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This paper reports a descriptive analysis of the historical development and the modes of differentiated integration in the treaties and legislation of the European Union. Whereas the number of differentiations has increased in the course of European integration, it has remained stationary relative to the growth of the EU’s membership, policy portfolio and legal production. Differentiated integration is predominantly multi-speed integration, typically originating in enlargement, focusing on internal market policies and affecting the comparatively poor Southern and Eastern new member states. In addition, durable differentiations originating in the deepening of the integration of core state powers have created a multitier structure, but the core is inclusive and open. The crisis period of European integration has reinforced the differentiation of the EU for the time being, but both Brexit and the stagnation of widening and deepening are likely to slow down differentiation.

This paper illustrates that the salience of differentiated integration has been quite low in Czech political debate since the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Abstract thinking about differentiated integration is virtually absent in governmental documents. They include occasional references to sensitive specific issues, such as the euro and the eurozone, Schengen and the Fiscal Compact. Similarly, parliamentary debates lack in-depth discussion of differentiated integration, although a few isolated speeches touching on two- or multi-speed Europe were delivered. This paper argues that, in general, Czech politicians do not favour differentiated integration because they do not want the Union to split into a centre and a periphery. They want Czechia to be part of the integration mainstream which is quite remarkable given the Czech reluctance to participate in ambitious integration projects.

This paper studies the salience of and government positions towards differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union in Estonian politics. As the keyword analysis reveals, conceptual debates over DI occur very rarely in Estonia and are usually invoked by specific events, such as ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, joining the eurozone or holding the European Council presidency. On the level of specific DI instances, the salience was much higher, often reflecting the importance of certain policies in Estonian foreign policy agenda or a high level of internal polarization over some specific DI policy. Regarding government’s position towards DI, there has been a notable improvement over the years. In the first years after joining the EU in 2004, Estonian politicians very clearly negative towards DI, mostly due to apparent fear of remaining into the slower less integrated group of countries. After joining the eurozone in 2011, the government made a swift change in their position and started showing much more optimism towards certain forms of DI. This rather positive position remained mostly unaltered throughout the last decade, although the government politicians have always emphasised that their first preference is for an EU that moves on together with all the Member States.

This working paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) from areas of integration.

This report investigates the politics of Differentiated Integration (DI) in France between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse, on conceptual grounds and on more concrete references. The report also aims to define the position of the French government (broadly understood as a set of institutional actors) on differentiated integration over time and to assess its stances on specific mechanisms and instances of differentiated integration. It shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) has increased over time in France. Notably, Emmanuel Macron engages more than his predecessors with European issues and DI in terms of concepts and models. On the other hand, DI mechanisms are more salient in parliamentary debates, particularly during two EU institutional crises: the 2012 eurocrisis and the 2016-2018 Brexit crisis. In both cases, the emphasis put on enhanced cooperation or opt-outs relates to economic issues. Conceptual references to differentiated integration in political discourse in France are generally neutral or positive. Two factors seem to be shared by all the French presidents: a need for enhanced cooperation on strategic issues (defence, foreign affairs, economic issues) and an emphasis put on Franco-German cooperation. Debates in parliamentary committees on differentiated integration and different models of it reflect a consensual position: DI is desirable, but needs to be debated with caution. To this end, multi-speed Europe is generally connoted negatively, while references to multi-end Europe are more positive. Positions on DI mechanisms follow a pro-European line: the French government (in the broad sense) usually views enhanced cooperation positively and opt-outs negatively. In particular, the French government seems to actively promote enhanced cooperation on economic issues. It is noteworthy that opt-outs are usually associated with a critique of the British influence on European integration.

The report investigates two questions regarding the Irish governmental discourse on differentiated integration (DI). First, how much did Irish governments talk about differentiated integration. Second, what positions did Irish governments take on differentiated integration. The report covers the time period 1990-2019. It distinguishes three conceptual levels: DI models (“multi-speed EU” and “multi-end EU”), DI mechanisms (enhanced co-operation and “opt-outs”), and DI instances (twenty-one differentiated EU policies). It finds that DI is a low salience issue, expect in the context of certain key events (i.e. EU treaty change). Moreover, the positions of Irish governments are highly policy- and context dependent. Over time, a principled negative assessment of “enhanced co-operation” has developed towards a more pragmatic approach, allowing other MS to cooperate in policy-fields where Ireland does not seek closer cooperation.

This report analyses the salience and position of the German government concerning differentiated integration in the European Union. The report employs a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse government programs, speeches of the prime minister and parliamentary debates. The results of the salience analysis show that differentiated integration is sparsely mentioned by the German government. It occurs most frequently in parliamentary debates, where it is discussed on a concrete level and concerns instances and mechanisms of differentiated integration. The results of the position analysis show that the German government and opposition parties take a very similar stance that encourages homogenous European legislation in reference to Germany’s historical role and responsibility in Europe. However, when the parliament discusses a specific issue that is in one of the parties’ or Germany’s general interest, mechanisms of differentiated integration are embraced as a way to move forward. This stance can be summarized as homogenisation if possible, DI if necessary.

This report analyses the salience and overall position of the Belgian government on issues of European Integration between 2004 and 2020. The material analysed consists of mainly speeches and debates from institutional actors at the federal level; other Belgian governmental instances have been excluded from the analysis. The analysis showed that DI is a low salience issue in Belgium, possibly due to the government’s instability and the overall pro-EU stance of the country. The Belgian government has taken a positive stance towards a multi-speed Europe, especially in the post-Brexit debates. This solution is described as allowing different MS to pursue different interests, while still working towards the EU integration project. A notable contentious issue amongst Belgian federal parties has been the Financial Transaction Tax, notably over the possible unfair consequences on competition that this tax would bring about.

This report reviews the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Denmark as well as the shifting positions of Danish governments on DI models and mechanisms. DI was generally a low-salience issue at the level of conceptual models in Denmark in 2004-2020, which is reflected in the government positions, as Danish governments did not take clear public stance on conceptual DI in either 2008, 2012 or 2017-2020. This was the case despite that the EU in general was as salient as economic and social/welfare issues in the period. By contrast, DI mechanisms were highly salient in the Danish debate, driven by discussions on the Danish opt-outs. Danish governments, it seems, would rather engage in public discussions on concrete policies and mechanisms than at the abstract conceptual level when it comes to DI. In 2008 the government wanted to abolish the opt-outs on JHA, the euro and defence. In 2012, it wanted to abolish the opt-out on defence and replace the JHA opt-out with an opt-in model. Neither succeeded. In 2017-2020, after the JHA opt-out referendum in 2015, this position had somewhat changed, supposedly making governments less eager to argue for abolishing the opt-outs. However, the Social Democratic government in 2019-2020 was the only government analysed that did not position itself clearly negatively towards the Danish opt-outs and, as a consequence, DI mechanisms, indicating a policy shift since previous periods.

The results show that differentiated integration (DI) is a very low-salience issue in Finland. It has mainly appeared in parliamentary debates but almost never in government programmes, Prime Minister (PM) speeches or European Council statements. The salience of DI models has been highest during a few specific debates in the parliament. In general, Finnish politicians emphasised that the optimal solution in European integration would be to have all states on board but differentiated integration can be an option in order to move forward in certain fields. Finland has wanted to remain in core Europe and participate in all significant integration projects, including most forms of differentiated integration. During the period analysed since 2004, participation in the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seem to be the only DI instances that some politicians opposed. Usually, it has seemed self-evident that Finland is involved in new initiatives. In the case of PESCO, the Finnish government even took some credit for the launch of cooperation.

This paper presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration from the perspectives of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Judging from our analysis, differentiated integration has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments. The few times that DI salience peaked were in 2003-07 (the beginning of the EU accession negotiations), 2009-12 (the period leading to the conclusion of the accession negotiations), and finally a more prominent peak during 2015-16, prompted by the 2015 EU refugee crisis. This has allowed identification of the principal drivers of DI on the demand and supply sides. We find that in the Croatian case the peak-salience moments are largely driven by the broad mechanisms (e.g. either enhanced cooperation or opt-outs) and instances of DI (e.g. Rome III, Pesco), together with specific instances of DI that gained particular traction in Croatian political discourse (e.g. the opt-out from the Global Compact on Refugees and the ‘Marrakesh agreement’). For the most part, political reflection on DI has taken place in the Croatian parliament (cro. Hrvatski Sabor), while salience has been overall low in Prime Ministers’ (PM) speeches (annual parliamentary addresses, European Council reports) and government programmes. Lastly, over the same period, the position of Croatian governments on differentiated integration has largely been informed by a very broad and non-specific support for Croatia’s EU membership and advancing the integration process across policy areas.

This report examines the dynamics of differentiated integration. In particular, it studies whether differentiated integration is a path-dependent process, in which earlier differentiation increases the likelihood of additional differentiation in the future. In a set of analyses on the EU’s treaty-based and legislative differentiation and the Eurozone crisis, this report provides consistent evidence for path-dependence. The analysis of treaty reforms shows that the extent of pre-existing differentiation in a policy area is correlated significantly with differentiations in subsequent treaty reforms – even when controlling for exogenous factors of differentiated integration. In turn, differentiation in EU legislation follows differentiation in EU treaties. Whereas such path dependence only takes place in the area of core state power integration, it is clearly the most important factor driving legislative differentiation. Finally, in the Eurozone crisis, the differential impact of the crisis on euro area and non-euro area countries motivated the euro area countries to adopt far-reaching centralizing reforms and financial commitments that non-euro area members refused or were excluded from. In sum, differentiated integration has not only been pronounced in policy domains related to core state powers – such as macroeconomic and security policies – when they were initially integrated, but the legal gap between insiders and outsiders has grown over time.

Thirty years after the Europe of bits and pieces of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU legal system has evolved beyond fragmentation to accommodate institutionally structured forms of differentiation. This paper explores several types of new differentiation regimes and argues that they can coexist together without necessarily challenging the unity of the EU legal system. It analyses how the legal system has progressively been adapting to new integration pathways by internalising differentiation and reabsorbing the fragmentation of the Maastricht’s construction. Through the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence and two case-studies in the areas of economic governance and defence it shows how different strands of differentiation can be blended together in ‘coherent’ differentiated regimes. The paper also considers future differentiation pathways after Brexit and emerging concerns as regards legitimacy and democratic accountability of a differentiated Union.

This working paper analyses the institutional challenges related to external differentiated integration in the European Economic Area (EEA). It focuses mainly on the formulation of EEA-relevant EU legislation and its incorporation into the EEA Agreement. The paper shows that over the past 25 years various institutional arrangements have been added to the initial institutional framework of the EEA in order to increase and maintain substantive integration. However, the European Union (EU) has been consistent in protecting the autonomy of its decision making which is why the EEA EFTA States have far-reaching access to EU policy making but never the right to vote. The EEA EFTA States therefore insist on separate EEA decision making whenever possible. This has given them a surprisingly large amount of room for manoeuvre for instance, by deliberately delaying the incorporation of politically sensitive acts, and by making EEA-specific adaptations to EU acts. On the other hand, they were also forced to introduce simplified procedures for EEA decision making in order to cope better with the high legislative dynamics of the EU. These procedures give priority to the efficacy of the EEA over the decision-making autonomy of the EEA EFTA States by establishing a more or less automatic rule transfer from the EU to the EEA. Thanks to its far-reaching functional and institutional integration the EEA provides a good example for the analysis of the legal and political feasibility of external differentiated integration. Above all, the results of the empirical analysis demonstrate how difficult it is to reconcile the integration reservations of non-Member States with the principles of the EU in an institutional framework designed to ensure the long-term good functioning of their relations.

Since the 1990s, European integration has been characterized by a combination of politicization and differentiation. Starting with the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which has led to a series of Danish opt-outs from the Treaty on European Union, domestic politicization has been one of the major drivers of differentiated integration in the EU. Whereas recent theorizing and research has covered the causes and conditions of differentiated integration extensively and has also addressed some of its institutional effects and dynamics, we lack any empirically based understanding of its micro-level consequences. Does differentiated integration improve the democratic quality of the EU and strengthen citizens’ support – or does it promote political divides and foster citizens’ alienation from European integration? This paper develops a theoretical argument on the positive attitudinal effects of differentiated integration, contending that differentiation accommodates heterogeneous preferences in a diverse EU and strengthens citizens’ ownership of European integration. A quasi-experimental analysis of public opinion of the 2015 Danish Justice and Home Affairs opt-out referendum demonstrates that the public vote increased citizens’ internal EU efficacy, indeed. Eurosceptic voters in particular strengthen their belief that their individual voice counts in EU politics, suggesting that differentiation can have a positive effect on the perceived democratic quality of the EU.

This report investigates the politics of Differentiated Integration (DI) in France between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse, on conceptual grounds and on more concrete references. The report also aims to define the position of the French government (broadly understood as a set of institutional actors) on differentiated integration over time and to assess its stances on specific mechanisms and instances of differentiated integration. It shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) has increased over time in France. Notably, Emmanuel Macron engages more than his predecessors with European issues and DI in terms of concepts and models. On the other hand, DI mechanisms are more salient in parliamentary debates, particularly during two EU institutional crises: the 2012 eurocrisis and the 2016-2018 Brexit crisis. In both cases, the emphasis put on enhanced cooperation or opt-outs relates to economic issues. Conceptual references to differentiated integration in political discourse in France are generally neutral or positive. Two factors seem to be shared by all the French presidents: a need for enhanced cooperation on strategic issues (defence, foreign affairs, economic issues) and an emphasis put on Franco-German cooperation. Debates in parliamentary committees on differentiated integration and different models of it reflect a consensual position: DI is desirable, but needs to be debated with caution. To this end, multi-speed Europe is generally connoted negatively, while references to multi-end Europe are more positive. Positions on DI mechanisms follow a pro-European line: the French government (in the broad sense) usually views enhanced cooperation positively and opt-outs negatively. In particular, the French government seems to actively promote enhanced cooperation on economic issues. It is noteworthy that opt-outs are usually associated with a critique of the British influence on European integration.

This report analyses the salience and overall position of the Belgian government on issues of European Integration between 2004 and 2020. The material analysed consists of mainly speeches and debates from institutional actors at the federal level; other Belgian governmental instances have been excluded from the analysis. The analysis showed that DI is a low salience issue in Belgium, possibly due to the government’s instability and the overall pro-EU stance of the country. The Belgian government has taken a positive stance towards a multi-speed Europe, especially in the post-Brexit debates. This solution is described as allowing different MS to pursue different interests, while still working towards the EU integration project. A notable contentious issue amongst Belgian federal parties has been the Financial Transaction Tax, notably over the possible unfair consequences on competition that this tax would bring about.

This paper studies the salience of and government positions towards differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union in Estonian politics. As the keyword analysis reveals, conceptual debates over DI occur very rarely in Estonia and are usually invoked by specific events, such as ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, joining the eurozone or holding the European Council presidency. On the level of specific DI instances, the salience was much higher, often reflecting the importance of certain policies in Estonian foreign policy agenda or a high level of internal polarization over some specific DI policy. Regarding government’s position towards DI, there has been a notable improvement over the years. In the first years after joining the EU in 2004, Estonian politicians very clearly negative towards DI, mostly due to apparent fear of remaining into the slower less integrated group of countries. After joining the eurozone in 2011, the government made a swift change in their position and started showing much more optimism towards certain forms of DI. This rather positive position remained mostly unaltered throughout the last decade, although the government politicians have always emphasised that their first preference is for an EU that moves on together with all the Member States.

This report reviews the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Denmark as well as the shifting positions of Danish governments on DI models and mechanisms. DI was generally a low-salience issue at the level of conceptual models in Denmark in 2004-2020, which is reflected in the government positions, as Danish governments did not take clear public stance on conceptual DI in either 2008, 2012 or 2017-2020. This was the case despite that the EU in general was as salient as economic and social/welfare issues in the period. By contrast, DI mechanisms were highly salient in the Danish debate, driven by discussions on the Danish opt-outs. Danish governments, it seems, would rather engage in public discussions on concrete policies and mechanisms than at the abstract conceptual level when it comes to DI. In 2008 the government wanted to abolish the opt-outs on JHA, the euro and defence. In 2012, it wanted to abolish the opt-out on defence and replace the JHA opt-out with an opt-in model. Neither succeeded. In 2017-2020, after the JHA opt-out referendum in 2015, this position had somewhat changed, supposedly making governments less eager to argue for abolishing the opt-outs. However, the Social Democratic government in 2019-2020 was the only government analysed that did not position itself clearly negatively towards the Danish opt-outs and, as a consequence, DI mechanisms, indicating a policy shift since previous periods.

This paper presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration from the perspectives of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Judging from our analysis, differentiated integration has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments. The few times that DI salience peaked were in 2003-07 (the beginning of the EU accession negotiations), 2009-12 (the period leading to the conclusion of the accession negotiations), and finally a more prominent peak during 2015-16, prompted by the 2015 EU refugee crisis. This has allowed identification of the principal drivers of DI on the demand and supply sides. We find that in the Croatian case the peak-salience moments are largely driven by the broad mechanisms (e.g. either enhanced cooperation or opt-outs) and instances of DI (e.g. Rome III, Pesco), together with specific instances of DI that gained particular traction in Croatian political discourse (e.g. the opt-out from the Global Compact on Refugees and the ‘Marrakesh agreement’). For the most part, political reflection on DI has taken place in the Croatian parliament (cro. Hrvatski Sabor), while salience has been overall low in Prime Ministers’ (PM) speeches (annual parliamentary addresses, European Council reports) and government programmes. Lastly, over the same period, the position of Croatian governments on differentiated integration has largely been informed by a very broad and non-specific support for Croatia’s EU membership and advancing the integration process across policy areas.

The results show that differentiated integration (DI) is a very low-salience issue in Finland. It has mainly appeared in parliamentary debates but almost never in government programmes, Prime Minister (PM) speeches or European Council statements. The salience of DI models has been highest during a few specific debates in the parliament. In general, Finnish politicians emphasised that the optimal solution in European integration would be to have all states on board but differentiated integration can be an option in order to move forward in certain fields. Finland has wanted to remain in core Europe and participate in all significant integration projects, including most forms of differentiated integration. During the period analysed since 2004, participation in the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seem to be the only DI instances that some politicians opposed. Usually, it has seemed self-evident that Finland is involved in new initiatives. In the case of PESCO, the Finnish government even took some credit for the launch of cooperation.

This report analyses the salience and position of the German government concerning differentiated integration in the European Union. The report employs a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse government programs, speeches of the prime minister and parliamentary debates. The results of the salience analysis show that differentiated integration is sparsely mentioned by the German government. It occurs most frequently in parliamentary debates, where it is discussed on a concrete level and concerns instances and mechanisms of differentiated integration. The results of the position analysis show that the German government and opposition parties take a very similar stance that encourages homogenous European legislation in reference to Germany’s historical role and responsibility in Europe. However, when the parliament discusses a specific issue that is in one of the parties’ or Germany’s general interest, mechanisms of differentiated integration are embraced as a way to move forward. This stance can be summarized as homogenisation if possible, DI if necessary.

This working paper analyses the institutional challenges related to external differentiated integration in the European Economic Area (EEA). It focuses mainly on the formulation of EEA-relevant EU legislation and its incorporation into the EEA Agreement. The paper shows that over the past 25 years various institutional arrangements have been added to the initial institutional framework of the EEA in order to increase and maintain substantive integration. However, the European Union (EU) has been consistent in protecting the autonomy of its decision making which is why the EEA EFTA States have far-reaching access to EU policy making but never the right to vote. The EEA EFTA States therefore insist on separate EEA decision making whenever possible. This has given them a surprisingly large amount of room for manoeuvre for instance, by deliberately delaying the incorporation of politically sensitive acts, and by making EEA-specific adaptations to EU acts. On the other hand, they were also forced to introduce simplified procedures for EEA decision making in order to cope better with the high legislative dynamics of the EU. These procedures give priority to the efficacy of the EEA over the decision-making autonomy of the EEA EFTA States by establishing a more or less automatic rule transfer from the EU to the EEA. Thanks to its far-reaching functional and institutional integration the EEA provides a good example for the analysis of the legal and political feasibility of external differentiated integration. Above all, the results of the empirical analysis demonstrate how difficult it is to reconcile the integration reservations of non-Member States with the principles of the EU in an institutional framework designed to ensure the long-term good functioning of their relations.

This paper illustrates that the salience of differentiated integration has been quite low in Czech political debate since the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Abstract thinking about differentiated integration is virtually absent in governmental documents. They include occasional references to sensitive specific issues, such as the euro and the eurozone, Schengen and the Fiscal Compact. Similarly, parliamentary debates lack in-depth discussion of differentiated integration, although a few isolated speeches touching on two- or multi-speed Europe were delivered. This paper argues that, in general, Czech politicians do not favour differentiated integration because they do not want the Union to split into a centre and a periphery. They want Czechia to be part of the integration mainstream which is quite remarkable given the Czech reluctance to participate in ambitious integration projects.

Thirty years after the Europe of bits and pieces of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU legal system has evolved beyond fragmentation to accommodate institutionally structured forms of differentiation. This paper explores several types of new differentiation regimes and argues that they can coexist together without necessarily challenging the unity of the EU legal system. It analyses how the legal system has progressively been adapting to new integration pathways by internalising differentiation and reabsorbing the fragmentation of the Maastricht’s construction. Through the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence and two case-studies in the areas of economic governance and defence it shows how different strands of differentiation can be blended together in ‘coherent’ differentiated regimes. The paper also considers future differentiation pathways after Brexit and emerging concerns as regards legitimacy and democratic accountability of a differentiated Union.

This report examines the dynamics of differentiated integration. In particular, it studies whether differentiated integration is a path-dependent process, in which earlier differentiation increases the likelihood of additional differentiation in the future. In a set of analyses on the EU’s treaty-based and legislative differentiation and the Eurozone crisis, this report provides consistent evidence for path-dependence. The analysis of treaty reforms shows that the extent of pre-existing differentiation in a policy area is correlated significantly with differentiations in subsequent treaty reforms – even when controlling for exogenous factors of differentiated integration. In turn, differentiation in EU legislation follows differentiation in EU treaties. Whereas such path dependence only takes place in the area of core state power integration, it is clearly the most important factor driving legislative differentiation. Finally, in the Eurozone crisis, the differential impact of the crisis on euro area and non-euro area countries motivated the euro area countries to adopt far-reaching centralizing reforms and financial commitments that non-euro area members refused or were excluded from. In sum, differentiated integration has not only been pronounced in policy domains related to core state powers – such as macroeconomic and security policies – when they were initially integrated, but the legal gap between insiders and outsiders has grown over time.

This working paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) from areas of integration.

This paper reports a descriptive analysis of the historical development and the modes of differentiated integration in the treaties and legislation of the European Union. Whereas the number of differentiations has increased in the course of European integration, it has remained stationary relative to the growth of the EU’s membership, policy portfolio and legal production. Differentiated integration is predominantly multi-speed integration, typically originating in enlargement, focusing on internal market policies and affecting the comparatively poor Southern and Eastern new member states. In addition, durable differentiations originating in the deepening of the integration of core state powers have created a multitier structure, but the core is inclusive and open. The crisis period of European integration has reinforced the differentiation of the EU for the time being, but both Brexit and the stagnation of widening and deepening are likely to slow down differentiation.

Since the 1990s, European integration has been characterized by a combination of politicization and differentiation. Starting with the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which has led to a series of Danish opt-outs from the Treaty on European Union, domestic politicization has been one of the major drivers of differentiated integration in the EU. Whereas recent theorizing and research has covered the causes and conditions of differentiated integration extensively and has also addressed some of its institutional effects and dynamics, we lack any empirically based understanding of its micro-level consequences. Does differentiated integration improve the democratic quality of the EU and strengthen citizens’ support – or does it promote political divides and foster citizens’ alienation from European integration? This paper develops a theoretical argument on the positive attitudinal effects of differentiated integration, contending that differentiation accommodates heterogeneous preferences in a diverse EU and strengthens citizens’ ownership of European integration. A quasi-experimental analysis of public opinion of the 2015 Danish Justice and Home Affairs opt-out referendum demonstrates that the public vote increased citizens’ internal EU efficacy, indeed. Eurosceptic voters in particular strengthen their belief that their individual voice counts in EU politics, suggesting that differentiation can have a positive effect on the perceived democratic quality of the EU.

The report investigates two questions regarding the Irish governmental discourse on differentiated integration (DI). First, how much did Irish governments talk about differentiated integration. Second, what positions did Irish governments take on differentiated integration. The report covers the time period 1990-2019. It distinguishes three conceptual levels: DI models (“multi-speed EU” and “multi-end EU”), DI mechanisms (enhanced co-operation and “opt-outs”), and DI instances (twenty-one differentiated EU policies). It finds that DI is a low salience issue, expect in the context of certain key events (i.e. EU treaty change). Moreover, the positions of Irish governments are highly policy- and context dependent. Over time, a principled negative assessment of “enhanced co-operation” has developed towards a more pragmatic approach, allowing other MS to cooperate in policy-fields where Ireland does not seek closer cooperation.

The report investigates two questions regarding the Irish governmental discourse on differentiated integration (DI). First, how much did Irish governments talk about differentiated integration. Second, what positions did Irish governments take on differentiated integration. The report covers the time period 1990-2019. It distinguishes three conceptual levels: DI models (“multi-speed EU” and “multi-end EU”), DI mechanisms (enhanced co-operation and “opt-outs”), and DI instances (twenty-one differentiated EU policies). It finds that DI is a low salience issue, expect in the context of certain key events (i.e. EU treaty change). Moreover, the positions of Irish governments are highly policy- and context dependent. Over time, a principled negative assessment of “enhanced co-operation” has developed towards a more pragmatic approach, allowing other MS to cooperate in policy-fields where Ireland does not seek closer cooperation.

This report reviews the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Denmark as well as the shifting positions of Danish governments on DI models and mechanisms. DI was generally a low-salience issue at the level of conceptual models in Denmark in 2004-2020, which is reflected in the government positions, as Danish governments did not take clear public stance on conceptual DI in either 2008, 2012 or 2017-2020. This was the case despite that the EU in general was as salient as economic and social/welfare issues in the period. By contrast, DI mechanisms were highly salient in the Danish debate, driven by discussions on the Danish opt-outs. Danish governments, it seems, would rather engage in public discussions on concrete policies and mechanisms than at the abstract conceptual level when it comes to DI. In 2008 the government wanted to abolish the opt-outs on JHA, the euro and defence. In 2012, it wanted to abolish the opt-out on defence and replace the JHA opt-out with an opt-in model. Neither succeeded. In 2017-2020, after the JHA opt-out referendum in 2015, this position had somewhat changed, supposedly making governments less eager to argue for abolishing the opt-outs. However, the Social Democratic government in 2019-2020 was the only government analysed that did not position itself clearly negatively towards the Danish opt-outs and, as a consequence, DI mechanisms, indicating a policy shift since previous periods.

The results show that differentiated integration (DI) is a very low-salience issue in Finland. It has mainly appeared in parliamentary debates but almost never in government programmes, Prime Minister (PM) speeches or European Council statements. The salience of DI models has been highest during a few specific debates in the parliament. In general, Finnish politicians emphasised that the optimal solution in European integration would be to have all states on board but differentiated integration can be an option in order to move forward in certain fields. Finland has wanted to remain in core Europe and participate in all significant integration projects, including most forms of differentiated integration. During the period analysed since 2004, participation in the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seem to be the only DI instances that some politicians opposed. Usually, it has seemed self-evident that Finland is involved in new initiatives. In the case of PESCO, the Finnish government even took some credit for the launch of cooperation.

This report analyses the salience and overall position of the Belgian government on issues of European Integration between 2004 and 2020. The material analysed consists of mainly speeches and debates from institutional actors at the federal level; other Belgian governmental instances have been excluded from the analysis. The analysis showed that DI is a low salience issue in Belgium, possibly due to the government’s instability and the overall pro-EU stance of the country. The Belgian government has taken a positive stance towards a multi-speed Europe, especially in the post-Brexit debates. This solution is described as allowing different MS to pursue different interests, while still working towards the EU integration project. A notable contentious issue amongst Belgian federal parties has been the Financial Transaction Tax, notably over the possible unfair consequences on competition that this tax would bring about.

This report investigates the politics of Differentiated Integration (DI) in France between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse, on conceptual grounds and on more concrete references. The report also aims to define the position of the French government (broadly understood as a set of institutional actors) on differentiated integration over time and to assess its stances on specific mechanisms and instances of differentiated integration. It shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) has increased over time in France. Notably, Emmanuel Macron engages more than his predecessors with European issues and DI in terms of concepts and models. On the other hand, DI mechanisms are more salient in parliamentary debates, particularly during two EU institutional crises: the 2012 eurocrisis and the 2016-2018 Brexit crisis. In both cases, the emphasis put on enhanced cooperation or opt-outs relates to economic issues. Conceptual references to differentiated integration in political discourse in France are generally neutral or positive. Two factors seem to be shared by all the French presidents: a need for enhanced cooperation on strategic issues (defence, foreign affairs, economic issues) and an emphasis put on Franco-German cooperation. Debates in parliamentary committees on differentiated integration and different models of it reflect a consensual position: DI is desirable, but needs to be debated with caution. To this end, multi-speed Europe is generally connoted negatively, while references to multi-end Europe are more positive. Positions on DI mechanisms follow a pro-European line: the French government (in the broad sense) usually views enhanced cooperation positively and opt-outs negatively. In particular, the French government seems to actively promote enhanced cooperation on economic issues. It is noteworthy that opt-outs are usually associated with a critique of the British influence on European integration.

This paper presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration from the perspectives of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Judging from our analysis, differentiated integration has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments. The few times that DI salience peaked were in 2003-07 (the beginning of the EU accession negotiations), 2009-12 (the period leading to the conclusion of the accession negotiations), and finally a more prominent peak during 2015-16, prompted by the 2015 EU refugee crisis. This has allowed identification of the principal drivers of DI on the demand and supply sides. We find that in the Croatian case the peak-salience moments are largely driven by the broad mechanisms (e.g. either enhanced cooperation or opt-outs) and instances of DI (e.g. Rome III, Pesco), together with specific instances of DI that gained particular traction in Croatian political discourse (e.g. the opt-out from the Global Compact on Refugees and the ‘Marrakesh agreement’). For the most part, political reflection on DI has taken place in the Croatian parliament (cro. Hrvatski Sabor), while salience has been overall low in Prime Ministers’ (PM) speeches (annual parliamentary addresses, European Council reports) and government programmes. Lastly, over the same period, the position of Croatian governments on differentiated integration has largely been informed by a very broad and non-specific support for Croatia’s EU membership and advancing the integration process across policy areas.

This paper illustrates that the salience of differentiated integration has been quite low in Czech political debate since the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Abstract thinking about differentiated integration is virtually absent in governmental documents. They include occasional references to sensitive specific issues, such as the euro and the eurozone, Schengen and the Fiscal Compact. Similarly, parliamentary debates lack in-depth discussion of differentiated integration, although a few isolated speeches touching on two- or multi-speed Europe were delivered. This paper argues that, in general, Czech politicians do not favour differentiated integration because they do not want the Union to split into a centre and a periphery. They want Czechia to be part of the integration mainstream which is quite remarkable given the Czech reluctance to participate in ambitious integration projects.

This report analyses the salience and position of the German government concerning differentiated integration in the European Union. The report employs a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse government programs, speeches of the prime minister and parliamentary debates. The results of the salience analysis show that differentiated integration is sparsely mentioned by the German government. It occurs most frequently in parliamentary debates, where it is discussed on a concrete level and concerns instances and mechanisms of differentiated integration. The results of the position analysis show that the German government and opposition parties take a very similar stance that encourages homogenous European legislation in reference to Germany’s historical role and responsibility in Europe. However, when the parliament discusses a specific issue that is in one of the parties’ or Germany’s general interest, mechanisms of differentiated integration are embraced as a way to move forward. This stance can be summarized as homogenisation if possible, DI if necessary.

This paper studies the salience of and government positions towards differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union in Estonian politics. As the keyword analysis reveals, conceptual debates over DI occur very rarely in Estonia and are usually invoked by specific events, such as ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, joining the eurozone or holding the European Council presidency. On the level of specific DI instances, the salience was much higher, often reflecting the importance of certain policies in Estonian foreign policy agenda or a high level of internal polarization over some specific DI policy. Regarding government’s position towards DI, there has been a notable improvement over the years. In the first years after joining the EU in 2004, Estonian politicians very clearly negative towards DI, mostly due to apparent fear of remaining into the slower less integrated group of countries. After joining the eurozone in 2011, the government made a swift change in their position and started showing much more optimism towards certain forms of DI. This rather positive position remained mostly unaltered throughout the last decade, although the government politicians have always emphasised that their first preference is for an EU that moves on together with all the Member States.

Thirty years after the Europe of bits and pieces of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU legal system has evolved beyond fragmentation to accommodate institutionally structured forms of differentiation. This paper explores several types of new differentiation regimes and argues that they can coexist together without necessarily challenging the unity of the EU legal system. It analyses how the legal system has progressively been adapting to new integration pathways by internalising differentiation and reabsorbing the fragmentation of the Maastricht’s construction. Through the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence and two case-studies in the areas of economic governance and defence it shows how different strands of differentiation can be blended together in ‘coherent’ differentiated regimes. The paper also considers future differentiation pathways after Brexit and emerging concerns as regards legitimacy and democratic accountability of a differentiated Union.

This working paper analyses the institutional challenges related to external differentiated integration in the European Economic Area (EEA). It focuses mainly on the formulation of EEA-relevant EU legislation and its incorporation into the EEA Agreement. The paper shows that over the past 25 years various institutional arrangements have been added to the initial institutional framework of the EEA in order to increase and maintain substantive integration. However, the European Union (EU) has been consistent in protecting the autonomy of its decision making which is why the EEA EFTA States have far-reaching access to EU policy making but never the right to vote. The EEA EFTA States therefore insist on separate EEA decision making whenever possible. This has given them a surprisingly large amount of room for manoeuvre for instance, by deliberately delaying the incorporation of politically sensitive acts, and by making EEA-specific adaptations to EU acts. On the other hand, they were also forced to introduce simplified procedures for EEA decision making in order to cope better with the high legislative dynamics of the EU. These procedures give priority to the efficacy of the EEA over the decision-making autonomy of the EEA EFTA States by establishing a more or less automatic rule transfer from the EU to the EEA. Thanks to its far-reaching functional and institutional integration the EEA provides a good example for the analysis of the legal and political feasibility of external differentiated integration. Above all, the results of the empirical analysis demonstrate how difficult it is to reconcile the integration reservations of non-Member States with the principles of the EU in an institutional framework designed to ensure the long-term good functioning of their relations.

This paper reports a descriptive analysis of the historical development and the modes of differentiated integration in the treaties and legislation of the European Union. Whereas the number of differentiations has increased in the course of European integration, it has remained stationary relative to the growth of the EU’s membership, policy portfolio and legal production. Differentiated integration is predominantly multi-speed integration, typically originating in enlargement, focusing on internal market policies and affecting the comparatively poor Southern and Eastern new member states. In addition, durable differentiations originating in the deepening of the integration of core state powers have created a multitier structure, but the core is inclusive and open. The crisis period of European integration has reinforced the differentiation of the EU for the time being, but both Brexit and the stagnation of widening and deepening are likely to slow down differentiation.

This report examines the dynamics of differentiated integration. In particular, it studies whether differentiated integration is a path-dependent process, in which earlier differentiation increases the likelihood of additional differentiation in the future. In a set of analyses on the EU’s treaty-based and legislative differentiation and the Eurozone crisis, this report provides consistent evidence for path-dependence. The analysis of treaty reforms shows that the extent of pre-existing differentiation in a policy area is correlated significantly with differentiations in subsequent treaty reforms – even when controlling for exogenous factors of differentiated integration. In turn, differentiation in EU legislation follows differentiation in EU treaties. Whereas such path dependence only takes place in the area of core state power integration, it is clearly the most important factor driving legislative differentiation. Finally, in the Eurozone crisis, the differential impact of the crisis on euro area and non-euro area countries motivated the euro area countries to adopt far-reaching centralizing reforms and financial commitments that non-euro area members refused or were excluded from. In sum, differentiated integration has not only been pronounced in policy domains related to core state powers – such as macroeconomic and security policies – when they were initially integrated, but the legal gap between insiders and outsiders has grown over time.

This working paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) from areas of integration.

Since the 1990s, European integration has been characterized by a combination of politicization and differentiation. Starting with the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which has led to a series of Danish opt-outs from the Treaty on European Union, domestic politicization has been one of the major drivers of differentiated integration in the EU. Whereas recent theorizing and research has covered the causes and conditions of differentiated integration extensively and has also addressed some of its institutional effects and dynamics, we lack any empirically based understanding of its micro-level consequences. Does differentiated integration improve the democratic quality of the EU and strengthen citizens’ support – or does it promote political divides and foster citizens’ alienation from European integration? This paper develops a theoretical argument on the positive attitudinal effects of differentiated integration, contending that differentiation accommodates heterogeneous preferences in a diverse EU and strengthens citizens’ ownership of European integration. A quasi-experimental analysis of public opinion of the 2015 Danish Justice and Home Affairs opt-out referendum demonstrates that the public vote increased citizens’ internal EU efficacy, indeed. Eurosceptic voters in particular strengthen their belief that their individual voice counts in EU politics, suggesting that differentiation can have a positive effect on the perceived democratic quality of the EU.

This report investigates the politics of Differentiated Integration (DI) in France between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse, on conceptual grounds and on more concrete references. The report also aims to define the position of the French government (broadly understood as a set of institutional actors) on differentiated integration over time and to assess its stances on specific mechanisms and instances of differentiated integration. It shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) has increased over time in France. Notably, Emmanuel Macron engages more than his predecessors with European issues and DI in terms of concepts and models. On the other hand, DI mechanisms are more salient in parliamentary debates, particularly during two EU institutional crises: the 2012 eurocrisis and the 2016-2018 Brexit crisis. In both cases, the emphasis put on enhanced cooperation or opt-outs relates to economic issues. Conceptual references to differentiated integration in political discourse in France are generally neutral or positive. Two factors seem to be shared by all the French presidents: a need for enhanced cooperation on strategic issues (defence, foreign affairs, economic issues) and an emphasis put on Franco-German cooperation. Debates in parliamentary committees on differentiated integration and different models of it reflect a consensual position: DI is desirable, but needs to be debated with caution. To this end, multi-speed Europe is generally connoted negatively, while references to multi-end Europe are more positive. Positions on DI mechanisms follow a pro-European line: the French government (in the broad sense) usually views enhanced cooperation positively and opt-outs negatively. In particular, the French government seems to actively promote enhanced cooperation on economic issues. It is noteworthy that opt-outs are usually associated with a critique of the British influence on European integration.

This paper illustrates that the salience of differentiated integration has been quite low in Czech political debate since the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Abstract thinking about differentiated integration is virtually absent in governmental documents. They include occasional references to sensitive specific issues, such as the euro and the eurozone, Schengen and the Fiscal Compact. Similarly, parliamentary debates lack in-depth discussion of differentiated integration, although a few isolated speeches touching on two- or multi-speed Europe were delivered. This paper argues that, in general, Czech politicians do not favour differentiated integration because they do not want the Union to split into a centre and a periphery. They want Czechia to be part of the integration mainstream which is quite remarkable given the Czech reluctance to participate in ambitious integration projects.

The report investigates two questions regarding the Irish governmental discourse on differentiated integration (DI). First, how much did Irish governments talk about differentiated integration. Second, what positions did Irish governments take on differentiated integration. The report covers the time period 1990-2019. It distinguishes three conceptual levels: DI models (“multi-speed EU” and “multi-end EU”), DI mechanisms (enhanced co-operation and “opt-outs”), and DI instances (twenty-one differentiated EU policies). It finds that DI is a low salience issue, expect in the context of certain key events (i.e. EU treaty change). Moreover, the positions of Irish governments are highly policy- and context dependent. Over time, a principled negative assessment of “enhanced co-operation” has developed towards a more pragmatic approach, allowing other MS to cooperate in policy-fields where Ireland does not seek closer cooperation.