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Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (MITI) proposed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) in August of 2006. This new regional FTA concept would extend the original footprint of ASEAN 10 + 3 to include the additional three countries of India, Australia, and New Zealand. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe then managed to garner support in January 2007 at the East Asian Summit for establishing a feasibility study group for the proposed scheme. Ironically, Japan some years earlier had proposed an “East Asian Free Business Zone” including only ASEAN+3 countries without Australia, New Zealand and India. What might explain the policy change, and how did it come about? Scholars and policy analysts have looked to the economic consequences, political implications and wider international implications of the ASEAN+3 approach to East Asian integration. We look rather to the political and economic rationales behind the ASEAN+6 proposal. Political analysis includes international issues such as the impact of ‘the rise of China’ on Japan’s sudden interest in expanding the footprint of the East Asian Community. Nor can domestic factors be ignored, such as bureaucratic competition in trade policy initiatives. Economic analysis includes the possible impact of CEPEA not only on member countries but also on non-members such as the United States, and how this affects Japan’s internal debate over the CEPEA initiative. The paper concludes by returning to the initial approach to a regional FTA, comparing expected economic consequences of the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 approaches to integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the negotiations for trade liberalization in global and regional levels bogged down, Singapore swiftly engaged in planning for and forging a vast array of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), culminating in the creation of an FTA grounds well in East Asia and beyond. On the role played by Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, confidently stated that 'to say it is because of us may be too strong, but we set an example and we set people thinking. And I think that's also the reason why ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] itself is discussing FTAs. There is a demonstration effect' (cited in Straits Times, 1 December 2004). Singapore's interest in signing bilateral FTAs consecutively was partly born out of a fear of its survival as a nation that heavily relies on trade for its growth, and FTAs are expected to help Singapore overcome its innate inability to call effectively for diplomatic and economic changes in Southeast Asia to promote trade liberalization in the region and beyond. 　There are two layers of FTA movements in Southeast Asia: 1) bilateral FTAs between ASEAN members and extra regional countries, and 2) FTAs between ASEAN as a single unit and extra regional countries. This chapter initially focuses on the first layer of bilateral FTA diffusion by exploring the impetus behind Singapore's active engagement in FTA negotiations by examining three pressures (economic, security and legal), set out by Solis and Katada, to establish whether Singapore has contributed to the growth of FTAs involving both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries, and if so, how. The paper also examines the nature of trade policy-making system in Singapore to analyze the alleged little involvement of the business sector in trade policymaking as a common feature in Southeast Asia, demonstrating the predominant role of the state in the FTA making process. The chapter finally analyses another level of FTA proliferation as ASEAN has served as a hub in the ASEAN+1 FTA networks with five major powers. The origins of this approach can be traced back to China's FTA proposal to ASEAN in 2000, as a result of its concern to be isolated after the bilateral FTA initiative started by Japan and South Korea in 1998. Given the subsequent reaction taken by Japan, Korea and India, China's aggressive diplomacy in Southeast Asia including the FTA proposal can be seen as an independent variable against FTA diffusion in this layer, and, symbolically, the ASEAN+1 FTA movement has been a site for the competitions where two types of FTAs - China-led traditional FTA with gradual implementation and Japan-led new-age FTA with single undertaking approach - have prevailed, creating further complicated situations for multilateral companies' possible use of the FTAs. This paper argues that the impact of bilateral FTAs on Southeast Asia is limited, as only Singapore and Thailand have virtually signed multiple bilateral FTAs and, moreover, those FTA and ASEAN's integration schemes such as ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) are not well utilized by ASEAN's and multinational companies either, representing the perception gap between keener FTA creator in the governments and indifferent users in the business sectors. FTA diffusion certainly occurred in Southeast Asia, but it is Japan-centered as most of ASEAN members chose it as their first and, in some cases, only bilateral FTA partner, and thus the concern about trade diversion effect as a valid explanatory variable is mainly attributed to Japan's larger economic presence as the largest trading partner and investment source to those countries... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]