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Introduction: In May 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention disseminated an alert advising that "a few" persons with Nirmatrelvir/ritonavir (NM/R)-associated rebound of COVID-19 infection had been identified. Three case reports appearing as pre-print postings described the first cases. Analyses in March 2023 by NM/R's manufacturer and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reported no association between NM/R and COVID-19 rebound in a large phase 3 randomized clinical trial. Our study evaluated if social media databases or electronically disseminated new articles might provide insights related to the putative new toxicity, NM/R-associated COVID-19 rebound., Methods: Information on NM/R-associated COVID-19 rebound cases was abstracted from preprint postings of non-peer-reviewed manuscripts, social media websites, electronically disseminated print and television media reports, a new FDA adverse event database for drugs that received Emergency Use Approval, and news articles in scientific journals., Results: Thirty-five persons experienced presumed or documented NM/R-associated COVID-19 rebound, based on information described in preprint services (n = 27), Twitter postings and related news articles (n = 7), and news articles without related Twitter reports (n = 1). These reports included information on dates of initial COVID-19 illness and rebound onset, COVID-19 testing, vaccine status, presentation, and outcome. A new FDA safety database identified 12,500 possible cases of this toxicity, but the quality of these data was poor. Preprint postings preceded peer-reviewed publications describing the same cases by four months. Social media websites including Instagram, Reddit, YouTube, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Health Alert Network, CDC Twitter, and Facebook did not provide clinically meaningful information on individual cases., Conclusion: Preprint services and Twitter facilitated identification of the largest case series of NM/R-associated COVID-19 rebound. The cases were reported in non-peer-reviewed media several weeks prior to the first peer-reviewed electronically disseminated publication of one person with this diagnosis., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: © 2024 Bennett et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)

Introduction: Nuclear reactor incidents and bioterrorism outbreaks are concerning public health disasters. Little is known about US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved agents that can mitigate consequences of these events. We review FDA data supporting regulatory approvals of these agents., Areas Covered: We reviewed pharmaceutical products approved to treat Hematopoietic Acute Radiation Syndrome (H-ARS) and to treat or prevent pulmonary infections following Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) exposure. Four drugs were approved for H-ARS: granulocyte-colony stimulating factor (G-CSF), granulocyte/macrophage colony stimulating factor, pegylated G-CSF, and romiplostim. For bioterrorism-associated anthrax, the FDA approved five antibiotics (doxycycline, penicillin-G, levofloxacin, moxifloxacin, and ciprofloxacin), two monoclonal antibodies (obiltoxaximab and raxibacumab), one polyclonal antitoxin (Anthrax Immune Globulin Intravenous) and two vaccines (Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed and Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed with an adjuvant). A national stockpile system ensures that communities have ready access to these agents. Our literature search was based on data included in drugs@FDA (2001-2023)., Expert Opinion: Two potential mass public health disasters are aerosolized anthrax dissemination and radiological incidents. Five agents authorized for anthrax emergencies only have FDA approval for this indication, five antibiotics have FDA approvals as antibiotics for common infections and for bacillus anthrax, and four agents have regulatory approvals for supportive care for cancer and for radiological incidents.

Biosimilars are biologic drug products that are highly similar to reference products in analytic features, pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics, immunogenicity, safety, and efficacy. Biosimilar epoetin received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval in 2018. The manufacturer received an FDA nonapproval letter in 2017, despite receiving a favorable review by FDA's Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee (ODAC) and an FDA nonapproval letter in 2015 for an earlier formulation. We discuss the 2018 FDA approval, the 2017 FDA ODAC Committee review, and the FDA complete response letters in 2015 and 2017; review concepts of litigation, naming, labeling, substitution, interchangeability, and pharmacovigilance; review European and U.S. oncology experiences with biosimilar epoetin; and review the safety of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents. In 2020, policy statements from AETNA, United Health Care, and Humana indicated that new epoetin oncology starts must be for biosimilar epoetin unless medical need for other epoetins is documented. Empirical studies report that as of 2012, reference epoetin use decreased from 40%-60% of all patients with cancer with chemotherapy-induced anemia to <5% of such patients because of safety concerns. Between 2018 and 2020, biosimilar epoetin use varied, increasing to 81% among one private insurer's patients covered by Medicare whose cancer care is administered with Oncology Analytics and to 41% with the same private insurer's patients with cancer covered by commercial health insurance and administered by the private insurer, to 0% in several Veterans Administration Hospitals, increasing to 100% in one large county hospital in California, and with yet-to-be-reported data from most oncology settings. We conclude that biosimilar epoetin appears to have overcome some barriers since 2015, although current uptake in the U.S. is variable. Pricing and safety considerations for all erythropoiesis-stimulating agents are primary determinants of biosimilar epoetin oncology uptake. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE: Few oncologists understand substitution and interchangeability of biosimilars with reference drugs. Epoetin biosimilar is new to the market, and physician and patient understanding is limited. The development of epoetin biosimilar is not familiar to oncologists., (© 2021 AlphaMed Press.)

The EU, the USA, and Japan account for the majority of biological pharmacotherapy use worldwide. Biosimilar regulatory approval pathways were authorised in the EU (2006), in Japan (2009), and in the USA (2015), to facilitate approval of biological drugs that are highly similar to reference products and to encourage market competition. Between 2007 and 2020, 33 biosimilars for oncology were approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), 16 by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and ten by the Japan Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA). Some of these approved applications were initially rejected because of manufacturing concerns (four of 36 [11%] with the EMA, seven of 16 [44%] with the FDA, none of ten for the PMDA). Median times from initial regulatory submission before approval of oncology biosimilars were 1·5 years (EMA), 1·3 years (FDA), and 0·9 years (PMDA). Pharmacists can substitute biosimilars for reference biologics in some EU countries, but not in the USA or Japan. US regulation prohibits substitution, unless the biosimilar has been approved as interchangeable, a designation not yet achieved for any biosimilar in the USA. Japan does not permit biosimilar substitution, as prescribers must include the product name on each prescription and that specific product must be given to the patient. Policy Reviews published in 2014 and 2016 in The Lancet Oncology focused on premarket and postmarket policies for oncology biosimilars before most of these drugs received regulatory approval. In this Policy Review from the Southern Network on Adverse Reactions, we identify factors preventing the effective launch of oncology biosimilars. Introduction to the market has been more challenging with therapeutic than for supportive care oncology biosimilars. Addressing region-specific competition barriers and educational needs would improve the regulatory approval process and market launches for these biologics, therefore expanding patient access to these products in the EU, the USA, and Japan., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Erythropoisis stimulating agent (ESA) use was addressed in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Oncology Drug Advisory Committee (ODAC) meetings between 2004 and 2008. FDA safety-focused regulatory actions occurred in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, black box warnings advised of early death and venous thromboembolism (VTE) risks with ESAs in oncology. In 2010, a Risk Evaluation Strategies (REMS) was initiated, with cancer patient consent that mortality and VTE risks were noted with ESAs. We report warnings and REMS impacts on ESA utilization among Veterans Administration (VA) cancer patients with chemotherapy-induced anemia (CIA). Data were from Veterans Affairs database (2003-2012). Epoetin and darbepoetin use were primary outcomes. Segmented linear regression was used to estimate changes in ESA use levels and trends, clinical appropriateness, and adverse events (VTEs) among chemotherapy-treated cancer patients. To estimate changes in level of drug prescription rate after policy actions, model-specific indicator variables as covariates based on specific actions were included. ESA use fell by 95% and 90% from 2005, for epoetin and darbepoetin, from 22% and 11%, respectively, to 1% and 1%, respectively, among cancer patients with CIA, respectively (p<0.01). Following REMS in 2010, mean hematocrit levels at ESA initiation decreased from 30% to 21% (p<0.01). Black box warnings preceded decreased ESA use among VA cancer patients with CIA. REMS was followed by reduced hematocrit levels at ESA initiation. Our findings contrast with privately- insured and Medicaid insured cancer patient data on chemotherapy-induced anemia where ESA use decreased to 3% to 7% by 2010-2012. By 2012, the era of ESA administration to VA to cancer patients had ended but the warnings remain relevant and significant. In 2019, oncology/hematology national guidelines (ASCO/ASH) recommend that cancer patients with chemotherapy-induced anemia should receive ESAs or red blood cell transfusions after risk-benefit evaluation., Competing Interests: The authors have read the journal’s policy and have the following competing interests to declare: LB is a paid employee of Oncology Analytics in Plantation, Florida (https://www.oncologyanalytics.com/). There are no patents, products in development or marketed products associated with this research to declare. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.

Oncology-associated adverse drug/device reactions can be fatal. Some clinicians who treat single patients with severe oncology-associated toxicities have researched case series and published this information. We investigated motivations and experiences of select individuals leading such efforts. Clinicians treating individual patients who developed oncology-associated serious adverse drug events were asked to participate. Inclusion criteria included having index patient information, reporting case series, and being collaborative with investigators from two National Institutes of Health funded pharmacovigilance networks. Thirty-minute interviews addressed investigational motivation, feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers, FDA personnel, and academic leadership, and recommendations for improving pharmacovigilance. Responses were analyzed using constant comparative methods of qualitative analysis. Overall, 18 clinicians met inclusion criteria and 14 interviewees are included. Primary motivations were scientific curiosity, expressed by six clinicians. A less common theme was public health related (three clinicians). Six clinicians received feedback characterized as supportive from academic leaders, while four clinicians received feedback characterized as negative. Three clinicians reported that following the case series publication they were invited to speak at academic institutions worldwide. Responses from pharmaceutical manufacturers were characterized as negative by 12 clinicians. One clinician's wife called the post-reporting time the "Maalox month," while another clinician reported that the manufacturer collaboratively offered to identify additional cases of the toxicity. Responses from FDA employees were characterized as collaborative for two clinicians, neutral for five clinicians, unresponsive for negative by six clinicians. Three clinicians endorsed developing improved reporting mechanisms for individual physicians, while 11 clinicians endorsed safety activities that should be undertaken by persons other than a motivated clinician who personally treats a patient with a severe adverse drug/device reaction. Our study provides some of the first reports of clinician motivations and experiences with reporting serious or potentially fatal oncology-associated adverse drug or device reactions. Overall, it appears that negative feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers and mixed feedback from the academic community and/or the FDA were reported. Big data, registries, Data Safety Monitoring Boards, and pharmacogenetic studies may facilitate improved pharmacovigilance efforts for oncology-associated adverse drug reactions. These initiatives overcome concerns related to complacency, indifference, ignorance, and system-level problems as barriers to documenting and reporting adverse drug events- barriers that have been previously reported for clinician reporting of serious adverse drug reactions., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Biosimilar filgrastims are primarily indicated for chemotherapy-induced neutropenia prevention. They are less expensive formulations of branded filgrastim, and biosimilar filgrastim was the first biosimilar oncology drug administered in European Union (EU) countries, Japan, and the U.S. Fourteen biosimilar filgrastims have been marketed in EU countries, Japan, the U.S., and Canada since 2008, 2012, 2015, and 2016, respectively. We reviewed experiences and policies for biosimilar filgrastim markets in EU countries and Japan, where uptake has been rapid, and in the U.S. and Canada, where experience is rapidly emerging. U.S. regulations for designating biosimilar interchangeability are under development, and such regulations have not been developed in most other countries. Pharmaceutical substitution is allowed for new filgrastim starts in some EU countries and in Canada, but not Japan and the U.S. In EU countries, biosimilar adoption is facilitated with favorable hospital tender offers. U.S. adoption is reportedly 24%, while the second filgrastim biosimilar is priced 30% lower than branded filgrastim and 20% lower than the first biosimilar filgrastim approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Utilization is about 60% in EU countries, where biosimilar filgrastim is marketed at a 30%-40% discount. In Japan, biosimilar filgrastim utilization is 45%, primarily because of 35% discounts negotiated by Central Insurance and hospital-only markets. Overall, biosimilar filgrastim adoption barriers are small in many EU countries and Japan and are diminishing in Canada in the U.S. Policies facilitating improved U.S. adoption of biosimilar filgrastim, based on positive experiences in EU countries and Japan, including favorable insurance coverage; larger price discount relative to reference filgrastim pricing; closing of the "rebate trap" with transparent pricing information; formal educational efforts of patients, physicians, caregivers, and providers; and allowance of pharmaceutical substitution of biosimilar versus reference filgrastim, should be considered. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE: We reviewed experiences and policies for biosimilar filgrastims in Europe, Japan, Canada, and the U.S. Postmarketing harmonization of regulatory policies for biosimilar filgrastims has not occurred. Acceptance of biosimilar filgrastims for branded filgrastim, increasing in the U.S. and in Canada, is commonplace in Japan and Europe. In the U.S., some factors, accepted in Europe or Japan, could improve uptake, including acceptance of biosimilars as safe and effective; larger cost savings, decreasing "rebate traps" where pharmaceutical benefit managers support branded filgrastim, decreased use of patent litigation/challenges, and allowing pharmacists to routinely substitute biosimilar for branded filgrastim., Competing Interests: Disclosures of potential conflicts of interest may be found at the end of this article., (© AlphaMed Press 2019.)

To explain bimodal relapse patterns observed in breast cancer data, we have proposed that metastatic breast cancer growth commonly includes periods of temporary dormancy at both the single cell phase and the avascular micrometastasis phase. The half-lives of these states are 1 and 2 years respectively. We also suggested that surgery to remove the primary tumor often terminates dormancy resulting in accelerated relapses. These iatrogenic events are very common in that over half of all metastatic relapses progress in that manner. Assuming this is true, there should be ample and clear evidence in clinical data. We review here the breast cancer paradigm from early detection, through treatment and follow-up, and consider how dormancy and surgery-driven escape from dormancy would be observed. We examine mammography data, effectiveness of adjuvant chemotherapy, heterogeneity and aggressiveness, timing of surgery within the menstrual cycle and racial differences in outcome. Dormancy can be identified in these diverse data but most conspicuous is the sudden escape from dormancy following primary surgery. These quantitative findings provide linkage between experimental studies of tumor dormancy and clinical efforts to improve patient outcome.

Without organized clinical trials, we are doomed to repeat our mistakes endlessly. There are many genuine conflicts of interest intrinsic to clinical research. Some of these arise from the necessity of admitting that we as physicians do not know the best way to treat every disease or each patient and that all treatments currently available for this patient's disease are suboptimal. With humility and honesty, these conflicts of interest can be overcome. Surmounting other more palpable ones, however, is equally challenging. Supporting the participation of our patients in clinical trials requires a practical reconfiguration of practice patterns, different and more record keeping, and the surrender of autonomy. Each of these facts has economic implications. Practitioners who are paid according to the specific services they provide risk both significant income loss and cost increase by participating in clinical trials. The Department of Veterans Affairs is a charter member of the cancer clinical trials establishment and the originator of a long string of important firsts in cancer research. The nature of the VA system eliminates or diminishes the impact of many of the conflicts of interest that hinder clinical trial participation. This globally budgeted comprehensive system, which theoretically is responsible for the care of more citizens than is the entire Canadian national health service, is an unique clinical research resource. Some of the high points of the VA contributions to cancer treatment development are listed in this paper. Hopefully, this overview makes the point that the VA clinical research enterprise is a treasure that can ask critical questions that, because of irresolvable economic conflicts of interest, can be asked neither in the fee-for-service nor the prepaid health maintenance settings. This clinical cancer research resource must be nurtured and supported, and it must continue to address critical questions that it alone can answer.