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The use of detention for psychiatric treatment is widespread and sometimes necessary. International human rights law requires a legal framework to safeguard the rights to liberty and personal integrity by preventing arbitrary detention. However, research suggests that extra-legal factors may influence decisions to detain. This article presents observational and interview data to describe how decisions to detain are made in practice in one jurisdiction (England and Wales) where a tension between policy and practice has been described. The analysis shows that practitioners mould the law into 'practical criteria' that appear to form a set of operational criteria for identifying cases to which the principle of soft paternalism may be applied. Most practitioners also appear willing, albeit often reluctantly, to depart from their usual reliance on the principle of soft paternalism and authorise detention of people with the capacity to refuse treatment, in order to prevent serious harm. We propose a potential resolution for the tension between policy and practice: two separate legal frameworks to authorise detention, one with a suitable test of capacity, used to enact soft paternalism, and the other to provide legal justification for detention for psychiatric treatment of the small number of people who retain decision-making capacity but nonetheless choose to place others at risk by refusing treatment. This separation of detention powers into two systems, according to the principle that justifies the use of detention would be intellectually coherent, consistent with human rights instruments and, being consistent with the apparent moral sentiments of practitioners, less prone to idiosyncratic interpretations in practice., (Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Autobiographical and clinical accounts, as well as a limited neuropsychological research literature, suggest that, in some situations, men and women with autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) may have difficulty making decisions. Little is known, however, about how people with ASCs experience decision-making or how they might best be supported to make decisions for themselves. In this study, we compared the decision-making experiences of adults with and without ASCs (n=38 and n=40, respectively) using a novel questionnaire and the General Decision Making Style inventory (GDMS, Scott & Bruce, 1995). The participants with ASCs reported experiencing several problems in decision-making more frequently than the comparison group, and were more likely to report avoidance of decision-making, as measured using the GDMS. The findings highlight areas of potential future research and inform suggestions for supporting adults with ASCs during decision-making.

Purpose: Despite the common occurrence of intellectual disability (ID) in people with epilepsy, most studies of the cost of epilepsy have focussed primarily or exclusively on people without ID. This paper estimates the costs of supporting people with epilepsy and ID., Methods: Prospective resource use and outcome data were collected on 91 participants from the east of England for seven months. Multivariate analysis was used to investigate the relationship between costs and patient and healthcare provider characteristics., Results: Mean health care costs relating to epilepsy or ID were £2800 (3500 Euros, 5200 USD) p.a. Modelling suggests costs are lower for patients with more severe ID (p=0.014); and higher for patients managed by a consultant neurologist (p=0.037)., Discussion: Our findings support limited evidence from the literature of increased epilepsy costs in people with ID. Patterns of expenditure suggest clinical variation in the treatment of epilepsy according to the severity of ID, particularly in the absence of management by a consultant neurologist., (Copyright © 2011 British Epilepsy Association. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Objectives: to determine the extent and nature of the decisions individuals are asked to make as in-patients, and whether doctors, nurses, other health care practitioners, and housekeepers engaged in routine (non-emergency) medical assessments, investigations and treatments, or acts of personal care observe the Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment, the principles of the Mental Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005, and the guidance from the Dignity in Care Campaign., Methods: hospital staff working on a general medical ward and a ward for older people in a large teaching hospital in England were observed for over 50 hours carrying out acts of medical and personal care. The observations were recorded using a semi-structured record sheet, complemented by unstructured field notes. Observations were subsequently categorized, coded and counted., Results: a total of 206 acts were observed, 127 (62%) of which were acts of medical care and 79 (38%) were acts of personal care. Patients approached for acts of personal care were generally presented with choices and options (78%). In contrast, when approached for acts of medical care, they were rarely presented with a choice (6%); instead, health care practitioners either requested permission to perform a procedure (29%) or informed patients that they were about to perform a procedure (50%). Irrespective of the way in which health care practitioners approached patients about acts of medical care, in the overwhelming majority of instances, patients complied (80%, 99 cases), either by giving permission for the act to be performed, or by complying and/or cooperating with the health care practitioner. In only a minority of cases did patients either refuse or resist a proposed procedure (9%)., Conclusions: patients were asked to make many varied decisions and the approaches taken by hospital staff differed depending on the nature of the decision and/or act in question. In contrast to personal care decisions, when health care practitioners approached patients in order to undertake routine acts of medical care, they generally did so in a manner that did not acknowledge that the patient had a right to exercise a choice. This is contrary to current law, policy and guidance. It seems to be rooted in the practical demands of running a hospital ward and uncertainties as to the purpose of securing patient consent before undertaking routine acts of medical care., (The Royal Society of Medicine Press Ltd 2011.)

Objectives: To examine attitudes to the Mental Capacity Act's new statutory Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA) service in England and Wales and consider the implications for its delivery., Methods: Quantitative data describing all referrals to the seven pilot IMCA services (January 2006-March 2007) and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with 18 doctors, 21 senior nurses and one discharge planning manager in four general hospitals in England., Results: Of 127 hospital-based referrals to the seven pilot IMCA services, 29 (23%) were for patients facing serious medical treatments, 52% of whom were judged to lack decision-making capacity due to a learning disability; ninety-eight (77%) were for patients facing a change of accommodation upon hospital discharge, 62% of whom were elderly and lacked capacity due to dementia. While aware of the potential benefits of the IMCA service, clinicians were generally negative about the contribution advocates could make to patients' medical care and thought they could only contribute usefully in a minority of ethically complicated decisions. In contrast, they were more positive about the involvement of advocates in hospital discharge decisions and hoped that they would improve current discharge practice., Conclusions: Clinicians held ambivalent attitudes towards the involvement of a statutory IMCA service in medical decisions, reflecting beliefs that the service was largely impractical and unnecessary given current procedures for making medical decisions in patients' 'best interests'. Conversely, clinicians were more likely to support advocacy in discharge decisions because they believed that non-medically qualified advocates could make a valuable contribution to decisions that were seen as predominantly social and where practice was frequently considered deficient. By holding these beliefs, clinicians are failing to have due regard for the IMCA service as a statutory measure for safeguarding patients' interests.