level visions. The extent such learning is possible through the development of potential niches, however, is subject to limitations that invite further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The map shows the centroids (geometric centres) of the local gas distribution zones (dotted circles), the offshore pipeline network connecting the potential hydrogen storage sites to the UK gas terminals. The scaling of the circles is logarithmic base ten, hence the energy storage need of LDZ is generally one or two orders of magnitude smaller than the storage capacity of individual storage sites. The LDZ are indicated in italic next to their matching centroid. Their storage need in TWh is also indicated. SC: Scotland, NO: Northern England, NE: North East England, NW: North West, EM: East Midlands, WM: West Midlands, WN: Wales North, WS: Wales South, SW: South West, SO: Southern England, SE: South East, NT: North Thames, EA: East Anglia. • A new method comparing geological storage capacity to storage need is presented. • Geological hydrogen storage capacity exceeds UK heating seasonal storage needs. • Offshore UK gas fields can potentially store 2661.9 terawatt-hour of hydrogen. • Hydrogen storage is unlikely to compete with other subsurface uses. • Stores used with hydrogen, instead of natural gas, can store up to 75% less energy. Hydrogen is considered as a low-carbon substitute for natural gas in the otherwise difficult to decarbonise domestic heating sector. This study presents for the first time, a globally applicable source to sink methodology and analysis that matches geological storage capacity with energy demand. As a case study, it is applied to the domestic heating system in the UK, with a focus on maintaining the existing gas distribution network. To balance the significant annual cyclicity in energy demand for heating, hydrogen could be stored in gas fields offshore and transported via offshore pipelines to the existing gas terminals into the gas network. The hydrogen energy storage demand in the UK is estimated to be ~77.9 terawatt-hour (TWh), which is approximately 25% of the total energy from natural gas used for domestic heating. The total estimated storage capacity of the gas fields included in this study is 2661.9 TWh. The study reveals that only a few offshore gas fields are required to store enough energy as hydrogen to balance the entire seasonal demand for UK domestic heating. It also demonstrates that as so few fields are required, hydrogen storage will not compete for the subsurface space required for other low-carbon subsurface applications, such as carbon storage or compressed air energy storage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Representative pathways can be sought to characterise a larger pathway ensemble. • Clustering performance is sensitive to the distribution of pathways. • K-means is the most robust approach for pathway grouping. • Hierarchical clustering might perform better if pathway distribution is irregular. • Sectoral standardisation can reveal the trade-offs between metrics in each sector. Long-term decarbonisation pathways to achieve ambitious low-carbon targets involve a range of uncertainties. Different energy system modelling approaches can be used to systematically evaluate the influence of the uncertainties, but this often leads to an unmanageable number of pathways. Summarising the large ensemble through a more limited number of representative pathways, to inform stakeholders, can be challenging. This study thus explores how to identify representative decarbonisation pathways using clustering algorithms, which can assist in grouping similar data points in uncategorised datasets, such as pathway ensembles. However, the suitability of clustering algorithms for pathway characterisation has not been investigated to date. Hence, k-means, hierarchical clustering, Gaussian mixture model, spectral clustering, and density-based clustering are adopted for comparisons. An illustrative pathway ensemble for the United Kingdom is applied to evaluate their performance based on cluster validity indices. Three metric transformations, including power, standardisation and sectoral standardisation, are also applied to create three additional sets of pathways for testing. The k-means algorithm is found to outperform others consistently, although hierarchical clustering might also be applicable if the distribution of pathway proximity is uneven. The results also highlight the utility of the approach in revealing distinctive trade-offs between technologies among the identified representative pathways. For instance, the electrification of heating can be replaced by district heating in the residential sector. The described, novel approach can be applied to characterise other sets of pathways, with greater technological details generated by any energy system models, to reveal insights for long-term decarbonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a methodology to assess the impact of alternative electricity generation and energy storage scenarios for meeting electricity demand on a national level. The method combines real and synthetic electricity generation and demand data to investigate different decarbonization strategies using solar and wind generation and electrical energy storage. This method is applied to provide relevant case studies for two geographically similar electricity systems in New Zealand and Great Britain. Newly available solar and wind data sets at hourly resolution are used within this method for these systems to assess the potential contribution of these technologies and as such, to refresh understanding of the impact of these technologies on decarbonization strategies against historical and future demand patterns. Although wind, solar and storage technologies are found to reduce the carbon emissions in both electricity systems, a key result is quantifying the impact this has on traditional generation as a backup resource. In New Zealand an investment in wind and solar equivalent to less than 15% of the wind/solar capacity in Great Britain is found to (i) reduce fossil fuel use to less than 2% of annual electricity generation requirements in the data assessed and (ii) remove the need for continuous operation of fossil fuel plants. Further, it is shown that existing hydro storage potential could be used to create near complete decarbonization of New Zealand electricity [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National Grid, the UK's largest utility company, has produced a number of energy transition scenarios, among which "2 degrees" is the most aggressive in terms of decarbonization. This paper presents the results of a combined prospective net energy and environmental life cycle assessment of the UK electricity grid, based on such a scenario. The main findings are that the strategy is effective at drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions (albeit to a reduced degree with respect to the projected share of "zero carbon" generation taken at face value), but it entails a trade-off in terms of depletion of metal resources. The grid's potential toxicity impacts are also expected to remain substantially undiminished with respect to the present. Overall, the analysis indicates that the "2 degrees" scenario is environmentally sound and that it even leads to a modest increase in the net energy delivered to society by the grid (after accounting for the energy investments required to deploy all technologies). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electrification of heat will impact demands on power systems, potentially increasing sensitivity to weather variability. We have developed a spatio-temporal methodology for assessing electricity demand in the context of weather variability. We analyse varying levels of electrification of heat in the United Kingdom and simulate local weather impacts with an ensemble of 100 weather realisations. Across the scenarios, the maximum simulated national electricity peak demand doubles compared to today. Assuming current weather pattern, the weather-induced variability in electricity peak is projected to range from 6.1–7.8 GW (10.2–15.2% of mean peak demand) in 2020 to 6.2–14.6 GW (9.8–22.2% of mean peak demand) in 2050. We find that future weather may exacerbate the impact of electrification of heat on peak demand. However, socio-economic uncertainty predominates weather-induced variability. Electrification of heat without reducing heating demands will result in dramatic increases in peak electricity demand as well as increased exposure to weather effects. Regions experiencing a combined increase in peak demand and weather variability will likely prove to be particularly challenging for balancing demand and supply. Switching to alternative fuels such as hydrogen or measures to lower heating demand reduces the need for additional peak electricity capacity as well as mitigating impacts of extreme weather events. • Weather variability is included in a high spatio-temporal energy demand simulation. • Electrification or socio-economic demand uncertainty predominate weather variability. • Electrification of heat increases weather vulnerability and may double peak demand. • Decarbonisation by alternative fuels reduces weather impacts on electricity system. • Regions with combined increases in peak demand and weather variability are mapped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]