The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 significantly altered the debate over economic integration in North America by shifting what were largely academic discussions about next-steps in government-led economic integration projects, such as the NAFTA, toward initiatives explicitly linking economics with security, such as the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). The linkage of security to economics in North America has arguably accentuated existing asymmetries between the United States and its NAFTA partners along several dimensions of power. Social science literature on power acknowledges the challenges researchers confront in operationalizing and measuring diverse conceptions of power (Doran, 1991; Hoppman, 1998; Nye, 1990; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Waltz, 1964). Power is a highly fungible entity, and subject to the vagaries of inter-temporal augmentation, diminution, aggregation and diffusion. It also comes in several different forms and can be exercised in many different ways. Scholars of conflict management, for example, have pointed repeatedly to a structuralist paradox wherein ostensibly weaker parties to negotiations are successful at wresting significant concessions from ostensibly more powerful counterparts.Following Dahl (1957), this paper proposes to identify and operationalize elements of power (base, means, amount, and scope) within contemporary North American political economy. Further, this paper will adopt a two-period, case-study approach to the use of American power in economic relations with its NAFTA partners prior to and after September 11, 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]