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Children who are involved in legal cases are often interviewed about events they witnessed or that might have happened to them. Occasionally, after such interviews, children are confronted with misinformation regarding their experiences. The question that arises is whether their earlier interviews may protect them from reporting misinformation. The goal of the present experiment was to assess whether empirically based interviewing by means of the National Institute for Child Health and Development (NICHD) Protocol would affect the reporting of misinformation in children. Children were involved in an interactive event (i.e., science demonstration). Following this, three experimental groups were created: one group was interviewed using the NICHD Protocol, one group had to freely recall what they experienced, and one group was not asked to retrieve any memories about the event. Next, all children received misinformation concerning the event and were then subjected to a final memory test. We found that children’s recall during the NICHD interview protected children against the incorporation of misinformation in their accounts of the event. This effect was absent in the other two conditions. The current experiment suggests that evidence-based investigative interviewing can inoculate children’s memory against the corrupting impact of misinformation.

Since January 2015, Safe Home [in Dutch: Veilig Thuis] is the national reportcenter for child abuse and domestic violence. The task of Safe Home and itspartner organizations is to stop child abuse and domestic violence. The Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model states that to reduce the chance for harmfulbehaviors in the future, relevant risk factors should be addressed in individualcases. Offered treatment programs should also be attuned to these riskfactors (which is known as risk-based care). The offered risk-based care doesnot always correspond to the request of the family in question.In the current study the main question was how it is determined which treatmentprogram or care is offered by the municipalities to families after theinvestigation of Safe Home is completed and a case is transferred to the localmunicipality. We interviewed professionals from six municipalities in the regionof South-Limburg about the use of structured risk assessment tools andthe effectiveness of offered treatment programs. We found that the choicefor certain treatment programs is mainly based on the family’s request (andnot risk-based, as suggested by the RNR-model). Moreover, the municipalitiesmake limited use of risk assessment tools that meet scientific standards.In order to stop child abuse in the long term, a radical change is needed inthe approach of child abuse cases. We offer several recommendations, includingthe use of scientifically validated risk assessment tools and a closercooperation and exchange of information between Safe Home and its partnerorganizations.

General Audience Summary A bitter controversy exists surrounding the topic of therapy-induced false memories. Because of this controversy, memory scholars have devised several ways to create false memories. The "lost-in-the-mall" paradigm has become the popular procedure to implant false autobiographical memories. Although the paradigm is highly influential, the paradigm is time consuming and requires extensive training to interview participants and score participants' reports. Therefore, we offer an elegant new and straightforward paradigm to implant false autobiographical memories. Inspired by the memory blindness literature and because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created a new paradigm that can be fully implemented online. In this paradigm, subjects receive a list of twenty autobiographical events including a critical false event (i.e., swimming trunks falling off), and have to indicate whether they ever experienced these events. Following a 1-week interval, participants stating that they did not experience the false event receive a second survey suggesting that they actually did experience the false event and stating that they experienced several true events. Participants have to provide, before and after receiving imagination instructions, belief and recollection ratings, and event-related details. In the present study, we also told one group that the false event happened once (Single group) while the other group was suggested that the event happened repeatedly (Repeated group). Depending on the memory type (e.g., false belief or false memory), false memory implantation ranged between 9% and 30%. Furthermore, false beliefs were most likely to be elicited in the Single group while false memory rates did not statistically differ between groups. This novel paradigm can offer new insights on how false autobiographical memories can be implanted.We offer an elegant new and straightforward paradigm to implant false autobiographical memories. Participants received 20 autobiographical events including a critical false event (i.e., swimsuit falling off) and had to indicate whether they ever experienced these events. After 1 week, participants who did not experience the false event received a second survey suggesting that they actually did experience the false event. Participants had to provide belief and recollection ratings and event-related details. Also, one group of participants was told that the false event happened once (Single group) while the other group was told that the event happened repeatedly (Repeated group). Depending on the memory type (e.g., false belief or false memory), false memory implantation ranged between 9% and 30%. Furthermore, false beliefs were most likely to be elicited in the Single group. This novel paradigm can offer new insights on how false autobiographical memories can be implanted.

We examined whether fabrication affects memory using a new paradigm combining the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM) and the Amsterdam Short Term Memory task (ASTM). Participants were assigned to either a forced fabrication or honest condition, and encoded emotionally-negative and neutral wordlists by reading words out loud. The wordlists contained words that were associatively related to each other (e.g., symphony, sound, piano, radio, sing, orchestra), and converged to a non-presented critical word (e.g., music). Next, all participants had to indicate two words that were previously read out loud. However, participants in the forced fabrication condition had to fabricate that they read two additional words out loud, which were associated to the same DRM list. Participants in the forced fabrication condition formed false memories for their self -generated fabrications. Although fabrication did not increase spontaneous false memory rates for non -presented critical words, our results did highlight the perils of forcing people to fabricate.

The survival processing advantage refers to the finding that processing information according to its survival value improves memory retention. We used mass-testing across three experiments to examine whether the survival processing advantage could be extended to crime-related contexts when adopting both offender’s (Experiment 1 and 2) and victim’s (Experiment 3) perspectives. Interestingly, crime-related scenarios produced the lowest memory retention in Experiments 2 and 3, indicating no mnemonic benefit resulting from crimerelated processing. Furthermore, in Experiments 1 and 2, we failed to replicate the standard survival processing effect, while in Experiment 3 the superior survival memory retention emerged in comparison with the standard control conditions (i.e., moving and pleasantness). Overall, our experiments showed that crime-related contexts did not lead to superior memory retention. Moreover, although we detected some failures to replicate the survival processing effect, this evidence is not sufficiently compelling to argue that there was a general absence of the survival processing advantage.

Research to date has exclusively focused on the implantation of false memories for single events. The current experiment is the first proof of concept that false memories can be implanted for repeated autobiographical experiences using an adapted false memory implantation paradigm. We predicted that false memory implantation approaches for repeated events would generate fewer false memories compared to the classic implantation method for single events. We assigned students to one of three implantation conditions in our study: Standard, Repeated, and Gradual. Participants underwent three interview sessions with a 1-week interval between sessions. In the Standard condition, we exposed participants to a single-event implantation method in all three interviews. In the Repeated condition, participants underwent a repeated-event implantation method in the three interviews. The Gradual condition also consisted of a repeated-event implantation method, however, in the first interview alone, we suggested to participants that they had experienced the false narrative once. Surprisingly, within our sample, false memories rates in the Standard condition were not higher compared to the Repeated and Gradual conditions. Although sometimes debated, our results imply that false memories for repeated events can be implanted in lab conditions, likely with the same ease as false memories for single events. ispartof: MEMORY vol:29 issue:10 pages:1320-1341 ispartof: location:England status: published

The present experiment aimed to examine how fabrication can affect memory. In particular, we examined whether different types of fabrication can lead to different mnemonic effects. A sample of 159 participants watched a video of a robbery and subsequently answered some questions about it. Participants were divided into three conditions: one group was instructed to tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling group), while the other two groups were instructed to lie either by partially distorting details (i.e., distortion group) or by completely making up wrong details of the event seen in the video (i.e., fabrication group). Two days later, participants completed a final memory test where they honestly answered recognition and recall questions concerning: (i) memory for the video and (ii) memory for having discussed details during the interview. Results showed that different types of fabrication affect liars' memory differently. Fabricators reported an undermining of memory for the event, whereas those who partially distorted details reported a higher impairment for the interview. Our findings showed that the effects of lying on liars' memory might be determined by the cognitive resources required to lie.

When beliefs in autobiographical memories are reduced while recollections remain relatively intact, a phenomenon termed nonbelieved memories (NBMs) unfolds. The current preregistered study (N = 104) used a 3-week longitudinal design to investigate the relationships between the frequency of recalled NBMs, memory distrust, rumination over autobiographical events, and self-esteem. Our analyses showed that memory distrust was a positive predictor for the initial recall of NBMs during the past 2 months at Time 1, but not for the follow-up recalls of NBMs during the past week at Times 2-4. Exploratory analyses showed that, at Time 1, self-esteem was negatively associated with the total number of NBMs. Furthermore, the tendency to report involuntary memories and rumination over memories was positively associated with the total number of NBMs. In addition, (in)voluntary autobiographical memory recall tendency was also a significant positive predictor for the total number of NBMs at Times 2-4. Our study is one of the first to show that NBMs might be uniquely tied to specific individual markers.

In a review of the literature in this journal, Piedfort-Marin et al. (1921) identified what they purported to be myths about dissociative identity disorder (DID) and dissociative amnesia. When responding to these beliefs, they supported the Trauma Model of dissociation and argued for a causal etiological link between trauma and dissociative conditions. In contrast, they challenged the Sociocognitive Model (SCM), which they claimed rejects the existence of DID and associated disorders (e.g., dissociative amnesia) and considers symptoms to be the byproduct of fantasy, suggestion, and the iatrogenic effect of psychotherapies. In this article, we critically evaluate the authors’ arguments and propose a more balanced, accurate, and comprehensive view of the sociocognitive model. We demonstrate that this model neither rejects the existence of DID, nor a link between trauma and dissociation potentially mediated by a variety of cognitive-affective-behavioral variables. We argue, contrary to Piedfort-Marin et al., that the tendency to confabulate and other cognitive and sociocultural variables may also contribute to the development of DID. We contend that a multifactorial integrative etiological perspective can move the field beyond a limited focus on controversies that divide the TM and SCM models of dissociation.

Objectives The role of self in veridical memory has been extensively studied, but what is the role of self in false memory development across the life span? The current study examined the impact of self-reference on associative false memory in children, younger adults, and older adults, and further investigated possible mechanisms concerning how self-reference might affect false memory in different age groups. Methods Combining a self-reference manipulation with the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, children, younger adults, and older adults encoded DRM word lists as paired with their own name, another person’s name, or a red square. Later their true and false recognition memory as well as recollection and familiarity were measured. Results A self-enhanced false memory effect was found in all age groups. That is, participants generated more false memories in the self-reference condition relative to the other-reference and neutral conditions. Furthermore, when examining its underlying memory mechanisms, we found that self-reference mainly increased false recollection in younger adults but facilitated familiarity of critical lures in older adults. Discussion Although self-reference increases false memory in both younger and older adults, the underlying mechanisms are different in that older adults have more self-relevant false familiarity while younger adults generate more self-relevant phantom recollection. The current study also has implications for eyewitness reports, suggesting that the self-relevance of memory may be one relevant factor to consider when evaluating potential risk factors of false memory.

We conducted a field study at a music festival to examine effects of naturally occurring sleep deficits and substance intoxication on false memory formation and susceptibility to suggestion, using two paradigms. In a misinformation task, sleep restriction was associated with increased levels of susceptibility to suggestion and false alarms to nonsuggestive questions for a virtual reality eyewitness scenario. Use of tetrahydrocannabinol and amphetamines was also related to increased false alarms to nonsuggestive questions, indicating that such questions might be sensitive to use of those drugs. In an implantation paradigm, neither sleep restriction, substances, nor exposure to fake social media content increased the likelihood of falsely believing or recollecting a purportedly experienced festival event. However, some people came to falsely believe (13%, n = 30) or falsely remember (6%, n = 14) the false suggested event. Findings indicate that some established lab effects can also be observed in a less controlled environment.

Does Eye Movement and Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy affect the accuracy of memories? This recurrent issue in recent memory research bears relevance to expert witness work in the courtroom. In this review, we will argue that several crucial aspects of EMDR may be detrimental to memory. First, research has shown that eye movements undermine the quality and quantity of memory. Specifically, eye movements have been shown to decrease the vividness and emotionality of autobiographical experiences and amplify spontaneous false memory levels. Second, a sizeable proportion of EMDR practitioners endorse the controversial idea of repressed memories and discuss the topic of repressed memory in therapy. Third, in the Dutch EMDR protocol, patients are instructed to select the target image by using flawed metaphors of memory (e.g., memory works as a video). Such instructions may create demand characteristics to the effect that people over-interpret imagery during therapy as veridical memories. Collectively, the corpus of research suggests that several components of EMDR therapy (i.e., performing eye movements, therapist beliefs and therapeutic instructions) may undermine the accuracy of memory, which can be risky if patients, later on, serve as witnesses in legal proceedings. ispartof: MEMORY vol:29 issue:9 pages:1254-1262 ispartof: location:England status: published

The eyewitness and fundamental memory research fields have investigated the effects of acute stress at encoding on memory performance for decades yet results often demonstrate contrasting conclusions. In this review, we first summarise findings on the effects of acute encoding stress on memory performance and discuss how these research fields often come to these diverging findings regarding the effects of encoding stress on memory performance. Next, we critically evaluate methodological choices that underpin these discrepancies, emphasising the strengths and limitations of different stress-memory experiments. Specifically, we elaborate on choice of stressors and stimuli, stress manipulation checks, stressor timing, and the interval between encoding and retrieval and discuss how methodological shortcomings in both the eyewitness and fundamental memory fields have limited our understanding of how encoding stress may affect eyewitness memory performance. Finally, we propose several recommendations for researchers interested in this topic, such as confirming stress inductions with physiological measures, implementing sufficient retrieval intervals to isolate the memory phase of interest and using ecologically valid memory paradigms. We conclude that the best progress can be made if researchers are responsive to the methodologies and findings reported in other research fields and encourage collaborations between the different disciplines. ispartof: MEMORY vol:29 issue:8 pages:1091-1100 ispartof: location:England status: published

Previous studies have found that false memories increase when people receive stimuli which is related to their knowledge base. In the current set of four experiments, we examined how accident experience affected false memory production among motorcyclists using different types of false memory word lists. Specifically, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were conducted involving motorcyclists with and without accident experience, whereas Study 4 was conducted on non-motorcyclists without accident experience. In all experiments, participants were given associatively-related word lists known to foster false memory creation. Different types of word lists were used consisting of accident-related words, emotionally-negative words, and neutral words. Levels of false memory were measured using recall and recognition tests. We found consistent results in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 in which among motorcyclists, accident-related words produced higher levels of false memory than emotionally-negative and neutral words. This pattern was not observed in Experiment 4 where non-motorcyclists were involved. Our results shed light on the role of previous experience on false memory formation. One implication could be that the police should be careful with reports of motorcyclists' experiences about their accidents as motorcyclists may spontaneously come up with false, but related details concerning these experiences.

In two studies, we surveyed the beliefs of undergraduate students (Study 1) and the general public (Study 2) about deceptive behavior, memory functioning, and the effects of lying on memory. We compared participants' beliefs with the current memory and deception literature. Overall, participants in both studies believed that different types of lies (i.e. false denials, feigning amnesia, fabrication) would elicit different memory impairing effects, although they did not know what specific kind of memory impairment (e.g. forgetting, false memory). In line with previous experimental studies, participants experienced difficulties in retrieving memories after falsely denying or feigning amnesia. Moreover, participants believed that lying would impact other people's memory such as that people would start to believe in their own lies. Meanwhile, they also indicated that these effects would be minimal for themselves. Interestingly, our results showed that false denials are used quite frequently in daily life. Finally, we found that undergraduate students' beliefs about memory were in line with scientific evidence, while the general public continues to have erroneous beliefs about memory. When the general public plays a role in the courtroom (e.g. jury members), we recommend involving memory experts in the assessment of reliability of statements when lying was involved.

We report on a unique Italian criminal case in which a court ruled that a therapist implanted false memories of abuse in a young girl. Using therapeutic excerpts, we show that the therapist used a multitude of problematic interventions that are all linked to false memory creation. Specifically, an analysis of the therapeutic excerpts showed that across many sessions, the therapist asked highly suggestive questions to the girl, implying that she was abused by her father. In addition, the girl underwent EMDR techniques that have been associated with memory undermining effects. Our analyses showed that although before treatment the girl did not have any recollection of being abused by her father, she gradually started to remember the abuse and identified the father as her abuser during the therapeutic sessions. Our case report clearly shows the danger of suggestive pressure in a therapeutic context causing patients to form false memories of abuse and supports the need to prevent the therapeutic practice of suggestive techniques. ispartof: JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES vol:67 issue:5 pages:2122-2129 ispartof: location:United States status: published

Recent studies have demonstrated that lying can affect memory and that such memory effects are based on the cognitive load required in performing the lie. The present study aimed to verify whether the impact of two deceptive strategies (i.e., false denials and fabrication) depends on individuals’ cognitive resources in terms of Executive Functions (i.e., EF: Shifting, Inhibition, and Updating). A sample of 147 participants watched a video of a robbery and then were instructed to either fabricate (i.e., fabrication condition), deny (i.e. false denial condition), or tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling condition) to some questions about the crime. Two days later, all participants had to provide an honest account on a final memory test where they indicated their memory for having discussed details (i.e., fabricated, denied, or told the truth) and their memory for the video. Finally, their EF resources were also assessed. Our findings demonstrated that individual differences in EFs played a role in how the event was recalled and on the effects of lying on memory. That is, memory for the event after having lied depended especially on individuals’ Shifting resources. We also found that the two deceptive strategies differentially affected individuals’ memory for the interview and for the event: Denying affected memory for the interview while fabricating affected memory for the event. Our findings can inform legal professionals on the possibility to assess individuals’ EF as an indicator of witnesses’ credibility. ispartof: Acta Psychologica vol:215 pages:1-11 ispartof: location:Netherlands status: published

In a preregistered experiment, we examined the efficacy of arousal reappraisal as an intervention for reducing the negative effects of stress at retrieval on memory. Participants (N = 177) were semi-randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a Stress-intervention condition, a Stress-placebo condition, and a No-stress-placebo control condition. Participants viewed four images of complex, mildly negatively valenced scenes. One day later, they received an arousal reappraisal intervention or placebo before exposure to a laboratory stressor (or a control version for the No-stress condition). Participants were then tested on their memory of the images using a free recall instruction and multiple-choice recognition questions. As expected, negative affect and blood pressure increased for the stress conditions but not the control condition. Contrary to our hypotheses, memory performance did not statistically significant differ between the Stress-placebo condition and the No-stress-placebo control condition, indicating a lack of negative effects of acute retrieval stress on memory. Furthermore, we also found no statistically significant differences between the Stress-intervention condition and Stress-placebo condition in terms of memory performance, suggesting that the intervention did not assist with enhancing memory. We integrate interpretations of the findings from this study with a discussion of avenues for future research in this area. ispartof: MEMORY vol:29 issue:3 pages:330-344 ispartof: location:England status: published

Expert witnesses and scholars sometimes disagree on whether suggestibility and compliance are related to people's tendency to falsely confess. Hence, the principal aim of this review was to amass the available evidence on the link between suggestibility and compliance and false confessions. We reviewed experimental data in which false confessions were experimentally evoked and suggestibility and compliance were measured. Furthermore, we reviewed field data of potential false confessions and their relationship with suggestibility and compliance. These diverse databases converge to the same conclusion. We unequivocally found that high levels of suggestibility (and to a lesser extent compliance) were associated with an increased vulnerability to falsely confess. Suggestibility measurements might be informative for expert witnesses who must evaluate the false confession potential in legal cases.

Culture plays a critical role in memory. Memory is also known to be constructive and prone to errors (e.g., false memories). However, little is known about how culture potentially shapes the formation of false memories. We examined the role of culture in shaping various aspects of false memory by comparing European (N = 33) and Chinese (N = 40) samples. In our study, we embedded the Deese-Roediger/McDermott (DRM) pictures in different contexts and paired them with participants’ own name or other people’s name (e.g., Adele) to create item-person-context memory episodes. We found that European participants had more phantom recollection for non-presented lure pictures while Chinese participants were more likely to form familiarity for lure pictures. Furthermore, we showed that European participants formed more self-related false memories of item-context bindings than Chinese participants. Our study is the first to show cultural differences in constructive false memories using the DRM paradigm.

The Dutch protocol for Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) uses two psychological myths as part of the therapeutic instruction: memory works as a video camera and individuals can have a photographic memory. This study explored how participants experience and evaluate such instructions and if these instructions affect their beliefs on memory. Participants received a video, photo, or a control instruction. Participants indicated on a visual analog scale how vivid and emotional they expected to recall the traumatic memory, how credible the therapeutic instruction was, and how reliable they would consider a therapist providing such an instruction. Next, participants completed a memory belief survey. Participants who received the video instruction were most likely to expect to vividly recall a memory. The credibility of the instructions and the reliability of the therapist providing the instruction were at chance level, which might pose problems for the therapeutic alliance and therapy outcome. ispartof: JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY vol:155 issue:2 pages:129-139 ispartof: location:United States status: published

In a new commentary in Mindfulness, Neff once again tried to defend the use of the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS) total score by arguing that compassionate and uncompassionate self-responding (CS and UCS) are part of a bipolar continuum. In this brief reaction, we refute this notion and also clarify how the continued use of the SCS total score muddies the water of research on self-compassion as a protective variable. We also illustrate how the SCS-by separating CS and UCS-can provide more valid and valuable information on protection and vulnerability within the context of psychopathology and stress than just relying on the total score of the SCS. ispartof: MINDFULNESS vol:13 issue:6 pages:1403-1409 ispartof: location:United States status: published

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.

What does believing in repressed memory mean? In a recent article in this journal, Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019, Study 3) argued that when people are asked to indicate their belief in repressed memory, they might actually think of deliberate memory suppression rather than unconscious repressed memory. They further argued that in contrast to belief in unconscious repressed memory, belief in deliberate memory suppression is not scientifically controversial. In this commentary, we show that they are incorrect on both counts. Although Brewin and colleagues surveyed people to indicate their belief in deliberate memory suppression, they neglected to ask their participants whether they (also) believed in unconscious repressed memory. We asked people from the general population whether they believed that traumatic experiences can be unconsciously repressed for many years and then recovered. In 2 studies of the general population, we found high endorsement rates (Study 1 [N = 230]: 59.2% [n = 45]; Study 2 [N = 79]: 67.1% [n = 53]) of the belief in unconscious repressed memory. These endorsement rates did not statistically differ from endorsement rates to statements on repressed memory and deliberate memory suppression. In contrast to what Brewin et al. argued, belief in unconscious repressed memory among lay people is alive and well. Finally, we contend that Brewin et al. overstated the scientific evidence bearing on deliberate repression (suppression). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Research suggests that both internal (i.e., lying) and external (i.e., misinformation) factors can affect memory for a crime. We aimed to explore the effects of post‐event misinformation on crime‐related amnesia claims. We showed participants a mock crime and asked them to either simulate amnesia (simulators) or confess to it (confessors). Next, some participants were provided with misinformation. Finally, all participants were requested to genuinely recollect the crime. Overall, simulators reported less correct information than confessors. Moreover, these two groups were equally vulnerable to misinformation. In addition, exploratory analyses on strategies adopted by simulators revealed that those who previously, mostly omitted information while simulating amnesia exhibited the lowest amount of correct details. Simulators who instead used a mixed strategy disclosed more fabricated memory errors. Findings suggest that legal professionals and jurors should take into account that even offenders, irrespective of confessing or simulating memory loss for a crime, can be susceptible to post‐event misinformation.

Are expert witnesses biased by the side (defense vs. prosecution) that hires them? We examined this issue by having students act as expert witnesses in evaluating interviews in a child sexual abuse case (Experiment 1, N = 143) and tested the value of an instruction to counteract such allegiance effects. The intervention concerned an instruction to consider arguments both for and against the given hypothesis (i.e., two-sided instructions; Experiment 2, N = 139). In Experiment 3 ( N = 123), we additionally provided participants with three different scenarios. Participants received a case file regarding a case of alleged sexual abuse. With the file, participants received an appointment letter emphasizing elements of the file that questioned (defense) or supported (prosecution) the veracity of the accusation. Participants displayed allegiance bias (Experiments 1–3), but two-sided instructions were not successful in eliminating allegiance bias (Experiments 2 and 3). The findings underscore the importance of legal safeguards in expert witness work.

In the present experiment, we examined whether adopting a fictitious biography would make participants believe in this autobiography. Participants were split up into two conditions: forced confabulation condition and control condition. The forced confabulation condition received a snippet with the fake biography and had to adopt it through several methods (i.e., method acting, journaling, and convincing experimenters in an interview) over an extended period of time. The control condition was told that they partook in an experiment about personal childhood memories. Before, during and after lying participants completed four Life Event Inventories (LEI). Results revealed that after coming forward with the truth participants did not increase nor decrease their belief for the lied about events. Additionally, even after a one-year delay, we found no evidence for either effect. Our findings suggest that more extreme forms of fabrication do not make people believe in their lies. ispartof: Memory vol:32 issue:6 pages:1-12 ispartof: location:England status: Published online

Objectives Falsification is regarded as a cornerstone of science. Anomalous data—even when highly credible—do not always lead to an adjustment of theory. In this paper, we discuss reasons for why current theories are not modified despite a corpus of work falsifying (parts of) the theory, using the case of self-compassion as an example. During more than 15 years, this psychological construct has been heralded as a protective factor against stress and emotional adversity. Methods A search in the Web of Science database using [SELF-COMPASSION in title] as the search term was conducted and found empirical papers were critically evaluated. Results Good evidence abounds indicating that the theoretical definition of self-compassion is limited and that as a consequence its proper assessment with the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS) is obscured as the measure is contaminated by psychopathological characteristics. Surprisingly, few researchers take these critical notes into account when conducting and reporting new studies on this topic. We argue that this might be due to all kinds of (conscious and unconscious) tendencies and cognitive biases of researchers and clinicians. Conclusion Research lines are not always guided by solid data but strongly determined by social factors. We close by providing a recommendation for researchers regarding the assessment of self-compassion including the continued use of the SCS.

Inthe current experiment, we were interested in the effects of lying (i.e. false denial or fabrication) on memory when deceptivestrategies were repeatedly executed. Participants (n = 121) watched a video (i.e., electrician who committed a burglary) and immediately afterand during the following ten days, they were instructed to either falsely deny, fabricate, or answer honestly to certain details of the video.Some details were discussed (i.e. denied, fabricated, or honestly answered) either once, or four times. Other details were never discussed.Finally, all participants received a memory test, in which they were asked whether they either previously discussed the details or saw thedetails during the video. Although, overall, repeated lying did not undermine memory for having discussed certain details, repeated falselydenying led to an impairment of the memory for the event. Findings show that lying can adversely affect memory and that repeated lying canincrease this effect

Significance This unique randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial examined the susceptibility to false memories under the influence of cannabis, using a basic (DRM) and two applied (misinformation) paradigms. We used a highly powered experimental design, allowing us to test acute and residual drug effects. To achieve high reproducibility and ecological validity, the misinformation paradigms included an eyewitness and a perpetrator scenario, presented in a virtual-reality environment. We show across different paradigms that cannabis consistently increases susceptibility to false memories. The results have implications for police, legal professionals, and policymakers with regard to the treatment of cannabis-intoxicated witnesses and suspects and the validity of their statements., With the growing global acceptance of cannabis and its widespread use by eyewitnesses and suspects in legal cases, understanding the popular drug’s ramifications for memory is a pressing need. In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled trial, we examined the acute and delayed effects of Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) intoxication on susceptibility to false memory in 64 healthy volunteers. Memory was tested immediately (encoding and retrieval under drug influence) and 1 wk later (retrieval sober). We used three different methods (associative word lists and two misinformation tasks using virtual reality). Across all methods, we found evidence for enhanced false-memory effects in intoxicated participants. Specifically, intoxicated participants showed higher false recognition in the associative word-list task both at immediate and delayed test than controls. This yes bias became increasingly strong with decreasing levels of association between studied and test items. In a misinformation task, intoxicated participants were more susceptible to false-memory creation using a virtual-reality eyewitness scenario and virtual-reality perpetrator scenario. False-memory effects were mostly restricted to the acute-intoxication phase. Cannabis seems to increase false-memory proneness, with decreasing strength of association between an event and a test item, as assessed by different false-memory paradigms. Our findings have implications for how and when the police should interview suspects and eyewitnesses.

Previous studies found that misleading feedback may increase self-reported symptoms. Does this reflect social demand or internalized misinformation? We investigated whether suggestive misinformation may escalate symptoms when it is provided in a context that minimizes social demand. Eighty participants completed the Checklist for Symptoms in Daily Life twice. Between test and retest, participants were given standardized symptom feedback through a bogus computer program that allegedly produced an analysis of their symptom ratings. The feedback pertained to randomly selected symptom ratings of participants: accurate feedback on four ratings (controls) and manipulated feedback (i.e., misinformation) on two other ratings (i.e., targets), which we increased by two full-scale points. Forty-nine (66%) participants accepted both target manipulations, of whom 35 (71%) confabulated explanations for the inflated ratings. Critically, at retest, participants who accepted the misinformation increased their ratings for target symptoms dramatically, whereas ratings for control symptoms and relevant ratings by participants who rejected the misinformation increased moderately. Our findings may help to understand iatrogenic effects of psychotherapy.

Victims of abuse might deny their traumatic experiences. We studied mnemonic effects of simulating false denial of a child sexual abuse narrative. Participants (N = 127) read and empathized with the main character of this narrative. Next, half were instructed to falsely deny abuse-related information while others responded honestly in an interview. One week later, participants received misinformation for the narrative and interview. In a final source memory task, participants' memory for the narrative and interview was tested. Participants who falsely denied abuse-related information endorsed more abuse-unrelated misinformation about the event than honest participants. Abuse-related false memory rates did not statistically differ between the groups, and false denials were not related to omission errors about (1) the interview and (2) narrative. Hence, victim's memory for abuse-related information related to their experience might not be affected by a false denial, and inconsistencies surrounding the abuse-unrelated information are more likely to take place. ispartof: Behavioral Sciences & The Law vol:40 issue:3 pages:1-19 ispartof: location:United States status: Published online

Victims, witnesses, and suspects of crime are frequently intoxicated by Alcohol or Other Drugs (AOD) during the event. How intoxication is perceived by investigating officers, and the manner in which this is handled during interview procedures, can affect the quality of information obtained and therefore investigative outcomes. Various factors are likely to contribute to how intoxication is handled during the investigation of a crime, including standard procedures, familiarity with the effects of different substances, and cultural attitudes. While findings with respect to the effect of different substances on memory are still emerging, it is important to investigate whether police beliefs are consistent with available evidence. In this study, Australian and Indonesian police officers were surveyed about their perceptions of memory accuracy and credibility of victims and witnesses intoxicated with various substances (e.g. alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines, and opioids). A higher proportion of Australian police identified larger negative memory effects associated with alcohol intoxication. At the same time, Indonesian police were found to be more likely to report that intoxication with alcohol would make a victim or witness less credible. With regard to timing, across multiple substances, larger proportions of Australian police reported believing that information obtained from witnesses that were still intoxicated would be more accurate than if interviewed after they became sober. It is concluded that, in order to rectify misconceptions about the impact of AOD intoxication on memory and improve investigative practices, both Australian and Indonesian police would benefit from additional training on the effects of intoxication.

Brand et al.’s (2018) response—as well as previous works by some of the authors—reveal a recurrent and concerning picture of using lengthy, but flawed, arguments to promote the concept of dissociative amnesia. Our focus here is not so much on the weak-to-moderate correlation between measures of trauma and dissociation—we concentrate more on the weak evidence for dissociative amnesia. If triers of fact accept there is a correlation between trauma and feeling depersonalized or experiencing memory errors, we foresee relatively few legal consequences. However, if the leap is made to accept that trauma causes dissociative amnesia (or dissociative identity disorder) then it opens the door to repressed memory testimony being trusted in the courtroom, which in the past has had negative consequences. The problem with the concept and theory of dissociative amnesia is that there is an easy-to-miss claim of extraordinary remembering that contradicts findings and theories in memory research. Incorrect beliefs in such extraordinary remembering that can have severe repercussions in court. We document some areas of agreement with Brand et al., but reiterate that there is a lack of evidence for themechanisms proposed in dissociative amnesia.

Memories can have consequences on people’s eating behavior. In the current experiment, we examined the effect of belief versus recollection on food preferences and then investigated whether explicit belief (i.e., self- reported) or implicit belief (i.e., measured by an autobiographical implicit association test; aIAT) had a similar effect on food preferences. Participants (N = 163) were falsely told that they got sick after eating egg salad in their childhood and then received guided imagery to induce false beliefs/recollections concerning the food-aversive event. Half of the participants with false memories were debriefed and told that the event was false to reduce their belief in the event. Belief, not recollection regarding the food-aversive event, impacted participants’ food preferences. Furthermore, we found that explicit, but not implicit, belief predicted participants’ food preferences. The current results suggest that explicit judgments of belief in a memory may explain the consequences resulting from memories.

Temporally structured sequences of experiences, such as narratives or life events, are segmented in memory into discrete situational models. In segmentation, contextual shifts are processed as situational boundaries that temporally cluster items according to the perceived contexts. As such, segmentation enhances associative binding of items within a situational model. One side effect of enhanced associative processing is increased risk of false recollections for not-presented, semantically related items. If so, do boundaries facilitate false recollections, or does segmentation protect against them? In two experiments, we introduced situational shifts in word sequences in the form of semantic and perceptual boundaries, with semantic relatedness between words or the frame color around a word changing on a regular basis. After encoding, we tested participants’ associative memory performance and false recollection rates. In Experiment 1, color boundaries occurred synchronously or asynchronously to semantic boundaries. We found better associative recognition, but also more false recollections, for synchronous than asynchronous boundaries. In Experiment 2, color boundaries occurred synchronous to semantic boundaries or were absent entirely. We found that false recollection rates elicited by semantic boundaries increased when color boundaries were absent. We also tested associative memory performance using a non-semantic, temporal memory task. We found better temporal memory performance for semantic boundaries, as well as a negative correlation between increased false recollection rates and better temporal memory performance for semantic lists, but not for random lists. We discuss implications for false memory theories and segmentation of narrative materials in false memory research.

Since the early work of Cohen (1962) psychological researchers have become aware of the importance of doing a power analysis to ensure that the predicted effect will be detectable with sufficient statistical power. APA guidelines require researchers to provide a justification of the chosen sample size with reference to the expected effect size; an expectation that should be based on previous research. However, we argue that a credible estimate of an expected effect size is only reasonable under two conditions: either the new study forms a direct replication of earlier work or the outcome scale makes use of meaningful and familiar units that allow for the quantification of a minimal effect of psychological interest. In practice neither of these conditions is usually met. We propose a different rationale for a power analysis that will ensure that researchers will be able to justify their sample size as meaningful and adequate.

Dissociative amnesia is one of the most controversial categories in the field of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Self-reports of dissociative amnesia in the general population, and beliefs about this topic, have so far not been subjected to empirical scrutiny. Here, we surveyed a sample from the general population (N = 1017), revealing that about a tenth (n = 102) claimed to have experienced dissociative amnesia. Some claims pertained to amnesia for traumatic autobiographical experiences (e.g., sexual assault), while other claims reflected memory loss for experiences that can be regarded as non-traumatic or non-stressful (e.g., dissociative amnesia for an anniversary). Importantly, many participants believed in the existence of dissociative amnesia, and those who claimed dissociative amnesia indicated even more belief in this phenomenon than the rest of the sample. Finally, many participants indicated to have at least once claimed to have feigned memory loss in their life, and that they experienced some form of forgetting when trying to retrieve events for which they lied upon. Overall, our findings suggest that claiming dissociative amnesia goes hand in hand with believing in dissociative amnesia. ispartof: MEMORY vol:29 issue:10 pages:1362-1374 ispartof: location:England status: published

Memory is considered to be a flexible and reconstructive system. However, there is little experimental evidence demonstrating how associations are falsely constructed in memory, and even less is known about the role of the self in memory construction. We investigated whether false associations involving non-presented stimuli can be constructed in episodic memory and whether the self plays a role in such memory construction. In two experiments, we paired participants’ own names (i.e., self-reference) or the name “Adele” (i.e., other-reference) with words and pictures from Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists. We found that (1) participants not only falsely remembered the non-presented lure words and pictures as having been presented, but also misremembered that they were paired with their own name or “Adele,” depending on the referenced person of related DRM lists; and (2) there were more critical lure–self associations constructed in the self-reference condition than critical lure–other associations in the other-reference condition for word but not for picture stimuli. These results suggest a self-enhanced constructive effect that might be driven by both relational and item-specific processing. Our results support the spreading-activation account for constructive episodic memory.

This preregistered experiment aimed to investigate the impact of backgroundinformation regarding an alleged victim of child sexual abuse onpolice investigators’ perception of the credibility of the victim’s statement,expected case outcome, and the type of questions police investigatorsplan to ask the victim in an investigative interview. We expected that theage and the description of the alleged victim’s character would affectperceived credibility, prediction of case prosecution and the use of biasedquestions in the interview plan. Indonesian police investigators (N = 369)read a case vignette of either a 5- or a 15-year-old female victim of childsexual abuse, including either a good character, bad character, or nocharacter information. Participants receiving the story of the 15-year-oldalleged victim perceived the victim as having contributed more to thecrime, predicted the case as more likely to be withdrawn and includedmore biased questions in their interview plans than those who receivedthe story of a 5-year-old alleged victim. Moreover, participants being toldthat the alleged victim had a bad character perceived her statement asless reliable, having contributed more to the crime, predicted the case asmore likely to be withdrawn or dropped-out than those who receivedinformation about the alleged victim with a good character. We did notfind any effect of our background information manipulation on the perceptionof suspect guilt, and on the estimated likelihood of the allegationbeing confirmed by corroborative evidence or being prosecuted. Thecurrent findings suggest that background information can negativelyaffect police investigators’ judgment and decision-making when workingon a child sexual abuse case.

RATIONALE: Cannabis use is widespread and has previously been associated with memory impairments. However, the role of cannabis in relation to false memory production, i.e., memories of events that were not experienced, is less well-understood. OBJECTIVE: The aim of the current field study was to examine the impact of cannabis use on false memory production. METHODS: The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was used to induce false memories. In this paradigm, participants study word lists that are associatively related to a non-presented word, termed the critical lure. In a later memory test, true recognition rates and false alarm rates toward critical lures and unrelated items are assessed. Memory performance was compared between three groups: regular cannabis consumers who were acutely intoxicated (n = 53), regular cannabis consumers who were sober (n = 50), and cannabis-naïve controls (n = 53). The participants were approached in Dutch coffee shops (cannabis outlets) and cafes and asked to participate in our study. After collecting general information on their cannabis use, they were subjected to the DRM procedure. RESULTS: Although false memory rates for critical lures did not statistically differ between groups, both intoxicated and sober cannabis consumers falsely recognized more unrelated items than control participants. Also, individuals without a history of cannabis use demonstrated higher memory accuracy compared with the intoxicated group. CONCLUSION: It is concluded that cannabis intoxication and history of cannabis use induce a liberal response criterion for newly presented words for which the level of association with previously learned words is low and uncertainty is high. ispartof: PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY vol:236 issue:12 pages:3439-3450 ispartof: location:Germany status: published

© The Author(s) 2019. Mental-health patients may report more symptoms than they actually experience. Experts and laypeople often view this overreporting as a sign of malingering. We show that there are multiple pathways to symptom overreporting: carryover effects from previous tests that lower the threshold for answering affirmatively to symptom items, suggestive misinformation that escalates symptom reports, inattentive responding that promotes indiscriminate endorsement of symptoms, and personality traits that bias symptom reports in an upward direction. A one-sided focus on malingering may distract from a research agenda that may contribute to knowledge accumulation in this domain. ispartof: Current Directions in Psychological Science vol:28 issue:3 pages:321-326 status: published

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants' memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants' memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants' decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.

© The Author(s) 2018. Children are often viewed as poor eyewitnesses. Fact-finders, lawyers, and researchers assume that children are exceptionally prone to accept external suggestive (leading) questions and to create false memories. Is this assumption justified? This review will show it is not. First, studies on spontaneous false memories—elicited without any suggestive pressure—reveal that children are less likely than adults to produce them. Second, under certain circumstances, children are even less prone to accept external suggestions than adults. This counterintuitive finding happens when false suggestions contain information that is associatively related but in actuality not experienced by children or adults. Using empirically based interview protocols can maximize the retrieval of accurate memories in children and adults. Furthermore, expert witnesses should use alternative scenarios to better evaluate whether statements by children or adults are based on truth or fiction. ispartof: Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences. vol:6 issue:1 pages:87-93 status: published

The goal of the present experiment was to examine the effect of certain (deceptive) strategies (e.g., false denial) on memory. Specifically, participants were shown a traumatic virtual reality (VR) video of an airplane crash. Following this, participants (N= 94) received questions concerning details from the VR scene in a baseline memory task. Then, participants could choose from 3 options how to cope in response to having experienced the VR scene: tell the truth, falsely deny, or fabricate. The majority opted to tell the truth (n = 81). A subsample of truth tellers were instructed to falsely deny having seen certain details. One week later, all participants received a source monitoring task in which they were asked (1) whether they remembered talking about these details during an interview, and (2) whether they remembered seeing certain details during the VR experience the week before. Participants had to tell the truth during this task. Participants who were instructed to falsely deny showed impaired memory for presented details that had previously been discussed (i.e., denial-induced forgetting) and seen in the VR scene. Also, the presentation of certain details in the baseline memory task seemed to inoculate participants who were instructed to falsely deny from experiencing memory impairment. The current experiment suggests that false denials can have adverse ramifications for memory for what is discussed and seen. ispartof: MEMORY & COGNITION vol:47 issue:3 pages:485-495 ispartof: location:United States status: published