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Under what conditions would Japanese leaders visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and why? Previous studies have focused primarily on the domestic benefits and effects of such visits, claiming that leaders employ visits to follow their own conservative ideology and gain domestic political support. Given the harsh international criticism that tends to ensue, however, political leaders should also consider the cost and international effects of such visits. This study proposes three necessary conditions for such visits: a conservative ruling party, a government enjoying high popularity, and Japan's perception of a Chinese threat. With regard to the latter, a security threat from China has allowed Japan to use these visits as a credible signal of its resolve against China. Comparative analyses of Japanese cabinets after the mid-1980s support this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the creative development of Chinese diplomatic theory since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Topics covered include a series of new concepts, new proposals and new initiatives on diplomacy that CPC general secretary Xi Jinping has formulated, and how his thought on diplomacy reflects dialectical and historical materialism and includes the philosophical thought of the finest traditional Chinese culture.

Hedging has been a widely discussed concept in explaining East Asian states' counteracting policies in the face of great power competition. However, the current literature has yet to specify how hedging responds to great power competition in economic statecraft, namely, using economic means to influence other states. This paper examines Vietnam's response to Japan and China's infrastructure financing programs over the past three decades. Through a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, it explains how Vietnam, while following economic pragmatism, does not simply aim to maximize gains from these two powers. Vietnam's decisions embody what we call economic hedging, or a cautious calculation over the linkage between security risks and infrastructure partnership and a tendency to pivot away from infrastructure partners deemed risky, namely, China. It also shows that such caution has intensified in the face of a nationalistic public that has challenged the notion of economic pragmatism, pushed a realist approach to economic relations with China, and bolstered Hanoi to take more action to protect Vietnamese sovereignty from Chinese economic influence. The convergence of these domestic and international trends have driven Hanoi to enhance collaboration with Japan, which it views as an increasingly important strategic partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes discursive strategies of China and Japan to integrate newly emerging Central Asian (CA) states into their internal and external policies, norms and concepts, according to which they justify both their actions in CA and CA responses to these policies. This article elaborates the concept that to a certain extent, the interests of China and Japan in CA are similarly focused on mineral resources and political stability. However, these countries employ different discursive strategies to frame their approaches and goals. This article also emphasizes that the discourse of competition for regional domination prevalent in the English language, Russian and some CA media is largely an imposition of a zero-sum vision of international relations that is not proven by any empirical evidence. On the contrary, many of the projects conducted both by China and Japan are compatible – if not supplementary – and do not necessarily imply exclusivity of interest. At the same time, both China and Japan have different ways of reasoning their CA engagements, resulting in a rivalry of discourses for the 'hearts and minds' of the CA population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studying unpublished documents from the Russian archive provides new information on the Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea at the end of the nineteenth century, a very complicated period in the modern history of Korea. These documents help researchers understand Qing China's relations with Korea and analyze Chinese methods for preserving control of the country. Rivalry over Korea occurred against the backdrop of military and economic expansion of the European powers, which further complicated China's position as a suzerain of Korea. The main milestones in the political dialogue between Qing China and Japan are discussed with a focus on specific Sino-Korean interactions. Qing authorities attempted to consolidate China's control over Korea by deploying the ancient Chinese diplomatic practice of "using barbarians to control [other] barbarians." Transferring this archaic method of maintaining political power into the modern environment of capitalist state expansion in eastern Asia failed. Qing China's loss of control over Korea was the logical result of instituting this erroneous policy. Russian documents reporting China's dialogue with Japan demonstrate that Qing China prioritized preserving traditional forms of contact with Korea, whereas Japan favored opening Korea to economic expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soft power and hard power are conceptualised in International Relations as empirically and normatively dichotomous, and practically opposite – one intangible, attractive, and legitimate, the other tangible, coercive, and less legitimate. This article critiques this binary conceptualisation, arguing that it is discursively constructed with and for the construction of Self and Other. It further demonstrates that practices commonly labelled and understood as soft power and hard power are closely interconnected. Best understood as 'representational force' and 'physical force' respectively, soft and hard power intertwine through the operation of productive and disciplinary forms of power. We illustrate this argument by analysing the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Both governments exercise representational force in constructing their respective versions of events and Self/Other. The soft/hard power binary itself plays a performative role as the Self is typically associated with soft power and the Other with hard power. The operation of productive power, moreover, privileges the attractiveness of the former and the repellence of the latter, and disciplinary power physically enforces these distinctions on subjects in both states. Finally, reinforced Self/Other distinctions legitimise preparations for violence against the Other on both sides, thus exposing how fundamentally entangled soft and hard power are in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the importance of political factors in the development of China-Japan economic relations over the last four decades. The China-US reconciliation and the rise of the pro-China Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1972–1974) led to the normalization of China-Japan relations in 1972. The bilateral political rapport was further consolidated in the face of the common threat in the Soviet Union. With the strengthening political relations, the bilateral economic exchanges were gradually developed. Nonetheless, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, mounting Sino-US tension, China's growing assertiveness, and rising nationalism in both China and Japan, the Sino-Japanese bilateral political relations have been deteriorating. The escalating political tensions have impacted bilateral economic relations, including declining Japanese investment in China, weakening bilateral trade, and decreasing Japanese visitors to China. Despite improving bilateral political relations in recent years, it is uncertain how long these friendly gestures by the leaders of the two countries may last given several unsettled territorial and historical issues. The growing tension between the United States and China further adds uncertainty to China-Japan relations in the future. Without strong political relations, weakening economic ties cannot be easily restored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note explores an increasingly prominent, but often neglected, communication group in China's cyberspace—the online "influential" (big Vs or verified users)—who shape public perceptions, including on foreign policy issues. Examining threads on Sino-Japanese relations on Weibo reveals a diverse ecosystem that includes not only established media agencies and government agencies, but public intellectuals, whose role and presence are quite central. An analysis of the content of posts finds that influentials have similarly diverse viewpoints on Sino-Japanese relations; some have broken with the conflict-focused discourses that have prevailed on Weibo, reflecting a competing narrative espousing the need for greater pragmatism towards Japan. The findings call into question the argument that social media necessarily trends toward greater nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the 'Dark Princess' by W. E. B. Du Bois is presented that discussed DuBois's Transpacific Imagination of World Revolution and imagining Japan and China. It mentions an actual conflict between Chinese workers and the British Navy in China; and also highlights major roles in modem Chinese history.

The article presents an authoritative analysis of the Japanese government's approach to managing China's activities in its territorial waters. It mentions policy and legal frameworks that guide the relationship between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in asserting Japanese rights under international law while carefully avoiding actions that could provoke conflict. It also mentions JCG is a civilian law-enforcement agency only, with no military role.

This article investigates whether the People's Republic of China and Japan perceive each other as rivals in Latin America (LA; both the Chinese and Japanese governments tend to refer to the region as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), but for the purposes of this article we focus mainly on LA), and what impact such a perception might have on their foreign policy decision-making. We take LA as a case study because China's and Japan's recent (re-)engagement there began almost simultaneously in the early 2000s, and has developed against the background of domestic leadership transitions, growing demands for energy and markets, as well as international political agendas in which LA might play a key role. Developing the work of Thompson [(1995). Principal rivalries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (2), 195–223; (2001). Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 557–586] and Vasquez [(1993). The War Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; (1996). Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: Aa quantitative comparative case study of the two paths to war. International Studies Quarterly, 40 (4), 531–558] on rivalry, in combination with perception theory [Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], the article suggests three indicators by which to measure the extent to which China and Japan might perceive each other as rivals. Drawing on content analysis of a range of Chinese- and Japanese-language official writing, news reports, and academic analysis, the article argues that, despite some media representation of China and Japan as competitors for resources and power in LA, in fact mutual perceptions concerning rivalry have not affected LA policy decisions of these two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent is China–Japan rivalry a global phenomenon, and what is the nature of the rivalry they engage in outside their own region? Literature on Sino-Japanese rivalry abounds, but it pays scant attention to the relevance of the rivalry outside East Asia. This article argues that Sino-Japanese rivalry has indeed become a global phenomenon, that various forms of the rivalry are evident in Africa, and that they are mostly of an asymmetrical nature. Quantitatively, China's contribution to Africa is far greater than that of Japan, with the exception of foreign direct investment (FDI). Qualitatively, though, Japan has a stronger sense of the rivalry than China has, revealing a psychological aspect to the asymmetry as well. Contextually, the types of activity that Chinese and Japanese actors carry out in Africa are not necessarily the same, which makes the rivalry all the more asymmetrical. The rivalry has become more apparent recently, not only because of the rise of China but also because of a change in the meaning of 'Africa' – from a region of 'poverty' and 'hunger' to a region of 'economic opportunities'. That said, Africa – to a greater or lesser degree in each of its countries – still suffers from conflict and instability. As a result, the ability of Japan and China to exert power and influence throughout Africa is somewhat restricted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the world in search for new economic engines, China and Japan have explicitly given their answer through their expansion of overseas infrastructure investments. This study focuses on the flagship sector of high-speed railways (HSR) and examines what kinds of development financing China and Japan have adopted in making these investments. It asks the following questions: What similarities are there in the Chinese and Japanese approaches to investments in overseas infrastructure, and how do they differ from traditional Western development financing? Also, in what ways have China and Japan changed their approaches to overseas infrastructure projects during this process? It argues that in the process of expanding overseas infrastructure investments and competing for infrastructure projects, China and Japan have become 'competitive partners' in challenging the traditional norms of development financing represented by the Washington Consensus and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). To be more specific, China and Japan have adopted each other's practices of tied commercial financing, heavy government involvement, focusing on physical infrastructure and industrialization, and showing respect for host-country forms of governance. In particular, by joining China in the new game of exporting infrastructure and through its own 'quality infrastructure investment' initiative, Japan has broken out of the constraints of DAC norms as an aid donor and endorsed some fundamental Chinese approaches to development and development cooperation, which in their turn were inspired by earlier Japanese practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008 the Japanese government has become more responsive to the exercise of Chinese economic, diplomatic and military power in Southeast Asia, suggesting an intensifying rivalry. The Japanese government has thrown off any reticence about self-promotion by more forcefully positioning Japan as a sensitive and sustainable strategic partner for Southeast Asian nations in a strategic contrast with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Rather than trying to contain China, Tokyo is seeking to mediate how China turns its material resources into influence. Despite an increasing asymmetry in material resources between China and Japan, this article argues that Japan maintains a surprising ability to influence the preferences of Southeast Asian nations and responses to exercises of PRC power, which in turn has allowed Japan to influence China's regional strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article questions why Japan has taken a neutral position in the Sino‐American trade tensions in 2018, despite its political rivalry with Beijing. It claims that the Japanese strategy towards China between 2012 and 2018 has moved from confrontational competition to competitive cooperation over third‐country markets; this is because of their shared beliefs and methodology regarding regional development. The paper undertakes three major tasks. Firstly, it compares Chinese and Japanese academic discussions regarding East Asia. It finds that experts on both sides admit the significant implications of the politico‐economic divide in the regional system. However, the realistic Chinese tend to consider the divide as a problem to be solved through power, whereas the more liberal Japanese expect it to provide a coordinating function for the regional order as a whole. Secondly, the article reviews the shifts in the Japanese government's behaviours toward China in recent years. It argues that Japan has moved for collaboration with China to maintain the liberal rule‐based order in the region. Finally, founded on the estimate of China's economic leverage over its neighbours, the paper claims that Japan will expand its responsibility in order formation in East Asia in future, becoming more independent from American influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narrative, we argue, can (re)construct social reality. Alternative imaginaries of 'being in the world' can lead to alternative ways of 'doing in the world'. We discuss the current dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as an example. Westphalian logic would have the two countries come to blows, if not go to war, over the Islands. The Westphalian account of the dispute centres on the key principle of sovereignty. But what if we utilized a different imaginary to re-narrate the conflict? We turn to popular culture in both Japan and China as a guide, and juxtapose two anime, Appleseed and Time of Eve, with one Chinese TV drama, Nirvana in Fire. Each of these upends conventional analyses of the Islands dispute and offers alternative conceptions of sovereignty. We conclude by considering the implications of such alternative imaginaries for the study, if not practice, of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, there have been differing opinions on the provenance of the Western Han style mirrors (WHSM) of the Yayoi period. Some researchers thought these mirrors were from today's Xi'an city (ancient Chang'an city, the capital of the West Han dynasty), while others argued that they may be from Korea. In this paper, eight bronze mirror samples, which were excavated from the Linzi district, Zibo city, Shandong Province, North China, were analyzed by SEM-EDS and MC-ICP-MS methods. The microstructure and SEM-EDS results indicated that, all of the samples were cast with high tin and low lead content. The lead isotopic results showed that, the lead material of these eight bronze mirrors had two different provenances: one from the Zhaoye region (Zhaoyuan and Yexian), which is a place near the Linzi area, North China, and the other was from the geochemical provinces of Yangtze, South China. Comparing with previous results, it indicates that the WHSM and imitative Han style mirrors (IWHSM) of the Yayoi period share the same alloy technology as the Linzi bronze mirrors. More importantly, all the WHSM and IWHSM share the same lead isotope ratio with the first group of Linzi bronze mirrors. This research inferred that the chemical composition and provenance of the WHSM and IWHSM were the same as those of Linzi bronze mirrors. All of these WHSM mirrors were probably cast in the Linzi area firstly and then exported to Japan. The exportation route was likely from Linzi through the Liaodong Peninsula to the Korean Peninsula and then finally to Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, a territorial dispute between Japan and China, has long been regarded as a ticking bomb, capable of blowing up the already volatile Sino-Japanese relations at any time. Would the differences over the islands lead China and Japan into major military confrontations, if not all-out war? This article argues that there is cause for optimism and that the Sino-Japanese relationship has displayed a remarkable level of resiliency through the years. In examining the three major diplomatic crises of 2004, 2010, and 2012 (and beyond) surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, this article shows that Japan and China have successfully engaged in bilateral crisis management by operating political, diplomatic, and military exchanges to prevent further escalation. Our analysis calls for a more informed and balanced view within academic discourse, so as to encourage accurate threat perceptions between China and Japan, mitigate the security dilemma, thereby eventually fulfilling the optimistic theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between political tensions and economic relations? In this study, we explore this question by examining how Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a territory much disputed with China, has affected bilateral trade between the world's second and third largest economies. Using monthly data, we find that the nationalization imbroglio has negatively affected the amount of goods Japan exports to China, with the effect being most pronounced for highly salient and visible products such as automobiles and cameras; these experienced immediate and dramatic drops lasting up to 12 months. In contrast, raw materials and intermediate goods were not affected at all; some even experienced increased exports. These findings suggest that consumer and corporate responses to political tensions may follow different logics. For consumers, certain political tensions, especially those involving enduring territorial disputes, could override entrenched economic interests and preferences, at least in the short term. In these instances, it will no longer be business as usual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Free and easy access to an unusually rich variety of sources (primarily books, newspapers, and periodicals) is the hallmark of the Database of Sources Concerning the War of Resistance against Japan and Modern Sino-Japanese Relations (Kang Ri zhanzheng yu jindai Zhong Ri guanxi wenxian shuju pingtai), launched in 2017. Continuously expanding with new uploads, this database contains both familiar and rare sources for the study of not just the two topics that make up the database name but also many other aspects of Republican China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an edited version of my keynote address given at the opening session of the 18th International Planning History Society (IPHS) conference in Yokohama, Japan in July 2018. The aims of the conference were to appreciate the diversity of planning histories, to deepen mutual understanding among planning historians in the world, and to look into the world history of planning, with the common goal of making our cities more humane. First, this paper discusses the necessity and difficulty of mutual understanding between different planning cultures. Secondly, it traces the planning history of Japan focussing on connections with China and the western countries, and on specific features from ancient to modern times. Finally, it reviews the points put forth by world historians today and emphasizes the importance of the quest for transnational planning history on the basis of mutual understanding between different planning cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the impact of Japan's pursuit of strategic independence on the country's own peace and prosperity and regional order in East Asia. It mentions that the country is leading free trade negotiations and maintaining a free and open international economic order with reference to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It informs that the country is utilizing major-power relations and promoting Japan-China coordination.

This study provides a longitudinal analysis of the news coverage on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations between 2001 and 2015 by China’s most influential official media, the People’s Daily, by drawing upon framing theory. The results of the content analysis demonstrated that most of the time the People’s Daily did not disseminate anti-Japanese content as around 70% of the article frames were not related to conflict between China and Japan. Furthermore, the People’s Daily framed the boundary of Sino-Japanese conflicts within the political arena while portraying other fields of bilateral relations as benign and cooperative. In addition to framing Sino-Japanese conflicts as politically oriented rather than full-scale, more importantly, the People’s Daily narrowed down the bilateral conflicts to an either-or choice between historical disagreements or controversies over contemporary interests, rather than a combination of these situations. This reduction suggested that the People’s Daily, as the dominant actor of framing Japan in China’s political communication space, attempted to de-radicalize the antagonistic sentiments towards Japan and stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1939, the Building Great East Asia Exposition opened in Nishinomiya City, Japan, in support of the ongoing China-Japan War (1937-45). At the heart of the exposition was the monumental Great "Capture of Wuhan" Panorama. Built in an open-air baseball stadium, this massive panorama referenced the long and bloody Battle of Wuhan waged the previous year. Comparing the panorama with other multimedia representations of the battle and connecting this site to other military spectacles reveal how this panorama operated as both somber, realistic edification and tantalizing entertainment as it mobilized exposition visitors for Total War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's new treaties with the Western powers came into force in the summer of 1899. These signified Japan's recognition as a modern state, but also opened the whole of Japan to residence and commerce for the nationals of the Western powers. This article examines Japan's legislative response to this new era of both political equality and expanded foreign intercourse and exchange. This comprised two new laws, Japan's first nationality law and new entry restrictions, both of which defined the boundaries of Japanese identity. The West played a paramount role in the crafting of these laws, but often forgotten is the role played by China. By examining the international contexts and the debates that attended the passage of these laws, this article shows that each law enacted a form of exclusion: the former sought to mitigate Western influence, while the latter sought to minimize Chinese immigration. Together, they reflected Japan's international position between two others: China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No relationship is more important to the future of Asia than the one between Japan and China. PM Abe's visit to Beijing last month put the relationship back on a firmer footing. Yet diplomacy alone will not stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. Popular attitudes in both countries also matter, and will be shaped by the success or failure of leaders to manage the growing complexity of this relationship from food security to fisheries management to national defense and new solutions to China's growing influence over the daily lives of Japanese. Across Asia too, Japan and China will need to coexist without impeding each other's influence. Next year's visit to Japan by President Xi offers ample opportunity for expanding the foundation of this latest round of diplomatic "fresh starts" in the Japan-China relationship. Uncertainty over the US role in Asia, however, has made this a more difficult task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UNESCO's ‘Memory of the World’ Programme promotes the preservation, universal access and public awareness of the world's significant documents as the common heritage of all humankind. The inscription of the ‘Documents of Nanjing Massacre’ into the ‘Memory of the World’ Register in 2015 reflects an increasingly globalised concern in the post-Cold War era over the remembrance of war and atrocity. Yet it has reignited the tension between Japan and China, resulting in strong pressure on UNESCO to reform its selection process for contested heritage. This paper addresses the limitations encountered by UNESCO in pursuing the promotion of global documentary heritage from an English School perspective. The 2015 controversy is relevant and indicative to an important question of International Relations on an inherent tension between the solidarist forces of promoting a normative agenda on human rights and common heritage and the pluralist pull of maintaining sovereignty and bringing heritage back to the hands of states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While major arenas of Sino-Japanese struggle are maritime security affairs and political leadership in managing regional affairs, infrastructure development is emerging as a new source of rivalry. Given this new trend, this article highlights rivalry in the provision of regional institutions and programs to sustain infrastructure development and the winning of the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project in Indonesia. It argues that in committing to infrastructure development, China and Japan were required to pay due attention to close connections with existing multilateral development banks and responses to the needs of a target government. Moreover, it contends that both states regarded commitments to infrastructure development as crucial vehicles to enhance political leverage and means to sustain the national economy and diffuse specific ideals for development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing prevalence of foreign media consumption, including from Japan, has received considerable notice in recent work on PRC youth culture. To date, however, few studies have considered how youth of different social backgrounds perceive their consumption of Japanese popular culture in the context of the Party-state’s ‘patriotic education’ campaign waged in schools and in the mass media. Studies have also overlooked how rural and urban youth in China juxtapose the images and themes conveyed in the Japanese media that they consume with school and domestic media messages. Drawing on interviews with middle school students in Shanghai and Henan, the present study addresses these issues. It finds that while a majority of youths from different backgrounds express animosity toward Japan, they separate these feelings from their passion for Japanese popular culture. In some cases, consumption of Japanese media also allows teenagers to feel that they ‘know’—or even appreciate—the other country better. Amid the anti-Japanese messages currently circulating in PRC schools and domestic media, consumption of Japanese popular culture manifests a form of ‘expressive individualism’ among teenagers, who creatively construct their own notions of patriotism, national memory, and Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks on the objective of Shinzo Abe, prime minister of Japan, for the protection of Japanese people and revision of National Defense Program Guidelines in Japan which includes advancement of defense diplomacy, procurement of defense equipment, and expansion of security cooperation network. It focuses on the capabilities, motives and consequences of Japan's Self-Defense Policy. The bilateral relations between China and Japan are also discussed.

This study examines the Japan-China rivalry and independent foreign policy (IFP) rhetoric of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Using both AntConc (concordance program) and conventional reading, this study identifies the themes and aspects as to how he used words related to China and Japan in his speeches. Data analysis reveals that his rhetoric centered on several themes, such as historical relations, brotherly and friendly relations, strategic partnership, China as an economic and military superpower, development assistance, and as point of reference, among others. Contrary to what Duterte portrays as IFP, the study shows that even after two years into his presidency, nothing has really changed in the Philippines. His promise of pursuing an IFP policy has neither taken the form of a concrete plan nor materialized as a policy. This paper argues that the ambivalence in Duterte’s foreign policy rhetoric is just a strategy to accommodate China’s influence while maintaining his nationalist narrative. His IFP rhetoric is just a manifestation of continuing dependency to outside powers. No matter how different it initially seemed to be from previous administrations in the way that it entertains other powers such as China and Japan apart from the US, it still cannot be considered as IFP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's security posture is unique: it is at once a pacifist nation, controls one of the world's largest militaries, is heavily reliant on its alliance with the United States and remains in nearly continuous political conflict with its nearest neighbours over historical issues. The authors surveyed in this book review essay suggest that Japan's security policy-making has undergone a significant transformation that will reverberate for decades. Andrew L. Oros suggests that Japan is experiencing a security renaissance, and is a much more active player now than during the Cold War. Sheila A. Smith believes that rising nationalism among Tokyo's conservative elite has made Sino-Japanese relations more contentious than ever. Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder state that diverging national identities have driven the increase in tensions between Japan and South Korea. Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford assert that the key to success of Japan's Ground Self-Defence Force has been its ability to reinforce peaceful postwar norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the state of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan, Japan's new strategic partnerships in Asia, and Japan's outreach to the U.S. and China.

Much of Japan's defence policy through the period of detente until the end of the Cold War, was designed by Vice-Minister of Defense Seiki Nishihiro. Minister Nishihiro was responsible for drafting two key documents—the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) and the Japan–US Defence Guideline (Guideline)—which have underpinned Japan's defence policy since the mid-1970s. Diplomatic normalization by Japan and the United States with the People's Republic of China meant (PRC) meant that military buildup against the PRC was no longer necessary. However, the NDPO rationalized the existing level of Japan's military capabilities as being required to meet the security environment and justified the incremental buildup of capabilities as necessary in case of an emergency. Though revised several times, the two documents still effectively outline Japanese defence policy and its relations with the US today. Currently, Japan faces two difficult challenges: the rapid growth of Chinese military power in the last two decades and North Korea's development of nuclear warheads. In order to meet these challenges, Japan has recently further updated the two documents to improve military capabilities and effectiveness. It will be key for Japan to remember its success in defence policy during the Cold War and stay confident with its posture while maintaining enhanced military cooperation with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elite and public doubts in Japan about the country's economic and security relationships with both the United States and China, changes in the regional threat environment and the enhanced influence of revisionist conservatives in leadership positions over the past five years make conditions ripe for more muscular internal and external balancing by Japan. Despite this, recent changes to Japan's overall grand strategy and military posture remain incremental and focused on longer-term transformation. We argue that despite a degree of convergence in threat perceptions between the Japanese public and elites—and despite a greater tolerance of debate on controversial security issues—the increased political influence of revisionist conservatives arouses suspicion owing to the interlinkages between their political, social and security agendas. This, in turn, the article argues, complicates moves towards a more robust, responsive and flexible Japanese deterrence posture and an approach to alliance deepening suitable for minimizing contemporary geopolitical vulnerability and risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze why negotiations for the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship were extended for a longer period than expected. Treaty negotiations were protracted largely due to a backlash against the Normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. Moreover Japan’s diplomacy against China was entwined with political factional strife in the Liberal Democratic Party. Premier Takeo Fukuda’s diplomatic guidance was solid and steady. He created an agreement within the party over time by rejecting an early political settlement that Premier Kakuei Tanaka did in 1972. He also addressed the territorial issue calmly, and steadily advanced negotiations for the treaty. As a result, the Fukuda administration successfully achieved the Japan-China Treaty. Conclusion of the Treaty by Fukuda, who had strong ties with the pro-Taiwan camp, brought an end to the conflict over policy towards China within the LDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, and its implications for the bilateral economic and trade cooperation between China and Japan. Topics discussed include the five major goals of this initiative including policy coordination, facilities connectivity, and people-to-people bonds. Also discussed are areas where China and Japan can pursue cooperation under the Belt and Road including the area of exploring third-party markets, the logistics channel and financing.

The study analyses the influence of technical barriers to agricultural trade carried out by Japan on China's fruit exports. In order to measure the tariff equivalents of technical barriers, the price wedge method is utilized. Based on the utility function specified in the study, the constructed model is adopted to evaluate the elasticity of substitution between the imported fruits and Japanese domestic fruits, and the consumers' preference parameters for different kinds of fruits. Sample data are chosen from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2015. Based on the estimated preference parameters and elasticity of substitution, the results show that Japanese consumers prefer domestic fruits to the imported fruits. Besides, the results reveal that although the substitution and preference parameters are higher for the improved quality of imported fruits in the context of the positive list system, the scales of tariff equivalents of technical barriers are larger than the regular custom tariffs, and the technical barriers would cause extra huge costs for the imported fruits. Especially, in the three consecutive years after the implementation of the positive list system, tariff equivalents of technical barriers almost reached 150%, and then gradually decreased in the following years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]