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Is climate change a valid national security issue for the United States? Even taking a narrow definition of national security issues-threats to a state's core values for which it would be willing to go to war or use force, one can identify a number of ways in which climate change already constitutes a national security issue to which security specialists in the United States should pay attention. In part 1, I explore the definitional terrain of "environmental security" by offering an account of "national security" and "grand strategy" that accords with traditional conceptions of security. I also identify criteria by which climate change could constitute a threat to national security and the U.S. in particular. In parts 2-4, I assess whether the potential effects of climate change constitute national security threats for the United States. In part 2, I examine the directs effects of climate change on the territorial United States, including abrupt climate change and extreme weather events. In part 3, I discuss the effects of climate change on the extraterritorial interests of the U.S. including the links between extreme weather events and violent conflict, natural disasters and humanitarian intervention, and, finally, climate change and soft power. The final section explores the security externalities of energy and climate change, looking at the links between oil dependence, terrorism, and climate change as well as the proliferation problems associated nuclear power as a remedy for climate change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. National Security" prepared for the annual conference of the International Studies Association in Honolulu, Hawaii. It seeks to link the issue of climate change with energy security, nuclear proliferation, disasters and reputational concerns. It also aims to introduce a line of new climate change political science research that speaks to the ambitions of the original proponents of environmental security.

The paper seeks answers to the puzzle, "How is that, in the face of an overwhelming scientific consensus that global warming is real, the advanced industrialized countries cannot agree on measures to deal with the problem?" The paper is guided by two intuitions: (1) national-level decision-making processes may foreclose mutually acceptable bargains between countries and (2) the ways international norms get framed may make getting on the agenda more likely but success at the decision stage less likely and The study concludes that the international arena’s early commitments froze in preferences that were too distant from those of important players in U.S domestic politics, both Congressional and larger societal (i.e. corporate interests). At the same time, as depicted by a simple spatial model, the preferences of European polities restricted the range of acceptable compromises that could be made, thus leaving the U.S. and its European allies at odds. Through the example of global warming, the paper also seeks to ascertain the gravity and significance of the foreign policy differences between the U.S. and its allies. Here, the argument emphasized the proxy nature of global warming as part of a larger European concern about U.S. unilateralism and diffidence. Implicitly, the paper favored the notion that the character of American hegemony matters for cooperation, and that the conflict with Europe over global warming and other issues may significantly undermine the capacity for Europe to cooperate with the U.S. on issues of interest to the Americans. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2000 presidential campaign, then-candidate George W. Bush called for a "humbler" foreign policy.. Yet as President, Bush surprised both domestic and international audiences through a series of actions overtly hostile to existing multilateral policy instruments: his Administration declared the Kyoto Protocol "dead;" de-signed the treaty in support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and punished countries that failed to sign immunity agreements with the United States; undermined enforcement protocols for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions; and withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). These policy changes all occurred before September 11th, frequently cited as the “shock” that caused the United States’ dramatic shift towards a policy of unilateralism and the aggressive use of national power. The puzzle that animates this paper is, "How was this set of unilateralist ideas about foreign policy, which were not clearly evident in the campaign, able to take hold in the Republican Party and Bush Administration? How did these ideas overcome and displace the counter-vailing establishment internationalism that had largely governed the policies of the Clinton Administration and most of his predecessors since World War II?" This paper show how these unilateralist ideas gained expression by looking at several key, pre-September 11th instances of unilateralismâ€"the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC, and the ABM Treaty. Our explanation is that the Bush Administration was elected in 2000 exclusively on domestic policy grounds. Americans were not paying much attention to foreign policy in the 2000 elections. The end of the Cold War and America's unipolar moment gave the United States considerable slack for what kind of foreign policy it would pursue. However, undercurrents of traditional isolationism (what we call conservative nationalism) and neo-conservativism (what we call liberal nationalism) both were rising up in the Republican Party to cut against establishment internationalism, the governing philosophy of the Cold War era that united liberal internationalists and conservative internationalists (in other words, realists) in a broadly multilateralist grand coalition. The twin strands of the new anti-multilateralism in the Republican Party were exemplified in Congress by Jesse Helms (largely a conservative nationalist) and in the Executive Branch by Paul Wolfowitz (largely a liberal nationalist). While they differed over the degree to which U.S. influence could reshape the world in its image, both were united in their relative hostility to the existing multilateral instruments and orientations that had characterized Cold War and Clinton era policymaking. The 2000 elections and the capture of the Executive Branch and both houses of Congress, we argue, allowed those groups to gain politically and bureaucratically at the expense of liberal and conservative internationalists through chairmanships of key Congressional committees as well as the appointments process in the Executive Branch. This electoral change thus allowed expression of these tendencies which were then reinforced by the events of September 11th, 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is climate change a valid national security issue for the United States? Even taking a narrow definition of national security, there are clearly ways in which climate change already constitutes a national security concern for the United States. This article evaluates a number of these potential linkages including the directs effects of climate change on the territorial United States, the effects of climate change on the country's extraterritorial interests, and the security externalities of energy and climate change. I offer an account of Ònational securityÓ that is consistent with conventional understandings of security but that also leaves room for environmental harms. In so doing, I also identify criteria by which climate change could constitute a threat to national security. While some of these linkages--the risks from rising sea levels--may have been over-dramatized by enthusiastic advocates, other examples--such as the risks of extreme weather events both to the homeland and to America's strategic interests overseas--may be more likely to cause security problems for the United States in the short- to medium-run. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What has happened to establishment internationalism in U.S. foreign policy? Conventional wisdom is rapidly becoming that generational, demographic, and cultural changes within the United States are inexorably leading to the decline of the broad, post-war internationalist consensus that dominated American foreign policy since 1945. Despite considerable diversity, this new cohort of foreign policy types is thought to be more unilateralist and America-first oriented than the preceding generation, and its rise is thought to be a product of both the death of the World War II generation of diplomats and the ascension of new groups and individuals as the political center of gravity in the US has shifted South and West. Despite the frequent assertion that this change has taken place, however, no study has analyzed whether or not in representation or belief if the foreign policy establishment that has emerged is qualitatively or compositionally different. To measure whether or not internationalist representation and thought has experienced a secular decline, this paper identifies a set of empirical indicators to track (1) changes in foreign policy voting patterns by members of Congress (2) changes in representation in the foreign policy elite and (3) changes of beliefs of the main foreign policy players in the Executive Branch and the U.S. Congress. First, we track the voting scores of members of Congress for their “conservative” or “liberal” character using the foreign policy votes from the American Conservative Union (1970-2004) and Americans for Democratic Action (1948-2004). Our second set of indicators track the state of birth, educational profile, and formative international experience of a cross-section of the U.S. foreign policy-making elite, including congressional chairmen and appointed positions in the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. Our third and fourth sets of indicators seek to track the ideational patterns of elite thought as represented by Presidential State of the Union addresses and party platform manifestos. While we find support for increasing partisan polarization in Congress on foreign policy, there is only mixed evidence to suggest that internationalism has experienced a secular decline. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the source and significance of the transatlantic divide between the U.S. and Europe. The paper examines several explanations such as Robert Kagan’s argument that American preferences for unilateralism and European preferences for multilateralism stem from underlying power positions. Drawing on John Ikenberry’s work, the essay notes that multilateralism is often a successful tool of great powers. The paper then considers Charles Kupchan’s argument that great powers inevitably decline. With Europe on the rise and eager to play a more dominant role, Kupchan suggests more conflict can be expected. As evinced by a widening cultural gap on issues such as the death penalty, Kupchan envisions strains in the transatlantic alliance that only conscientious policymakers can mute. While sympathetic to Kupchan’s argument, the essay takes issue with his assessment of European cohesiveness and the extent of the values gap. Through the analysis of climate change politics, the paper concludes that domestic political processes and institutional configurations undermine transatlantic cooperation and accentuate values differences, particularly on issues such as the use of force. Like Kupchan, the essay suggests that policymakers can mitigate these problems, but success will require appeals to respective domestic polities that compromises are necessary to further the common good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]