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Se analizan la planeación y asignación de transferencias hacia los 125 municipios del Estado de Jalisco durante el periodo 2005-2012. Se evisan los planes de desarrollo de los gobiernos federal y estatal para analizar el papel de la planeación financiera en el desarrollo local. La evidencia sugiere que la planeación financiera y la asignación efectiva de transferencias federales son consistentes entre sí. La asignación de transferencias estatales es ambigua.

The input-output matrix can regionalize national indirect methods to data, in the case of Ecuador, by provinces. The utility of this type a matrix is large. This article is a review of the application of methodologies for analysis of sectoral interlinkages in part regionales.El text economies from reviewing how to regionalize matrix of this type and ends with analysis of the relationships between sectors. First location coefficients are applied to adjust the input-output matrix and include imports between provinces. The results of the application of RasmussenHirschman coefficients are analyzed., Las matrices de insumo-producto nacionales pueden regionalizar por métodos indirectos para tener datos, en el caso del Ecuador, por provincias. La utilidad de una matriz de este tipo es amplia. Este artículo es un repaso de la aplicación de metodologías de análisis de las interrelaciones sectoriales en economías regionales. El texto parte desde la revisión de cómo se regionalizan matrices de este tipo y se termina con análisis de las relaciones entre los sectores. En primer lugar se aplican coeficientes de localización para ajustar la Matriz de insumo producto e incluir las importaciones entre provincias. También se analizan los resultados de la aplicación de coeficientes Rasmussen-Hirschman.

We study the behaviour of banking intermediaries focusing on the joint relationships among risk management, fragility and the market structure. Theoretically, we use the industrial organisation approach to analyse the relationships between banking behaviour and risk management goals and between banking behaviour and regulation effects. We develop and calibrate models to study the monopolistic competition effects on banking stability and to study the effects of asset and liability uncertainty on banking decisions. We extend such analyses to study the effects caused by portfolio restrictions and deposit interest-rate regulations on banking behaviour. Empirically, we characterise the financial and banking stylised facts associated to stable and unstable banking systems. Furthermore, we assess among competing theories and policy views regarding the relationships between banking stability and management practices, and between fragility and banking market structure. The empirical study relies on OLS regressions and random effects logit models for panel data. The dataset includes data for a sample of 47 countries during the period 1990-1997. Theoretically, we show that the optimal risk management asset allocation for banking firms depends on the banking market structure. We also show that the maximisation of long-term profits and the minimisation of financial distress are complementary and compatible management objectives. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the achievement of banking and regulatory goals may depend on the degree of competition in the banking market. Moreover, they also suggest that interest-rate instruments may be better than asset portfolio restrictions as regulatory devices. Empirically, our findings suggest that financial development is associated with market-based financial systems and non-competitive banking systems. We also provide evidence that banking competition enhances fragility. Furthermore, the analyses reject the bank-based policy view re

We study the behaviour of banking intermediaries focusing on the joint relationships among risk management, fragility and the market structure. Theoretically, we use the industrial organisation approach to analyse the relationships between banking behaviour and risk management goals and between banking behaviour and regulation effects. We develop and calibrate models to study the monopolistic competition effects on banking stability and to study the effects of asset and liability uncertainty on banking decisions. We extend such analyses to study the effects caused by portfolio restrictions and deposit interest-rate regulations on banking behaviour. Empirically, we characterise the financial and banking stylised facts associated to stable and unstable banking systems. Furthermore, we assess among competing theories and policy views regarding the relationships between banking stability and management practices, and between fragility and banking market structure. The empirical study relies on OLS regressions and random effects logit models for panel data. The dataset includes data for a sample of 47 countries during the period 1990-1997. Theoretically, we show that the optimal risk management asset allocation for banking firms depends on the banking market structure. We also show that the maximisation of long-term profits and the minimisation of financial distress are complementary and compatible management objectives. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the achievement of banking and regulatory goals may depend on the degree of competition in the banking market. Moreover, they also suggest that interest-rate instruments may be better than asset portfolio restrictions as regulatory devices. Empirically, our findings suggest that financial development is associated with market-based financial systems and non-competitive banking systems. We also provide evidence that banking competition enhances fragility. Furthermore, the analyses reject the bank-based policy view re

We study the behaviour of banking intermediaries focusing on the joint relationships among risk management, fragility and the market structure. Theoretically, we use the industrial organisation approach to analyse the relationships between banking behaviour and risk management goals and between banking behaviour and regulation effects. We develop and calibrate models to study the monopolistic competition effects on banking stability and to study the effects of asset and liability uncertainty on banking decisions. We extend such analyses to study the effects caused by portfolio restrictions and deposit interest-rate regulations on banking behaviour. Empirically, we characterise the financial and banking stylised facts associated to stable and unstable banking systems. Furthermore, we assess among competing theories and policy views regarding the relationships between banking stability and management practices, and between fragility and banking market structure. The empirical study relies on OLS regressions and random effects logit models for panel data. The dataset includes data for a sample of 47 countries during the period 1990-1997. Theoretically, we show that the optimal risk management asset allocation for banking firms depends on the banking market structure. We also show that the maximisation of long-term profits and the minimisation of financial distress are complementary and compatible management objectives. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the achievement of banking and regulatory goals may depend on the degree of competition in the banking market. Moreover, they also suggest that interest-rate instruments may be better than asset portfolio restrictions as regulatory devices. Empirically, our findings suggest that financial development is associated with market-based financial systems and non-competitive banking systems. We also provide evidence that banking competition enhances fragility. Furthermore, the analyses reject the bank-based policy view re

We study the behaviour of banking intermediaries focusing on the joint relationships among risk management, fragility and the market structure. Theoretically, we use the industrial organisation approach to analyse the relationships between banking behaviour and risk management goals and between banking behaviour and regulation effects. We develop and calibrate models to study the monopolistic competition effects on banking stability and to study the effects of asset and liability uncertainty on banking decisions. We extend such analyses to study the effects caused by portfolio restrictions and deposit interest-rate regulations on banking behaviour. Empirically, we characterise the financial and banking stylised facts associated to stable and unstable banking systems. Furthermore, we assess among competing theories and policy views regarding the relationships between banking stability and management practices, and between fragility and banking market structure. The empirical study relies on OLS regressions and random effects logit models for panel data. The dataset includes data for a sample of 47 countries during the period 1990-1997. Theoretically, we show that the optimal risk management asset allocation for banking firms depends on the banking market structure. We also show that the maximisation of long-term profits and the minimisation of financial distress are complementary and compatible management objectives. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the achievement of banking and regulatory goals may depend on the degree of competition in the banking market. Moreover, they also suggest that interest-rate instruments may be better than asset portfolio restrictions as regulatory devices. Empirically, our findings suggest that financial development is associated with market-based financial systems and non-competitive banking systems. We also provide evidence that banking competition enhances fragility. Furthermore, the analyses reject the bank-based policy view re

We study the behaviour of banking intermediaries focusing on the joint relationships among risk management, fragility and the market structure. Theoretically, we use the industrial organisation approach to analyse the relationships between banking behaviour and risk management goals and between banking behaviour and regulation effects. We develop and calibrate models to study the monopolistic competition effects on banking stability and to study the effects of asset and liability uncertainty on banking decisions. We extend such analyses to study the effects caused by portfolio restrictions and deposit interest-rate regulations on banking behaviour. Empirically, we characterise the financial and banking stylised facts associated to stable and unstable banking systems. Furthermore, we assess among competing theories and policy views regarding the relationships between banking stability and management practices, and between fragility and banking market structure. The empirical study relies on OLS regressions and random effects logit models for panel data. The dataset includes data for a sample of 47 countries during the period 1990-1997. Theoretically, we show that the optimal risk management asset allocation for banking firms depends on the banking market structure. We also show that the maximisation of long-term profits and the minimisation of financial distress are complementary and compatible management objectives. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the achievement of banking and regulatory goals may depend on the degree of competition in the banking market. Moreover, they also suggest that interest-rate instruments may be better than asset portfolio restrictions as regulatory devices. Empirically, our findings suggest that financial development is associated with market-based financial systems and non-competitive banking systems. We also provide evidence that banking competition enhances fragility. Furthermore, the analyses reject the bank-based policy view re