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June Carbone and Naomi Cahn argue that growing earnings inequality and the increased educational attainment of women, relative to men, have led to declining marriage rates for less-educated women and an increase in positive assortative matching since the 1970s. These trends have negatively affected the welfare of children, as they increase the proportion of poor, single-female-headed households. Using data on marriage markets defined by state, race and time, and the Choo-Siow marriage matching function, this review provides a quantitative assessment of these claims. We show that changes in earnings inequality had a qualitatively consistent but modest quantitative impact on marriage rates and positive assortative matching. Neither changes in the wage distributions nor educational attainments can explain the large decline in marriage rates over this period. (JEL C78, D63, J12, J15, J16, J31) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a tractable framework for studying frictionless matching in education and labor markets when individuals have heterogeneous communication and cognitive skills. In the model, there are gains to specialization and team production, but specialization requires communication and coordination between team members. Individuals accumulate cognitive skills in schools when young. As adults, they decide whether to work as a manager or a worker in a firm or become a teacher in a school. Individuals with more communication skills will become either managers or teachers and earn higher wages. Each manager manages several workers and each teacher teaches several students, with their span of control being determined by their communication skill. These individuals also invest discretely more in education than marginally different individuals who become workers. Equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of an utilitarian social planner solving a linear programming problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects. It rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations. The model was used to estimate U.S. marital behavior in 1971/72 and 1981/82. The marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade. Unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results, the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper estimates the e ects of federal research funding on research outcomes at 68 research universities. We provide a new interpretation of the instrumental variable estimate of the coe cient in a regression of the output of an institution on an input. Absent parameter heterogeneity, it captures the total change in output when an institution obtains an additional unit of the input that may be correlated with the other inputs that a ect the output measure. Our instrument for research funding is alumni representation on U.S. Congressional appropriations committees. Our results suggest an increase of $1 million in federal research funding (1996$) to a university results in 10 more articles and 0.2 more patents. The change in citations per article is negative but very small and imprecisely measured. As a rst approximation, increasing federal research funding on the margin results in more, but not necessarily higher quality, research output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how up-or-out rules operate as a screening device in the market for lawyers. Using data on large New York law firms, we show that firm growth is a slow and uncertain process because performance as an associate is not an especially informative signal about whether a lawyer will make a good partner and because the costs of mistaken promotion are relatively high. A newly hired associate is unlikely to be a suitable partner and the screening process is relatively imprecise. Firm growth therefore contributes between 5%-7% of the present value of profits of a law firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]