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Study Objectives: To quantify the readiness of individual academic emergency departments (EDs) in the United States for an outbreak of pandemic influenza. Methods, design, and setting: Cross-sectional assessment of influenza pandemic preparedness level of EDs in the United States via survey of medical directors and department chairs from the 135 academic emergency medicine departments in the United States. Preparedness assessed using a novel score of 15 critical preparedness indicators. Data analysis consisted of summary statistics, χ 2 , and ANOVA., Participants: ED medical directors and department chairs., Results: One hundred and thirty academic emergency medicine departments contacted; 66 (50.4 percent) responded. Approximately half (56.0 percent) stated their ED had a written plan for pandemic influenza response. Mean preparedness score was 7.2 (SD = 4.0) out of 15 (48.0 percent); only one program (1.5 percent) achieved a perfect score. Respondents from programs with larger EDs (=30 beds) were more likely to have a higher preparedness score (p < 0.035), an ED pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.004) and a hospital pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.007). Respondents from programs with larger EDs were more likely to feel that their ED was prepared for a pandemic or other major disease outbreak (p = 0.01). Only one-third (34.0 percent) felt their ED was prepared for a major disease outbreak, and only 27 percent felt their hospital was prepared to respond to a major disease outbreak., Conclusions: Significant deficits in preparedness for pandemic influenza and other disease outbreaks exist in US EDs, relative to HHS guidelines, which appear to be related in part to ED size. Further study should be undertaken to determine the barriers to appropriate pandemic preparedness, as well as to develop and validate preparedness metrics.

Objective: To assess the level of pandemic preparedness at emergency departments (EDs) around the country and to better understand current barriers to preparedness in the United States represented by health professionals in the American College of Emergency Physician (ACEP) Disaster Medicine Section (DMS). Methods, design, and setting: A cross-sectional survey of ACEP DMS members was performed. A total of 300 members were surveyed both via e-mail and with paper surveys during the 2009 ACEP Scientific Assembly DMS Meeting. An optional comments section was included for section members' perspectives on barriers to preparedness. A 15-item pandemic preparedness score was calculated for each respondent based on key preparedness indicators as defined by the authors. Results were analyzed with descriptive statistics, χ 2 analysis, Cochran-Armitage trend test, and analysis of variance. Free text comments were coded and subjected to frequency-based analysis., Results: A total of 92 DMS members completed the survey with a response rate of 31 percent. Although 85 percent of those surveyed indicated that their hospital had a plan for pandemic influenza response and other infectious disease threats, only 68 percent indicated that their ED had a plan, and 52 percent indicated that their hospital or ED had conducted disaster preparedness drills. Only 57 percent indicated that there was a plan to augment ED staff in the event of a staffing shortage, and 63 percent indicated that there were adequate supplies of personal protective equipment. While 63 percent of respondents indicated that their ED had a plan for distribution of vaccines and antivirals, only 32 percent of EDs had a plan for allocation of ventilators. A total of 42 percent of respondents felt that their ED was prepared in the event of a pandemic influenza or other disease outbreak, and only 35 percent felt that their hospital was prepared. The average pandemic preparedness score among respondents was 8.30 of a total of 15. Larger EDs were more likely to have a higher preparedness score (p = 0.03) and more likely to have a pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.037). Some major barriers to preparedness cited by section members included lack of local administration support, challenges in funding, need for dedicated disaster preparedness personnel, staffing shortages, and a lack of communication among disaster response agencies, particularly at the federal level., Conclusions: There appear to be significant gaps in pandemic influenza and other infectious disease outbreak planning among the hospitals where ACEP DMS members work. This may reflect a broader underlying inadequacy of preparedness measures.

A total of 20 commercial cigarette and 16 commercial smokeless tobacco products were assayed for 96 compounds listed as harmful and potentially harmful constituents (HPHCs) by the US Food and Drug Administration. For each product, a single lot was used for all testing. Both International Organization for Standardization and Health Canada smoking regimens were used for cigarette testing. For those HPHCs detected, measured levels were consistent with levels reported in the literature, however substantial assay variability (measured as average relative standard deviation) was found for most results. Using an abbreviated list of HPHCs, statistically significant differences for most of these HPHCs occurred when results were obtained 4-6months apart (i.e., temporal variability). The assay variability and temporal variability demonstrate the need for standardized analytical methods with defined repeatability and reproducibility for each HPHC using certified reference standards. Temporal variability also means that simple conventional comparisons, such as two-sample t-tests, are inappropriate for comparing products tested at different points in time from the same laboratory or from different laboratories. Until capable laboratories use standardized assays with established repeatability, reproducibility, and certified reference standards, the resulting HPHC data will be unreliable for product comparisons or other decision making in regulatory science., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Objective: To assess the level of pandemic preparedness at emergency departments (EDs) around the country and to better understand current barriers to preparedness in the United States represented by health professionals in the American College of Emergency Physician (ACEP) Disaster Medicine Section (DMS). METHODS, DESIGN, and, Setting: A cross-sectional survey of ACEP DMS members was performed. A total of 300 members were surveyed both via e-mail and with paper surveys during the 2009 ACEP Scientific Assembly DMS Meeting. An optional comments section was included for section members'perspectives on barriers to preparedness. A 15-item pandemic preparedness score was calculated for each respondent based on key preparedness indicators as defined by the authors. Results were analyzed with descriptive statistics, Chi2 analysis, Cochran-Armitage trend test, and analysis of variance. Free text comments were coded and subjected to frequency-based analysis., Results: A total of 92 DMS members completed the survey with a response rate of31 percent. Although 85 percent of those surveyed indicated that their hospital had a plan for pandemic influenza response and other infectious disease threats, only 68 percent indicated that their ED had a plan, and 52 percent indicated that their hospital or ED had conducted disaster preparedness drills. Only 57 percent indicated that there was a plan to augment ED staff in the event of a staffing shortage, and 63 percent indicated that there were adequate supplies of personal protective equipment. While 63 percent of respondents indicated that their ED had a plan for distribution of vaccines and antivirals, only 32 percent ofEDs had a plan for allocation of ventilators. A total of 42 percent of respondents felt that their ED was prepared in the event of a pandemic influenza or other disease outbreak, and only 35 percent felt that their hospital was prepared. The average pandemic preparedness score among respondents was 8.30 of a total of 15. Larger EDs were more likely to have a higher preparedness score (p=0.03) and more likely to have a pandemic preparedness plan (p=0.037). Some major barriers to preparedness cited by section members included lack of local administration support, challenges in funding, need for dedicated disaster preparedness personnel, staffing shortages, and a lack of communication among disaster response agencies, particularly at the federal level., Conclusions: There appear to be significant gaps in pandemic influenza and other infectious disease outbreak planning among the hospitals where ACEP DMS members work. This may reflect a broader underlying inadequacy of preparedness measures.

Civilian humanitarian assistance organizations and military forces are working in a similar direction in many humanitarian operations around the world. However, tensions exist over the role of the military in such operations. The purpose of this article is to review cultural perspectives of civilian and military actors and to discuss recent developments in civil-military humanitarian collaboration in the provision of health services in Iraq for guiding such collaborative efforts in postconflict and other settings in future. Optimal collaborative efforts are most likely to be achieved through the following tenets: defining appropriate roles for military forces at the beginning of humanitarian operations (optimally the provision of transportation, logistical coordination, and security), promoting development of ongoing relationships between civilian and military agencies, establishment of humanitarian aid training programs for Department of Defense personnel, and the need for the military to develop and use quantitative aid impact indicators for assuring quality and effectiveness of humanitarian aid.

Study Objectives: To quantify the readiness of individual academic emergency departments (EDs) in the United States for an outbreak of pandemic influenza. METHODS, DESIGN, AND SETTING: Cross-sectional assessment of influenza pandemic preparedness level of EDs in the United States via survey of medical directors and department chairs from the 135 academic emergency medicine departments in the United States. Preparedness assessed using a novel score of 15 critical preparedness indicators. Data analysis consisted of summary statistics, chi2, and ANOVA., Participants: ED medical directors and department chairs., Results: One hundred and thirty academic emergency medicine departments contacted; 66 (50.4 percent) responded. Approximately half (56.0 percent) stated their ED had a written plan for pandemic influenza response. Mean preparedness score was 7.2 (SD = 4.0) out of 15 (48.0 percent); only one program (1.5 percent) achieved a perfect score. Respondents from programs with larger EDs (= 30 beds) were more likely to have a higher preparedness score (p < 0.035), an ED pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.004) and a hospital pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.007). Respondents from programs with larger EDs were more likely to feel that their ED was prepared for a pandemic or other major disease outbreak (p = 0.01). Only one-third (34.0 percent) felt their ED was prepared for a major disease outbreak, and only 27 percent felt their hospital was prepared to respond to a major disease outbreak., Conclusions: Significant deficits in preparedness for pandemic influenza and other disease outbreaks exist in US EDs, relative to HHS guidelines, which appear to be related in part to ED size. Further study should be undertaken to determine the barriers to appropriate pandemic preparedness, as well as to develop and validate preparedness metrics.

Background: The conduct of research in the combat and disaster environments shares many of the same fundamental principles and regulations that govern civilian biomedical research. However, Department of Defense research protocols stipulate additional requirements designed to preserve servicemembers' informed consent rights, uphold ethical standards, and protect sensitive or classified information. The authors reviewed studies that have been approved for the conduct of research in current combat operations and also discuss their applicability in disaster settings., Methods: This is a descriptive, retrospective study of protocols that have currently been approved for conduct of research in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom., Results: During the period of July 2005 through October 2007, 38 retrospective chart review protocols, seven prospective studies requiring consent or an alteration of the consent document and 12 prospective observational studies were submitted through the Deployed Research Committee in Iraq for review and approval at the Brooke Army Medical Center Institutional Review Board (IRB). A total of 55 protocols were approved by the IRB for implementation in the Iraq combat theater. Most of these protocols involved trauma care treatment. One prospective study investigating the effects of blast-concussive injuries on US Soldiers in Iraq requiring informed consent was reviewed and approved., Conclusions: The conduct of military medical research has, and will make, significant and lasting contributions to the practice of both civilian and military medicine. Although policies and regulations to conduct research and release-associated findings often seem cumbersome and stringent, these added hurdles serve not only to ensure protection of the rights of human subjects during a time of potentially increased vulnerability, but also to protect the security interests of US troops. Many of these principles and practices are directly applicable in disaster research environments.