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What are the likely trends in the use of force in world politics in the coming 15 years, and how will they relate to U.S. national security policy? Most places in which the United States enters combat will be ones that planners do not now anticipate, because when and where force is used will depend on local crises that the United States cannot control in advance, accumulated lessons from experience, and the particular administration in power in Washington at the time. Limited humanitarian interventions will be frequent, but more often undertaken by other countries than by American forces. Unconventional American counterterror operations will be frequent, since Al Qaeda is unlikely to be neutralized soon. Inter-state conventional wars will be rare, especially since the United States is much more constrained from attacking remaining “rogue” states because of the bad results of the invasion of Iraq and the more complicated political and diplomatic obstacles in regard to Iran and North Korea. Use of ...

The United States persists in aggressively exploiting primacy because the policy has been popular across the domestic political spectrum and is tolerated abroad despite unhappiness with it. Objections prove to be much more about style than substance. Although Democrats in the US criticize Bush for unilateralism, they seldom make the alternative of multilateralism a precondition for American action. When Washington genuflects to principles of multilateral consultation, allied governments allow themselves to be pulled along on US initiatives. Differences between the Bush and Kerry views of the American role in the world have been less than meets the eye. Only a significant disaster-such as the total unravelling of the project in Iraq-is likely to turn either party away from the urge to control the development of world order.

Strategy is the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable. It is the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce the other. Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure. Without strategy, power is a loose cannon and war is mindless. Mindless killing can only be criminal. Politicians and soldiers may debate which strategic choice is best, but only paciasts can doubt that strategy is necessary. Because strategy is necessary, however, does not mean that it is possible. Those who experience or study many wars and strong reasons to doubt that strategists can know enough about causes, effects, and intervening variables to make the operations planned produce the outcomes desired. To skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the gap between policy objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to a speciaed end. When this is true, war cannot be a legitimate instrument of policy. This article surveys ten critiques that throw the practicability of strategy into question. It pulls together many arguments that emerge in bits and pieces from a variety of sources. Some are my own formulation of skepticism implicit but unformed in others’ observations; few analysts have yet attacked the general viability of strategy head-on. The notion that effective strategy must be an illusion emerges cumulatively from arguments that: strategies cannot be evaluated because there are no agreed criteria for which are good or bad; there is little demonstrable relationship between strategies and outcomes in war; good strategies can seldom be formulated because of policymakers’ biases; if good strategies are formulated, they cannot be executed because of organizations’ limitations; and other points explored below. Unifying themes include the bar

Political science attends to causes and consequences of war but only fitfully welcomes study of its conduct, because few grasp how much the dynamics of combat shape politics. Bernard Brodie called for development of strategic studies on the model of the discipline of economics, because neither the military nor academia treated the subject rigorously. His call was answered in the early cold war, with mixed results. Theories about nuclear deterrence burgeoned while empirical studies of war lagged. The late—cold war impasse in nuclear strategy, rooted in NATO doctrine, shifted attention to conventional military operations and empirically grounded theory. Since the cold war, research on general theoretical questions about war and peace has been prospering, but education in military matters has been eroding. Interdisciplinary strategic studies integrate political and military elements of international conflict, but there is no recognized discipline of military science; military analysis is smuggled into political science and history departments, where it is resisted by calls to conceptualize security broadly or focus on purely theoretical work. If serious military studies are squeezed out of universities, there will be no qualified civilian analysts to provide independent expertise in policy and budget debates, and decisions on war and peace will be made irresponsibly by uninformed civilians or by the professional military alone.

Most major wars since 1939 have begun with surprise attacks. Hindsight reveals that the element of surprise in most of these attacks was unwarranted; substantial evidence of an impending strike was available to the victims before the fact. The high incidence of surprise is itself surprising. The voluminous literature on strategic surprise, however, suffers from three fixations. One is a focus on the problem of warning, and how to improve intelligence collection, rather than on the more difficult problem of how to improve political response to ample warning indicators. Another is a common view of surprise as an absolute or dichotomous problem rather than as a matter of degree. Third is the prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies. This article puts these fixations in perspective.1

List of Contributors Foreword Bill McGuire and Mark Maslin Chapter 1: Hazardous responses of the solid Earth to a changing climate Bill McGuire Chapter 2: Future climate changes in the context of geological and geomorphological hazards Felicity Liggins, Richard Betts and Bill McGuire Chapter 3: Climate change and collapsing volcanoes: evidence from Mount Etna, Sicily Kim Deeming, Bill McGuire and Paul Harrop Chapter 4: Melting ice and volcanic hazards in the twenty-first century Hugh Tuffen Chapter 5: Multiple effects of ice load changes and associated stress change on magmatic systems Freysteinn Sigmundsson and others Chapter 6: Response of faults to climate-driven changes in ice and water volumes at the surface of the Earth Andrea Hampel, Ralf Hetzel and Georgios Maniatis Chapter 7: Does the El-Nino Southern Oscillation and influence earthquake activity in the eastern tropical Pacific? Serge Guillas, Simon Day and Bill McGuire Chapter 8: Submarine landslides and tsunamis in a changing climate Dave Tappin Chapter 9: Heat waves and slope stability in high mountain terrain Christian Huggel and others Chapter 10: Impacts of recent and future climate change on natural hazards in the European Alps Jasper Knight, Margreth Keiler and Stephan Harrison Chapter 11: Assessing the past and future stability of global gas hydrate reservoirs Mark Maslin, Matthew Owen, Richard Betts, Simon Day, Tom Dunkley Jones and Andrew Ridgwell Chapter 12: Methane hydrate instability: a view from the Palaeogene Tom Dunkley Jones, Andrew Ridgwell, D. J. Lunt, Mark Maslin, D. N. Schmidt and Paul Valdez Index

Proteinase-activated receptor 2 (PAR 2 ) is widely expressed in the respiratory tract and is an integral component of the host antimicrobial defense system. The principal aim of this study was to investigate the influence of a PAR 2 -activating peptide, SLIGRL, on influenza A virus (IAV)-induced pathogenesis in mice. Intranasal inoculation of BALB/c mice with influenza A/PR/8/34 virus caused time-dependent increases in the number of pulmonary leukocytes (recovered from bronchoalveolar lavage fluid), marked airway histopathology characterized by extensive epithelial cell damage, airway hyper-responsiveness to the bronchoconstrictor methacholine, and elevated levels of inflammatory chemokines (keratinocyte-derived chemokine and macrophage inflammatory protein 2) and cytokines (interferon-γ). It is noteworthy that these IAV-induced effects were dose-dependently attenuated in mice treated with a PAR 2 -activating peptide, SLIGRL, at the time of IAV inoculation. However, SLIGRL also inhibited IAV-induced increases in pulmonary leukocytes in PAR 2 -deficient mice, indicating these antiviral actions were not mediated by PAR 2 . The potency order obtained for a series of structural analogs of SLIGRL for anti-IAV activity (IGRL > SLIGRL > LSIGRL >2-furoyl-LIGRL) was also inconsistent with a PAR 2 -mediated effect. In further mechanistic studies, SLIGRL inhibited IAV-induced propagation in ex vivo perfused segments of trachea from wild-type or PAR 2 (−/−) mice, but did not inhibit viral attachment or replication in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells and chorioallantoic membrane cells, which are established hosts for IAV. In summary, SLIGRL protected mice from IAV infection independently of PAR 2 and independently of direct inhibition of IAV attachment or replication, potentially through the activation of endogenous antiviral pathways within the mouse respiratory tract.

This is an updated version of an article which appeared in Foreign Policy, no. 26 (Spring 1977). The article is reprinted with the permission of Foreign Policy and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The original text is in Roman; the updates are in italics.

The characteristic structural forms of large Renaissance churches-domes, drums, pendentives, and barrel vaults-were the products of innovation in theory and practice during the later fifteenth century in Italy that culminated in Bramante's projects for the new Saint Peter's. Significant ideas were contributed by Leon Battista Alberti, Francesco di Giorgio, and Leonardo da Vinci. Francesco di Giorgio's geometrical methods of design for churches as described in his second treatise incorporate a procedure for calculating the thickness of walls bearing vaults. Francesco di Giorgio tested the procedure in his own churches, and it was later used by Bramante.

the Large-Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA) has resulted in an unprecedented international effort to understand the functioning of the vegetation of Amazonia and its interaction with the atmosphere and hydrosphere. As a result, Amazonia is now almost certainly the best studied major tropical forest region of the world, although our journey to a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of this system is only just beginning. Some of the key questions that LBA asked in relation to the vegetation and soils of Amazonia included the following: (1) How does the structure and functioning of Amazonian forests vary across the region; what factors drive this variation? (2) How much carbon is stored in Amazonian vegetation and soils; is this carbon store increasing or decreasing in response to contemporary environmental change? (3) How does the supply of nitrogen, phosphorus, and other nutrients affect Amazonian forests and the viability and sustainability of management practices after conversion of forest to other land uses? (4) How does Amazonian vegetation respond to seasonal, interannual, and long-term drought? (5) What role does Amazonia play in global climatic teleconnections and in the budgets of the major atmospheric trace gases? (6) How are Amazonian forests changing, and how will they change in response to climate change? In this introduction, we provide a brief overview of the major themes discussed in this section. We do not introduce the chapters in sequence but rather when appropriate to our narrative.

This chapter contrasted HadCM3LC simulations of Amazonian forest at the Last Glacial Maximum (21 kya) and a Younger Dryas-like period (13-12 kya) with predicted responses of future warming to provide estimates of the climatic limits under which the Amazon forest remains relatively stable. Simulations indicate that despite lower atmospheric CO2 concentrations and increased aridity during the LGM, Amazonia remains mostly forested, and that the cooler climate of the Younger Dryas-like period in fact causes a trend towards increased above-ground carbon balance relative to today. The vegetation feedbacks responsible for maintaining forest integrity in past climates (i.e. decreased evapotranspiration and reduced photorespiration) cannot be maintained in the future. Although elevated atmospheric CO2 contributes to a positive enhancement of plant carbon and water balance, decreased stomatal conductance and increased plant and soil respiration cause a positive feedback that amplifies localised drying and climate warming. The Amazonian forest appears to be presently near its critical resiliency threshold, and even minor climate warming may be sufficient to promote deleterious feedbacks on forest integrity.

We are interested in developing an airway explant culture system using sheep bronchi in which to establish respiratory viral infection and from which tissue can be used for functional, biochemical and immunohistochemical studies involving the endothelins (ETs). Freshly harvested sheep bronchial airway smooth muscle contains a homogeneous population of the ETA receptor. However, the potency of ET-1 and maximum contractile response of sheep bronchial explants to ET-1 increased with time in culture, despite these parameters remaining constant for carbachol in explants maintained for up to 48h. The possibility that this was caused by changes in ET receptor density was assessed using light microscopic quantitative autoradiography. In view of the increased responsiveness to ET-1 in cultured explants, it was surprising to demonstrate a significant decrease in total ET receptor (59±6% compared with the initial value, n = 4–5; P

The author assesses President Bush’s foreign policy, suggesting that there are surprisingly few differences beneath the surface between the policies of the current administration and the Clinton presidency. He gives high marks to the Bush administration for its conduct of the war in Afghanistan, but cites several ambiguous, and hence more difficult, obstacles that confront the Bush foreign policy team. In particular, he warns that the United States appears to be losing the crucial battle for public opinion among Muslims worldwide. He also remarks on the poor job, thus far, by the president to revamp the American military to face the challenges of the new century.

The climate system and the global carbon cycle are tightly coupled. Atmospheric carbon in the form of the radiatively active gases, carbon dioxide and methane, plays a significant role in the natural greenhouse effect. The continued increase in the atmospheric concentrations of these gases, due to human emissions, is predicted to lead to significant climatic change over the next 100 years. The best estimates suggest that more than half of the current anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide are being absorbed by the ocean and by land ecosystems (Schimel et al., 1995). In both cases the processes involved are sensitive to the climatic conditions. Temperature affects the solubility of carbon dioxide in sea water and the rate of terrestrial and oceanic biological processes. In addition, vegetation is known to respond directly to increased atmospheric CO2 through increased photosynthesis and reduced transpiration (Sellers et al., 1996a; Field et al., 1995), and may also change its structure and distribution in response to any associated climate change (Betts et al., 1997). Thus there is great potential for the biosphere to produce a feedback on the climatic change due to given human emissions. Despite this, simulations carried out with General Circulation Models (GCMs) have generally neglected the coupling between the climate and the biosphere. Indeed, vegetation distributions have been static and atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have been prescribed based on results from simple carbon cycle models, which neglect the effects of climate change (Enting et al., 1994). This chapter describes the inclusion of vegetation and the carbon cycle as interactive elements in a GCM. The coupled climate-carbon cycle model is able to reproduce key aspects of the observations, including the global distribution of vegetation types, seasonal and zonal variations in ocean primary production, and the interannual variability in atmospheric CO2. A transient simulation carried out with this model suggests that previously-neglected climate-carbon cycle feedbacks could significantly accelerate atmospheric CO2 rise and climate change over the twenty-first century.

No subject generates more concern within the military than strategy. Yet policymakers are often indifferent to it. Some find the demand for more and better strategy to be naive resistance to inevitable ad hocery. Why is the subject never settled enough to allow leaders to get on with other business? Why do senior officers insist on clear strategy more than do civilian officials? What Clausewitz said of friction in war applies to strategy: it "is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." The trouble begins with the term strategy which is a buzzword that covers a multitude of sins. Many were content with a limited conception in earlier times planning and directing large-scale military operations. Clausewitz, however, injected politics when he defined strategy as "the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war." This wedge properly pushes the concept to higher levels. But some usages of the term become so broad that they are synonymous with foreign policy.

Foxp3+ CD4+ regulatory T cells represent a T cell subset with well-characterized immunosuppressive effects during immune homeostasis and chronic infections, and there is emerging evidence to suggest these cells temper pulmonary inflammation in response to acute viral infection. Recent studies have demonstrated treatment with PC61 CD25-depleting antibody potentiates inflammation in a murine model of RSV infection, while paradoxically delaying recruitment of CD8+ T cells to the site of inflammation. The present study therefore sought to examine the role of these cells in a murine model of acute influenza A virus infection through the administration of PC61 CD25-depleting antibody. PC61 antibody is able to partially deplete CD25+Foxp3+ regulatory T cells to a comparable degree as seen within previous work examining RSV, however this does not alter influenza A-virus induced mortality, weight loss, viral clearance and cellularity within the lung. Collectively, these data demonstrate that partial depletion of CD4+CD25+ regulatory T cells with PC61 antibody does not alter the course of influenza A virus infection.

The failure to prevent the attacks of September ll, 2001, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, and the proliferation of official investigations trying to figure out what went wrong in both cases have combined to put intelligence issues in a very unusual position this year: at the center of a closely contested presidential campaign. All the attention creates both an op portunity and a danger. The opportunity stems from the consensus that major reforms are necessary. Previous contro versies over the quality of intelligence have generally been inside-the-Beltway debates leading to only minor reforms at best. That will probably be true this time as well. But if there were ever a moment when public demand might overcome the entrenched institutional interests that block radical change, this should be it. The danger stems from the gap be tween the urge to do something and the uncertainty about just what that some thing should be-as well as from the entanglement of intelligence and policy issues involved with the Iraq question in particular. Political points are scored by painting issues in broad swaths of black and white, but the real choices in this area are inevitably found among shades of gray, and ill-considered reforms could do more harm than good. At the end of the day, the strongest defense against intelligence mistakes will come less from any structural or procedural tweak than from the good sense, good character, and good mental habits of senior officials. How to assure a steady supply of those, unfortunately, has never been clear.

WITH WAR in the Middle East imminent, it is clear that the United States has painted itself-as well as Iraq-into a corner. The Bush administration's success in engineering international support for a preventive war in the Persian Gulf is impressive, both politically and diplomatically. But Washington's case rests on two crucial errors. It understates the very real risk that an assault on Iraq will trigger a counterattack on American civilians. And even when that risk is admitted, the pro-war camp conflates it with the threat of unprovoked attack by Iraq in the future. Many Americans still take for granted that a war to topple Sad dam Hussein can be fought as it was in 1991: on American terms. Even when they recognize that the blood price may prove greater than the optimists hope, most still assume it will be paid by the U.S. military or by people in the region. Until very late in the game, few Americans focused on the chance that the battlefield could extend back to their own homeland. Yet if a U.S. invasion succeeds, Sad dam will have no reason to withhold his best parting shot-which could be the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inside the United States. Such an Iraqi attack on U.S. civilians could make the death toll from September 1i look small. But Washington has done little to prepare the country for this possibility and seems to

Since the Cold War, other matters have displaced strategic concerns on the foreign policy agenda, and that agenda itself is now barely on the public's radar screen. Apart from defense policy professionals, few Americans still lose sleep over weapons of mass destruction (wmd). After all, what do normal people feel is the main relief provided by the end of the Cold War? It is that the danger of nuclear war is off their backs.

Physicians have a motto that peacemakers would do well to adopt: "First, do no harm." Neither the United States nor the United Nations have quite grasped this. Since the end of the Cold War unleashed them to intervene in civil conflicts around the world, they have done reasonably well in some cases, but in others they have un wittingly prolonged suffering where they meant to relieve it. How does this happen? By following a principle that sounds like common sense: that intervention should be both limited and impartial, because weighing in on one side of a local struggle un dermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of outside involvement. This Olympian presumption resonates with respect for law and international cooperation. It has the ring of prudence, fairness, and restraint. It makes sense in old-fashioned U.N. peacekeeping operations, where the outsiders' role is not to make peace, but to bless and monitor a cease-fire that all parties have decided to accept. But it becomes a destructive misconception when carried over to the messier realm of "peace enforcement," where the bel ligerents have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain by fighting.