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During the last three decades, deterrence and the arms dynamic have increasingly merged into a single phenomenon. A large and diverse body of opinion views this synthesis as a problem. The main criticism is that modern military means create more, and more serious, difficulties than they solve. Although designed to make states feel more secure, modern military means serve that end only by raising states’ fears of each other. Those fears in turn create a widespread public anxiety about a major war that would be a catastrophe for the human species because the military means controlled by states encompass such immense destructive power. The security of states thus depends on means which themselves heighten insecurity in the international system as a whole.

Present excitements over the ‘Soviet military build-up’ are considerable, to say the least, though the recognition of this phenomenon has been astonishingly tardy. The historian of Soviet military policy would insist quite properly that Soviet society had long ago embarked on a permanent military build-up, signalled by the introduction in 1928 of the first Five Year Plan: nor do Soviet accounts shy away from affirming this rationale. As for mass, the same historian would point to that traditional Russian predilection for quantitative solutions to military problems, not to mention the proclivity towards over-insurance — though the irony is that both the Imperial Russian and the Soviet military systems have over-insured against the wrong things. Nor is the business of elucidation helped by those caprices of selectivity which abound in the western press and which are designed to serve a variety of causes, be they budgetary, political or emotive: a persuasive example is the reaction of the Western press to Soviet naval programmes, whereby much of Admiral Gorshkov’s work has been done for him by our own journalistic hyperbole.

Among the major reforms and adjustments of the Goldwater -Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a provision making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the developmental of joint military doctrine. This Article examines the reasons for congressional concern over joint doctrine, and the role joint doctrine should play in national military operations. A proposal is made that joint doctrine should be based on the established principle of combined arms, which has found wide application in the internal doctrine of the services but not at the joint level. Keywords: Joint military activities, Cooperation, Military commanders.

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the origins and drives of military organizations of the East and West, how they interact with home politics and each other as adversaries, and the resulting combat systems. The superpower economic and political development, are aided by the military, which maintains a status quo while ready for all-out war. Computers as a means, enhance the war fighting capabilities. The National Security Agency (NSA) long backed powerful processors. Politicians believe that military programs lead to civilian jobs, directly through funding programs and indirectly via technology hand-over into consumer products. The commercially driven, pluralist mix in the West has favored the motivational aspects of the multiple source creativity, which planning focuses onto military missions. Naval officers serving on submarines are dependent upon computers. Soviet officers accept “programming” solutions as fundamental to their task and readily accept the application of military computers in combat decision making. The Soviet programmers' accomplishments are based on the first-class mathematicians, clever software, and team continuity over decades.

This monograph examines USAF fighter doctrine as it applies to contingency operations. The monograph briefly analyzes joint doctrine to describe a model of the operational continuum. This provides a basis to study doctrine covering military operations short of war which include contingency operations. The study then examines coverage of contingency operations in joint and USAF doctrinal definitions. These definitions help establish criteria to evaluate the three levels of USAF doctrine - basic, operational, and tactical. The monograph then focuses on common threads in previous contingency operations to gain doctrinal insight for the future. The study concludes that USAF doctrine for contingencies needs maintenance at all levels to adequately cover contingency operations. USAF tactical level doctrine needs emphasis on fighter support of conventional and special operations forces in contingency operations. USAF operational level doctrine is too outdated to meet an air component commander's needs. USAF basic level doctrine needs adjustment to incorporate joint doctrinal definitions and concepts that shape employment of military operations across the operational continuum. Keywords: Military doctrine, Continuum, Mechanics, Low intensity conflict, Special operations, Tactical doctrine.

This study investigates the existence of a professional military ethic and the validity of the military as a profession. Mandates regarding the training of ethics are reviewed as are current ethics training programs and other efforts. Evidence confirms the professional status of the military and points to the military's commitment to the concept of a professional military ethic. Conclusions and recommendations cite the need to add emphasis to existing policies and programs.

The major issues raised in modern theories of civil-military relations are rooted in Harold D. Lasswell's developmental construct of 'the garrison-state.' In a world in which modern military technology would make civilians as vulnerable to armed attack as military personnel would be, Lasswell projected that 'specialists in violence,' i.e., military elites, would add management to their repertoire of skills and would become a major force in ruling elites. Among their skills, they would count the manipulation of symbols, in the interest of mobilizing the entire population for defense efforts. Income would be somewhat equalized, in order to reduce opposition to the regime by the underprivileged. Economic production would be regularized and geared primarily toward military rather than consumption goods. Democratic elections would be replaced by plebiscite. What was new in Lasswell's thinking was not that military forces would play a major role in the governance of a state. Indeed, there is a large literature on the role of the military lin politics. This literature, however, focusses on pre-industrial nations. What was new in Lasswell's construct was that, as part of the normal course of development, military elites might gain ascendency in modern industrial states.

This paper deals with the character of modern war at the operational level and how military theory can assist the US Army in the 1980's. The paper covers the process of converting theory to practice in order to enhance the capability to employ military force in support of national policy. A proper military doctrine developed from the study of military theory can provide more assistance in heightening national security than any number of weapons systems, because a realistic theory takes both material and nonmaterial factors into consideration. (Author)

The purpose of this paper is to give a history of Soviet military districts (MD) that have existed since 1 January 1945. It is not meant to be a complete history. Therefore, it will not deal with number and type of units, the mission, training history, or command structure of each MD. It will, instead, concentrate on: (1) what MDs have existed, (2) where and when they existed, (3) who commanded the MDs, and (4) which MDs constitute the 'fast track' to promotion.

This study considers the question of professional military values-- the code f standards by which American military leaders have traditionally patterned their professional lives and actions to determine if there is today a need to rethink and update the code that has prevailed and served American soldiers so well since the Revolution. It is possible that the set of values which has inspired and motivated military officers for over 200 years has gradually become diminished in urgency, currency, and relevance to today's Army, and in so doing has lost touch with modern military leaders? This study deals in basic terms first with our traditional military value system, examining the reason why it was initially established by our earlier leadership, how it has evolved and how it has inspired and sustained military professionalism over the years. Secondly, the requirements for a rethinking and updating of our values is discussed. Modern societal conditions, as well as modern man himself, make it imperative to broaden our emphasis--maintaining the established code of Duty- Honor-Country, but focusing in on new criteria as well which must be paramount to inspire the type of truly dedicated professionalism essential for success in America's military leader of today.

This monograph provides a definition of military geography as it relates to the application of operational art, and a recommended framework for the assessment of the influence of military geography in operational planning. Its focus is the theoretical and doctrinal concepts that define the interaction of the conduct of military operations at the operational level of war and the environment. The study begins with a discussion of the theoretical writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini concerning the relationship of the conduct of military operations and military geography. U.S. doctrine describing the influences of military geography on military operations at the operational level is presented. Soviet military geography as defined by its relationship with Soviet military art and science is examined for a comparative view to U.S. doctrine. A definition of military geography and a conceptual framework is presented for an operational assessment of the influence of military geography on military operations at the operational level. Keywords: Operational art; Geography; Military geography; Soviet military geography; Operational planning; Doctrine-military geography.

This chapter discusses the legal issues related to military service of aliens. When considering military service performed by individuals enrolled in the military forces of a State whose nationality they do not possess, a distinction must be drawn as to whether this military service is exercised voluntarily or performed on a compulsory basis. A further important factor is whether the individual concerned has a single foreign nationality, dual nationality, or, being a stateless person, no nationality at all. Treaties between States that deal with the military service of their nationals must also be respected. That every State has the right to compel its own nationals to perform military service is undisputed. Despite the fact that some States do not require military service from their nationals or may only enroll them in their forces during a state of war, the international law leaves the decision entirely to the national legal systems that will also regulate the military service of aliens in such cases. International law does not prevent States from permitting aliens to serve in the military.

This research contribution lays out a methodology for interpreting the Soviet literature dealing with military affairs. The following aspects are covered: the subject matter that normally yields the best evidence of Soviet intentions; the theoretical disciplines involved with this subject matter and their relationship to official channels; the problem of determining the truthfulness and authoritativeness of Soviet statements; and the rules of analysis in coping with their literature. Keywords: Foreign, Foreign policy, Literature, Military doctrine, Military publications, Military strategy, Strategic analysis, Translations, USSR.

This paper gives a historical overview of reforms of the command, control, and coordination structure of U.S. military forces. It identifies trends that are common motivations behind various reform movements. It also attempts to identify common characteristics of the organizational changes themselves in order to provide a suggestion as to future directions.

This paper examines Soviet combat engineer equipment, organization and tactical groupings, staff procedures, and support to defensive, offensive, movement and river crossing operations. Types of engineer equipment are reviewed and briefly described. Organizational tables are adapted from accepted U.S. sources and improved to provide additional detail and conformity with Soviet sources, resulting from an extensive review of Soviet military journals, 1974- 1978. The single most important source is the book, 'Engineer Support of Combined Arms Combat' by Pliaskin, Lysukhin and Ruvinskii (1972), as translated by the author of this paper.

This study began in August 1979 as a series of notes for a lecture on the employment of contingency forces at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The lecture was intended to serve as a historical introduction to the subject, using the 1958 American intervention in Lebanon as a case in point. It was thought that by analyzing the Lebanon intervention one could demonstrate several important lessons: how political and diplomatic objectives directly affect the character of modern military operations; how an operational military plan is conceived and what evolutions it endures before it is executed; how such plans, though they appear to anticipate every operational problem, are usually unequal to the realities of operational practice; and, finally, how valuable a quality mental agility can be when put to use by a military commander and his subordinates. Interestingly, most of the literature dealt with the Marines if of it took notice of military operations at all.

This chapter discusses the bases of military on foreign territories. A military base on foreign territory can be defined as a delimitated site for military operations or supplies of one or more states on the territory of another. Historically, military bases on foreign territory constitute a specific phenomenon. Under the principles of general international law the establishment of a military base on foreign territory requires in time of peace, and among friendly states in time of war also, authorization by the receiving territorial sovereign. Every stationing of military forces abroad and every concession of a military base on foreign soil implies a restriction of authority on the part of the receiving territorial sovereign. The nature and extent of such a restriction of sovereignty will be determined by construction of the respective convention agreement or supplementary agreement, or can be deduced from principles of general international law, which are often uncertain and in dispute.

In recent years, a debate between the Secretaries of State and Defense focused on the moral justification necessary for the critical application of U.S. military force. Historically, those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the diplomatic affairs of state have been most reluctant to resort to the use of such force. Only after all other recourses have been exhausted would they agree to consider the commitment of military forces. On the other hand, those more directly charged with the defense of the country traditionally have been far more willing to exercise military power in the discharge of their responsibilities. Within the recent quest for viable criteria upon which to base such a decision there was, however, an unusual reversal. Keywords: Weinberger doctrine; Defense establishment; U.S. Military force; Military intervention; Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

This document summarizes the papers presented at the conference on 'Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention.' Individual conference papers will be issued. The threatened and actual use of force in international relations has traditionally operated under real and self-imposed limitations. With the advent of nuclear wepons, it becomes even more important to analyze the limitations which condition the scope and pattern of military intervention. This study applies an interdisciplinary social science frame of reference to the limits and potentials of military intervention by the United States. Crisis situations will arise where a military response is deemed proper, but decision makers will have to operate within a narrow scope and delimited time frame. The search for deterrence and, beyond that, for 'stabilization' remains paramount along the entire continuum of military and politico-military operations. Recognition of the limits of military intervention can only make for more realistic and more effective policies and practices.

The nature of civilian-military linkages and their implications for civilian control of the military is an enduring research and policy issue. The advent of the all-volunteer force has resulted in a generally renewed focus on this issue as reflected in a recent paper by Segal, Senter and Segal. Their study addressed the question of how well the military is woven into the fabric of society. They focused on the structural linkages between a cross-section of the civilian population and the military institution and examined the implications of such linkages for civilian control of the military. This paper will examine the general issue of the integration of the military into society but will entend existing analyses by also looking at the structural linkages between a representative sample of Army personnel and civilian society. In addition, the implications of these linkages for the internal integration of soldiers into the military organization as well as for their external integration into American society will be examined. In the ongoing policy debate over the transition to an all-volunteer force, one major concern is whether voluntary conditions will lead to an increasingly isolated military. It has been hypothesized that the military's boundaries are becoming less and less permeable, resulting in less civil-military contact and, consequently, less impact from civilian norms and sensibilities. Career military men have, for example, been found to hold ideological views that are increasingly distinct from their civilian counterparts.

Operational art as a focus for U.S. military doctrine has only recently emerged in our manuals. Initially, operational art emerged during the interwar period. Reflecting upon the experience of World War I, German and Soviet theorists recognized that mass armies and new technologies required successive military operations. Operational art was developed to provide the conceptual framework for successive operations. This monograph seeks to answer the question, Was operational art developed in the U.S. Army during the interwar years? This paper uses lectures and texts from the curricular archives of the Command and General Staff College and the War College to analyze the theory and doctrine of the interwar period. The criteria used to evaluate the doctrine are: elements of campaign planning, sophistication of approach (role of logistics, joint and combined operations), and operational concepts. The key operational concepts examined are phased operations, culminating point, center of gravity, and lines of operation. This study concludes that operational art did exist in the American army during the interwar period. The implications of this study suggest that the interwar emphasis on concentration and planning may be useful to current doctrine developers.

A constant in the drumbeat for military reform has been the need for true cooperation among the United States' Military Services. Predicated on the belief that success in all future military operations will require the skills and assets of all the services working together as a cohesive force, the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated that the military services initiate means to facilitate true jointness. Mandating jointness is one thing, achieving it is something else. Each service is the guardian of deeply seated, cherished traditions which profoundly affect how it views and administers its profession. Each has built its warfighting doctrine upon the foundation of lessons learned in combat. Roles and missions are guarded jealously. Each service competes for scarce resources; strong and emotional feelings abound. When faced with jointness, the inherent beliefs and values of the services, combined with ever present competition, can create friction with resultant animosity and lack of cooperation. This paper examines the causes of friction between the services relying on a historical perspective where possible. It identifies and explores the services' unique roles and missions, views of warfighting, and ways of doing business which hinder cohesion, and recommend ways of reducing or eliminating them. Joint military activities; Department of Defense. (edc)

This study opens with the proposition that students attending the U. S. Army War College (USAWC) have not accepted that institution's curricular theme -- the conjoining of political and military perspectives at the senior level of military leadership. This rejection is traced to the American tradition of antimilitarism and its source in the writings of the Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution of 1787. The views of both Antifederalists and Federalists are contrasted as revolutionary zeal and sober reflection. Despite the adoption of the Constitution, the Antifederalist doctrine of hostility to a standing army survived the intervening two centuries as a respectable opinion and found popular proponents. This opinion shaped the public interpretation of the paradigmatic event of modern U.S. civil-military relations: the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Since World War II, respected authorities of academia, civil government, and the U.S. military have espoused a preference for the isolation of the military from political matters and this preference has informed the current generation of U.S. military officers. General Eisenhower's wise dissent from this trend is not widely heeded. The essay concludes with a call for the introduction of instruction on civil-military relations within the USAWC curriculum which will revive the great tradition of the American warrior- statesman and which will inculcate an ethic in the student body supportive of our Constitutional heritage and the purposes of the USAWC as the prerequisite of its pedagogical success.

The Soviet Union's overwhelming capabilities in space pose a continuing and accelerating threat to the national security interests of the United States. A comprehensive, coherent, and complementary National Space Strategy integrating political, economic, socio-psychological, and military elements of power is vital to securing these interests. This paper was designed to examine the military element of power as a component of the integrated national strategy. During research it was discovered that the United States does not have clearly stated political, economic, and socio-psychological strategies in space, and that the statement of the military element of power is unstructured, incomplete, and ambiguous. It was further discovered that there are numerous approaches to a military space strategy, but that there is no consensus regarding appropriate objectives and concepts. This paper examines key military issues in space and presents a recommended definitional and structural framework for objectives, concepts, and components of a national military space strategy.

Over the years the subject of leadership, and particularly the disciplined variety practiced by the military, has been of obvious interest to the military community. Much of the research dealing with leadership during periods of conflict has been directed to analyzing the successes and failures of the leaders of World War II and earlier. However, because the technology of the battlefield has changed so significantly, media coverage so rapidly influences public opinion, and warfighting has become so directly influenced by civilian leadership, it was felt that a need existed to study leadership in a more contemporary setting--the Vietnam era. This paper attempts to define the attributes of the senior leader by referring to the Clausewitzian traits of the military genius, detail some effects of external influences as senior leaders functioned during the era studied, and through the use of the Military History Institute Oral History products, attempts to obtain first-hand experiences of such senior leaders as Generals Michael Davidson, Bruce Palmer and James Polk. The paper concludes that, while external influences have changed over the years, the qualities inherent in successful leadership have changed little.

Since World War II the wrestling for military supremacy has played center stage in Soviet-American relations. This competition dominates debates in Moscow and Washington over the allocation of national resources and molds the foreign policies of the two countries toward allies in Eastern and Western Europe. Assistance and coercion in the Third World are often designed to prevent military expansion by the other superpower.

To many persons the concept of military medicine is reasonably simple. If one asks them what military medicine is they will say, "It is medical care for military patients." Many physicians hold this same belief. It is completely erroneous. It is regrettable that so widespread a belief exists, because thinking that medicine can serve military forces by simply applying everyday medical principles to the men in uniform can result in neglect, loss of life, and even in the loss of a nation. Medicine must enter into multiple strange enterprises; it must often shoulder responsibilities that are unique. In stating that it is a fallacy to believe that military medicine consists of care of military patients, no implication is meant that such patient care is not a medical responsibility. In considering military medicine, the error in thinking is to believe that patient care comprises the total military medical effort. In many

Before examining the economic arguments for and against joining the Common Market, it is necessary to deal with the political and military arguments. For many people who are not enthusiastic about the economic case for joining it, and even some who would be decidedly against joining it on purely economic grounds, are willing to pay the price in terms of economic disadvantages for the sake of the advantages they believe it offers in the sphere of international politics and in the military sphere.

Since the inception of military aid, there have been a number of useful appraisals of this US program. In the main, however, they have focused on the effectiveness of the program within a relatively narrow context of military aid policy implementation. Within the last several years, however, not only implementation but military aid's very existence and the need for the program have been brought into question. In such a changed context, the study examines the relation of military aid to broader US foreign policy and national security considerations. This study not only examines the relevance or, equally important, the possible lack of relevance, of military aid to current and potential US foreign policy and strategic problems but also suggests a basis for developing guidelines for determining the current and future relevance of military aid to these problems.

The document deals with examining the part specific Soviet governmental agencies play in the formulation and dissemination of military doctrine. The author feels that the understanding of these two functions is requisite to preparing strategies to deal with the Soviets in force relationships and applications.

This is a translation of a series of lectures on Military Intelligence given at the Ecole de Guerre. The translation work is excellent, Captain North being well qualified in French. The subject matter is excellent in particular the historical examples used. In general the doctrine is the same as that taught elsewhere.

The volume presents a comparative analysis of the methods and techniques used by civilian agencies in terms of use by U.S. military froces, and recommendations regarding methods and techniques for accomplishing community and technical development work which may be applicable to Military civic action. Volume II also contains the executive summary, a glossary of abbreviations and the bibliography.

Contents: Psyops Organization and Personnel; Psycho-Political Warfare; Military Psychological Operations; Psyops Techniques; Media and Support; Psyops Analysis.

This article is designed to provide a short summary for medical personnel with limited military experience to understand how the medical staff function works within a military headquarters. It places planning military health services support in the context of wider planning for military operations. It starts by examining the Contemporary Operating Environment and the role of military forces within it, then considers the generic military planning process and how the medical staff in a headquarters plan the medical support to military operations. The final element of the article is a discussion of the composition of the personnel required within a medical branch in a military headquarters.

The article is presented against the background of the need for African military forces to deal with the complexities that come with leading and participating in multinational military operations in Africa. The research problem that guided this research is: What should the doctrine of military forces in Africa be to enable them to work together as part of the multinational forces while serving African interests? The aim is to investigate the possibility of a military doctrine that would serve African interests in the context of the reality of a multinational approach to military intervention. This aim has been achieved by offering theoretical assumptions on military doctrine, multinational military intervention and humanistic values in Africa to form a theoretical framework for deploying the argument. An in-depth discussion of African military practice prior to colonialism, the multinational and humanistic nature of military operations since the end of the previous century, as well critical reflec...

A truly unique compilation, World Perspectives in the Sociology of the Military explores both age-old and con-temporary issues pertaining to the sociology of military institutions and civil-military relations. At the same time it deals with major conceptual, research-empirical, and methodological issues in the field of sociology devoted to military aspects. A concise overview with a socio-logical-political science framework and a perspective utilizing international factors is provided, along with analyses of the major issues of the internal dynamics of military organizations as these issues are reflected in evolving military organizations around the world. The interrelationship between social and political changeand the military, and the way the armed forces responds to and internalizes these changes are also fully treated. The principal focus is on the concepts of professional and organizational perspectives and of civil-military rela-tions. Comparative international factors are provided by chapters on African, European, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and United States militaries, and also included is a section devoted to the methodological aspects of the measurement of military intervention in developing na-tions. In Part I the editors have written an integrated overview and sociological framework for analyzing and critically assessing military sociology. Part II explores the internal dynamics of military organizations, with an emphasis upon professionalism, politics, recruitment, and sociali-zation. Larson first provides an excellent discussion of two major interpretations of military professionalism and civic control. In the following contribution career pat-terns and occupational structure is the topic, and Lang notes that technological and organizational devel-opments in the U.S. military have led to a shift away from combat orientations to "resource management." While technological change has had important effects on the American military, Gamier warns against generalizing about the effects of technology on other militaries; he argues that changes in the technology can be mediated by cultural and organizational factors. Kourvetaris and Do-bratz address themselves to the issues of social recruit-ment and political orientation of off icer corps in fourteen countries; they find that the broadening of the social base of recruitment has not been followed by a concomitant process of political democratization of the officers' politi-cal attitudes and/or behavior. Lucas delineates the nature and content of the military images important in the professional socialization of Army ROTC cadets. Cockerham's research on airborne paratroopers argues against the importance of the sociali-zation process; using interview data, he analyzes the context of airborne socialization in the United States as a status passage. Ben-Dor outlines a behaviorally oriented theoretical approach to the study of military intervention in the Mid-dle East to begin Part III. Likewise, Thompson advances a synthetic approach for explaining Arab military coups along systemic and subsystemic dimensions of military and civilian structures and regimes. Event data from a number of sub-Saharan African nations were researched by McKown, who suggests analyzing elite political be-havior in order to explain the cause of coups d'etat. In particular she recommends further examination of the variables of elite cohesion and coercive ability and poten-tial. Segal, et al. explore the thesis of convergence and suggest that the emerging pattern for industrial nations of the West may be one of divergence. Convergence can be seen as making the military functionally more indepen-dent of its host society and therefore insulated from it. Using Moskos's developmental construct of convergent, divergent, and segmented patterns of civil-military rela-tions, Kourvetaris traces the linkages between armed forces and society in the context of the military role in Greek politics, both in diachronic and synchronic terms. Drury assesses the effectiveness of military rule in Brazil during 1964-70 and Herspring provides back-ground information on socialist countries, while consid-ering the effect that an increasing reliance on modern technology has had on civil-military relations in East Germany. Sigelman examines five indicators of the extent of military intervention and derives his own Military In-tervention Index. The final contribution by Tannahill dis-cusses new operationalism of military intervention and provides an application of this new variable in the context of military intervention in Latin America.

Interaction between civilian and military sec-tors is playing an ever-increasing part in the de-velopment of many Third World nations today. Unique in its combined focus on the military and development forces simultaneously at work in these countries, Militarism in Developing Coun-tries presents the latest findings of the best-known scholars in this field. The major issues, themes, problems, pro-cesses and trends in this vital area of interna-tional diplomacy and study are looked at via a broad spectrum of approaches. A comprehen-sive overview of the situation is contained in chapters including theoretical analyses, case studies and general treatments. Specific types of development models are re-lated to the expansion of the military role. Power seizures by military forces are discussed in light of the interplay among the changing class struc-tures, organizational structures and institutional processes that created the proper conditions for military takeovers and helped to select the per-sonnel involved. Elite civilian and military groups are examined along with the resultant social changes and development they fostered. Similar-ly, the consequential stagnation or progress that comes from the military's operation as a special-interest group as well as its internal conflicts ofinterest are discussed. Also covered are the po-tentials and limitations of military-sponsored so-cial changes, international trends in the mili-tarization of developing nations and foreign influences on the professional socialization of Third World officers. This volume deftly highlights the fact that, in most contemporary developing countries, the military institution is inextricably involved not only in politics but also in determining every major social process.

I It is a peculiarity of Anglo-Saxon military terminology that it knows of tactics (unit, branch, and mixed) and of theater strategy as well as of grand strategy, but includes no adequate term for the operational level of warfare-precisely the level that is most salient in the modern tradition of military thought in continental Europe. The gap has not gone unnoticed, and Basil Liddell-Hart for example attempted to give currency to the term ”grand tactics” as a substitute (already by his day the specialized usage of the directly translated term “operationalfunctioning machine/unit,” was too well established to be redeemed.) The operational level of war, as opposed to the tactical and strategic levels, is or ought to be of greatest concern to the analyst. In theater strategy, political goals and constraints on one hand and available resources on the other determine projected outcomes. At a much lower level, tactics deal with specific techniques. In the operational dimension, by contrast, schemes of warfare such as blitzkrieg or defense in depth evolve or are exploited. Such schemes seek to attain the goals set by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics. It is not surprising that the major works of military literature tend to focus on the operational level, as evidenced by the writings of Clausewitz. What makes this gap in Anglo-Saxon military terminology important for practical purposes is that the absence of the term referring to the operational level reflects an inadvertence towards the whole conception of war associated with it, and this in turn reflects a major eccentricity in the modern AngloSaxon experience of war. It is not merely that officers do not speak the word but rather that they do not think or practice war in operational terms, or do so only in vague or ephemeral ways. The causes of this state of affairs are to be found in the historic circumstances of Anglo-Saxon warfare during this century. In the First World War, American troops were only employed late, and then under French direction; their sphere of planning and action was essentially limited to the tactical level. As for the British, who did have to endure the full five years and more of that conflict, they mostly did not I am greatly indebted to my partner, Steven L. Canby, for many key ideas developed in this essay.