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The article offers information on the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and bipartisanship. Topics discussed include 1871 Republican evidence about the Equal Protection Clause & 1872 Republican evidence about the Privileges or Immunities Clause; the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 & 1875 opposed by the Democrats; and also mentions about Representative John Bingham's proposal of the three critical clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.

Despite his advanced academic training in ethics, Justice Gorsuch has stoutly, repeatedly, and properly denied that officers today have any power to override the original meaning expressed in statutory or constitutional text in the name of contemporary moral considerations. However, moral reality can still be relevant to interpretation if we acknowledge--as we should--a gap between textually expressed meaning and the fact-dependent collection of tangible applications falling under that meaning. Moral reality can also be important as an empirical guide to original meaning to the extent that we attribute moral virtue to the Framers and as a consideration fo r when we should overrule precedents. This Essay considers what justice Gorsuch's first year and a half on the Court tells us about his understanding of the relationship between interpretation and moral considerations. His deep respect for tradition as an ethical guide frequently makes it difficult to tell whether he reads the Constitution as referring directly to tradition, right or wrong or instead reads it to refer to moral reality, which he then uses tradition to fill out. Either way, Justice Gorsuch's willingness to go his own way interpretively will render his methodological approach of lasting concern to our constitutional culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a defense on the view that aims to fit the text and history of the U.S. Constitution, preserve Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy, and clarify the Fourteenth Amendment's author by framing it as an expression of the victorious Union's Republican principles.

Many disputes in constitutional theory-- in particular, disputes over forms of originalism and non-originalism-- would be far clearer if they employed two distinctions that philosophers have drawn repeatedly in dealing with the nature of reality. First, we should distinguish constitutional epistemology (our knowledge of the Constitution 's requirements) from constitutional ontology (those requirements themselves). We should not be drunks under the constitutional lamppost, searching for our keys only where the light is best rather than where we dropped them. Constitutional epistemology (together with epistemically-freighted constitutional pragmatics) tells us who decides questions of constitutional interpretation: the distribution of interpretive authority between government and citizens, between and within branches of government, and for all of these interpreters, the distribution of such authority over time. It tells us what burdens of proof govern different interpreters' determinations, and what sorts of evidence might satisfy those burdens. Akin to the Erie/Hanna regime, such "procedural" matters of constitutional epistemology and pragmatics could be changed radically even if the underlying "substance" of constitutional interpretation-- what makes claims about the Constitution true or false--stays the same, and vice-versa. Attention to this epistemic-ontological distinction undermines or complicates recent arguments against originalism by Richard Fallon, Daniel Farber, Martin Flaherty, Helen Irving, Andrew Koppelman, Suzanna Sherry, and David Strauss, as well as a classic argument by Justice Jackson, but also raises trouble for arguments for originalism by the late Justice Scalia and Lawrence Solum. Epistemic vices of either a fixedmeaning or a common-law Constitution cannot undermine a constitutional theory's ontological virtue-- if it possesses it-- of accurately representing our actual Constitution, and epistemic virtues cannot compensate for the ontological vice of wrongly identifying the Constitution itself. Second, as a precursor to assessing constitutional theories' ontological virtues, we should classify forms of originalism or non-originalism based on their constitutional truth-makers. For originalists, a focus on truthmakers can clarify exactly what form of the theory they adopt; our standards for dealing with various sorts of evidence are distinct from our principles governing what makes constitutional claims true. Non-originalists can clarify their theories by ansivering whether they acknowledge any constitutional truthmakers at all, or whether they acknowledge more than one. Pragmatists deny the existence of any truth-maker external to the practice of judging, while plu-ralists point to more than one. Truthmakerless constitutional theories like those of Judge Posner; Eric Segall, or the early Felix Frankfurter cannot vindicate "wrong the day it was decided" (wtdiiud) data from the Court itself and irreducibly plural constitutional theories like those of Philip Bobbitt cannot vindicate such data in cases where constitutional modes conflict. An integrated constitutional truthmaker like that proposed by the early Richard Fallon, which sets out a criterion for picking winning and losing constitutional arguments when different modes clash, has a distinct ontological advantage over pragmatist or irreducibly plural constitutional theories. Even a theory merely positing an unknown proper corn-mensuration of conflicting constitutional arguments into answers for particular cases-- that is, a reducible pluralism-- can vindicate wtdiwd data in a way pragmatism and Bobbitism cannot. Single-truthmaker forms of living constitutionalism are thus ontologically preferable to -not-ruthmaker or multiple-truthmaker forms. We can then ask (as I do and will do in earlier and future work) whether that, single truthmaker matches, or does not match, the "this Constitution" to which Article VI refers, and to which, on a naive view of our current practices, current officeholders swear an oath. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of diminutivity is mentioned only in passing in the major contemporary works devoted to describing Susu (e.g., Houis, 1963; Touré, 1994, 2004). It has yet to be given the careful attention that this topic has received in other Mande languages (e.g., Nikitina in press), through some uses of the word díí 'child' from which the Susu diminutive is derived, are explored in work by Diané & Vydrine (2012) on the language's kinship system. This paper has the modest goal of adding to what is currently known about Susu diminutivity by reporting on and considering the use of several morphemes, both affixal and free, that figure into the expression of diminutivity in the language. Key to our discussion will be the behavior of Susu's suffixal diminutive marker, -di which is cognate to similar morphemes found in other Mande languages; we also discuss additional ways in which diminutivity is encoded in the language. Lastly, we consider similarities and differences between the encoding of diminutivity in Susu and certain other Mande languages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Messay Kebede. RADICALISM AND CULTURAL DISLOCATION IN ETHIOPIA, 1960-1974. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 2008. 235 pp. $75.00 (cloth). Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960-1974 was authored [...]

Courts exercising judicial review in every state require the conflict between a statute and the state constitution to be "clear," rather than simply shown by the preponderance of the evidence. In almost every state, however, courts also require proof of unconstitutionality beyond reasonable doubt. A state-by-state canvass shows that in the great majority of states, a clarity requirement appeared first, sometimes long before a noreasonable- doubt rule. To the extent they conflict, clarity has a better pedigree, but there are compelling reasons to take early reasonable-doubt formulations as elaborations of a clarity rule, rather than a consciously higher standard. The judicial obligation to exercise judicial review only when a constitutional conflict is clear is coupled with an obligation to render constitutional requirements as clear as possible. This obligation means, at a minimum, responding to all contrary considerations with an adequate reasoned explanation, as in contemporary administrative law. Because clarity is contingent on the amount of analysis that courts have given a constitutional issue in response to litigation, it can change over time. Are historic rationales for a clarity requirement obsolete? One basic sort of rationale--the gravity of judicial review because of its resistance to correction--is not. Another sort of rationale, however--deference to the constitutional views of elected branches--is undermined if and when legislators fail to conduct constitutional analysis or executive officers fail to justify statutes adequately in litigation. Judicial consideration of such failures, however, need not eliminate a clarity requirement, which is a burden of persuasion, not production. Failures of legislative or executive justification can satisfy a clarity requirement or presumption of constitutionality rather than eliminating them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kurt T. Lash’s The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship (2014) defends the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” cover only rights enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. My own book, however, Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution: The Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (2015), reads the Clause to guarantee equality broadly among similarly situated citizens of the United States. Incorporation of an enumerated right into the Fourteenth Amendment requires, I say, national consensus such that an outlier state’s invasion of the right would produce inequality among citizens of the United States. Lash and I agree about a great deal, but this Article provides a focused explanation of the clash between our two books. Searchable electronic databases have produced an amazing variety of new evidence and argument related to the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning and the enumerated-right controversy. Lash’s book vividly shows that there is an enormous amount that the last seventy years of discussion of incorporation failed to uncover. Here, I raise six problems for Lash’s enumerated-rights-only view: (1) the gulf between the constitutional needs of the Founding and Reconstruction; (2) the inherent unabridgeability of federally enumerated rights through state action; (3) textual and historical complications for sharply distinguishing Article IV from the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) equality-focused interpretations of the Louisiana Cession language and of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, explaining the Clause in terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; (5) 1866 disputes over voting rights and indefiniteness, incomprehensible on the enumerated-rights-only view; and (6) subsequent-interpretation evidence, especially the use of the enumerated-rights-only view against the Civil Rights Act of 1875. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need to understand relationship of knowledge to the constitution to solve controversies including defining judicial activism, dealing with borderline cases, understanding the relationship of judicial and executive review of the constitutionality of legislation, and reconciling interpretive theory. Topics include originalism as the way to obtain certainty about constitutional requirement, having knowledge about constitution, and adopting epistemic view of vagueness.

Error patterns in children's phonological development are often described as simplifying processes that can interact with one another with different consequences. Some interactions limit the applicability of an error pattern, and others extend it to more words. Theories predict that error patterns interact to their full potential. While specific interactions have been documented for certain pairs of processes, no developmental study has shown that the range of typologically predicted interactions occurs for those processes. To determine whether this anomaly is an accidental gap or a systematic peculiarity of particular error patterns, two commonly occurring processes were considered, namely Deaffrication and Consonant Harmony. Results are reported from a cross-sectional and longitudinal study of twelve children (age 3 ; 0–5 ; 0) with functional phonological delays. Three interaction types were attested to varying degrees. The longitudinal results further instantiated the typology and revealed a characteristic trajectory of change. Implications of these findings are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on schizophrenia in regard to food-chain issue in punitive damages and criminal law. It says that courts and legislatures have grappled with whether and how to recognize a rogue-employee defense to criminal liability or to punitive damages because rules vary within states. It adds that there is no good reason for criminal law and punitive damages to punish corporation using different rules. It suggests that courts consider both fields at once when assessing the liability of a corporation on the issue.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a prevalent, chronic, and disabling anxiety disorder that may develop following exposure to a traumatic event. The majority of individuals with PTSD often have comorbid psychiatric conditions such as major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and substance use disorders, and are at increased risk for suicide. Despite the public health significance of PTSD, relatively little is known about the etiology or pathophysiology of this disorder, and pharmacotherapy development to date has been largely opportunistic instead of mechanism-based. One promising target for modulation is Tropomyosin Receptor Kinase B (TrkB), the receptor for Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF), a signaling pathway important for neuronal plasticity, survival, and growth. The following discusses how genetic and environmental alterations to this signaling pathway may contribute to anatomical and functional changes in the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the nucleus accumbens. Changes in these brain regions may in turn contribute to the predisposition to or maintenance of some of the clinical manifestations of PTSD, including intrusive memories, hyperarousal, increased fear, and emotional numbing.

Data from two varieties of Bamanankan, or Bambara, a Mande language spoken in Mali and surrounding nations, illustrate differences in permissible syllable shapes between the variants. A comparison of the Classic variety of the language spoken in Ségou and that spoken by a younger cohort of individuals in the Malian capital reveals that the latter variety is synchronically developing complex CCV and CVC syllable shapes primarily through vocalic syncope, whereas the classical variety permits only maximal CV syllables. Data presented in this study show that this complexification of syllables in Bamako Bamana is one manifestation of the overall drive towards word minimization in this variety of the language. These data illustrate that this variety of Bamana has preferential patterns of deletion that are largely dependent on phonotactic constraints and permissible syllable contact that results from syncope. Additionally, other processes that interact with syncope or prevent it from occurring are explored.