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On 3 December EY hosted a SUERF conference on banking reform with Sir Howard Davies, the Chairman of RBS, and Dame Colette Bowe, the Chairman of the Banking Standards Board, as the two keynote speakers. Professor David Miles (Imperial College) gave the SUERF 2015 Annual Lecture on Capital and Banks. The conference focused on core aspects of banking reform: the amount of capital required, the design of capital requirements (complexity versus simplicity), proportionate regulation, recovery and resolution, and risk culture.

In August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over 140 years. Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. In fact, ten years earlier it had converted from a mutual building society whose activities were limited by regulation largely to retail deposits and mortgages. Graphic television news pictures showed very long queues outside the bank as depositors rushed to withdraw their deposits. There was always a fear that this could spark a systemic run on bank deposits. After failed attempts to secure a buyer in the private sector, the government nationalised the bank and, for the first time, in effect socialised the credit risk of the bank. It is now a fully state-owned bank...

This paper considers the conditions that are necessary for market discipline to complement prompt corrective action (PCA) by the authorities in handling problem banks.We initially consider precisely what market discipline means in this context, who exercises it and the preconditions that are necessary for it to operate effectively.We explore the incentives that are necessary for PCA and market discipline to reinforce rather than cancel each other and in particular consider the limits to market discipline in this context from corporate governance and from difficulties in valuation.While our analysis is primarily aimed at advanced countries, we also examine problems in emerging markets and how deposit insurance arrangements might conflict with the aims of both PCA and market discipline.

1) D.T. Llewellyn, " The future for small & regional banks in Europe" 2) R. Ortner, " What future for regional banks?" 3) H. Stepic, " The Strategy of RZB in Central and Eastern Europe" 4) St. K. Zapotocky, " The challenges and chances of regional exchanges" It has been argued that the combination of technological advance, the European Single Market, the advent of EMU and, more generally, the reality of a global financial community, is undermining the competitive position of small, regional financial organisations, be they banks, stock exchanges or other financial entities. This line of argument leads to the conclusion that there is no viable business future for the small. This SUERF Study offers points of view to the contrary, both from the academic and " practitioners" angle. Professor David Llewellyn contributes the academic view, strongly arguing that size per se is not the issue but rather that efficient, well focused small and medium-sized financial institutions remain viable. Representatives of three regional financial institutions in Austria were asked to discuss elements of their business strategy to substantiate their belief in the viability of their institution's future. The contribution by Reinhard Ortner (Erste Bank) is based on a talk he gave on the occasion of the 22nd SUERF Colloquium in Vienna in 2000, and that of Helmut Stepic (Raiffeisen Zentralbank) on a speech at the Alpbacher Banking Seminar in 2001. The consolidation and concentration process has, of course, also engulfed stock exchanges and many of the small ones have already been pronounced terminally ill. Stefan Zapotocky (Wiener Börse AG) is firm in his view that regional exchanges will have a viable future catering for regional financing needs. His contribution is based on a presentation at the SUERF Salzburg Seminar of 2002, which dealt with the future of regional exchanges.

As bank failures clearly involve avoidable costs, there is a welfare benefit to be derived from lowering their probability and reducing the cost of those that do occur. The paper suggests a paradigm for enhanced financial stability. A central theme is that, what are often viewed as alternatives, are in fact complements within an overall regulatory strategy. The discussion is set within the context of what is termed a regulatory regime which is wider than the rules and monitoring conducted by regulatory agencies. Just as the causes of banking crises are multi-dimensional, so the principles of an effective regulatory regime also need to incorporate a wider range of issues than externally imposed rules on bank behaviour. The key components of the regime are: (1) the rules established by regulatory agencies; (2) monitoring and supervision by official agencies; (3) the incentive structures faced by regulatory agencies, consumers and banks; (4) the role of market discipline and monitoring; (5) intervention arrangements in the event of bank failures; (6) the role of internal corporate governance arrangements within banks, and (7) the disciplining and accountability arrangements applied to regulatory agencies. The central theme is that the components of the regulatory regime need to be combined in an overall regulatory strategy, and that while all are necessary, none alone are sufficient. The objective is to optimise a regulatory strategy by combining the components of the regime, bearing in mind that negative trade-offs may be encountered. Thus, if regulation is badly constructed or taken too far, there may be negative impacts on other components to the extent that the overall effect is diluted. The paper also argues that the optimum mix of the components of the regime will vary between countries, over time for all countries, and between banks. The proposed New Basel Capital Accord is discussed in terms of the regulatory regime paradigm.

A short oveview of issues related to the reform of capital adequacy regulation for financial institutions, which has been proposed by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.

All aspects of banking business are being radically transformed and to an extent that is changing the fundamental economics of the banking firm and the banking industry. This is because of three dominant factors: a series of powerful pressures acting simultaneously; technology is changing the very core of banking business: infor-mation advantages, processing, moni-toring, delivery, etc; and because, as a result of these pressures, competition is increasingly developing from outside the traditional banking industry. The paper reviews the pressures impinging on the economics of banking and considers their implications for the structure of the banking industry; the business operations of banks, and the structure of the banking firm."