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The crises of the beginning of the 21st century changed the political landscape of modern Germany, which was manifested in increasing right-wing radicalism. As the party identity of the far-right transforms, they shift from being marginal nationalist anti-migrant forces, contradicting the democratic culture of Germany, to movements which defend identity and rights, including womens rights. Thus, the far-right in Germany claim to become a part of the civic culture that includes the right to criticize and disagree with the governments policies. The article examines how far-right parties interact with the female electorate on the example of the Alternative for Germany party. The study highlights the main activities of the Alternative for Germany in attracting womens votes, based on the analysis of the partys political program, interviews with party members and media materials. These activities include the orientation towards the socio-economic issues, concerning women, the consideration of the migrant problem through the prism of the Muslim threat towards women, the protection of the interests of conservative women, the attraction of women as party leaders. The author pays a special attention to female right-wing activists, as independent actors in the political life of Germany. Based on the cases of Beate Zschpe, Francisca Berit and #120db movement, the following interests of female activists were determined: opposing to gender mainstreaming, which threatens the traditional family structure, and opposing to Islam as a source of violence against women. Alternative for Germany aims at strengthening its positions among all women, whose rights are an integral part of European identity, therefore, the actualization of womens involvement in the movement becomes not only instrumental, but also of value nature. More radically oriented female activists get involved in the European Identitarian movement.

Since late 2020, protests against government measures to contain the Covid-19 pandemic have swept across Germany. At the forefront of these protests was the Querdenker Movement, a heterogeneous alliance of ordinary citizens, hippies, esotericists, opponents of conventional medicine, Christian fundamentalists, and right-wing extremists bonded by their shared belief in conspiracy myths. This contribution draws upon the theoretical framework of the studies on the authoritarian personality to dissect the nature of this heterogeneous alliance and the democracy-endangering potential of conspiracy myths. We present three key insights based on an analysis of representative public opinion surveys conducted by the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study. First, we demonstrate that susceptibility to conspiracy myths in the public mood occurs in waves that coincide with times of crisis. In this regard, the Covid-19 pandemic is a catalyst of conspiracy myths as it has induced existential and epistemic insecurities amongst many citizens. Second, it is shown that there is an elective affinity between superstition, esotericism, and a conspiracy mentality, which can be cited as one explanation for the heterogeneous alliance during the protests. On the other hand, the nexus between religion and the conspiracy mentality depends on an individual's interpretation of religion. It is literalist fundamentalism that fosters susceptibility to conspiracy myths. Third, we highlight the democracy-endangering consequences of a conspiracy mentality. Its manifestations include resentment and hostility toward minorities, an alienation from democracy, an increased likelihood of voting for right-wing authoritarian parties, and an affinity for violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, the small parties continued their electoral ascent in Germany. For the first time they received more votes than did the cdu/csu and the spd. Three finished with a double-digit result, and the combined vote share of the top two small parties exceeded that of the largest vote-getter. After the election, a novel three-party coalition arose at the national level. This resulted in a centrist alternative to grand coalitions and converted the electoral gains of the small parties into increased policymaking influence for the Greens and the fdp. This article considers the impact of the small parties, analyzes their success in 2021, and examines the campaigns, results, and prospects of Alliance 90/The Greens, the Free Democratic Party, the Alternative for Germany, and the Left Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, research found that populism employed a new strategy by using nostalgia, a sentimental longing for the past, as a communication tool to persuade citizens to support their political agendas. In populist campaigns, nostalgia is used to affectively link (alleged) crises with longing for a cherished past. In this article, we applied a mixed-methods approach to understand how populists exploit nostalgia in their communication and how nostalgic rhetoric has the potential to persuade people to support their claims. In Study 1, we conducted a case study based on a qualitative content analysis of Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) online election campaign in the 2019 Thuringia election in East Germany. The analysis revealed that the campaign was built around the nostalgic narrative of the 1989 peaceful revolution as a proud historical moment for former German Democratic Republic citizens while at the same time creating a sense of crisis supposedly caused by false post-reunification politics. To further investigate the persuasiveness of nostalgia, Study 2 used a statement from the campaign and found that participants tended to agree more with populist statements if they contained nostalgic rhetoric (compared to non-nostalgic populist and control rhetoric). These findings suggest that right-wing populists can effectively exploit nostalgia and that it may ‘sugarcoat’ populist messages.

This article analyzes the Alternative for Germany's campaign for the 2019 European Parliament elections against the backdrop of the phenomenon of "post-truth politics." Post-truth politics is operationalized here as the strategic deployment of misleading frames and argumentative as well as evaluative styles. This has become a standard tool in the repertoire of populist actors, and in German politics, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a case in point. Despite the party's thematic shift from issues of European integration to migration and multiculturalism, the European Union (EU) still represents an important point of reference in the party's rhetoric. Empirically, this article addresses the importance of post-truth politics in the AfD's campaign by examining the frames and evaluative styles employed by the party and its leading candidates in evoking negative images of the eu, considering in particular social and other digital media as important venues for such processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is dedicated to analysis and efficiency evaluation of the Office of Constitution protection – a key law-enforcement body in Germany, which prevents political extremism, spionage and anti-state activities. In 2020 the Office celebrated its 70th anniversary. The present article describes structure, main tasks and functions of the Office, as well as the most known failures in its operations, related to the Red Army Fraction and «National-socialist underground». The article also provides an analysis of current state of political extremism in Germany and other threads to the «struggling democracy».

In popular culture, politics are frequently framed with negative stereotypes, and there is some overlap between the anti-establishment rhetoric of political humor and populist challengers. This article probes similarities shared by politicians as presented in the television comedies Eichwald MdB (about a backbencher in the Bundestag) and Ellerbeck (about a kindergarten teacher turned mayor) and supporters of the (right-)populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD). The analysis of the storylines uncovers representations of self-serving and incompetent politicians that align with the fundamental critique expressed by the AfD. However, the negative depictions in the shows are interwoven with positive elements that speak to a responsiveness of democratic institutions. The two case studies help us better understand the specific form of German political satire produced by a public broadcaster and how satirical entertainment oscillates between negativity and meaningful critique of political power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany's 2017 elections marked the first time since 1949 that a far-right party with neo-Nazi adherents crossed the 5 percent threshold, entering the Bundestag. Securing nearly 13 percent of the vote, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) impeded Chancellor Angela Merkel's ability to pull together a sustainable national coalition for nearly six months. Violating long-standing partisan taboos, the AfD 'victory' is a weak reflection of national-populist forces that have gained control of other European governments over the last decade. This paper addresses the ostensible causes of resurgent ethno-nationalism across EU states, especially the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 and Merkel's principled stance on refugees and asylum seekers as of 2015. The primary causes fueling this negative resurgence are systemic in nature, reflecting the deconstruction of welfare states, shifts in political discourse, and opportunistic, albeit misguided responses to demographic change. It highlights a curious gender-twist underlying AfD support, particularly in the East, stressing eight factors that have led disproportionate numbers of middle-aged men to gravitate to such movements. It offers an exploratory treatment of the 'psychology of aging' and recent neuro-scientific findings involving right-wing biases towards authoritarianism, social aggression and racism. Keywords: Alternative for Germany, Angela Merkel, East German identity, Euroskeptic parties, psychology of aging, relative deprivation, rightwing populism, Introduction: Mutter der Nation versus the Alternative for Germany Since 2005, Angela Merkel has secured her place in German history, given her unique status as the first woman, the first [...]

Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one's personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on how and in which ways migrants are taken into the right-wing populist agendas, specifically analysing how migrants are represented in the right-populist style of Germany's Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Party. At a time when populism studies have increased gradually and attained maturity, the impact and contribution of the populist actors by means of their discourse and style on the representation of certain groups should not be neglected. In addition to this, the ways migrants have been represented by the populist actors can be ranked among the subjects which need to be investigated not only for Turkey which hosts millions of migrants and people with Turkish heritage living in Europe but also for the Turkey-European Union (EU) relations in the long-term. The relevant literature suggests that migrants are represented in Europe within negative frameworks rather than positive. This study is designed to ascertain the contributions of the right-wing populist parties to the existent discourses and representations, accordingly, analysed how and through which representation strategies migrants have been in the right-wing populist style. For this study, the AfD and its representation strategies concerning migrants have been chosen and the party campaign visuals of the AfD posted between 2013-2021 have been considered and the ones which are overtly related to the migrants have been focused on to reach the argument of the article with primary coding for an initial analysis. The key findings of the article suggest that negative representation of migrants has been sustained by the right-wing populist party AfD and the existent pejorative representations have been reinforced, moreover migrants have been constructed as floating signifiers in and through right-wing populist style with strategic usages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article covers the specific depiction of Eastern Europe in the programs of the main political forces in parliamentary elections in Germany 2017. Positions of political forces of the Federal Republic of Germany are characterized by the degree of impact to the course of political life. The election programs of the six parties (CDU / CSU, SPD, FDP, “Alliance 90 / The Greens”, “Left”, “Alternative for Germany”) that managed to overcome the barrier were analysed. Almost all political parties that succeeded in breaking the barrier in the parliamentary elections on September 24, 2017, presented their own vision of the European direction of FRG’s foreign policy in their election programs. All parties, except the right-wing populists, spoke in favor of Germany’s active participation in the processes of European integration. Such issues as a strategy for the further development of the EU, overcoming the negative effects of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, and the prospects of community enlargement at the expense of Turkey and the Western Balkans were the focus of political forces. The Christian and Democratic Union / Christian and Social Union, led by Federal Chancellor A. Merkel, emphasized the need to strengthen the European Union as a subject of world politics against the background of geopolitical shifts after 2014 and the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Free Democratic Party and the “Alliance 90 / The Greens” spoke in favor of reforming the EU institutions. Instead, the far-right “Alternative for Germany” called for a radical revision of FRG’s foreign policy strategy. All political forces have noted the deterioration of the situation with democracy and human rights in Turkey, which makes it impossible for this country to enter the EU in the near future. As for membership prospects for the Western Balkans, the parties’ positions differ. The conclusions state that the formation of another “grand coalition” led by A. Merkel testified to the stability of the foreign policy and the desire to maintain the leading role of FRG in the processes of deepening and expanding European integration.

The symbolic and significant 2019 year for Europe is coming to an end: the largescale celebration of size of the 30th Anniversary of the Berlin Wall fall – the reference point of birth of renewed Europe implying fundamental changes of the socio-economic system in the East of the continent, which affected the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev perestroika. By the way, 30 years ago, the Soviet leadership quite sincerely recognized our country as part of Greater Europe – from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Today, the continent is undergoing another wave of political transformation, one of the main signs of which, apparently, is the strengthening of centrifugal trends – from the regular agreement reached in October on Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit) on January 31, 2020 to becoming dominant in the central and eastern parts of the EU right-populist political forces. And this is against the background of growing alienation between the European Union and the USSR’s successor – Russia. In this symbolic year for the EU, it was French President Emmanuel Macron – in the spirit of de Gaulle and the post-war traditions of the Old World – who urged Europeans and Russians to return to the political thinking of those times – not to repel, but to involve Russia in the process of creating a renewed Europe.

In October 2018 parliamentary elections took place in Bavaria on October 14 and in Hessen on October 28. They reaffirmed the pan-European trend for the weakening of large popular parties and strengthening of protest forces. In this article the author shows data on elections in two lands of Germany and analyzes the electoral behavior of the German voters

In 2015 the European Union and its most advantaged countries, including Germany, faced a massive migration crisis. Supranational and national leadership demonstrated absence of the comprehensive approach to these challenges. Prior to the parliamentary elections in 2016 the "Alternative for Germany" published a program in which, among other things, it presented its views on the actual issues related to Islam, immigration and interethnic and interreligious relations in the country. Eurosceptics offered multifaceted measures to preserve the ethnic and cultural face of the country and prevent its further Islamization

Criminal offenses ignite the political debate. Questions about the causes, development, and combating of crime touch on widespread fears; those who make them their subject can be sure of public attention. This Article looks at 242 press releases of the German right-wing populist party, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland; AfD) from 2018 dealing with criminal offenses. It examines which crime phenomena the reports describe, which perpetrator and victim images they project, and how crime and immigration are depicted as related threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of the political party Alternative for Germany from the Eurosceptic party that emerged from the criticism of the German federal policy during the eurozone crisis, to the rightwing populist group that builds its political capital by promoting anti-immigration and racist slogans, has contributed to determining the party's attitude towards women, their role in the society and gender equality. The purpose of this article is to present - on the basis of the analysis of the group's programming documents as well as the political speeches of the party members in the media - how the AfD perceives the role of women in the German society, which model of gender relations it promotes and what its view is on the equality between men and women. Moreover, an attempt was made to answer the question about the appeal of the presented vision to the female electorate. The domination of the national conservative wing in the party caused the group's allegiance to traditional social roles held by both genders, recognizes family as the highest value and treats women in an objective way, reducing their existence to reproductive and educational functions. The group negates the legislation in terms of implementation of the provisions of the German Basic Law on equality between women and men, as well as the execution of the gender equality policy in accordance with the European Union gender mainstreaming strategy. The migration crisis has also contributed to the political alteration by the group of the topics relevant from the point of view of the female part of the society and using those topics to picture the threat to the national security posed by foreigners with a different culture and religion. Narrative literature from the area under study was reviewed and the methodology of political sciences was employed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I illuminate the affective and economic factors that drive anti-Muslim sentiment. By lowering the bar of what is sayable, the German New Right creates more acceptance of Islamophobia. Conservative-voting states have held more negative views of Muslims, with the South of Germany being more wary than the North. However, local factors like economic insecurity in de-industrialized regions and high incidence of far-right activities further determine how Germans feel about Islam. Scapegoating Muslims mainstreams 'group-focused enmity' and legitimates violence against minorities and socially weak groups. Currently, populist and far right groups like Pegida and the Alternative for Germany have revived a critique of global economic processes as benefitting only social elites: they dismiss all print journalism as a pack of lies, take a virulent anti-government stance, and create a backlash against career politicians and experts. The fear of refugees gaining access to economic support has provided a convenient scapegoat for processes of devolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey of party positions, this study compares the AfD with other European parties outside the political mainstream across several ideological/attitudinal dimensions. The paper explores the changing character of European party systems and multiple axes of party competition. It regards populism and nativism as distinct political phenomena, but as ones that are symbiotic and coupled together provide a particular powerful narrative. The paper finds that the AfD shares a close affinity with radical right parties in Europe but also emerges as one of Europe's most populist and nativist parties. This explains the AfD's affiliation with the Identity and Freedom Group in the European Parliament; it also supports the argument it is the blend of populist anti-elitism and nativist alarmism that has made the AfD the potent force in German politics that it is today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The story of Die Linke (Left Party, or LP) over the past thirty years reflects the incomplete project of politically unifying the two halves of Germany. Over the course of its history, the LP has been transformed from a desperate holdover from the communist era, to a populist representative of eastern identity in the decade after unification, and finally to a modern, all-German radical left party. Since 2015, however, the LP has found itself threatened in its eastern German heartland by the radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is attempting to supplant the LP as the voice of eastern German protest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, many far-right parties maintain youth wings, providing opportunities to mobilise members and future party leaders. However, they are often neglected in the study of the far right’s organisation. This article explores the development of the ‘Young Alternative’ and its ambivalent relationship with the ‘Alternative for Germany’. Theoretically, it argues that far-right youth wings can act as important drivers of radicalisation. It also tries to understand conflicts between far-right youth organisations and parties by discussing the interactions between organisational development and radicalisation. Empirically, it opens the ‘black box’ of the German case by drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including semi-structured interviews with high-ranking ‘Young Alternative’ members, (social) media communication and official documents of the ‘Young Alternative’, ‘Alternative for Germany’ and intelligence services. Overall, the article underlines the importance of far-right youth wings as part of the broader party organisation and offers substantial theoretical and empirical research perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European migration crisis has divided the population of Germany along the lines of the country’s migration policy and the attitude to immigrants. The antiimmigrant sentiment, supported by the rhetoric of the extreme right-wing parties and the criticism of current policies, have been growing in the society. This article reviews theoretical approaches to the study of public attitude to migrants proceeding from the effect that immigration has on the socioeconomic development of the host society. The authors propose a mechanism for analysing the political life of a society to develop viable approaches to managing the migration shock and mitigating its effect. The article considers the attitudes of the German population to immigration and immigrants in terms of the transformation of electoral preferences under the influence of the migration crisis. Recent data on the electoral standing of the Alternative for Germany party are used to develop a typology of states, based on the level of support for this party from the local population and on other measures of the migration situation and socioeconomic development. The authors identify northeastern regions with a high probability of popular support for the extreme right views on the migration crisis and northern and southwestern states that are most and least susceptible to the extreme right influence.

В свете крупномасштабного европейского миграционного кризиса население Германии разделилось в своем отношении к реализуемой в стране политике в области миграционного регулирования и к самим иммигрантам. В обществе нарастают антииммиграционные настроения, поддерживаемые антииммиграционной риторикой крайне правых партий, и критика проводимой политики. Осуществляется теоретический обзор подходов к изучению отношения населения к мигрантам с точки зрения влияния иммиграции на социально-экономическое развитие принимающего общества. Предлагается механизм анализа политической сферы жизни общества для разработки подходов к управлению последствиями миграционного шока в жизни общества и их смягчению. Делается попытка оценить отношение населения Германии к иммиграции и иммигрантам с точки зрения трансформации его электоральных предпочтений под влиянием миграционного кризиса. С опорой на последние данные электорального рейтинга партии «Альтернатива для Германии» предложена типологизация земель по критериям поддержки партии «Альтернатива для Германии» населением того или иного региона, а также по дополнительным показателям, характеризующим состояние миграционного поля и уровень социально-экономического развития земель, разработана ее методология. Выявлены регионы с высокой степенью вероятности поддержки населением крайне правых взглядов на миграционный кризис на северо-востоке страны, а также наиболее и наименее подверженные правому влиянию земли в юго-западной и северной частях Германии. The European migration crisis has divided the population of Germany along the lines of the country’s migration policy and the attitude to immigrants. The antiimmigrant sentiment, supported by the rhetoric of the extreme right-wing parties and the criticism of current policies, have been growing in the society. This article reviews theoretical approaches to the study of public attitude to migrants proceeding from the effect that immigration has on the socioeconomic development of the host society. The authors propose a mechanism for analysing the political life of a society to develop viable approaches to managing the migration shock and mitigating its effect. The article considers the attitudes of the German population to immigration and immigrants in terms of the transformation of electoral preferences under the influence of the migration crisis. Recent data on the electoral standing of the Alternative for Germany party are used to develop a typology of states, based on the level of support for this party from the local population and on other measures of the migration situation and socioeconomic development. The authors identify northeastern regions with a high probability of popular support for the extreme right views on the migration crisis and northern and southwestern states that are most and least susceptible to the extreme right influence.

Borders in the Political Vision of Contemporary Extreme Right in Germany The article deals with the issue of broadly defined borders in political and ideological programmes of selected extreme right organisations in contemporary Germany (AfD, NPD, IBD). The starting point for the textual and content analysis of actual programs of these organizations is the author’s reflection on the importance of dichotomy in the broader political view of the extreme right. The author claims that the considerably strong focus of the selected right‑wing organisations on the issue of physical or cultural borders does not only derive from the timing of their activism – the so called migration crisis. It is rather pre‑defined by the ideological features of the far right in general. The core ideological elements ascribed to the far right as a stream of political thought, such as nationalism or authoritarianism, are based on the dichotomy and influence on the far right perception of the world.

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The memory landscape in Germany has been lauded for its pluralism: for reckoning with the past not only critically but in its many complex facets. Nevertheless, particularly victims of repression in East Germany lament that their plight is not adequately represented and some have recently affiliated themselves with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and other groups on the far-right spectrum. This article seeks to explain the seeming contradiction between existing pluralism in German public memory and dissatisfaction with it by tracing how memory activists have shaped memory policy and institutions. Based on extensive interview and archival research, I argue that the infiltration of civil society into the institutions that govern memory in large part explains the strength of critical memory in unified Germany and the country's ability to accommodate a variety of pasts. However, there is also a distinct lack of pluralism when it comes to the rules of "how memory is done," to the exclusion of more emotional and politicized approaches that are sometimes favored by some victims' groups. Using the case of the recent debate about the Hohenschönhausen Memorial, I contend that this explains some of the attraction felt by these groups towards the right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the issue of broadly defined borders in political and ideological programmes of selected extreme right organisations in contemporary Germany (AfD, NPD, IBD). The starting point for the textual and content analysis of actual programs of these organizations is the author's reflection on the importance of dichotomy in the broader political view of the extreme right. The author claims that the considerably strong focus of the selected right-wing organisations on the issue of physical or cultural borders does not only derive from the timing of their activism - the so called migration crisis. It is rather pre-defined by the ideological features of the far right in general. The core ideological elements ascribed to the far right as a stream of political thought, such as nationalism or authoritarianism, are based on the dichotomy and influence on the far right perception of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to analyse the determinants of electoral support for the Alternative for Germany, which gained 7.04% of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. AfD is considered a right-wing populist protest party of a primarily Eurosceptic orientation. However, there has been no in-depth analysis of its electoral success based on statistical methods. The territories of former East and West Germany have been selected as unit of analysis, since different patterns of electoral behaviour can be expected to play a role in former Eastern Bloc and Western countries. We analyse voters' political preferences and the question whether the success of the AfD could be better explained with reference to protest voting or issue voting. We conclude that while in West Germany both protest voting and issue voting can explain the success of the AfD, the priority of issue voting over protest voting was pronounced in East Germany, as the immigration issue proved to be a very strong and significant predictor of electoral support for the AfD. Thus, we once again confirm that differences in individual voting behaviour between West and East persist even a quarter century after the unification of Germany. It is thus apparent that the so-called Iron Curtain continues to function as a cleavage in contemporary German politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]