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Fossil fuel corporations play a significant role in promoting their interests in schools and other educational institutions, a practice that has recently been labelled as 'petro-pedagogy.' But this role goes beyond the production of the pro-petroleum and anti-science corporate propaganda that tends to attract the most critical attention. In this article, I present a case study of the involvement of BP, one of the world's largest fossil fuel corporations, in primary and secondary education in the United Kingdom. As practiced by BP, petro-pedagogy constitutes a core part of a corporate education reform network that, for the past decade, has focused on promoting a neoliberal model of STEM education in schools around the world. This model, based on corporate and capitalist interests, poses a significant threat to our collective efforts to tackle the global climate crisis.

Talk of the rise of a global war for talent and emergence of a new global meritocracy has spread from the literature on human resource management to shape nation-state discourse on managed migration and immigration reform. This article examines the implications that the global war for talent have for education policy. Given that this talent war is a product of neoliberalism, it raises many of the same concerns for educators as neoliberalism in general: the embrace and promotion of social, economic and educational inequality; and a narrow, market-based conception of education, skill and talent. This article argues, however, that the global war for talent represents a new phase in neoliberalism, as it seeks to liberalise the global movement not just of capital and commodities, but of high skill labour as well. In this, it threatens to undercut some of the founding assumptions and goals that have shaped national education policy in OECD countries throughout the post-World War II period, and raises serious concerns for how we are to think about and pursue equality, inclusion and fairness in and through education in the future.

The Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, Robert Birgeneau, told "Time" magazine recently that America is in "an economic war" with the world and "the importance of investing in long-term research for winning that war hasn't been understood". This article argues that such comments are not just metaphorical or unfortunate word choices, but instead reveal deep truths about the role of American universities globally. The fact that people such as Birgeneau, as head of a "world class" university, line up so readily behind US nationalism and militarism has serious implications for how we need to understand higher education not just in America but worldwide.

Background Phase III clinical trials and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory decisions are critical for success of new drugs and can influence a company’s market valuation. Knowledge of trial results before they are made public (ie, “inside information”) can affect the price of a drug company’s stock. We examined the stock prices of companies before and after public announcements regarding experimental anticancer drugs owned by the companies. Methods We identified drugs that were undergoing evaluation in phase III trials or for regulatory approval by the US FDA from January 2000 to January 2009. Stock prices of companies that owned such drugs were analyzed for 120 trading days before and after the first public announcement of 1) results of clinical trials with positive and negative outcomes and 2) positive and negative regulatory decisions. All statistical tests were two-sided. Results We identified public announcements from 23 positive trials and 36 negative trials and from 41 positive and nine negative FDA regulatory decisions. The mean stock price for the 120 trading days before a phase III clinical trial announcement increased by 13.7% (95% confidence interval = −2.2% to 29.6%) for companies that reported positive trials and decreased by 0.7% (95% confidence interval = −13.8% to 12.3%) for companies that reported negative trials (P = .09). In a post hoc analysis comparing the stock price averaged over 60 trading days before and after day −60 relative to the clinical trial announcement, the mean stock price increased by 9.4% for companies that reported positive trials and decreased by 4.5% for companies that reported negative trials (P = .03). Changes in company stock prices before FDA regulatory decisions did not differ statistically between companies with positive decision and companies with negative decisions. Conclusions Trends in company stock prices before the first public announcement differ for companies that report positive vs negative trials. This finding has important legal and ethical implications for investigators, drug companies, and the investment industry. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The approval of a new drug for cancer treatment by the regulatory authorities, such as the United States Food and Drug Administration or European Medicines Agency, is usually based on the positive results of one or more randomized phase III clinical trials comparing the investigational treatment with the standard treatment. A clinical trial is presented as positive if the new drug tested on an experimental group shows a statistically significant difference with the control group (P < .05) in the primary endpoint, which is usually a time-to-event endpoint (overall survival or progression-free survival). Such apparently positive clinical trials disregard whether the final value of the difference in the primary endpoints between the experimental and control groups (δ) meets the criterion that was predefined in the protocol. Currently, the trend is to design large trials that may detect statistically significant, but often trivial, differences in survival endpoints. However, recent appeals have been made in the oncology literature for the design of smaller clinical trials to detect or exclude only larger, clinically important, values of δ. Here, we have evaluated 18 randomized phase III clinical trials that were used for the approval of molecular-targeted anticancer drugs by the United States Food and Drug Administration. Results showed that in some of the articles the magnitude of the reported values of δ were lower than the values predefined in the protocol. We suggest that trials should not be declared positive based only on a statistically significant P value, but should also require detection of a difference in survival outcome that equals or exceeds a clinically important value that is specified in the protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The American Federation of Teachers' (AFT) international program is one of the largest of any labor union in the United States, running operations in countries around the world, from Bolivia to Burma and Kenya to Kazakhstan. In this article, the authors analyze the AFT's recent interventions in the Middle East and, in particular, Lebanon. Contrary to the AFT's high-minded rhetoric of global labor solidarity, philanthropic goodwill, and democracy promotion, the authors argue that the AFT's Middle East programs serve U.S. government foreign policy interests in maintaining and extending American control and influence over the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates over the H-1B visa program and high-skilled immigration more generally in the United States need to be viewed in the context of America's position in the world as global hegemon or imperialist power. While those supporting and those opposing the expansion of the H-1B program may seem to be ideological opposites, both sides often share a common and comfortable assumption of the righteousness of US global domination, privilege and advantage. Challenging such assumptions and working our ways out of the frequent dead-ends of the H-1B debates is essential for developing a globally progressive, equitable and anti-imperialist labor and education politics in America today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: To determine whether oral language, working memory, and social anxiety differentiate children with selective mutism (SM), children with anxiety disorders (ANX), and normal controls (NCs) and explore predictors of mutism severity.Method: Children ages 6 to 10 years with SM (n = 44) were compared with children with ANX (n = 28) and NCs (n = 19) of similar age on standardized measures of language, nonverbal working memory, and social anxiety. Variables correlating with mutism severity were entered in stepwise regressions to determine predictors of mute behavior in SM.Results: Children with SM scored significantly lower on standardized language measures than children with ANX and NCs and showed greater visual memory deficits and social anxiety relative to these two groups. Age and receptive grammar ability predicted less severe mutism, whereas social anxiety predicted more severe mutism. These factors accounted for 38% of the variance in mutism severity.Conclusions: Social anxiety and language deficits are evident in SM, may predict mutism severity, and should be evaluated in clinical assessment. Replication is indicated, as are further studies of cognition and of intervention in SM, using large, diverse samples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the relationship between the higher education and the public good in the U.S. It states the purpose of the universities which is for public good not because of their contribution to economic development but because they help improve lives of individuals for betterment. The author also focuses to the wage gap among the college and non-college graduates. It offers an overview on the role of educational institutions in relation to the society, government and to the economy.

The article focuses on the counter-recruitment movement in the U.S. after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks. Many antiwar activists consider counter-recruitment as a more effective weapon of the antiwar movement as compared to antiwar marching and demonstrating. The aim of the counter-recruitment movement is to question the dependence of the U.S. Government of recruiting from within its domestic population. The movement has grown considerably as a result of the difficulties faced by the U.S. military to meet its recruiting targets. The methods employed by counter-recruiters include putting up tables providing counter-recruitment information, at events where the U.S. military makes its sales pitch to the attract the country's young population. The counter-recruiters also call for banning military recruiters from entering school and colleges. In spring 2005, many of the country's antiwar groups joined hands to launch a nationwide "Opt Out Campaign" to challenge the military recruitment policy as envisaged in the No Child Left Behind Act.

Focuses on the literacies of youth workers in workplaces in the U.S. Background on young workers; Proliferation of text in the youth workplace; Employee participation programs that influence youth literacy.

Provides information on a study which examined the comorbidity of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and reading disability among children in the United States; Methodology used in the study; Discussion of the results; Conclusions.

Competing Interests: Mark J. RatainHonoraria: M3, Emerson Lake SafetyConsulting or Advisory Role: Aptevo Therapeutics, Pneuma Respiratory, Apotex, Genentech, Arvinas, Ayala Pharmaceuticals, Oncovalent Therapeutics, EQRx, Bluebird BioResearch Funding: AbbVie, Genentech/Roche, Xencor, Corvus Pharmaceuticals, Bristol Myers Squibb, Boston Biomedical, IncytePatents, Royalties, Other Intellectual Property: Royalties related to UGT1A1 genotyping for irinotecan, royalties related to UGT1A1 genotyping for irinotecan, Provisional patent application for method of treating viral pneumonitis with low-dose tocilizumabExpert Testimony: Multiple generic companies (defendants in patent litigation)Other Relationship: BeiGene, Credit Suisse, Optimal Cancer Care Alliance Ian F. TannockConsulting or Advisory Role: Roche/Genentech, Bayer Allen S. LichterLeadership: Cellworks, LifeLinkHonoraria: Cellworks, Ascentage Pharma, L-NutraConsulting or Advisory Role: Integra LifeSciences, Ascentage Pharma, L-Nutra, TRG HealthcareTravel, Accommodations, Expenses: CellworksNo other potential conflicts of interest were reported.

Purpose: There are increasing reports of rare but serious toxicities caused by new anticancer drugs, and there are costs associated with their management., Methods: We identified anticancer drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration from 2000 to 2011 and pivotal trials supporting their registration. Twelve frequent grade 3 to 4 adverse event (AEs) were weighted and pooled in a meta-analysis. Estimates of incremental drug prices and incremental costs for management of AEs were calculated according to type of new agent based on target specificity., Results: We identified 41 studies comprising 27,539 patients and evaluating 19 experimental drugs. Agents directed against a specific molecular target on cancer cells had a lower incidence of grade 3 to 4 toxicities compared with controls (median risk ratio [RR], 0.67; P = .22), whereas less-specific targeted agents, including angiogenesis inhibitors (median RR, 3.39; P < .001) and chemotherapeutic agents (median RR, 1.73; P < .001), were more toxic. Risk was increased regardless of whether the control arm contained active treatment (RR, 2.11; P < .001) or not (RR, 3.02; P < .001). Median incremental drug price for experimental agents was $6,000 per patient per month. Median cost of managing toxicity was low compared with drug costs but higher than controls for treatment with less-specific targeted agents and chemotherapies., Conclusion: Newly approved anticancer drugs are associated with increased toxicity, except for agents with a specific molecular target on cancer cells. Management of toxicity leads to a small increase in overall cost of treatment. Frequency of toxicity and associated costs are likely higher in less-selected patients treated in general oncologic practice. Development of biomarker-driven agents should be encouraged., (© 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology.)

Background: Phase III clinical trials and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory decisions are critical for success of new drugs and can influence a company's market valuation. Knowledge of trial results before they are made public (ie, "inside information") can affect the price of a drug company's stock. We examined the stock prices of companies before and after public announcements regarding experimental anticancer drugs owned by the companies., Methods: We identified drugs that were undergoing evaluation in phase III trials or for regulatory approval by the US FDA from January 2000 to January 2009. Stock prices of companies that owned such drugs were analyzed for 120 trading days before and after the first public announcement of 1) results of clinical trials with positive and negative outcomes and 2) positive and negative regulatory decisions. All statistical tests were two-sided., Results: We identified public announcements from 23 positive trials and 36 negative trials and from 41 positive and nine negative FDA regulatory decisions. The mean stock price for the 120 trading days before a phase III clinical trial announcement increased by 13.7% (95% confidence interval = -2.2% to 29.6%) for companies that reported positive trials and decreased by 0.7% (95% confidence interval = -13.8% to 12.3%) for companies that reported negative trials (P = .09). In a post hoc analysis comparing the stock price averaged over 60 trading days before and after day -60 relative to the clinical trial announcement, the mean stock price increased by 9.4% for companies that reported positive trials and decreased by 4.5% for companies that reported negative trials (P = .03). Changes in company stock prices before FDA regulatory decisions did not differ statistically between companies with positive decision and companies with negative decisions., Conclusions: Trends in company stock prices before the first public announcement differ for companies that report positive vs negative trials. This finding has important legal and ethical implications for investigators, drug companies, and the investment industry.

The burden of cancer is growing, and the disease is becoming a major economic expenditure for all developed countries. In 2008, the worldwide cost of cancer due to premature death and disability (not including direct medical costs) was estimated to be US$895 billion. This is not simply due to an increase in absolute numbers, but also the rate of increase of expenditure on cancer. What are the drivers and solutions to the so-called cancer-cost curve in developed countries? How are we going to afford to deliver high quality and equitable care? Here, expert opinion from health-care professionals, policy makers, and cancer survivors has been gathered to address the barriers and solutions to delivering affordable cancer care. Although many of the drivers and themes are specific to a particular field-eg, the huge development costs for cancer medicines-there is strong concordance running through each contribution. Several drivers of cost, such as over-use, rapid expansion, and shortening life cycles of cancer technologies (such as medicines and imaging modalities), and the lack of suitable clinical research and integrated health economic studies, have converged with more defensive medical practice, a less informed regulatory system, a lack of evidence-based sociopolitical debate, and a declining degree of fairness for all patients with cancer. Urgent solutions range from re-engineering of the macroeconomic basis of cancer costs (eg, value-based approaches to bend the cost curve and allow cost-saving technologies), greater education of policy makers, and an informed and transparent regulatory system. A radical shift in cancer policy is also required. Political toleration of unfairness in access to affordable cancer treatment is unacceptable. The cancer profession and industry should take responsibility and not accept a substandard evidence base and an ethos of very small benefit at whatever cost; rather, we need delivery of fair prices and real value from new technologies., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Purpose: The relationship between market pricing of new anticancer drugs and the magnitude of clinical benefit caused by them has not been reported., Patients and Methods: Randomized clinical trials (RCTs) that evaluated approved new agents for solid tumors by the U.S. Food and Drug administration since the year 2000 were assessed. Hazard ratios (HRs) and 95% CIs were extracted for time-to-event end points described for each RCT. HRs were pooled for three groups: agents directed against a specific molecular target, for which the target population is selected by a biomarker (group A); less specific biologic targeted agents (group B); and chemotherapeutic agents (group C). Monthly market prices of these different drugs were compared., Results: For overall survival (OS), the pooled HR was 0.69 (95% CI, 0.59 to 0.81) for group A (six drugs, six trials); it was 0.78 (95% CI, 0.74 to 0.83) for group B (seven drugs, 14 trials); and it was 0.84 (95% CI, 0.79 to 0.90) for group C (eight drugs, 12 trials). For progression-free survival (PFS), the pooled HR was 0.42 (95% CI, 0.36 to 0.49) for group A (six drugs, seven trials); it was 0.57 (95% CI, 0.51 to 0.64) for group B (seven drugs, 14 trials); and it was 0.75 (95% CI, 0.66 to 0.85) for group C (six drugs, 10 trials). Tests for heterogeneity between subgroups were highly significant for PFS (P < .001) and OS (P = .02). The median monthly prices for standard doses of drugs were $5375 for group A, $5644 for group B, and $6584 for group C (P = .87)., Conclusion: New agents with specific molecular targets are clinically the most beneficial, but their monthly market prices are not significantly different from those of other anticancer agents.

Purpose: Oncologists prescribe anticancer drugs based on results of phase III randomized clinical trials (RCTs), but some safety concerns appear only later in updated drug labels. Here, we analyze adverse drug reactions (ADRs) of targeted anticancer agents from updated drug labels and their reporting in corresponding pivotal RCTs., Methods: We searched the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Web site for approved targeted anticancer drugs with updates of their labels related to safety in 2008 and 2009 and at least one RCT referenced in the updated drug label. For each drug, serious ADRs, including potentially fatal ADRs, were identified from the updated label. Published reports of RCTs referenced in the label were searched to determine whether they described these ADRs., Results: We identified 12 eligible targeted anticancer agents with 36 corresponding RCTs referenced in updated drug labels. There were 76 serious ADRs reported in updated drug labels, and 50% (n = 38) were potentially fatal. Of these, 39% (n = 30) of all serious ADRs and 39% (n = 15) of potentially fatal ADRs were not described in any published report of RCTs, whereas 49% and 58%, respectively, were not described in initial drug labels. After a median 4.3 years between initial approval and update of drug labels, 42% (n = 5) of targeted cancer agents acquired one or more boxed warnings (the highest level of FDA alert)., Conclusion: Published reports of pivotal RCTs and initial drug labels contain limited information about serious ADRs of targeted anticancer agents. Rare but serious ADRs may be important causes of morbidity and mortality in general oncologic practice.

Purpose: To investigate the prevalence of underpowered randomized controlled trials (RCTs) presented at American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) annual meetings., Methods: We surveyed all two-arm phase III RCTs presented at ASCO annual meetings from 1995 to 2003 for which negative results were obtained. Post hoc calculations were performed using a power of 80% and an alpha level of .05 (two sided) to determine sample sizes required to detect small, medium, and large effect sizes. For studies reporting a proportion or time-to-event as primary end point, effect size was expressed as an odds ratio (OR) or hazard ratio (HR), respectively, with a small effect size defined as OR/HR >or= 1.3, medium effect size defined as OR/HR >or= 1.5, and large effect size defined as OR/HR >or= 2.0. Logistic regression was used to identify factors associated with lack of statistical power., Results: Of 423 negative RCTs for which post hoc sample size calculations could be performed, 45 (10.6%), 138 (32.6%), and 233 (55.1%) had adequate sample size to detect small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. Only 35 negative RCTs (7.1%) reported a reason for inadequate sample size. In a multivariable model, studies that were presented at oral sessions (P = .0038), multicenter studies supported by a cooperative group (P < .0001), and studies with time to event as primary outcome (P < .0001) were more likely to have adequate sample size., Conclusion: More than half of negative RCTs presented at ASCO annual meetings do not have an adequate sample to detect a medium-size treatment effect.

Purpose: To evaluate the quality of reporting in abstracts describing randomized controlled trials (RCTs) included in the Proceedings of American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) meetings and to propose reporting guidelines for abstracts that are submitted to future meetings., Methods: Guidelines for reporting of RCTs in abstracts were developed by extracting key elements from published guidelines for full reports of RCTs, and modified based on an expert survey. Abstracts presenting results of RCTs with sample size > or = 200 were identified from the ASCO Proceedings for the years 1989 to 1998. Information regarding the quality of each abstract was extracted, and a quality score (possible range, 0 to 10) was assigned based on adherence to the guidelines., Results: Brief description of the intervention, explicit identification of the primary end point, and presentation of results accompanied by statistical tests were regarded by experts as the most important items to include in an abstract, whereas presentation of secondary and subgroup analyses was the least important. Deficiencies in reporting were present in almost all of the 510 abstracts; for example, only 22% of the abstracts provided explicit identification of the primary end point. The median quality score was 5.5 (range, 2.0 to 8.5); the quality score improved with time (P <.0001) and was better for oral or plenary presentations (P =.0003)., Conclusion: The quality of reporting of RCTs in abstracts submitted to Annual Meetings of ASCO is suboptimal. Although space precludes the inclusion of details required in the final report, abstracts could be improved through the use of explicit minimal guidelines, which are suggested in this article.

Purpose: Decisions about management of patients depend on the perception of physicians about the results of clinical trials. We therefore determined whether physicians would recommend adjuvant chemotherapy for specified patients with breast cancer, and whether the perceived levels of benefit that led to these decisions were supported by the results of clinical trials., Methods: We mailed a questionnaire that presented two clinical scenarios to 515 American and European oncologists. Scenario A depicted a premenopausal woman with node-negative, estrogen receptor-negative (ER-) breast cancer, and scenario B depicted a post-menopausal woman with node-positive, ER- disease. Respondents were asked about the evidence that they required from clinical trials to recommend adjuvant chemotherapy for these patients., Results: Replies were received from 307 oncologists. American respondents were more likely to recommend adjuvant chemotherapy than Europeans (A, 93% v 68%; B, 85% v 67%; P < .001 for both comparisons). Opinion was evenly divided as to whether improvement in the relapse-free survival (RFS) rate was sufficient to recommend treatment, or whether improvement in overall survival was necessary. Mean values of 12.9% to 14.6% improvement in RFS at 3 years, or 10.7% to 12.4% improvement in overall survival at 5 years, were required to offer treatment. An overview analysis of clinical trials suggests that adjuvant chemotherapy achieves absolute improvements of 6% to 9% in RFS rates at 3 years and 3% to 4% in overall survival rates at 5 years for patients in these scenarios., Conclusions: Most oncologists recommended treatment in these scenarios, but require a level of treatment effect that has not been demonstrated in clinical trials. Our results suggest that oncologists' perceptions of the results of clinical trials overestimate the therapeutic gain from use of adjuvant chemotherapy for breast cancer.