Search

The present research aims to examine whether the questions in the Program for the International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 reading literacy instrument display differential item functioning (DIF) among the Turkish, French, and American samples based on univariate and multivariate matching techniques before and after the total score, which is the matching variable, is purified of the items flagged with DIF. The study is a correlational survey model research, and the participants of the study consist of 4459 Turkish, French, and American students who took booklets 1, 3, 4, and 6 in the PISA 2009 reading literacy measure. Univariate and multivariate (bivariate, trivariate, and quadrivariate) DIF analyses were performed through logistic regression before and after purifying the matching variable off the items displaying DIF. Literature was used to detect extra matching variables, and multiple linear regression analysis was carried out. As a result of the analyses, it was discovered that using extra matching variables apart from the total score reduces type I errors. It was also concluded that the exclusion of DIF items (removal of items with DIF) while calculating the total score led to variation in the number of questions detected as DIF and DIF levels of the items, although it did not yield consistent results.

Copyright of Dinbilimleri Journal is the property of Dinbilimleri Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The statewide system of health insurance exchanges established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 will allow millions of U.S. citizens to change their health care policies more easily than they can switch automobile or homeowner insurance coverages, because deniability based on prior claim history is illegal. Focusing on this consumer endogeneity of health insurance policy choice, we examine the individual moral hazard welfare implications of a reduction in the price of medical care, which is a potential consequence of the ACA. We show that endogenous policy choice plays a key role in determining the welfare outcome. While moral hazard welfare improvement is not precluded, a distinctly possible outcome is that the consumer revises his/her choice of insurance policy so as to retain some portion of the reduction in expenditure risk caused by the medical care price decrease. In this event, moral hazard welfare loss is higher than it was before the price decrease, although the increased loss is tempered by the endogenous contract choice effect. This result resuscitates an old conventional wisdom. ( JEL I11, I13, I30) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the Cukurova University Institute of Social Sciences is the property of Cukurova University Institute of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The gross price elasticity of demand for medical care is decomposed into two separate observable components: the medical care gross price elasticity of insurance choice and the cost-sharing elasticity of medical care. When consumers alter their choice of health-care plans, the price elasticity of medical care is no longer equivalent to the cost-sharing elasticity; using the latter as a proxy for the former may produce misleading results. We present conditions under which the medical care price elasticity is positive, the case of a quasi-Giffen good, and provide a theoretical foundation for extant empirical findings of a positive medical care price elasticity of insurance demand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]