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Women's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 12 years showcased their extraordinary abilities and reinforced the belief that women are qualified to join combat arms specialties. As a result, on January 24, 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) removed ground combat restrictions for women thereby removing some of the barriers for increased opportunities. Research suggests that integrating women into previously closed specialties can improve team performance and indicates that successful integration depends on the Army's ability to plan and execute a comprehensive strategy for implementing change in organizations. Therefore, this paper examines the evolving role of women in the Army and acknowledges several concerns and benefits about integrating women into combat arms specialties. John Kotter's eight step process for leading change in organizations is used to examine and offer recommendations about how the Army should implement DOD's directive requiring women be integrated into combat specialties by 2016.

The Army finds itself at a critical point in its implementation of a mission command culture. Recent post-conflict history demonstrates tendencies towards centralization. While there are some differences in context, the anticipated future environment for the Army bears many similarities to its recent post-conflict past. Army senior leaders experienced the difficult days of "zero defect" command climates, reductions in end strength, and reduced promotion rates. Conversely, based on their experiences in combat over the last decade, the Army's junior leaders have both mission command experience and an expectation of empowerment from their leadership. To increase the chances of successful implementation of a mission command culture, the Army should utilize Schein's cultural embedding mechanisms. Specific recommendations include: consistent senior leader focus on mission command, senior leader role modeling mission command, rewarding positive examples of mission command, and adjusting the Officer Evaluation Report to ensure the Army promotes the right leaders. The implementation of a mission command culture will only occur when senior leaders overtly embrace and participate in the process.

Mission command is the philosophy of command that Army commanders and leaders must use to lead Soldiers and units in the 21st Century. While first conceptually introduced in 1982 with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army did not officially adopt the evolved doctrinal term and concept of mission command until 2003 with the publication of FM 6-0, Mission Command. While mission command has been integrated into its doctrine, the Army still has yet to institutionalize it. The Army has not yet fully integrated mission command into its culture, fostered unit climates that engender it, incorporated it into its training methodologies, developed personnel management systems that reward it, and employed it consistently in all environments. These challenges result from the Army's inability to create major change and transform over the past 11 years, as well as its rooted culture, organizational climates, tiered structure, bureaucratic processes, and dated training and personnel management systems. This paper describes this latest evolution of mission command, explains why challenges to its institutionalization exist, and proposes solutions to Army senior leaders as to what should be done to achieve institutionalization.

The integration of women in Maneuver Fires and Effects branches in the Army represents a promising change for the Army and the nation. Not only will this long overdue change allow the Army to align with social norms pertaining to equality and inclusion, it will also enhance Army readiness and increase creativity and innovation in combat arms units. However, continued resistance to this change effort does not bode well for the Army moving forward. As such, senior Army leaders must understand factors that underscore resistance and communicate the importance of this change effort through strong messages and behavior patterns to influence institutional beliefs. This research project provides a historical review of women in the Army with emphasis on patterns of institutional resistance towards women, analyzes the benefits of integrating women into combat arms units, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to effectively integrate women in combat arms units

Army Medicine, to combat the rising cost of health care, the increasing rate of preventable diseases, and the diminishing pool of eligible military recruits due to health related issues, is transforming from a health care system to a System for Health. The focus is shifting from a disease-based model to a preventive model of care. Although Army Medicine is changing practices and implementing health-focused initiatives to facilitate this paradigm shift, barriers inherent in the organization remain and are hindering the transformation process. Institutionalizing this new paradigm requires eliminating the cultural, economic, and educational barriers by providing tools and appropriate resources, implementing methods for promoting healthy lifestyles, and leveraging education, research, and technology. Transforming Army Medicine from a health care system to a System for Health has the potential to positively influence Army Medicine, the Military Health System, and ultimately shape health care in the nation.

Purpose - The objective of the research was to align the 3-part habit routine to intended organisational change initiatives that use discrete methodologies like Lean Six Sigma to achieve outcomes that are more successful than change initiatives deployed only from a technical systematic approach. Design/methodology/approach - An infield quantitative experiment designed to measure the longitudinal effects of mindfulness, organisational routines, and job satisfaction. Findings - This study does not provide empirical proof that the outcome to intended change initiative have improved with contextual cues over the predetermined time horizon. Research limitation/implications - The results suggest the 20-day time horizon of the study was insufficient to establish automaticity. The language used in the assessment tools chosen, posed a challenge in the context of a South African services organisation. Not including considerations for affective and behavioural factors into intended change programmes will continue to influence the effectiveness of change agents, and practitioners. Originality/value - Within the context of intended organisational change, this study aimed to amend embedded routines and/or automatic behaviours by providing contextual cues at a specific time of day.

"As the United States (U.S.) continues its drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's clear that the coming decade is a vital period of transition for the U.S. Army. This transition is enabled by declining budgets, a shift in emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region, counterterrorism, and training of partners to shaping the strategic environment, preventing the outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the army's readiness to respond in force to a range of complex contingencies worldwide. In order to meet the challenges of shaping a future volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) strategic environment, senior leaders must identify and develop agile, adaptive strategic leaders who are equipped to embrace and negotiate challenges that await them. This project examines how the U.S. Army, from 1972-2012, developed its organizations and training to prepare and develop agile, adaptive strategic leaders who manage a budget-strained, technologically-oriented Army. This project will also analyze how senior leaders learned from history, adapted to their current operational environment, and anticipated future requirements in order to adequately prepare strategic leaders to meet the challenges before them."--Abstract.

"Since 2004, The Department of the Army has been required to provide an annual report on sexual assault. The Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) office has been the lead agent for the report and program. Over the years, the SHARP office has gone through several organizational changes due to Department of Defense directed mandates and internal Army decisions. This paper examined the Army's SHARP program from 2004 to 2011 by using Kotter's eight-step process of creating major change in an organization. This examination of Army decisions and programs within each of the eight steps showed that the Army has made many significant improvements to address this issue and anchor these changes within its culture. In concluding, this paper provided recommendations in four areas related to formally developing a vision for the SHARP program and using additional ways to communicate the vision and programs to members of the active Army and more specifically to the Reserve Component."--Abstract.

"Using a comprehensive approach, this study aims to recommend measures that will improve NATO's capabilities and make it a more efficient organization. For any military organizations, adjusting capabilities to governmental ambitions and strategic goals is fundamental. As such, NATO needs to continuously adjust its posture and capabilities to remain relevant in face of new threats and new requirements, especially since the end of the Cold War. This adjustment is even more pressing in the present context of financial austerity and of the upcoming important downsize in Afghanistan. Through a thorough review of NATO's evolution of the last 20 years, this study will demonstrate that although NATO is attempting to transform and adapt, its operational efficiency still suffers from important capability shortages and challenges. In order to tackle this crucial issue, a "roadmap toward 2020" containing various measures will aim to improve NATO's relevancy going forward."--Abstract.

Presentation regarding the Economic and Employment Services Program of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, and the need to switch to the Business Process Redesign program.

Testimony regarding SRS' role in the implementation of Governor Brownback's reorganization plan. The Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services supports and is working to achieve the reorganization of public health programs into a single state agency.

Testimony regarding SRS' role in the implementation of Governor Brownback's reorganization plan. The Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services supports and is working to achieve the reorganization of public health programs into a single state agency.

The construction industry is one of the most diverse industries that provide the desired foundation for the economic growth. Existing contractual structure that bases the framework for activities within this significant industry discourages coordination between the project players. Each of these attributes can lead to an environment of distrust with unresolved claims, budget overruns and schedule delay. This study presents a formal contractual framework that increases productivity, maximizes efficiency and minimizes wastes thorough utilizing partnering and integrated project delivery (IPD) approach. Partnering is an approach that provides more beneficial construction environment through defining shared goals for all the project stakeholders, while IPD is a PDS that integrates all project participants to deliver the best end product. The aim of this study is to build a collaborative environment that anticipates potential problems, allocates risks properly and as the bottom line, "Best for Project" shapes all the activities within this working relationship.

The legacy structures and processes of a national security system that is now more than 60 years old no longer help American leaders to formulate coherent national strategy. 1. The system is grossly imbalanced. It supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms. 2. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions. 3. The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House. 4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations. 5. Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult. Taken together, the basic deficiency of the current national security system is that parochial departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging security issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system. The White House bottleneck, in particular, prevents the system from reliably marshaling the needed but disparate skills and expertise from wherever they may be found in government, and from providing the resources to match the skills. That bottleneck, in short, makes it all but impossible to bring human and material assets together into a coherent operational ensemble. Moreover, because an excessively hierarchical national security system does not know what it knows as a whole, it also cannot achieve the necessary unity of effort and command to exploit opportunities.

"We are engaged in a dynamic global environment, in which pace, scale, and complexity of change are unprecedented. It is a networked world where what happens in Peshawar affects Peoria--and vice versa. Risks are often unforeseen and threats are hidden and agile, making the job of intelligence professionals more critical and more challenging. Our national security depends on anticipating risks and out-maneuvering our adversaries, not just out-muscling them. Therefore, intelligence is more critical than ever. We must address these risks and threats by integrating all elements of national power--defense, homeland security, diplomacy, development, and intelligence. However, the Intelligence Community is still largely structured, staffed, and operated around a design optimized for a different era. Adapting the Community to this new environment is our fundamental challenge. The purpose of this Vision document is to chart a new path forward for a globally networked and integrated Intelligence Enterprise for the 21st century based on the principles of integration, collaboration, and innovation. The mission of the Intelligence Community is to create decision advantage for our customers--policymakers, military commanders, law enforcement and homeland security officials. This means we collect and analyze intelligence to improve our customers' ability to make a decision while denying our adversaries the same advantage. To transform the Community and create decision advantage, we need to accomplish the following: develop integrated capabilities to address emerging challenges in cyber space and support new missions such as energy security; create a customer-driven intelligence model; improve our ability to anticipate and prevent strategic surprise through better global awareness and strategic foresight; Integrate the Community through mission-focused operations that transcend agency and functional silos. This also requires us to network our collection assets to work, autonomously and cooperatively in near-real time, to penetrate the most difficult targets; Field a net-centric information enterprise that enables end-users to discover, access, and exploit intelligence information in a secure, tailored manner; Remove the barriers to cross-agency collaboration by integrating the strategic enablers of the Intelligence Enterprise--human capital, education and training, business systems, facilities, science and technology, and acquisition and procurement."--Page 1.