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Consideration of the traffic generated by inter-urban road investments is important for assessing their economic feasibility and external costs and for designing sustainable road maintenance strategies. While the literature and evidence on generated traffic is growing, it has almost exclusively focused on advanced economies. In contrast, readily available methodologies for predicting the generated traffic impacts are lacking in low and middle income countries (LMICs), where most of the future road investments will be made and where detailed travel demand models and data that would be needed to feed them are often not available. This study attempts to fill this gap by specifically focusing on observed traffic growth and its drivers in developing countries. After reviewing the literature on generated traffic modelling, it presents empirical evidence on the characteristics and outcomes of inter-urban road projects implemented over the last three decades across 68 LMICs. The study quantifies the statistical association between, on the one hand, the travel time or vehicle operating cost (VOC) savings resulting from the road improvement and, on the other hand, the observed short-term growth in traffic on the project roads. Controlling for a range of macro-economic and project-level attributes, both travel time savings and VOC reductions are found to have a statistically significant, positive association with observed short-term traffic growth of a magnitude that much exceeds the elasticities reported in developed country literature. Population growth in the project country/State/province during the project implementation period is also found to have a large, positive association with traffic growth, while per capita income growth is found to have a marginal effect. Toll roads (albeit representing a small share of the sample) are found to have statistically significantly lower observed traffic growth compared to non-toll roads even after controlling for the other project characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses loan-level data on syndicated lending to a large sample of developing countries between 1993 and 2017 to estimate the mobilization effects of multilateral development banks (MDBs), that is, their ability to crowd-in capital from private creditors. Controlling for a large set of fixed effects, the paper shows evidence of positive and significant mobilization effects of multilateral lending on the size of bank inflows. The number of lenders and the average maturity of syndicated loans also increase. These effects are present not only on impact but last for up to three years and are not offset by a decline in bond financing. There is no evidence of anticipation effects, and the results are robust to numerous tests controlling for the role of confounding factors and unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the results are economically sizable, indicating that MDBs can mobilize about seven dollars in bank credit over a three-year period for each dollar invested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Multilateral Development Banks can help fill the infrastructure financing gap in developing countries by mobilizing resources. • MDBs indirectly mobilize resources from other entities, such as private investors and bilateral financiers, by reducing costs for participants. • The mobilization effects of MDBs vary across countries, and are influenced by factors such as income level, capital controls, and governance quality. We explore how Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) can help to fill a large infrastructure financing gap in developing countries by indirectly mobilizing resources from other entities. The analysis focuses on more than 6,500 transactions in 2005–2020 to low-income developing and emerging markets from the Infrastructure Journal database. Using granular data aggregated at the country-sector level, we analyze the dynamics of flows from different actors to different infrastructure sectors and control for a wide range of fixed effects. MDB lending significantly increases the inflows from other sources. Cross-border and domestic resources are mobilized from the official and private sectors. Results exhibit country heterogeneity. Mobilization occurs in countries of all income levels though it decreases as a country's income increases. In countries that use capital controls frequently, mobilization effects are undermined. When the 2008 global financial crisis hit, no difference in mobilization effects was found, unlike the COVID-19 pandemic when mobilization effects were weakened. Finally, we find evidence of complementarity between bilateral and multilateral financing in mobilizing resources. The findings survive a long battery of robustness checks, and no evidence of anticipation effects is found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims at highlighting the importance of climate protection in the world and in Europe due to climate change, as well as the role of multilateral development banks in climate finance. The topic has a current relevance as in 2017 President Donald Trump gave a notice to quit the Paris Climate Agreement accepted by all United Nations (UN) member states, amongst them by the members of the European Union (EU). The move of the United States (US) President was a shocking surprise worldwide and provoked heavy reactions – including the US. The paper gives an overview of the relationship between climate change, climate protection and climate finance. It sees climate change a threatening reality of today, affecting Europe as well. It considers climate protection necessary not only on country but also on regional and global level. Besides regulation and voluntary pledges, it attributes a crucial role to climate finance focusing on huge, long-term, high risk investments and projects to mitigate the effects and adapt to climate change. It mentions its sources, major directions and institutions, amongst them the multilateral development banks. It compares them with special attention to Europe exploring similarities and differences how climate finance is reflected in their policy, what resources they mobilize, what kind of projects they finance, what results they have achieved, what their plans are in this area and what reactions their activity provoke. Results show that multilateral development banks play a key role in climate finance. Due to differences in geographic, historic and economic circumstances and exposure to climate change they act on it differently. The paper helps to better understand the links between climate change, climate protection and climate finance and the role of the multilateral development banks in it in a comparative perspective.

ABSTRACT Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are designed to finance investments that promote global economic and social development. The objective of this paper is to discuss a key component in meeting the demand for investment in developing countries, namely the ability of MDBs to provide loans in local rather than foreign currency. To explain how these institutions fulfill this purpose, we distinguish “traditional” from “new” MDBs, discuss the problems generated from foreign currency indebtedness, and explore a way out, or an alternative explanation, based on New Developmentalism theory and the challenge of local currency financing.

The debate about the benefits and the risks brought both to People’s Republic of China and to the other participant countries by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been gaining momentum in the academic and in the political landscapes. We argue that the BRI is the main pillar of the new financial institutionalism proposed by China to redefine the current global financial architecture and that, consequently, the initiative needs to be considered in that context. This paper (i) reviews the timeline that led to this Chinese-led new financial institutionalism, (ii) proposes two theoretical frameworks to define the concept of multilateral financial statecraft and of new financial institutionalism led by China, and (iii) enumerates the main differences and similarities observed between this new financial institutionalism and the one dominated by the Bretton Woods-related institutions that gradually emerged after World War II, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Marshall Plan, and the Asian Development Bank.

China has been emerging as an alternative source of international cooperation and recently launched One Belt One Road Initiative. To have a better understanding of the Initiative, to explore possible benefits and lesson to South American countries, this paper firstly investigates the Chinese initiative and later discusses South American Integration and Development initiatives, including financial institutions and the main infrastructural initiative. Lastly, it is proposed the “South American Road” to be created complementing the Chinese initiative and integrating with other regions as Central America, Oriental part of Europe, South and Oriental parts of Africa, and Oceania.

The article is focused on the activities of two recently established multilateral development banks (MDBs) - the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) - in mobilizing private infrastructure investment. Unlike other MDBs, these banks specialize exclusively on sustainable infrastructure projects and are currently creating mechanisms to attract private investment. These factors, as well as Russia’s leading role in both banks, make it necessary to study the mechanisms used by the NDB and AIIB to mobilize private sector funds and make recommendations for their further expansion and development. To achieve this goal, this article presents an analysis of both banks’ documents providing for their engagement with the private sector and mobilizing its resources, and compares qualitative and quantitative characteristics of practical cooperation between private investors and the two MDBs. Based on the analysis, the author makes recommendations on improving and expanding the list of mechanisms used to mobilize private financing. In particular, the AIIB, following the NDB example, should start attracting capital in the member countries financial markets as soon as possible. The NDB needs to ensure the prompt launch of its Project Preparation Fund operations, while the similar AIIB’s fund should focus on raising funds from private investors to finance its activities. It will also be instrumental for the NDB to clearly formulate a strategy for financing loans without sovereign guarantees. In addition, both banks should expand the set of tools used for mobilizing private investment and consider provision of guarantees, expert work and support directly to borrowing countries, as well as exchange of experience and participation in joint projects.

The paper handles two Eurasian international financial institutions, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development (EFSD), focusing on interaction with their international counterparts, including international financial organisations and multilateral development banks. We attempt to explain the reasons behind the choice of partners, modalities of interactions, underlying incentives and constraints, and varying dynamics of these two entities. It covers the following questions: What are the reasons behind the varying dynamics of international interactions for both institutions? What conditions the choice of institutions to cooperate with? Which constraints do the Eurasian institutions face? What is the relation between competition and complementarity in these interactions? The paper eliminates gaps in understanding the modalities and dynamics of the EDB and EFSD's interaction with their counterparts among international financial institutions and provides a set of explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDB s) are a growing source of development finance, with nearly two trillion dollars in assets. They have developed a wide array of governance structures, with implications for the distribution of members' control over those assets. This paper measures that power distribution in 28 MDB s using Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices and members' relative voting power on MDB governance boards. It uses these calculations to create a typology of MDB governance structures: creditor-led MDB s distribute power among non-borrowers, core borrower-led MDB s distribute power among a few central borrowers, and mutual aid-oriented MDB s distribute power among a wide group of borrowers. Finally, it explores the impact of the creation of two new MDB s, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, and finds that while they do not dramatically alter the global landscape they do allow significantly greater access to capital for some borrowers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) highlights the role of large infrastructures in promoting socioeconomic progress. Environmental and social planning will play a pivotal role to ensure that the BRI is tuned with the protection of nature and societal needs. This paper appraises environmental and social safeguards employed by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), one of BRI’s key actors. Results show that their rationale, scope, and function are aligned with international practice. Their efficacy however may be jeopardized by the limited capacity of the Bank to oversee the screening and assessment of impacts. More importantly, AIIB’s safeguards endorse an obsolete conceptualization of sustainability, centred on the mitigation of impacts, rather than on the transformation of socioeconomic development patterns.

The 2008 global financial crisis has become a turning point for the world community to realize the necessity to reform international economic system and to allow greater participation of leading emerging economies in the global economic governance. Given the huge economic might that Chinahas accumulated and its willingness to assume greater international responsibilities and leadership functions, Chinacan be regarded as one of the countries that play a key role in the processes of reforming the international economic system and global economic governance. Contributing to the improvement of the existing rules, norms and institutions, Beijing at the same time offers to the world its new, China-centered initiatives, to name a few, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “Belt and Road” Initiative. This article characterizes China’s participation in the reforming of the international economic system after the 1997 Asian financial crisis till the present time with the focus on identifying major forms of China’s participation, its motivations and efforts’ emphasis. By reviewing initiatives and measures that China offers, backs and conducts in order to bring changes into the international economic system and by analyzing Chinese leadership’s official rhetoric and foreign policy activities, the article concludes that Beijing has set a course to assume one of the key roles in the global economic governance and to create China-dominated system of international rules, norms and institutions..

Given their attractiveness as a source of financing for the least developed countries, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have grown in quantity and size supported by their sources of financing. We believe that this 'resource dependency' has not been sufficiently questioned in the literature, especially regarding the credit exposure these organizations have with their largest borrowing members. This article characterizes and identifies the differential effects of the three sources that make up the dependence on resources in the MDBs: capital contributions, leverage in the markets and their credit function. We analysed these sources particularly at the International Development Bank (IBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) and in two recent events: the risk exchange implemented by the referred MDBs in 2015 and the effect of the Argentina's selective default on the IDB's capital adequacy (2014). We find an increasing relevance of leverage and the size of loans, which models a dependence on resources that weakens the development mandate of these organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are accorded immunities and privileges as agents of their member states as justified by functionalist arguments. They are also operationally hybrid: they are actors in their own right in addition to being functional agents. Navigating the functionalist imagery and relying on the argument that they are delegated purely economic pursuits (i.e. financing economic development), MDBs are able to eschew accountability to rights-holders that are affected by their decisions and operations. Although administrative law approaches have succeeded in increasing transparency, instilling self-regulatory frameworks and providing for independent review, the absence of external oversight of such review mechanisms and the broad immunities to suit enjoyed by MDBs have impeded true accountability to rights-holders. This article argues that, in so far as they engage in private sector financing operations, MDBs and their constituent arms share the form, function and relationships of an economic corporation to a large extent. Consequently, their immunities should be limited to render them bound—like ordinary corporations- by the domestic norms with respect to rule of law and human rights of the home and host countries in which they operate in order to make them accountable to rights-holders and to provide recourse for wrongdoings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) seemingly face a dilemma whereby rating agencies require them to maintain low‐risk profiles; otherwise, they may be at risk of downgrade. Meanwhile, MDBs are faced with the pressure to increase quantum of their lending operations. This paper estimates the lending headroom available to 'AAA'‐rated MDBs under scenarios that attempt to manage both of these parameters. Our estimates suggest that MDBs can collectively increase their lending between US$598billion and US$1268billion (65–137 per cent) and that for at least four MDBs, the policy option of opting for 'AA+' may possibly be a viable case. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent the backbone of global economic development because they account for creating private initiatives, innovation, and employment. In the wake of the Coronavirus outbreak, the SMEs were strongly affected, both from the demand and supply of products and services, tightening the ability to gather financial resources in order to meet short term liquidity demands and working capital requirements. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments and multilateral development banks (MDBs) have provided financial resources to SMEs in order to tackle the effects of lockdown. This paper aims to characterize and assess current measures and initiatives adopted by MDBs to support SMEs. We highlight that international financial institutions act countercyclically in securing businesses and supporting jobs. The paper underlines the importance of transparency, a correct evaluation of risks and fiscal costs, and strong governance while dealing with MDBs support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically reviews the World Bank's reorientation from its traditional role as a lender for major development projects to become a broker for private investment. It highlights the follies of the Bank's 'billions to trillions' agenda, rebranded as Maximizing Finance for Development, that seeks to use aid and public money to leverage private finance, supposedly to fill the financing gap for achieving the SDGs. While such leveraging has failed to raise substantial finance, the Bank's promotion of PPPs and 'de-risking' foreign private finance in developing countries has significantly increased risk for developing country governments. Focusing on 'blending' aid with private finance has obscured crucial measures such as macro-prudential regulations and international cooperation to address systemic issues, e.g., harmful tax competition and illicit capital outflows from developing countries via transfer pricing and tax havens. The B2T/MFD hype has also deflected attention from stagnant and declining aid flows, and onerous conditionalities, especially for the least developed and other fragile economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are designed to finance investments that promote global economic and social development. The objective of this paper is to discuss a key component in meeting the demand for investment in developing countries, namely the ability of MDBs to provide loans in local rather than foreign currency. To explain how these institutions fulfill this purpose, we distinguish "traditional" from "new" MDBs, discuss the problems generated from foreign currency indebtedness, and explore a way out, or an alternative explanation, based on New Developmentalism theory and the challenge of local currency financing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a landmark decision in February 2019, the US Supreme Court delivered judgment in Jam et al v International Finance Corp (IFC), riding that this international financial institution, a member o f the World Bank Group, did not enjoy absolute immunity as argued by the World Bank. The implications o f this ruling go beyond the issue o f immunity or the existence (or lack thereof) o f a procedural bar in claims against the IFC before US courts. It arguably marks a critical moment in the manner in which financial institutions may be dealing with complaints alledging environmental and human rights abuses. The present analysis discusses the ruling and its possible implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to characterize China's approach to global economic governance during the Xi Jinping era, and to provide details on how it is playing out. One finding is that China has moved away from the period of "hiding one's strength and biding one's time" and is now acting in a more norm-making and agenda-setting role in which it is seeking largely incremental change. Another finding is that China is doing these things through a variety of global governance forms such as inter-governmental organizations with a fairly highly degree of formality, looser international organizations that have weaker implementation capacity and unilateral initiatives which put China very much in a leadership position. Findings are based on an examination of major activities of the Xi period, including hosting the G20 leaders' summit in Hangzhou, China, joint creation of new multilateral development banks, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The paper also touches on motives for China's activities, including hedging against adverse developments in the international system, greater wealth, and a global power vacuum that has arisen with the rise of nativist and populist movements in the West, and possible constraints to the realization of China's objectives such as slowing domestic economic growth and a backlash against China's globalization, which could intensify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the drivers of American support for environmental projects in the multilateral development banks (MDBs). We first describe how U.S. Executive Directors are guided by Congressional directives regarding environmental aspects of MDB projects. The article then turns to statistical analysis of the strategic and normative drivers of U.S. positions on MDB projects. Our analysis finds mixed support for environmental factors driving U.S. votes. The United States is more inclined to vote against ''dirty'' projects (i.e., mining, coal, and oil) rather than specifically support ''green'' projects (i.e., projects related toward climate change or biodiversity). The overall environmental performance of a country had a minor influence on whether the United States would support proposals from that country, but the United States was much more likely to disapprove of a project if a project failed to undergo an environmental analysis or failed the analysis in anyway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945 the number of multilateral development banks (MDBs) has increased at a linear rate, with approximately one new MDB created every three years. The proliferation of MDBs has resulted in an inefficient duplication of international institutions with overlapping functions. Further, this trend contradicts our existing understanding of why states create countervailing international organizations. This article proposes a novel, two-step theoretical model of institutional change and creation in an attempt to explain this empirical puzzle. Utilizing the complementarities of rational-choice and historical institutionalism, the model demonstrates that the rational actions of states in the past can lead to seemingly irrational institutional change in the future. This process results in the repetitive creation of countervailing MDBs designed to solve the same functional problems. To evaluate the model's hypotheses, three case studies are undertaken, employing archival material, internal documents, and 48 interviews conducted by the author in London, Washington, D.C. and Manila, Philippines. The empirical results are of direct interest to policy-makers currently negotiating the structure of new MDBs in Asia and Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the November G20 Summit, Leaders are expected to approve a revamp of the global financial system as proposed by the October 2018 report entitled 'Making the Global Financial System Work for All' by the G20 Eminent Persons Group. This article describes some of the report's proposals and warns that, in their current form, they could undermine accountability, participation and sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2008 global financial crisis has become a turning point for the world community to realize the necessity to reform international economic system and to allow greater participation of leading emerging economies in the global economic governance. Given the huge economic might that China has accumulated and its willingness to assume greater international responsibilities and leadership functions, China can be regarded as one of the countries that play a key role in the processes of reforming the international economic system and global economic governance. Contributing to the improvement of the existing rules, norms and institutions, Beijing at the same time offers to the world its new, China-centered initiatives, to name a few, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “Belt and Road” Initiative. This article characterizes China’s participation in the reforming of the international economic system after the 1997 Asian financial crisis till the present time with the focus on identifying major forms of China’s participation, its motivations and efforts’ emphasis. By reviewing initiatives and measures that China offers, backs and conducts in order to bring changes into the international economic system and by analyzing Chinese leadership’s official rhetoric and foreign policy activities, the article concludes that Beijing has set a course to assume one of the key roles in the global economic governance and to create China-dominated system of international rules, norms and institutions.

This article discusses climate-related standards that development finance institutions establish or apply to projects supported by their investments. It focuses particularly on multilateral development banks given their major role in providing finance to developing countries, where the bulk of the world’s fastest growing emissions are taking place. It looks at proposed and recently adopted standards, as well as different perspectives developed and developing countries have regarding these standards. It also discusses how these standards might be impacted by the evolution of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations and concludes that there will be continuing challenges to implement these standards unless developed countries fulfill their pledge of expected finance.

SDR valuation is done in terms of currency amounts of the four international reserve currencies, namely the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the pound sterling. Currencies included in the SDR calculations are determined on the basis of the value of export of goods and services over the past five years. The IMF Rule O-2(a) defines the value of the U.S. dollar in terms of the SDR as the reciprocal of the sum of the equivalents in U.S. dollars of the amounts of the currencies in the SDR basket. Each U.S. dollar equivalent is calculated on the basis of the middle rate between the buying and selling exchange rates at noon in the London market, or New York market or on the basis of euro reference rates published by the European Central Bank depending upon availability. For other currencies, SDR rates are based on SDR-USD rate and USD-other currency rate. Currency rates in terms of USD as reported by the issuing central banks is different from the SDR-USD rate based on London market, this difference cause the SDR to have different dollar values. It can potentially create spurious translation movements, even for a perfectly hedged position. In this study, we assess the impact of different exchange rate quotations for SDR calculations on SDR as a unit of account. Specifically we look at the long run behavior and the short run dynamics of the difference between SDR as done by the IMF and on basis of London market and look at the implications for SDR as a unit of account and for currency risk management for MDBs that currently use SDR as a unit of account.

This article takes a closer look at the complex web of financial assistance mechanisms in the climate change sector. These mechanisms are important tools for assisting developing countries to address the challenges associated with climate change. Mapping the various types of institutions and funds in this sector, the author underlines the important role played by the private sector but also highlights the increasing presence of financial mechanisms under the aegis of international organizations, such as the World Bank. Moreover, a particular focus is placed on the Green Climate Fund and the way in which the establishment of this mechanism may affect the functioning of existing financial mechanisms. In calling for better communication, coordination, and coherence among these actors and mechanisms, the author suggests that these ends may be achieved by placing an emphasis on plurality, complementarity, and mutual support through, inter alia, more effective policy oversight and enhanced inter-institutional relations.

Copyright of Military Science Review / Hadtudományi Szemle is the property of National University of Public Service and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Each multilateral development bank (hereinafter "MDB") has its own procurement policy regulating procurement in projects financed by it. This article aims to investigate those key institutional arrangements, in and out of an MDB procurement policy, that tend to impact the core procurement principles and standards in the policy. The topics addressed in this article are the impact of the non-resident Board system of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (hereinafter "AIIB") on procurement, compared with the executive Board of the traditional MDBs; the role of trust funds in MDB-financed procurement; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as private entities in MDB-funded procurement; the choice of alternative procurement arrangements; and procurement-related complaints and disputes. The methods of investigating these issues include references to the law and practice of the World Bank, other MDBs, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article not only describes what these methods are regarding these issues, but also suggests what should be done to optimize MDB procurement results. There is a special focus on the procurement law of the China-led AIIB throughout the discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Strategic Review / Przeglad Strategiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Multilateral Development Banks (hereinafter MDBs) have evolved from avoiding non-economic considerations, as required in most of their charters, to officially supporting sustainable development. This transformation is due not only to international law, civil society pressure or internal adjustments, but in part to the emulation phenomenon between the international effort for sustainable development made by international conferences and commissions and the sustainable development effort by MDBs. The paper first examines this emulation phenomenon and its strong impact on MDB creation of substantive instruments - the environmental and social safeguards - and of procedural instruments - the accountability mechanisms - for the integration of sustainable development. Following this discussion, the second part points out that MDBs' environmental and social safeguards still differ substantially, revealing a fragmentation in MDBs' normative understanding of sustainable development. After presenting the arguments supporting this fragmentation, the last part of the paper argues in favor of the harmonization of MDBs' environmental and social safeguards, resulting in the creation of a common law of sustainable development, the promotion of international law and the facilitation of investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development bank (MDB) engagement with gender has always been controversial in review and uneven in practice. This article adopts a mixed qualitative/quantitative document analysis of 95 documents produced by 11 MDBs between 1979 and 2021. The primary objectives of the article are to evaluate how gender has been conceptualised and operationalised by the MDBs over time. Based upon its analysis, this article divides MDB gender engagement into three eras and observes the MDBs as a network of aligned organisations operating in a common institutional field. It concludes that while the MDBs have since the late-2000s expanded their operationalisation of gender greatly, this operational growth has paralleled a concerning conceptual narrowing that has disbanded initiatives to alleviate poverty, reduce gendered inequalities, and promote wellbeing in favour of making better entrepreneurial economic units of women and girls for the narrow purpose of enhancing national economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development financial institutions have emerged in the last years as major investors in the private equity industry. Their main goals are to create new jobs, to foster innovation and to develop the private sector. The aim of the paper is to analyze the role played by the development financial institutions in the creation and development of emerging markets private equity funds in the light of financial crisis started in 2008. We found that many development banks have increased their financial support to the emerging markets private equity funds and have improved the standards and norms of the local industry. They played a countercyclical role during a difficult period when private investors proved reluctant in backing new private equity funds.

In 1993, the World Bank created its Inspection Panel, unprecedently opening itself up to being held to account by people negatively affected by its development projects. Within a decade, the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) – the Asian, African, Inter-American Development Banks, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the rest of the World Bank Group would too. The creation of these accountability mechanisms embodies a norm of ‘accountability as justice’ that provides recourse for damaging behaviour through a formal sanctioning process. This article makes two arguments: first, the United States built on its history of using ‘accountability as control’ to advocate using accountability for justice for the MDBs during debates over maintaining their efficiency and effectiveness. As the predominant MDB shareholder, the United States used its power (of the purse) and influence (through its voice and vote) to garner support for the norm despite opposition from borrowers and the Banks. Second, the United States had to resort to these same levers to demand the MDBs reformulate the mechanisms when borrower resistance and Bank avoidance hindered their effectiveness. The United States successfully created the norm but Bank recalcitrance meant the United States had to use the same levers to ensure its effectiveness. The article concludes that change within the Banks is evident but incremental: the spread of the norm amongst the MDBs has changed their governance to include recourse for project affected people with structures in place to strengthen them over time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article offers three arguments outlining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's significance and to help policy planners navigate the complex relationship between China, the Bank and themes of sustainability. First, there is little uncertainty that China is serious about development and sustainability. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is but one extension of China's increasing commitment to sustainability and should therefore be embraced by development stakeholders. Second, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's commitment to infrastructure development complements other multilateral development banks and should not be considered a challenger to the existing order of development lending practices. Rather, China's interest in establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank points to competitive pluralism and poses no threat to the existing international order. Finally, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's sustainability guidelines are not unique and fall in line with similar policy of other large development banks. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank therefore reinforces sustainability norms while posturing itself as a partner for development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is focused on the issues of social and economic development of the poorest countries of the South-east Asian region and the role of international institutions in this process. The article tries to assess the impact of multilateral mechanisms for international development cooperation on the social and economic development of this group of countries. A special emphasis is made on the role of the Russian Federation as a new donor and emerging economic power in the South-east Asian region. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary This paper considers why and how the Performance Based Allocation (PBA) used in multilateral development banks and in particular at IDA, could be improved by taking the structural handicaps of eligible countries into account. The PBA relies on a debatable definition of performance. It does not meet the equity concern raised by the existence of structural handicaps to growth. It neglects the lessons of the aid effectiveness literature. Finally, it suffers from some opacity. We show how it is possible to increase the share of specific groups of countries, such as Sub-Saharan Africa or post-conflict states, in a transparent manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasingly supporting climate change mitigation efforts. However, little is known about how and why this role in climate finance has evolved, and how MDBs are managing this change internally. This paper addresses these questions through an analysis of energy support provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The paper maps trends in the number and monetary value of ADB energy projects and technical assistance activities, presenting descriptive statistics on five categories of energy between 2000 and 2014. The results indicate that ADB while decreased its support for fossil fuel interventions, this sector continues to enjoy substantial funding support. At the same time, support for sustainable energy projects has also increased, reflecting the Bank's evolving priorities and providing a rough proxy for its entry into the climate finance system. These new insights enhance understanding of the changing dynamics of multilateral climate finance and its complex relationship with development finance institutions. Given their financial resources and policy influence, it is essential for MDBs to support the goals of the new global climate finance architecture. But to be considered a serious actor in the climate finance system, ADB has to revisit its policy architecture, strengthen its accounting procedures, and coordinate its efforts with those of other actors across this fragmented system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this article is to analyze the strategies of difusion/imposition and the content of the neoliberalism in the provinces and municipalities of Argentina using the “Córdoba’s case” as a case of reference. It is divided in two main parts: the first one, presents the strategies that the central agents use to espread/impose the neoliberalism in different parts of the planet and the main features of the neoliberal reforms of first and second generation; the second one, makes an historical analysis of the political field of Córdoba and a juridical analysis of the norms that gave form to the process of the “New State” and the “Fiscal Pact” of 2000.