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In this study the authors intended to investigate the procedural rules specific to the judicial control of the acts issued by the public authorities in the matter of restitution of properties taken over by the State during the communist regime, as well as the processual guarantees enjoyed by the persons concerned for the effective exercise of the right to a fair trial and the right to respect the goods regulated by Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, respectively, Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention. During this scientific process, the authors have identified the shortcomings of the legislation in the matter and have formulated de lege ferenda proposals for complying with the Pilot-Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Case Maria Atanasiu and others against Romania, whereby it has been decided that the Romanian State takes measures to guarantee the effective protection of these rights. The proposed legislative amendments have as purpose to re-open access to justice for the eligible persons, in compliance with the requirements of ECHR law, in the cases where public authorities refuse to resolve their requests for restitution of buildings abusively taken over by the State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exacerbation of climate change effects has rendered the legal adaptation of granting future generations standing in climate change litigation, necessary to achieve intergenerational justice and to protect their human rights. International law and norms do not operate in a legal vacuum. Instead, they possess the evolutionary quality to respond to societal shifts specifically seen in climate change action. This transient quality is greatly questioned in the debate surrounding the current legal lacuna concerning the lack of legal recognition for future generations in climate change actions. This has consequential effects on intergenerational justice and their human rights. Whilst international law has implemented a number of climate change mitigation strategies, these are insufficient in protecting future generations. The granting of standing in climate change litigation adequately complements the current approaches in resolving the lacuna in the law between theory and practice.

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 2-3/PUU-V/2007, perihal pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1997 tentang Narkotika diajukan oleh ketiga orang pelaku Bali Nine yang merupakan warga negara asing. Adapun Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam amar putusannya memutuskan bahwa permohonan pengujian yang diajukan oleh ketiga warga negara asing tersebut tidak dapat diterima (niet ontvankelijk verklaard), bahwa terhadap putusan ini terdapat dissenting opinion dari 4 (empat) orang Hakim Konstitusi berkaitan dengan kedudukan hukum (legal standing) pemohon berkewarganegaraan asing, yaitu Hakim Konstitusi Laica Marzuki, Achmad Roestandi, Harjono dan Maruarar Siahaan, yang pada intinya mengakui legal standing bagi ketiga warga negara asing tersebut. Dalam perspektif perbandingan, terdapat beberapa Mahkamah Konstitusi di dunia menerima permohonan constitutional review oleh warga negara asing, seperti halnya di Republik Ceko, Mongolia serta Republik Federal Jerman. Adapun tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menggagas pemberian legal standing bagi warga negara asing dalam permohonan constitutional review di Mahkamah Konstitusi. Adapun tulisan ini dibuat dengan menggunakan metode penulisan normatif dengan pendekatan studi konseptual, pendekatan perbandingan dan pendekatan perundang-undangan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pemberian legal standing bagi warga negara asing dalam permohonan constitutional review di Mahkamah Konstitusi ke dalam Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Peraturan Mahkamah Konstitusi terkait dapat dilakukan dengan melihat perspektif hak asasi manusia dan negara hukum. After The Constitutional Court Decision Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007 regarding the constitutional review of The Law Number 22 Year 1997 about Narcotics lodged by the three Bali Nine case of which they are foreign citizens. Based on the Decision of the Constitutional Court, the application from them was unacceptable (niet van ontvankelijk verklaard), that toward this decision there are dissenting opinion of 4 (four) constitution judges related to the legal standing of foreign citizens in the applicantion, they are Laica Marzuki, Achmad Roestandi, Harjono and Maruarar Siahaan. In essence, they are admitting legal standing for them in the case. Seen from the perspective comparison, there are several of the world constitutional courts accepting the constitutional review by those foreign citizens, such as Czech Republic, Mongolia and Federal Republic of Germany. This paper aims to analyze the idea for granting the legal standing for foreign citizens applicant of constitutional review in the Constitutional Court. This paper is created by using the normative legal writing method with conceptual approach, comparative approach, and statute approach. Through this paper is expected to has the idea for granting the legal standing of foreign citizens on constitutional review in the Constitutional Court into the Law of Constitutional Court and the Regulation of Constitutional Court based on human rights perspective and the country of law.

The author illustrates the normative framework of protection against religious discrimination in Italian legal system, scattered over several different pieces of legislation. The analysis is devoted to the substantive and procedural rules on the principle of equal treatment irrespective of religion. The analysis shows that the law guarantees every aspect of freedom of personal convictions in religious matter and protects not only people who belong to traditional organized religions, but all people who have held religious beliefs or practices. Italian law prohibits discrimination in regard to religion, not just in employment, but also in other areas. Consequently, the scope is wider than the EU Non-discrimination Directive 2000/78/EC, which only covers discrimination in employment, occupation and working conditions. The rules for the procedure before the court, designed to ensure the protection for persons who have been subject to discrimination are then examined. The author focuses in particular on the provisions regarding the legal standing, the burden of proof, and the remedies, which are crucially important for the effective implementation of the principle of equality.

It will be argued in this article that the EU Recommendation on common principles for collective redress might have limited impact on the field of competition law due to: several uncertainties regarding the legal standing in class actions; difficulties in their funding; and the risk of forum shopping with cross-border actions. Nevertheless, Belgium and Great Britain have recently introduced class actions into their national legal systems and addressed some of the difficulties which other Member States were experiencing already. It will also be suggested that the Portuguese model – the ‘Popular Action’ – and recent Portuguese practice may be considered an interesting example to follow in order to overcome some of the identified obstacles to private antitrust enforcement.

Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) was a dispute over a multi-billion-rand tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional Court recognised the public importance of the case, it adjudicated the dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant did not have legal standing to seek the judicial review of the award of the tender. This case note has three aims. First, I will argue that the Constitutional Court's majority judgment in Areva was generally unpersuasive. Second, I will attempt to show that Areva exposes an unresolved legal question: when should a court consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing? Third, I will propose a method for resolving this question by way of substantive judicial reasoning in any given case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Penetapan ukuran kerugian konstitusional memiliki kedudukan strategis sebagai pintu gerbang atas pengujian norma yang hendak diuji. Mahkamah Konstitusi merumuskan syarat kerugian konstitusional berdasarkan penafsiran Pasal 51 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi. Doktrin kerugian konstitusional terdiri dari lima syarat yang dapat diklasifikasikan dalam dua kelompok. Kelompok pertama berisikan unsur-unsur yang harus dipenuhi pemohon terdiri dari (i) adanya hak dan/atau kewenangan konstitusional dan (ii) ada kerugian. Kelompok kedua merupakan prosedur pengujian mengenai ukuran kerugian yang diderita pemohon yang didalamnya yang terdiri dari (i) bentuk kerugian, (ii) hubungan kausalitas dan (iii) pemulihan kerugian. Kelima syarat ini bersifat kumulatif. Dalam penerapannya, doktrin kerugian konstitusional ini sangatlah dinamis. Ada kecenderungan bahwa doktrin ini menyimpan permasalahan. Tulisan ini berupaya mengidentifikasi masalah yang ada dalam penerapan doktrin kerugian konstitusional. Salah satunya adalah tumpang tindihnya antara pembuktian hak konstitusional pemohon dalam bagian kedudukan hukum dengan pengujian norma dalam pokok perkara. Sedangkan konkretisasi pembuktian unsur kerugian berkelindan dengan pengujiannya dalam kelompok doktrin kedua. Oleh karenanya, tulisan ini berkesimpulan bahwa telah ada kebutuhan untuk melakukan penyempurnaan doktrin kerugian konstitusional dengan melakukan penafsiran ulang atas Pasal 51 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi dan tidak lagi mencantumkan kelompok pertama dalam doktrin kerugian konstitusional untuk pemeriksaan pengujian Undang-Undang di masa yang akan datang. The concept of constitutional injury is a substantial pre-requisite in the examination of judicial review case. The Constitutional Court drafted the concept as an interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. It consists of five conditions that can be classified into two groups. The first group contains elements that must be met by the applicant which are (i) constitutional rights and/or authorities and (ii) injuries. The second group is the test in regard to the size of the injury suffered by the applicant therein consisting of (i) forms of injury, (ii) causality and (iii) redressability. The requirement is accumulative. Yet in practice the doctrine is variedly applied. There is tendency the doctrine itself causes problems. This paper seeks to identify the problems and aimed to give solution to the problem. Two problems are identified, one is an overlap examination of constitutional rights in standing and also in ratio decidendi. Another one is that the injury element in the doctrine intertwined with its own testing in the second group of the doctrine. Therefore, this paper concludes that there is a need to revise the doctrine with reinterpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Law and recommend not to exclude the first group of the doctrine.

Copyright of Revista Jurídica de Castilla y León is the property of Junta de Castilla y Leon, Direccion de Servicios Juridicos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Aarhus Convention legally articulates basic human needs to live in the environment adequate for human health and well-being and to engage in protection and improvement of the environment. It recognized and protected a general human right to adequate environment and three particular rights in environmental matters - to information, to public participation in decision-making and to justice. The Aarhus Convention introduced innovative approach to human rights protection in relation to transboundary issues and legal standing.

In the context of history and politics, in fact, indigenous people have been there ahead of the country of Indonesia. Protection of customary law community unit to defend their constitutional rights if there are laws that harm their constitutional rights. But there are certain requirements that must be met in order for customary law community unit having legal domicile (legal standing) to file a petition for legislation in the Constitutional Court because not all indigenous people have legal standing in testing the law. This of course has the legal implications on the recognition, respect and protection of customary law community unit, namely the unity of indigenous people that still exist are not automatically recognized as customary law community unit unless it has to meet certain constitutional requirements set out in the 1945 post-change. The purpose of the conduct of this research is to discover, deepen and develop ideas related to concepts, theories, principles of legal and normative provisions concerning the legal status of customary law community unit in the proceedings in the Constitutional Court. Requirement for customary law community unit in order to have legal status (legal standing) as the applicant in the testing of the Act is quite heavy, but must prove himself as a customary law community unit as referred to in Article 51 paragraph (1) letter b Law the Constitutional Court, must also meet 5 (five) loss of constitutional requirements as specified in jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The legal position because of the weight requirement (legal standing) for customary law community unit, until now there is no applicant who claims to customary law community unit, has a legal domicile (legal standing) in testing the law. Typology and benchmarks about who is categorized as a customary law community unit is still not clear, so that through decision No. 31/PUU-V/2007, the Court gave typology and size of the unity of indigenous people by interpreting Article 18B paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution

Constitutional Court received a petition for the constitutionality of Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas and Law No. 8 of 2011 on the Amendment of the Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court against the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 Three issues are addressed in this study is about (1) the legal standing of the applicant in the judicial review of Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas and the Law number 8 of 2011 concerning Amendment to Law number 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court; (2) consideration of constitutional court give legal standing to the applicant in the judicial review of Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas and Law No. 8 of 2011 on the Amendment of Law Number 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court; and (3) the proposed granting legal standing of the applicant in the case of judicial review in the Constitutional Court. To answer these problems, this research using material in the form of the decision of the Constitutional Court law, legislation, and writings relating to constitutional law. The type of this research is the juridical-normative. Theory in assessing the applicant has legal standing or not, one of which is the theory of legal standing. Theory of point d’interet legal standing point d’action that is without the benefit of no action. The petitioner in case No. 36/PUU-X/2012 and No. 7/PUU-XI/2013 does not have legal standing to appeal. Court is not appropriate to assess the applicant in case No. 36/PUU-X/2012 and No. 7/PUU-XI/2013 have no legal standing. Because the applicant does not have a base (interest) to apply for judicial review. In addition there are constitutional judges dissenting opinion affirming that the applicant has no legal standing.

This paper takes the title: "Legal Standing of the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) in Case Dispute Authority of State Institutions in the Mahkamah Konstitusi". The research in this paper addresses two problems that are associated with the KPK as a state institution in the UUD NRI 1945 and the legal standing of the KPK, which can be a Party to the Dispute Authority of State Institutions in the Mahkamah Konstitusi by the UUD NRI 1945. The method used in this research is normative legal research, because this research seeks to discuss or review the legal norm in this case the norms of legislation to determine the synchronization either vertically or horizontally. This thesis explains that the KPK is a state agency whose authority is not clearly regulated by the UUD NRI 1945. Therefore, the KPK does not have legal standing as an applicant or respondent in a lawsuit filed in the Mahkamah Konstitusi relating to dispute the authority of state institutions because the authority is the Commission does not expressly provided in UUD NRI Tahun 1945 but by law.

Copyright of Pasos: Revista de Turismo y Patrimonio Cultural is the property of Universidad de La Laguna, Instituto Universitario de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Supreme Court has annulled by its Judgment of 8th June 2015 the pardon conceded by Government through Royal Decree 863/2013 to a businessman sentenced in 2011 to prison as author of a crime against territorial planning. Beyond the relevance of such a decision, which is not surprising as it derives from the previous jurisprudence, the case has the remarkable distinction of having been raised by an environmental association, whose controversial legal standing is supported by the innovative interpretation that High Court makes about the class action on environmental matters regulated by Law 27/2006 of 18th July. This paper studies the Judgment in question with an emphasis on new products involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author illustrates the normative framework of protection against religious discrimination in Italian legal system, scattered over several different pieces of legislation. The analysis is devoted to the substantive and procedural rules on the principle of equal treatment irrespective of religion. The analysis shows that the law guarantees every aspect of freedom of personal convictions in religious matter and protects not only people who belong to traditional organized religions, but all people who have held religious beliefs or practices. Italian law prohibits discrimination in regard to religion, not just in employment, but also in other areas. Consequently, the scope is wider than the EU Non-discrimination Directive 2000/78/EC, which only covers discrimination in employment, occupation and working conditions. The rules for the procedure before the court, designed to ensure the protection for persons who have been subject to discrimination are then examined. The author focuses in particular on the provisions regarding the legal standing, the burden of proof, and the remedies, which are crucially important for the effective implementation of the principle of equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Chilena de Derecho is the property of Revista Chilena de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The substance of legislation is a written legal norm which has a binding and constant legal power. Substantially, the Article 20 section 1 letter a of the Laws Number 21/2001 has violated the constitutional rights of the adat community of Yawaonat. In this connection the adat community has made a proposal for material examination against Laws Number 21/2001 to the Constitutional Court. This study describes the rights of the adat community in accommodating outsiders (non-Papuan people) to become the Native of Papuans based on the adat law which has been accommodated in the Laws Number 21/2001. The material examination conducted by the Constitutional Court decided that the significance for recognizing outsiders to become the Native of Papuans if it is not well signified will create constitutional losses for outsiders who have been recognized as the native Papuans and can harm the constitutional rights of the adat community. This is a normative legal study. The legal sources employed for this study was the legal primary and secondary sources. The analysis was done systematically and interpretatively with juridical evaluations. The legal standing of the adat community of Yawaonat as a proposer in the session of the Constitutional Court is based on the specifications of Article 51 section 1 of the Laws Number 24/2003 with reference to the Laws Number 8/2011 concerning Constitutional Court. The rights of the adat community which is violated covers the constitutional rights given by the 1945 Constitution and the rights by Laws Number 21/2001

Under the Italian legal system the actions in order to claim compensation for the damages caused to the environment rest essentially in the hands of the Ministry of the Environment. However, a tendency has been noticed for the environmental associations to claim damages from liable operators before the national courts. Through these actions, though, the associations cannot claim damages on behalf of the environment but only the reparation of their own rights. This article puts forwards some suggestions in order to grant the associations a more prominent role when taking action for the protection of the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the issue of joinder of executional files, making reference to the meaning of the syntagm „expenses incurred by the time of joinder”, to the possibility of reducing the court executor's fee within this procedure, to the manner and to the time limit for contesting the interlocutory judgment of the court executor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En el presente artículo se analizarán los sujetos legitimados para la interposición del conflicto de órganos constitucionales, regulado por la LOTC. Se sostendrá que la legitimación en los términos normativos resulta insuficiente para garantizar la organización constitucional. Así, se estudiarán exhaustivamente la restrictiva lista de sujetos legitimados y se discutirán los posibles sujetos a los que podría atribuírseles una legitimación alternativa. This article deals with the legitimated subjects to interpose the conflict between constitutional organs, as regulated by the LOTC. It will be argued that the legitimation conceded by the authoritative law is insufficient to guarantee the separation of powers (as constitutional organization). Therefore, this work will study all the currently legitimated subjects and will discuss possible subjects to which it could be granted the required legitimation.