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The Institute of Enhanced Cooperation (EnC) was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) but it was made more flexible and operational by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Its main objective was to overcome the blockages in the law-making process, as well as to strengthen the cooperation among EU member states and deepen the integration process in specific areas. In this paper, the authors examine the institute of enhanced cooperation as a form of flexible and differentiated integration. The authors first present a brief historical overview of the legal regulation of this institute in the provisions of the founding treaties of the EU. Then, they provide an overview of the sources of law adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation in certain areas of Private International Law, and particularly for the purpose of establishing the European Public Prosecutor's Office. Based on the analysis of a number of legal acts adopted within this institute, the authors draw a conclusion that the institute of enhanced cooperation has only partially justified its contractually defined role. Viewed from the perspective of the legal order of the European Union as a whole, this institute requires special attention due to the particularities of its application, which ultimately entails different solutions in the EU member states on certain issues of particular importance for legal and natural persons in the Union. There is no doubt that this institute provides many opportunities to the EU member states in terms of realizing or deepening their cooperation in certain issues, particularly if it is perceived as a stage on the way to establishing general, common rules for all member states. However, its application may challenge the unity and the integral structure of the EU legal order. It may also be inconsistent with some of the basic EU legal principles which have been continuously strengthened and expanded by the Court of Justice of the EU. Above all, it refers to the principle of unity of the legal order, the principle of prohibition of discrimination on the basis of citizenship, and the principle of legal certainty.

This article presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration (DI) from the perspective of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Considering DI's relevance for the future of EU integration as well as the fact that DI was de facto adopted by the Croatian governments in order to maintain a healthy relationship with the EU, the main assumption is that DI – as a broad and multifaceted integration phenomenon – appears prominently in the domestic political discourse. By employing text mining and sentiment analysis on a corpus of 376 various governmental documents we answer, do governments talk about DI and specific DI mechanisms at a conceptual level? Which differentiated policy fields do they talk about most often? Our results show that DI has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments over the last 15 years, which is surprising considering that over this period, Croatia consolidated its position in the EU in the shadow of the 'polycrisis', also thanks to DI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration has become ubiquitous in the European Union today. However, the evaluation of differentiated integration by the academic community is much contested: While some see it as a remedy to political gridlock, others think of it as the beginning of the end of the EU (i.e., disintegration). Our article sheds light on the relationship between differentiated integration and disintegration from the viewpoint of subnational members of Parliament. Assuming that at least some scenarios of differentiated integration are related to disintegration, we report on data from a survey of seven EU member states about subnational members of Parliament's preferences regarding future scenarios for the EU. Our results find that a preference for a Europe with a singular focus on "nothing but the single market" is related to a functionalist approach towards European integration and the perceived disintegration of the EU. This preference is especially prevalent among subnational MPs in the Czech Republic and Poland, both known for having opt-out solutions. While the Czech Republic constantly shows high levels of Euroscepticism in public surveys, the reverse is true in Poland. Obviously, a general commitment to the EU should not be equated with a shared common goal of further European integration. If such differences become permanent, European integration may genuinely be endangered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration has been a well-established concept and a part of political programmes in Europe for last 40 years. Author argues that politisation of the project and growing Eurosceptic tendencies transform it from rather innocent tool to enhance integration and wait for some member states into potentially dangerous framework for peripherisation. Building European policy on the rejection of Europeanisation was adopted as a tactic by Hungary in 2010 and Poland in 2015 and the possibility of peripherisation of Vysehrad subregion in the EU became real. War in Ukraine weakened the tensions but structurally the issue is still important - differentiated integration has changed its principal function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Research Area and Framework Programme 7 represents a conducive means for positive differentiation beyond the borders of the EU. The article aims to identify the ERA's differentiated integration and segmentation swatches by concentrating on the closely-tied neighbouring countries of Morocco and Tunisia. The thematic distinction of the Mediterranean represents positive differentiation that surpasses EU territory. It occurs based on the thematic priorities co-decided by key EU institutions and articulated by the European Commission in annual work programmes. Segmentation in research across the Mediterranean area is a centrally-steered process incentivised by the European Commission through open calls for project applications. Process tracing allows for even more nuanced thematic steering patterns to be explored. A content analysis of open calls with a specific focus on the annual work programmes demonstrates the important role played by the fact that Morocco and Tunisia correspond to the country category of "(African) Mediterranean Partner Countries". This geographical position offers preferential treatment to participate in several project applications explicitly inviting geographical focus on the Mediterranean area and/or partnerships with a Mediterranean membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(2), 909-928 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - I.1. From initial rejection to acceptance of differentiated integration as an institutional feature of the EU migration policy. - I.2. The "migration crisis" and the "fractured values" of the EU migration policy: differentiated integration as an indicator or a catalyst? - II. Differentiation as a governance tool: the intergovernmental roots of the EU migration policy. - II.1. Defining EU migration policy. - II.2. The evolution of the EU migration policy: from a purely intergovernmental to a quasi-fully integrated policy. - II.3. The institutional challenges of differentiation for EU migration policy: defining the territorial scope of EU migration law. - III. Intersecting the migration' and rule of law "crises": Unveiling a deeper layer of differentiated integration? - III.1. From the institutional to the normative dimension of differentiation in the EU migration policy. - III.2. Worlds apart? The dis-connection between the rule of law and migration "crises" in the case law of the CJEU. - IV. Final remarks. | (Abstract) As with the whole Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), EU migration policy is one area of EU policy-making in which differentiated integration has found its clearest expression. Owing to its intergovernmental roots, differentiated governance has been considered the necessary compromise for a deeper integration in this policy field since the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force. The adoption of flexible mechanisms aimed to accommodate the political interests of some Member States. While many of the technical intricacies related to this special institutional set-up have now disappeared in the aftermath of Brexit, looking at the possible intersections between the recent migration and rule of law "crises" has brought to the fore a more serious form of disagreement between the Member States on the deeper values - or the possible absence thereof - with respect to EU migration policy. This has become especially clear in the way in which the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) seems to have adopted a disconnected approach in its case law relating, respectively, to the "rule of law crisis" and the "migration crisis" so far. This Article argues that beyond the fragmented scope of the EU migration policy caused by differentiation, lies a deeper "fracture" on the values that underpin it. In this sense, it invites for a more careful examination of what could become a widening gap by examining especially the relevant case law of the CJEU on asylum in the aftermath of the "migration crisis".

Both political parties and differentiated integration (DI) play an ambivalent role in regard to democratic backsliding. Parties' positioning towards democratic backsliding has not always been straightforward, and DI has been seen as facilitating it. We analyse whether party actors view democratic backsliding as a problematic issue for the EU, if they think DI facilitates it, and how they consider the EU should respond to it. Drawing on thirty-five interviews and a survey of forty-two party actors in seven member states, we show that many do view backsliding as problematic. Moreover, around half worried that DI could facilitate backsliding, though others did not link the two. Finally, almost all considered it legitimate for the EU to address democratic backsliding. Although centre-of-left actors are most likely to worry about democratic backsliding and favour EU intervention, actors across the political spectrum are sceptical about accepting DI in matters pertaining to Article 2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The aim of this study was to identify the circumstances in which the Common Agricultural Policy, once the most centralised policy in the EU, changed, after 2013, into one which is the most decentralised and diversified. The following hypothesis was put forward that the introduction of significant flexibility in the CAP reflects the search by Member States for the most effective ways to identify and implement their own preferences on the EU forum. The research was conducted from the perspective of the liberal intergovernmentalism theory based on a critical analysis of the respective literature and the applicable strategic documents and regulations. In the study, a large heterogeneity of agricultural sectors in the EU has been shown, resulting from several enlargements of the EU. Consequently, it has led to an increasing diversification of national preferences, significantly affecting the shape of the CAP reforms proposed on the EU forum. Other important drivers influencing the changes in the CAP were the introduction of a codecision procedure in the area of agriculture, along with the increasing impact of Member States on the decision-making process since the economic crisis of 2008-2009. As a consequence, EU budget negotiations have been dominated by narrowly-defined sectoral and national interests. The concentration of Member States on an acceptable net position contributes to maintaining the status quo in terms of the expenditure part of the EU budget or its reduction. Thus, there is a risk that the deficit of European integration in areas assuming the distribution of costs and benefits between Member States may have a negative impact on the future of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines public preferences for two forms of differentiated integration (DI): opt-outs and multi-speed EU. Due to the low salience of DI in domestic politics, we suggest that people use ideological benchmarks when forming opinions about DI mostly relating to their general predispositions towards the EU. While pro-EU citizens are more in favor of DI in the form of multiple speeds as this might pose a solution to overcome gridlock, Euroskeptic citizens display more support for opt-outs as a means to accommodate concerns about national identity and control. These differences are in turn accentuated by people's left-right ideology. We test our hypotheses using public opinion data from the Eurobarometer between 2004 and 2018 and complete it with novel survey data. Our results suggest that while support for DI has increased in recent years, DI preferences largely coincide with ideological predispositions. Our findings indicate that rather than overcoming preference heterogeneity within the EU, DI might entrench existing fault lines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noncompliance and differentiated integration are two strategies to cope with heterogeneity between European Union member states. This article explores the relationship between the two strategies of coping with heterogeneity. We start from the observation that research has linked cross-country variation in differentiated integration and noncompliance to similar root causes—diverging preferences and differential capacity. Addressing the same issues of heterogeneity, we hypothesize that differentiated integration is likely to reduce member states' noncompliance. In order to test this hypothesis, we combine novel data on differentiated integration and noncompliance. We find that differentiation increases rather than reduces the likelihood of noncompliance. We conclude by discussing why differentiated integration does not serve as a strategy to prevent noncompliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do integration crises reinforce legal differentiation in European integration? Are differentiated EU policies under stress prone to cascading opt-outs? We argue that integration crises as such are unlikely to cause further fragmentation in already differentiated EU regimes. If the EU decides to adopt new treaties and laws in response to the crises, however, these are likely to reproduce and extend pre-existing patterns of differentiation. Empirically, this study offers within-case counterfactual analyses of differentiation in the Euro and the migration crises. Whereas the Euro crisis triggered a major institutional change in the Eurozone, the member states could not agree on a thorough reform of the asylum system. Correspondingly, we observe excess differentiation in the Euro crisis but stable differentiation in the migration crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on differentiated integration has paid considerable attention to its causes. However, we know very little about its consequences. Using the synthetic control method and interactive factor models, this article investigates the effects of differentiated integration on citizens' support for the EU. We find that in cases where member states are granted an opt-out or are allowed to integrate into a policy area they were previously excluded from, support increases. In contrast, support decreases when member states are not granted a requested opt-out or are excluded from a policy area they would like to join. These findings carry important implications for the EU's legitimacy. While differentiated integration has the potential to enhance citizens' legitimacy perceptions, it can also undermine them simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has focused on the causes, conditions, and patterns of differentiation in European integration. By contrast, we know less about its effects on institutional outcomes and public support; moreover, alternatives to de jure DI in providing flexibility are still rarely accounted for. This introduction to the special issue takes stock of, and discusses omissions, in the current literature on DI. We propose an analytical framework, centering on efficiency and legitimacy, to study the effects of different types of DI. We use this framework to motivate the choice and assess the contributions of the articles selected for this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does differentiated integration undermine the motivation of parliamentarians from less integrated member states to become involved in European Union affairs? Focusing on the European Union's new interparliamentary conferences in economic governance, and justice and home affairs, this study examines whether voluntary and involuntary as well as comprehensive and partial differentiation influence parliamentary involvement, measured as participation in interparliamentary conferences. Based on new data and Coarsened Exact Matching, the results indicate that the effect of differentiation depends on its political origins and design. Only voluntary and comprehensive differentiation depress parliamentary involvement. The results can be seen as favourable regarding the legitimacy of differentiation and compatible with the European Union's ambition to limit the institutional implications of differentiation. They also indicate a targeted parliamentary response to differentiated integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the policy consequences of constitutional differentiation in core state powers? We argue that the most important consequence is not necessarily the exclusion of the constitutional outs from the policies of the ins, but their reintegration by different means. The outs often have strong functional and political incentives to re-join the policies they opted out from, and the ins have good reasons to help them back in. We develop a theoretical framework that derives the incentives for reintegration from the costs of a policy exclusion. We use a novel dataset of reintegration opportunities to map trends and patterns of reintegration across policy fields and member states. We analyze selected cases of reintegration to probe the plausibility of our theoretical argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This forum article analyzes differentiation among states in the European Union and among regions within states as a single phenomenon, an arrangement in which one or more constituent units opt out of a common policy. By examining differentiation in a variety of contexts, we seek to shed light on its basic features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article maps and investigates public support for different types of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union. We examine citizens' preferences for DI using novel survey data from eight EU member states. The data reveals substantive differences in support for different types of DI. Factor analyses reveal two dimensions that seem to structure citizens' evaluations of DI. The first dimension relates to the effect of DI on the European integration project, the second concerns the safeguarding of national autonomy. Citizens' attitudes on this second dimension vary substantively across countries. General EU support is the most important correlate of DI support, correlating positively with the first and negatively with the second dimension. Our results underline that while citizens generally care about the fairness of DI, balancing out their different concerns can be a challenging political task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How far and under what conditions may experimentalist governance be an efficient and legitimate means of responding to diversity among EU member states, in comparison to both conventional uniform regulation and differentiated integration? By comparing two major domains where the challenge of integrating national diversity has arisen prominently, electricity and banking, we find that under conditions of high interdependence and high uncertainty, diachronic experimentalism may be a necessary condition for synchronic uniformity. Uniform rules can be accepted as efficient and legitimate by member states, provided that they are regularly revised based on implementation experience through deliberative review processes in which national officials themselves participate. Our findings on EU banking regulation further suggest that experimentalist governance and differentiated integration may also be complementary, but asymmetrically so, in that the latter depends on the former to accommodate diversity within and across member states, but not vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the extent to which European Union (EU) directives allow for variation in domestic implementation. Such flexibility in implementation may be used to deal with heterogeneity among member states. Based on an original dataset of 164 directives adopted between 2006 and 2015, we find that the use of flexibility is associated more with efforts to accommodate differences between national policies (substantive use of discretion) than with attempts to facilitate the decision-making process in and between EU legislative institutions (strategic use of discretion). Although flexibility may be used to address some of the same concerns that drive differentiated integration (DI), the situations in which each is most likely to be used are distinct because they approach the divergences between member states differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration (DI), whereby some MS opt out or are excluded from certain common EU policies for sovereignty or capacity reasons, may be thought to undermine the EU's functioning as what John Rawls called a fair scheme of cooperation, grounded in norms of impartiality and reciprocity. However, we argue that different forms of DI can be compatible with either fair cooperation between states on the model of Rawls' Law of Peoples or cooperation among citizens on the model of Rawls' two principles of domestic justice. Meanwhile, the EU has features of both, being an international Union of states and a supra- and trans-national Union of citizens. We defend the coherence of this combination and contend that DI can provide a justified mechanism for ensuring fairness between states remains compatible with fairness between citizens both within and across states. Indeed it offers a potential model for other forms of international cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation is not only a design feature of European integration, it is also a Member State strategy to overcome preference divergence. However, putting together an optimal group is difficult: Either the resulting club lacks the capacity to produce the club good efficiently; or differentiation attempts lead to an equally suboptimal outcome of a club too large and too heterogeneous to be effective. This paper develops an explanation of this differentiation paradox. When an avant‐garde group proposes differentiation, the presence or absence of its go‐it‐alone power determines the outcome. The former leads to suboptimally large clubs due to the bandwagoning dynamic that produces a cascade. By contrast, the absence of go‐it‐alone power triggers a blockade and results in suboptimally small clubs. This actor‐centred approach to differentiated integration is tested by analysing the establishment of Permanent Structured Co‐operation in security and defence, which declined from an ambitious idea into a diluted reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China, which shows signs of trying to create an integrated historical bloc, also supports a process that will lead to the consolidation of authoritarian political patterns in parallel with its increasing investments and financial support in the frame of the Belt and Road Initiative. This study argues that China’s approach to the Western Balkans is an extension of the hegemony-building process. It brings the question of geopolitical concern regarding the enlargement strategy of the EU, which is seen as a normative power. Although this concern has been observed much more in the EU, it emphasises the reform process rather than enlargement. This situation, which could also be defined as a stability-democracy dilemma, not only undermines the normative power of the EU but also leads to the consolidation of illiberal regimes.

Exit of Britain from the European Union resuscitated academic discussions on the topic of the certainty value for the unfolding of disintegrative trends in the united Europe. Nevertheless, no general perception has emerged yet of how Brexit is likely to influence the organizational prospects and viability of the European integration grouping. In most cases the conceptualizations do not escape the presentation of dichotomy between integration and disintegration as two ultimo states in international relations. In fact, these are two processes, more complexly co-related. Each of them can include a wide array of structural arrangements, some differentiation dynamism, different levels of centralization in separate domains, as well as certain (variable) numbers of participants in distinct arrangements. In this article the meaning of Brexit as a condition of further European (dis)integration is treated, as based on Alexander Bogdanov’s theory of organization. This theory serves to reconsider the established renderings of such key notions, as integration, disintegration and differentiation.The new sight is gained of immune after-effects of prior Europeanization for the political system of the UK. Cases of the Economic and Monetary Union and the Northern Ireland Protocol receive separate treatment. The latter one presents a path-breaking design for differentiated integration with subnational region participation. Yet to realize the potential of the Protocol in full, political will is needed from both London and Brussels.On the most basic level, once this large country left the EU, one could hardly imagine any of its remaining 27 members to head off further progressive development of European integration. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that, in order to make headway in terms of integration, the EU system, rather than unification and centralization, is in need of intensified differentiation. Meanwhile, the supranational institutions, and the European Commission most notably, remain oriented towards uniform integration as their priority. This can result in lower efficacy of the EU integration policy.

This article aims to investigate the character of transatlantic security relations in Africa: How can it be characterized? Have they become weaker or stronger over the past decade? How can this development be explained? As NATO has not yet been heavily engaged on the African continent, it is prudent to study the relations between the EU and the US. Africa has been of concern to the EU (and its member states) for decades due to its geographical closeness and historic bonds. Since 2001, for both Europe and the US, Africa has become a region of increasing security concern due to the threat of international terrorism—for Europe, we can also add the migration concern. The European side of this relationship has also been largely dominated by France, making the transatlantic security cooperation in Africa essentially about French-American relations. As France has taken the lead regarding Europe’s security and defense engagement in Africa, increasingly with the support of other EU member states and associated non-members, this bilateral relationship is more than simply cooperation between two states. By applying a framework that understands EU security and defense policy as a process increasingly characterized as a differentiated and flexible integration under French leadership, the development of the Franco-US security relations in Africa must be understood as an expression of the transatlantic security relations in this region.

Farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon, son yıllarda Avrupa Birliği (AB) gündeminin en temel meselelerden biri haline gelmiştir. ‘Tek bedenin herkese uyması’ (one-size-fits-all) prensibinin bazı durumlarda yetersiz kalması özellikle genişleme ve derinleşme adımlarıyla birlikte daha belirgin bir hal almıştır. Bu yüzden, farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon düşüncesi çerçevesinde Birlik için yeni bir model arayışı kaçınılmaz olmuştur. Bu makalede, Juncker Komisyonu döneminde (2014-2019) ‘Avrupa’nın Geleceği Üzerine’ hazırlanmış olan Beyaz Kitap’ta yer alan beş farklı senaryo, farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon modelleriyle birlikte düşünülerek incelenecek ve söz konusu senaryo ve modellerin AB vatandaşlarına potansiyel etkileri ele alınacaktır.

Differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has mainly been understood as variation in participation in common policies. But DI also has implications for the nature and functioning of the EU as a polity. While temporary DI may facilitate deeper integration, permanent DI is liable to increase transaction costs and fragmentation. However, little is known about how such alternatives are assessed by decision-makers in the member states. This article uses novel quantitative and qualitative data to shed light on this question. It looks at the explanatory role of various types of opt-outs and at member states' dependence, capacity, and identity. We find that temporary and permanent differentiation are assessed differently in the member states but neither alternative is clearly preferred. Long-term involuntary opt-outs are related to negative assessments of both forms of DI. Surprisingly, voluntary opt-outs do not seem to lead to more positive assessments of DI. We also find that the temporary DI is preferred in smaller member states, while support for permanent DI is higher in larger member states. Finally, we find differences in the effects of dependency, capacity, and identity between older and newer member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the standard conceptualization of differentiation in the European Union (EU) focuses on differentiated integration, scholars devote less attention to differentiated cooperation. This article argues, on the contrary, that member states' engagement in differentiated efforts in EU foreign policy manifest themselves both in the form of differentiated integration and cooperation. It elaborates an original conceptual framework for exploring differentiated cooperation as a mode of governance. Drawing on the articles in this special issue, this introduction maps empirical manifestations of differentiated cooperation in various areas and dimensions of EU foreign policy. The results of the special issue show that differentiated cooperation has mostly manifested itself in informal patterns of cooperation, with the treaty-based mechanisms being limited. As such, the special issue reflects the differentiation and informalization processes occurring not only in the EU, but also in global governance more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of differentiated integration (DI) has spawned a wide‐ranging research agenda that has significantly advanced scholarly understanding of the complex and often uneven process of European integration. Discussions about DI have suffered, however, from conceptual stretching as DI has been applied to an increasing number of EU policy areas, including those that function on the basis of intergovernmental co‐operation rather than supranational integration. To address this problem, we propose to distinguish between DI and differentiated co‐operation (DC) as two subtypes of differentiation, depending on whether such a phenomenon occurs in a policy area that operates along the lines of integration or co‐operation respectively. We illustrate the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). We conclude by highlighting avenues for further research that the distinction between DI and DC suggests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An extensive size of literature has investigated the multifaceted dimensions of differentiated integration in Europe. Notwithstanding, we know little about the drivers and strategic underpinnings of differentiated integration in the high politics areas concerning national and international security, such as foreign policy, security and defence. What explains the variation in states' foreign policy preferences of integration in multilateral security orders? In this article, we seek to explain this variation by putting forward a two-level argument. First, we claim that states adopt a genuine role player conception underpinned by a mixture of relative gains, absolute gains, and normative factors. Second, we propose a novel operational model to examine member states' efforts for cooperation and integration in the security and defence domain based on their threat perceptions, level of ambitions, strategic partnerships, military spending, and troop deployments. To illustrate our argument, we employ a comparative case study design, examining four countries: Germany, France, Ireland and Romania. The article finds that the analysed countries play conspicuous roles in the Euro-Atlantic security order. France takes the role of an agile power-projector, Germany embraces the role of a global responsibility taker, Ireland plays the role of a peacekeeping neutral, and Romania of a small regional power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there are various legal tools to make European integration more flexible, the EU and its member states uphold long-term arrangements of de facto differentiation circumventing EU law. This article assesses their role in the EU's system of differentiated integration. To that end, it advances a model based on rational choice theory, outlining the steps and conditions under which tolerated arrangements of de facto differentiation can emerge. This is illustrated in three case studies in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): (1) Sweden's de facto opt-out from EMU; (2) Kosovo's adoption of the euro as sole legal tender, and (3) the Fiscal Compact. Data was gathered via document analysis and 11 expert interviews. The article concludes that de facto differentiation may constitute a viable alternative and useful means to make EU integration more flexible if strong national demand for differentiation meets the need for discretion or timely, pragmatic action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's successive enlargements had a qualitative impact on the nature of the integration organization, entailing changes in the agenda and priorities, institutions, and decision-making process and also changing the attitude of other international actors towards the European Union. The EU's decision to grant candidate status to Ukraine reflects a fundamental change in the logic and goals of the enlargement policy and will have a strategic impact on the design of integration processes both within the EU and on its periphery. This article is devoted to two aspects of the ongoing changes: (1) the geopoliticization of the enlargement policy and (2) the further development of differentiation processes and the prospect for new forms of external differentiation (partial membership). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leaders of EU member states have been frequently referring to "geopolitical Europe". Macron has been actively promoting the concept of Europe as a power since 2017, a vision based on the premise of deep geopolitical shifts and a new reality of big power rivalries on the world chessboard. Nevertheless, France must convince EU Member States that this concept is stable. As a tool for achieving "geopolitical Europe", the French concept of Differentiated Integration will be examined in this paper. An emphasis will be placed on the EU enlargement process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union has recently attracted considerable scholarly and political attention. Yet, we know rather little about where scholars’ normative support of DI begins and where it ends, and whether there is scholarly consensus about which type of DI warrants support. This contribution addresses which type of DI scholars support, and which policy areas should be exempt. It explores these questions by means of a novel expert survey (n = 95). Three broad observations can be made. First, whilst support for DI is strong in the abstract, it becomes much weaker when empirically applied. Second, the high levels of support are not necessarily in tune with the perceived risks of DI. Third, there is a fair amount of expert disagreement around DI. We defend the view that the type of disagreement we see in the findings is valid and substantively relevant because it highlights genuine diffusion (as opposed to conceptual confusion) in the distribution of preferences among experts that has previously been largely obscured. The article thereby also makes a contribution to the literature on expert surveys, discussing the distinction between benchmarking and non-benchmarking expert surveys, and the legitimacy of expert disagreement.

How does the public form preferences about differentiated integration (DI)? The literature on mass‐elite linkages offers two perspectives: top‐down, political elites cue the public, or bottom‐up, political elites react to public preferences. This paper develops expectations based on both perspectives, and presents novel empirical data on citizens, political parties, and governments to test them. We distinguish preferences over differentiated policy integration, like 'Opt‐Outs', from preferences over polity differentiation, such as 'Two‐Speed Europe'. Although our evidence is observational and therefore cannot establish causal relationships between elites and the mass public, our results are most compatible with the notion of a top‐down linkage. This is because DI preferences are generally of low salience, and first revealed at the European level in the context of negotiations. Subsequently, this revelation of DI preferences shapes domestic discussions about DI, especially at the level of political parties. Yet, this mostly pertains to situations when governments do not yet have clear DI preferences of their own, meaning government preferences are not yet formed and revealed in the context of the supranational negotiations. Overall, this study suggests that mass‐elite linkage in the preference formation on DI might be more tenuous than either the top‐down or bottom‐up perspective might assume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.

Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) Genişleme Politikası ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, Birliğin etkili dış politika araçlarıdır ve mevcut durumda kimi zaman AB’nin derinleşme sorunları yanında, ekonomik krizin etkileri, göç, terörizm ve günümüzde gözardı edilemeyen bir unsur olan kamuoyunun etkisiyle eleştiriye uğramaktadır. Bu durumda Brexit, söz konusu politikaları etkileyen yeni bir faktör olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hükümetlerarası niteliği haiz AB dış politikasının Ekim 2019 tarihinde gerçekleşen Zirvede, genişleme politikası ile ilgili kararlarda da görüldüğü üzere Fransa-Almanya ekseninde belirlenecek olması Brexit ile daha belirgin hale gelmiştir. Brexit etkisi ile ortaya çıkabilecek sonuçlar ve kamuoyunun özellikle genişleme politikasına olumsuz bakışı, bu politika kapsamındaki ülkelerin zaten kırılgan olan siyasi ve ekonomik yapısının etkilenmesine neden olabilir. Ancak, Brexit sonrasında da AB’nin geleceği ve farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon tartışmalarının AB genişleme ve komşuluk politikasını belirlemeye devam edeceğini söylemek mümkündür.

Sınırların kontrolü söylemi üzerinden ulusal egemenliğe bir tehdit olarak gösterilen ve halkın endişelerini tetikleyerek siyasi amaçlar için araçsallaştırılan göç konusu, Birleşik Krallık’ın (BK) Avrupa Birliği’nden (AB) ayrılmasında en temel belirleyici unsurlardan biri olmuştur. BK, Avrupa Birliği’nin göç, sığınma ve sınır yönetimi alanındaki politikalarının büyük ölçüde dışında kalmasına ve bu politika alanlarını kendi ulusal egemenliği kapsamında düzenlemesine rağmen, Brexit süresince ülkedeki Avrupa-şüpheci partiler göçmen karşıtı popülist söylemleriyle göç konusunu daha da siyasallaştırmıştır. Brexit, Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinin geleceği için de kuramsal bağlamda incelenebilecek somut bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Son dönemlerde daha sık tartışılmaya başlayan “farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon” kavramına özellikle göç politikalarına katılım bağlamında örnek gösterilebilecek BK, Brexit tecrübesiyle Birliğin geleceğinin “farkılaştırılmış dağılma” kavramı üzerinden yeniden tartışılabileceğini de göstermektedir.

Previous research shows that Differentiated Integration (DI) in areas of core state powers works according to a postfunctional logic, in response to concerns about national autonomy and sovereignty. Against this backdrop, scholars usually expect that the policies and practices ensuing from formal DI are equally differentiated. This article presents theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. It argues that, while postfunctionalism explains the emergence of formal DI, its practical consequences are driven by functional pressures. The interdependencies produced by the integration process create functional incentives for states with opt-outs to work towards 'reintegration' by converging with EU policies. The result of this process is a decoupling between differentiated rules and similar practices. The plausibility of this argument is tested by applying process tracing techniques to the case of Denmark in Justice and Home Affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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