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As a consequence of various terrorist attacks on U.S. soil the vulnerability of American agriculture to an agro-terrorist attack has come into question. The objective of this paper is to view the threat of agroterrorism through the lens of uncertainty reduction theory and extend the original application of the theory from the realm of interpersonal communication to the mass communication level. We offer a brief overview of bioterrorism and agriculture and the general concepts of crisis communication and pre-crisis preparedness. We explain the relationship between the level of uncertainty and organizational crisis with the value of pre-crisis planning efforts. We show the importance of the agricultural communicator as a source of agricultural knowledge in the pre-crisis stage, which can contribute to reducing uncertainty following an agro-terrorist event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this statewide study was to determine preferences for the sources of information beef producers in Oklahoma use and trust when they seek information about agriculture during a crisis. Participants in this study were randomly selected from a population of 48,000 beef producers in the Oklahoma. All 470 respondents completed a telephone survey conducted by the Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics Service (OASS). Descriptive statistics, t-tests, and cross tabulations were used to analyze the data. Producers preferred their veterinarians when seeking information about animal health issues and any agriculturally related crisis; and preferred to receive information through county extension publications. They also perceived the local veterinarian as the most trusted and reliable source of information available. The Oklahoma State University Cooperative Extension Service, through the county extension agents and the local area livestock specialists, and the USDA were also trustworthy and reliable sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Malevolent use of plant pathogens in an act of agroterrorism represents a potential threat for European agriculture and forestry. We investigated the risk of agroterrorism sensu lato, which is raising debates among the community of plant pathologists. In the absence of a previous unambiguous definition of agroterrorism we characterized the risk for Europe by taking into account the multiplicity of the threat, of the perpetrator’s objectives, and of potential modus operandi. To this end, we have applied a three-step methodology involving: (1) the building of a list of candidate pathogens, (2) a scenario-based exploration of potential agroterrorist acts, and (3) the design of a risk evaluation scheme (RES), derived from the standard pest risk analysis (PRA). We adopted a congruent risk assessment strategy consisting of coupling the foresight exercise (assignment of nine key pathogens extracted from the list to nine scenarios and comparison of different intrinsic criteria) to the analytical assessment (application of the RES to the nine key pathogens and qualitative analysis resulting in a pentagonal star plot representing risk profiles). Analysis was performed by non-experts on the selected diseases, and thus enabled a comparison between crops or pathogens on the basis of the characterization of the threat. The risk, considered in its hybrid dimension (both factual because it refers to crop protection and an effective stake, and also irrational because it refers to bioterrorism, a vague and unobservable concept) was characterized exhaustively for the selected plant pathogens and the success of a malevolent act appeared to be much more uncertain than believed. However, agroterrorism should be considered as a plausible threat, potentially more important by the consequences of the securitization of the concept, which could imply disruption of regulations and trade, than by direct damaging consequences on European crops. There is probably not a single short-list of threatening pathogens: different pathogens would be most threatening for different purposes, for different perpetrators, and for different target crops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agroterrorism and food terrorism have been identified as important homeland security issues by officials in the public health, government, and food industry sectors of the U.S. Intentional contamination of food has already occurred both abroad and in North America. Outbreak investigation and control measures in response to intentional contamination differ from those employed in cases of naturally occurring contamination. Operations-based exercise efforts specific to bioterrorism events are essential to train public health personnel and first responders to consider the possibility of deliberate contamination during an outbreak investigation. A recent search of the Rand Corporation's Public Health Preparedness database identified no operations-based (functional or full-scale) exercises involving foodborne contamination with a biological or chemical agent. This manuscript describes a functional exercise developed and conducted by the University of Illinois, College of Veterinary Medicine, Section of Community Health and Preventive Medicine. The functional exercise simulated a food-borne terrorism event and was designed to evaluate the efficacy of the Food Emergency Response Plan (FERP) of the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH), Division of Food, Drugs and Dairies (DFDD). The exercise was held on November 18th and 19th, 2008 at the College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL. Based on this and previous exercises and training programs developed and conducted by CHPM, it is apparent that the more exercise designers, evaluators and public health and support agency participants move away from discussion based exercises and towards operations based exercises, the more strengths and deficiencies in preparation and response of participating agencies are revealed. Although public health agencies have begun training personnel and partner agencies to consider intentional contamination of food during an outbreak investigation, the relative lack of widespread operations-based exercises to assess preparedness in response to an intentional incident of foodborne contamination seems to be an important deficiency in homeland security. Additional funding to create opportunities for public health and first responder personnel to participate in operations-based bioterrorism response exercises is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on models of security measures in the milk supply of the U. S. It mentions that despite the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and agro-terrorism being included in the al Qaeda training manual, less attention has been given to protecting the food industry which was worth $1.023 trillion in 2005. To address the issue, the Food and Drug Administration established the Final Food Bioterrorism Regulation. In the milk industry, policies are described to be isolated and have issues with coordination. The article examines the use of a game-theory model and stochastic optimization models to improve safety in milk supply.

The article discusses the need for stricter oversight of high-containment laboratories. Across the U.S. government agencies, industries, and universities are constructing biological laboratories to research hazardous pathogens such as the Ebola virus, botulism, and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB). Topics include a discussion regarding the vulnerability of the U.S. food supply and agricultural sectors due to deliberate contamination and former president George W. Bush's 2004 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, to protect the U.S. agricultural industry against foreign animal diseases. Also discussed is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) plan to build a National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) and details regarding the building of NBAF. INSET: Biosafety Levels Explained.

The economics of agro-terrorism has not been fully developed within the economics literature, yet with increasing concerns about agro-terrorism it is important to understand how consumers will generally respond. This article presents an overview of food safety issues, and develops an economic model that can be used to illustrate and establish hypotheses regarding consumer behaviour and agro-terrorism. We then present sample and econometric results from a survey of 304 New Jersey consumers and explain the characteristics of the 33% that confirmed that they have increased purchases of locally grown produce due to terrorism fears. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports results of a survey on consumer perceptions about agroterrorism conducted in October and November of 2004. As part of a more general survey the authors asked respondents who the most likely perpetrator of an agroterrorist attack would be. Of American consumers, 47.52% believed that the most likely attack would come from a state-sponsored terrorist organization or government, 23.47% from a non-state-sponsored terrorist organization, and only 14.46% for domestic terrorism. The article argues that at the time of the survey these perceptions of risk were at odds, in terms of history and the conventional wisdom, which would place higher likelihoods first on domestic terrorism, then foreign non-state-sponsored terrorism, and then foreign state-sponsored terrorism. These results are explored in detail using a combination of cross tabulation and PROBIT analysis and find that a key variable (among others) in risk perception is political affiliation. The article then discusses the role of political communication via the Iraq War and Al Qaeda to explain the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the attitudes of commercial-scale farmers and ranchers in Utah, their perceived risk of an act of agroterrorism, and their willingness to implement biosecurity measures. The study used a QUAN-QUAL model. Results reveal that producers were most concerned about an act of agroterrorism at the national level and least concerned about an act of agroterrorism that occurs on their farm or ranch. In 2007, a number of the producers had set up some security measures, but most actions were in response to vandalism. Additional efforts are needed to teach Utah producers about highly transmissible diseases and their symptoms.

The article discusses cooperative international efforts to defend and protect the global food supply system. It notes that such initiatives have focused on traditional food security which is different from food defense. It tackles the debate on whether an act of terrorism that targets food should be considered a crime. It emphasizes the need to institutionalize the process of international and regional terrorism exercises in order to establish a formidable food defense system.

Agro terrorism is a threat facing the public today. National response systems are not yet able to perform efficiently and effectively to address this threat. Any locality can be targeted, and the immediate response will come from local entities, regardless of how adequately prepared they are to respond. Knowing that acts of agro terrorism are both expected and feasible today, we must alter our prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, response, attribution, recovery, and mitigation programs and base them on a better understanding of the threat. There are a number of things we can do in advance of agro terrorism, none of which is impossible or beyond our current means and abilities. Additionally, we must keep in mind that although our response to acts of agro terrorism will be local, these local efforts will take place in and be affected by the global agricultural context. The global community will, in fact, be the source of our relief. We must strive now to plan accordingly, and undertake the necessary diplomatic, political, and interpersonal activities well in advance of an act of agro terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deliberate and malevolent use of plant pathogens, i.e. agroterrorism lato sensu (anticrop bioterrorism and use of bioweapons against the agricultural sector), may represent a non-negligible threat for crops and forests in Europe. In order to assess this risk objectively, a methodology based on a critical review of existing Pest Risk Analysis schemes has been elaborated and is described in the present paper. In this methodology, three interdependent steps are suggested: (i) definition of an a priori list of potentially dangerous plant pathogens for Europe, (ii) detailed elaboration and analysis of theoretical scenarios of possible acts of agroterrorism, and (iii) elaboration and use of a risk assessment scheme adapted to agroterrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-11 September security environment has led to a reevaluation of the nature of national security and national security systems. Bioterrorism in the form of attacks against the agricultural sector, particularly in the form of foot-and-mouth disease, could prove attractive to some groups should other targets and means of attack become more difficult. This article considers three cases, one of bioterrorism and two of agricultural disease outbreaks. Using complex adaptive system principles it suggests a strategy and socio-technical system design, adaptive hardening, appropriate to the challenge posed by terrorist-induced foot-and-mouth disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agrosecurity has become a major concern for livestock operations. This paper reviews post 11 September 2001, American planning activities and offers commentary on issues related to these plans. A critical issue is the need for as many people as possible to be aware of plans and preparations already completed and actions still necessary. There is a sizeable disparity within tile animal agriculture sector about information known and understood at different levels. Several readiness exercises have highlighted the need for better broad-spectrum communication: communication within disciplines, within agencies, across disciplines, across agencies, and most importantly everyone involved must talk with industry at all levels. The best preparation involves close coordination between law enforcement, industry, governmental agencies at all levels, academia, risk managers and communicators, veterinarians, engineers, economists, game theorists, and others. This paper features issues related to concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), highlights some of the lessons learned through these exercises, and discusses a plan of action patterned after the activities of a regional agricultural jurisdictional working group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. agricultural infrastructure is one of the most productive and efficient food-producing systems in the world. Many of the characteristics that contribute to its high productivity and efficiency also make this infrastructure extremely vulnerable to a terrorist attack by a biological weapon. Several experts have repeatedly stated that taking advantage of these vulnerabilities would not require a significant undertaking and that the nation's agricultural infrastructure remains highly vulnerable. As a result of continuing criticism, many initiatives at all levels of government and within the private sector have been undertaken to improve our ability to detect and respond to an agroterrorist attack. However, outbreaks, such as the 1999 West Nile outbreak, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 2003 monkeypox outbreak, and the 2004 Escherichia coli O157:H7 outbreak, have demonstrated the need for improvements in the areas of communication, emergency response and surveillance efforts, and education for all levels of government, the agricultural community, and the private sector. We recommend establishing an interdisciplinary advisory group that consists of experts from public health, human health, and animal health communities to prioritize improvement efforts in these areas. The primary objective of this group would include establishing communication, surveillance, and education benchmarks to determine current weaknesses in preparedness and activities designed to mitigate weaknesses. We also recommend broader utilization of current food and agricultural preparedness guidelines, such as those developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the epidemiologic occurrence of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Ohio. As discussed during the March 2006 conference entitled "The Fifth Plague," FMD is described as a disease that could be used as an agroterrorism agent. It is also identified as a highly contagious disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals including cattle, sheep and pigs, caused by picornavirus. Important factors that affects the transmission of the disease is discussed. Moreover, surveillance activities including investigations of suspected cases of FMD, and animal tracing to and from an infected farm are required to help prevent the spread of the disease.

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the agroterrorism threat to Australia. Based on primary research conducted among Australia's biotechnology and agriculture sectors, it examines current threat scenarios and existing vulnerabilities within Australia. It argues that the threat of agroterrorism to Australia is real, and, for prudential reasons, should be taken more seriously by government authorities. The article concludes with a series of broad policy options to mitigate the threat of agroterrorism to Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Agroterrorism is the deliberate tampering with and/or contamination of the food supply with the intent of adversely affecting the social, economic, physical, and psychological well-being of society. Testimony before the Government Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate has suggested that agriculture is an area that has received comparatively little attention with regard to terrorism. Methods: In February of 2004, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Southwest Center for Agricultural Health, Injury Prevention, and Education developed a workshop on agroterrorism designed to engage local community leaders in a process to prepare for and respond to a terrorist event involving the food supply. The workshop was an effective collaboration between NIOSH Agricultural Centers, the state department of health (Texas), a school of public health, and the Texas Agricultural Research and Extension Centers in five urban and rural locations with substantial agricultural production. In order to reach a diverse and geographically widespread audience, the workshop was conducted by synchronous two-way interactive televideo (nine geographic sites). The audience of 155 participants was comprised of numerous stakeholders. The workshop format involved separate modules addressing food and fiber, livestock and poultry, food distribution, and emergency preparedness, with participants developing priorities for future consideration within their communities to address all phases of an event from preparedness to follow-up debriefing. There were 13 additional individuals (for a total of 168) who participated in the workshop subsequently through use of a video. Results: Workshop evaluation components included pre- and post-workshop objective assessment of factual information presented (tests), and follow-up for implementation of priorities developed by conference participants. Statistically significant improvement was noted in knowledge acquisition. The six-month follow-up demonstrated implementation of preparedness planning priorities. Conclusions: This is an effective method of reaching a geographically widespread and diverse audience of community members who will be on the "front lines" of an agroterrorism event. An attempt was made to enhance communication and collaboration among involved groups for effectively detecting and addressing such an event. This workshop can serve as a model for use in other communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late winter of 2003, a number of livestock animals in the Midwest were poisoned due the accidental contamination of a popular commercial feed with a lethal additive. Although all the evidence indicates this incident had no malicious or terrorist intent, it is informative as a case study highlighting potential security implications with respect to a terrorist event directed at U.S. agriculture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on psychological consequences of agroterrorism. The spread of a major agricultural or food related disaster would extend far beyond the economic effects on the agriculture industry. Fear of being infected from pathogenic microorganisms could set forth a greater strain on social and psychiatric resources than the pathogens themselves.

After a brief historical introduction, the authors describe a list of pathogens likely to be used by bioterrorists to adversely affect animal health and production, and eventually human health in case of zoonotic agents. The selection criteria for these numerous pathogens as well as the means available for their procurement, manipulation and dispersal are discussed. The potential consequences of this bioterrorism are evaluated mainly in economic terms. The authors conclude that the threat of bioterrorism is serious and suggest appropriate measures to prevent it or to limit its consequences. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article presents tips to U.S. citizens on how to get on with their normal lives despite the reality of terrorism in the U.S. Their goal must be to get past these occurrences in order to survive. They must be ready psychologically for what comes. They must find a way to get past this and go on with their individual and collective lives. They must return to normalcy and routine. They should turn the TV off since it is the electronic equivalent of talking about what happened on September 11, 2001.

The world has recently witnessed the global impact of natural disease outbreaks, such as those caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), Ebola virus and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, and the lasting impact of the accidental spread of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom. Natural outbreaks, of both emerging and re-emerging diseases, can have significant impacts on local, national and regional communities. An effective response to these outbreaks relies heavily on the coordination of both public health and Veterinary Services to identify the signs, symptoms and patterns of disease quickly and respond accordingly. The future global risks related to infectious disease are influenced by several factors, including human migration, urban development, agricultural development and climate change. As technology advances, we are more aware of the potential risks associated with dual-use equipment and research (defined as equipment or research that can be used for legitimate as well as nefarious purposes), synthetic biology, the engineering of biological systems, and the evolving modus operandi of criminals and terrorist groups. The ability to detect natural, accidental or deliberate outbreaks and incidents will rely heavily on cross-agency communication, establishment of informationsharing platforms, development of joint investigative strategies, and recognition that effective response requires a strong health and security agency interface. Therefore, the management of a suspicious biological incident requires intersectoral and interregional cooperation employing a comprehensive approach which considers prevention, preparedness, response and recovery and identifies and considers the unique characteristics and requirements of the incident.

Livestock production systems and the societies in which they are embedded face a set of risks presented by infectious diseases and natural and human-made disasters which compromise animal health. Within this set, threats are posed by natural, deliberate and accidental actions that can cause sudden changes in animal health status, requiring the allocation of additional resources to manage animal health. Determining the benefit of preparing for such emergencies is a challenge when the total set of risks includes the unknown. Any method for analysing the economic costs and benefits of animal health emergencies must not only accommodate this uncertainty, but make it a central feature of the analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is a key approach to economically evaluating animal health interventions. However, the value of this approach in dealing with uncertainty is often called into question. This paper makes the case that, by restricting the outcomes of an emergency event to specified states of nature, boundaries can be placed on the uncertainty space, allowing cost-benefit analysis to be performed. This method, which merges state-contingent analysis with cost-benefit analysis, is presented here. Further discussion on the economic characteristics of emergency events, and the nature of the threats posed to animal health systems, is also provided.

An introduction is presented which discusses several reports within the issue of the periodical on topics including threats of agroterrorism; vaccine requirements for those in the health-care profession; and biosecurity.