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Government perpetrated attacks against independent media, ranging from journalists' imprisonment to verbal attacks against outlets, carry an adverse effect for freedoms in democracies. Verbal attacks specifically provide leaders with a low-cost, easy to execute tool to delegitimize critical media. In this paper we present a theoretical contribution on when leaders in unconsolidated democracies verbally attack the media. Furthermore, we propose a way to quantitatively measure such attacks. Focusing on unconsolidated democracies, we argue that verbal attacks against independent media will increase when leaders face non-institutional ouster attempts like major protests and coups due to two reasons: 1) the surprise nature of these events, and 2) their disconnect to fully democratic means of staying in power. Our analysis examines verbal attacks on independent media by former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. We code 385 airings of Chávez's weekly program Aló Presidente, from May 1999 to January 2012, counting verbal attacks against independent media. Using a Box-Tiao intervention model, we find Chávez's verbal attacks against independent media significantly increased during non-institutional ouster efforts, such as major protests and the 2002 coup attempt. These findings show the degree to which elected leaders will go to discredit uncomfortable media outlets in unconsolidated democracies during uncertain political events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the restructuring and collapse of the Venezuelan political party system during the 1990s. The author examines the reasons for the collapse, which is centered around growing tensions since the elections of 1958 between those who promoted nationalization and those who promoted regionalization. The political situation in Venezuela after the collapse of the party system is also detailed.