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The aim of this entry is to provide an overview of the most important philosophical issues concerning the Artificial Intelligence. The introduction is devoted to shortly analyze the meaning of the term “Artificial Intelligence” and its history; the first section presents Turing’s test and its philosophical significance for the question whether the machines can think. Then, it is discussed John Searle’s Chinese room argument with the exploration of the topics of consciousness and intentionality. The last section is devoted to Catholic Church’s view on these matters.

Supervaluationism is one of the most discussed approaches to the semantics of future tense sentences in a branching time. In this paper, we consider the criticism advanced by Malpass against Supervaluationism. This criticism relies on the fact that supervaluationists must accept as supertrue disjunctions whose disjuncts are not only supertrue-which supervaluationists are ready to acknowledge-but also not satisfiable. In order to show this, Malpass proposes a formula, FF1$$ F{F}_1 $$, which shows the existence of a satisfiable disjunction with unsatisfiable disjuncts in supervaluationist models. In reply, we show that formula FF1$$ F{F}_1 $$ cannot be expressed within a model (whether Ockhamist or supervaluationist) because it quantifies on models. It can be correctly characterised only within a meta-model that has the resources to quantify on various models. However, once that is done, FF1$$ F{F}_1 $$ is, for the advocates of Supervaluationism, no more demanding than other disjunctions because it just generalises at the meta-theoretical level what supervaluationists already acknowledge at the theoretical level.

According to some scholars, universalist semantics of the future are incompatible with classical ascriptions of probability. This alleged fact is used as an argument for the linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, we show that, on the contrary, universalist semantics of the future are in harmony with the theory of probability, while the advocates of linearist semantics have to pay high theoretical costs to maintain the coherence with the classical theory of probability.

The concept of autonomy is crucial for the theoretical characterization of robots and, more in general, complex technological artifacts. The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual and logical framework in which it is possible to define two concepts of autonomy: autonomy of performance and autonomy of process. The analysis is carried out exploiting the logical resources of the counterfactual semantics – developed by Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s seminal works – and branching structures of the possible courses of actions. It allows to differentiate the autonomy of a robotic arm from the autonomy of a highly complex machine- like rovers for the explorations of the planets. The clarification of the concept of autonomy is, moreover, an essential precondition for the investigation concerning the ethics of artificial agents.

In this paper, we aim to examine the relationships between four solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom—theological determinism, Molinism, simple foreknowledge and open theism—and divine providence and theodicy. Some of these solutions—theological determinism and Molinism, in particular—highlight God’s government of the world. Some others—simple foreknowledge and open theism—highlight human autonomy and freedom. In general, the more libertarian human freedom is highlighted, the less God’s government of the history of the world seems possible. However, the task of theodicy becomes easier because humans are fully responsible for the evil they do. Conversely, the more God’s government is highlighted, the more human freedom seems to be restricted. Moreover, God seems to be directly or indirectly responsible for evil in the world. Because of the trade–off between control and freedom, each solution finds itself at ease with some problems, while on other fronts, it must adopt a defensive position. As we will see, no solution can solve all problems; thus, the pros and cons of each solution should be weighed carefully.

The present paper is devoted to present two pragmatic logics and their corresponding intended interpretations according to which an illocutionary act of (scientific) hypothesis-making is justified by a scintilla of evidence. The paper first introduces a general pragmatic frame for assertions, expanded to hypotheses, AH and a hypothetical pragmatic logic for evidence HLP. Both AH and HLP are extensions of the Logic for Pragmatics, LP. We compare AH and HLP. Then, we underline the expressive and inferential richness of both systems in dealing with hypothetical judgements, especially when based on different, sometimes conflicting, evidence.

The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.

Hume’s Principle (HP) states that the cardinal number of the concept F is identical with the cardinal number of G if and only if F and G can be put into one-to-one correspondence. The Schwartzkopff-Rosen Principle (SR Principle) is a modification of HP in terms of metaphysical grounding: it states that if the number of F is identical with the number of G, then this identity is (strictly, fully, and immediately) grounded by the fact that F and G can be paired one-to-one (Rosen 2010, 117; Schwartzkopff Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82(1), 353–373, 2011, 362). HP is central to the neologicist program in the philosophy of mathematics (Wright 1983; Hale and Wright 2001); in this paper we submit that, even if the neo-logicists wish to venture into the metaphysics of grounding, they can avoid the SR Principle. In Section 1 we introduce neo-logicism. In Sections 2 and 3 we examine the SR Principle. We then formulate an account of arithmetical facts which does not rest on the SR Principle; we finally argue that the neo-logicists should avoid the SR Principle in favour of this alternative proposal.

In our introduction we make some remarks on the main topics of this issue: assertion and proof. We briefly describe how each of the papers in the present publication has contributed from either different or complementary perspectives to the logical reflection on assertion and proof, while also specifying the relation between them.

La prima introduzione sistematica alla metafisica analitica contemporanea in Italia.

Are identity criteria grounding principles? A prima facie answer to this question is positive. Specifically, two-level identity criteria can be taken as principles related to issues of identity among objects of a given kind compared with objects of a more basic kind. Moreover, they are grounding metaphysical principles of some objects with regard to others. In the first part of the paper we criticise this prima facie natural reading of identity criteria. This result does not mean that identity criteria could not be taken as grounding principles. In the second part, we propose some basic steps towards a conceptual reading of grounding. Such a way of understanding it goes along with an epistemic reading of identity criteria.

Our aim is to overcome some counterexamples to the classical criteria of abstractness; this can be done, we argue, by considering another fundamental metaphysical distinction, that is, the distinction between dependent and independent entities. By including it in the framework we are able to cast some light on the relationship between abstractness criteria based on the negation of some features of concrete objects (metaphysical criteria) and abstractness criteria based on Frege’s Abstraction Principles (logico-semantical criteria).

Philosophy of mathematics of last fifty years has been dominated by the metaontological stance according to which one fundamental problem of the ontology of mathematical theories is the existence of mathematical objects and the related epistemic access to them. But during the last ten years another fecund and promising metaphysical framework has been developed: the key idea (which goes back to Aristotle) is that the main problem of metaphysics is about the relation of grounding among various levels of reality. Although this approach should be relevant for almost all the metaphysical questions, however, there are few attempts to extend these intuitions to the debate in philosophy of mathematics. The aim of this, preliminary, work is analysing some possible outcomes of the grounding approach in metaphysics of mathematics.

In this paper, we argue that Williamson’s arguments against luminosity and the KK principle do not work, at least in a scientific context. Both of these arguments are based on the presence of a so-called “buffer zone” between situations in which one is in a position to know p and situations in which one is in a position to know ¬p. In those positions belonging to the buffer zone ¬p holds, but one is not in a position to know ¬p. The presence of this buffer zone triggers two types of sorites arguments. We show that this kind of argument does not hold in a scientific context, where the buffer zone is controlled by a quantitative measurement of the experimental error.

In the first part of this paper, we analyze the concept of open future. Our main thesis is that the indeterminateness of the future crucially depends on the perspective from which the propositions containing the future operator are evaluated. For this reason, we offer a perspectival temporal semantics, in which propositions are evaluated with respect to two indexes: the time of evaluation and the time of the perspective. This demonstrates the compatibility of this semantics with both a tensed and a tenseless metaphysics of time. In the second part, we apply the theoretical device of perspectival semantics to the problem of divine foreknowledge, demonstrating that this semantics proves to be promising in the solution of the foreknowledge problem. Finally, we discuss this solution from the point of view of both a tenseless and a tensed conception of the universe.

The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to provide a conceptual analysis of the so called moving spotlight theory of time, highlighting its underlying metaphysical assumptions; on the other hand, to develop a semantics for a temporal logic which allows us to grasp the philosophical background of this theory.

In addressing the problem of the (in)compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter problems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models of temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have proved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure of the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the Thin Red Line (TRL) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are true or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between Molinism and TRL models, Restall (2011) has advanced some criticisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against TRL models. In particular, Restall believes that the implication p --> HFp is not true in TRL models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication is not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall’s criticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in many open future models (not just TRL) the implication p --> HFp is invalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication, some modifications are required in respect of the branching time semantics. In proposing one such modification, we show that this new semantics can be adopted by advocates of the TRL and, as a consequence, by Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated by Restall is either a problem for many open future models (not just for Molinists) or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a problem for Molinists either.

This is a special Issue of Logique et Analyse devoted to the logic of speech acts.

This book deals with an old conundrum: if God knows what we will choose tomorrow, how can we be free to choose otherwise? If all our choices are already written, is our freedom simply an illusion? This book provides a precise analysis of this dilemma using the tools of modern metaphysics and logic of time. With a focus on three intertwined concepts - God’s nature, the formal structure of time, and the metaphysics time, including the relationship between temporal entities and a timeless God - the chapters analyse various solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom, revealing the advantages and drawbacks of each. Building on this analysis, the authors advance constructive solutions, showing under what conditions an entity can be omniscient in the presence of free agents, and whether an eternal entity can know the tensed futures of the world. The metaphysics of time, its topology and the semantics of future tensed sentences are shown to be invaluable topics in dealing with this issue. Combining investigations into the metaphysics of time with the discipline of temporal logic this monograph brings about important advancements in the philosophical understanding of an ancient and fascinating problem. The answer, if any, is hidden in the folds of time, in the elusive nature of this feature of reality and in the infinite branching of our lives.

The species concept is one of the central concepts in biological science. Although modern systematics speculates about the existence of a complex hierarchy of nested taxa, biological species are considered particularly important for the active role they play in evolution. However, neither theoretical biologists nor philosophers of biology have come to an agreement about what a species is. In this chapter, we address two questions pertaining to biological species: (1) are they individuals or universals? and (2) are they bona fide or fiat entities? In section The Species-as-Individuals View, we illustrate the reasons that have led many scholars to support the view that species are individuals. In the next two sections, we show that the relational concepts of species – on which the species-as-individuals view is based – provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for species membership. This seriously undermines the species-as-individuals view. In the section A Conceptualist Model for the Metaphysics of Species, we advance the proposal that species are fiat concepts (and thus, universal entities partially dependent on the human mind) carved in a multi-dimensional space representing the properties that the biological organisms possess. The final section concludes.

How to Say 'Yes' or 'No': Logical Approaches to Modes of Assertion and Denial. Book of Abstracts.

Com’è possibile conciliare l’onniscienza di Dio con la libertà degli esseri umani? In fondo, se Dio conosce fin dall’eternità l’esito della storia, non è forse tutto già scritto, immutabile e quindi vana la nostra pretesa di essere protagonisti del nostro destino? Domande simili hanno assillato teologi, filosofi e credenti di tutti i tempi – anche al di fuori della fede cristiana. La questione è cruciale e tocca due cardini di quella che, un po’ sbrigativamente, potremmo chiamare concezione religiosa del mondo: l’esistenza di un’entità suprema che conosce ogni cosa e la possibilità da parte degli esseri umani (ma anche di altre entità personali) di autodeterminare le loro esistenze. Scopo di questo lavoro è fornire una rassegna sintetica, ma aggiornata, circa le trattazioni filosofiche del problema dell’onniscienza divina e della libertà umana.

Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995, Erkenntnis, 43, 81–109) by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On the basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses

The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, while a dynamic conception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events and human freedom can be reconciled.

Linnebo argues that Boolos' interpretation of second order monadic logic (MSOL) is not logic. His argument starts by proposing some conditions for logicality (ontological innocence, cognitive primacy, and universal applicability) and goes on arguing that Boolos' proposal does not satisfy them. The problem is that, in our view, Linnebo's conditions for logicality meet some general difficulties on the very same notion. His formulation cannot be considered a good test for demarcating what is logic at all. Take first order logic (F OL ): either it does not satisfy the conditions proposed or it satisfies them trivially. A positive result of our analysis is that an account of logicality based on independency is better evaluable in a relational setting.

This is a review of Evandro Agazzi's book "Ragioni e limiti del formalismo"

L'articolo difende una concezione aprioristica del sapere matematico che fa appello a una forma di intuizione intellettiva delle entità matematiche.