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The article presents a reprint of Volume 4, May 1, 2009 issue of the "International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Annual: The Middle East & North Africa." It features the political, economic, financial and composite risk assessment of United Arab Emirates (UAE). It presents a pessimistic economic outlook of UAE relative to the effects of global economic crisis, the decline of housing demand and efforts of the government to address the lack of transparency in real-estate sector.

The article provides an overview of the political conditions of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from 1971 to 2007.

The article offers information on the key findings of the country analysis report of Datamonitor Group for the United Arab of Emirates (UAE). An overview of the country's government policy, current account surplus, labor immigration and progress of its market for telecommunication and information technology (IT)-related services is presented. It also highlights the political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental (PESTLE) landscape of the country.

The article reports on the economic, political and social conditions in United Arab Emirates. It is noted that foreign investments will be encouraged by evolution in investment laws and regulations. majority of citizens in the country are Sunni Muslims, although Shiites can freely worship and have mosques. The country is a member of various organizations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN).

The article discusses political and economic forecasts for United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is noted that inability to stop inflation could damage the economic development program of the government. Expatriate workers conducted wage strikes because of the rising cost of living. It is asserted that political unity will back domestic stability.

The article focuses on the political issues and other developments in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Politically, the country's government has been considered to perform in a judicious manner, realizing its exponential growth using its oil revenues. Though lack of organized system of democracy has been determined, UAE is evaluated to benefit from its hereditary structure of political governance. Additional details on its political evolution, structure, figures and policies are highlighted.

The article presents a political overview of the United Arab Emirates since achieving independence in 1971.

The article discusses U.S. foreign policy toward the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as of February 2014. Topics covered include governance, human rights and reform issues in UAE, the efforts to promote U.S. democracy, rule of law and civil society, as well as foreign policy and defense. Also addressed is the U.S.-UAE defense cooperation agreement.

The article examines the governance, human rights and reform issues in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as of February 2014. It discusses the impact of Shayk Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan's stroke in January on the leadership of the UAE. Other topics covered include political reform, accommodation and pressure on pro-democracy activists, and efforts to counter Islamist movements liked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The article presents the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federation of 7 emirates that include Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. Shaykh Zayid's first son Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan was chosen as UAE president by leaders of all 7 emirates who make up the "Federal Supreme Council." The UAE has acted against some U.S.-funded democracy promotion groups as it closed the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the office of the German democracy-promotion organization Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

The article discusses the U.S. policy responses to the political and economic developments in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as of March, 2013. The topics discussed include the UAE's support to the organization Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state Bahrain, discontent against UAE ruling leaders after the Arab uprisings of 2011-12, and the UAE's role in implementing international sanctions against Iran.

The article provides information on the structure and policies of the judicial system in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It mentions that federal judicial system is the most common judicial system adopted in the UAE, the UAE company law is the legislative and regulatory basis for conducting business in the country. It notes that there is no federal tax legislation to corporation in the UAE, however, each emirate has its own tax policies.

The UAE's relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive technologies acquired from the West. Moreover, the social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political opening; the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders, even as it allows informal citizen participation and traditional consensus-building. Members of the elite (the ruling families of the seven emirates and clans allied with them) also routinely obtain favored treatment in court cases and lucrative business opportunities. However, economic wealth-- coupled with some government moves against political activists--have enabled the UAE to avoid widescale popular unrest that have erupted elsewhere in the Middle East since early 2011. Political reform has been limited, both before and since the Arab uprisings began in the region. Lacking popular pressure for elections, the UAE long refrained from following other Gulf states' institution of electoral processes. It altered that position in December 2006 when it instituted a selection process for half the membership of its consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). Possibly to try to ward off the unrest sweeping the region, the government significantly expanded the electorate for the September 24, 2011, FNC election process. However, turnout was only about 25%, suggesting that the clamor for democracy in UAE remains limited or that the citizenry perceived the election as unlikely to produce change. And, the government has not announced a major expansion of the FNC's powers, which many intellectuals and activists seek. On foreign policy issues, the UAE--along with fellow Gulf state Qatar--has become increasingly and uncharacteristically assertive in recent years. This assertiveness is probably a product of the UAE's ample financial resources and drive for more influence in Gulf state deliberations. It has joined the United States and U.S. allies in backing and then implementing most international sanctions against Iran, causing friction with its powerful northern neighbor. It has deployed troops to Afghanistan since 2004. In 2011, it sent police to help the beleaguered government of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state Bahrain, supported operations against Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, joined a successful GCC diplomatic effort to broker a political solution to the unrest in Yemen, backed the Arab League suspension of Syria, and appointed an Ambassador to NATO. It gives large amounts of international humanitarian and development aid, for example for relief efforts in Somalia. The UAE's growing assertiveness on foreign policy marks its emergence from the 2008-2010 global financial crisis and recession. That downturn hit Dubai emirate particularly hard and called into question its strategy of rapid, investment-fueled development, especially of luxury projects. For the Obama Administration and many in Congress, there are concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program. This was underscored by dissatisfaction among some Members of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, submitted to Congress that day, and entered into force on December 17, 2009. However, expert concerns about potential leakage of U.S. and other advanced technologies through the UAE to Iran, in particular, remain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on governance, human rights, and reform in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It states that seven principalities comprise the UAE, including Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and five smaller and less wealthy emirates. The UAE is governed by its highest body, the Federal Supreme Council, which is composed of the leaders of each of the seven emirates of the UAE and meets four times per year to establish general policy guidelines. The effects of 2011 regional unrest are discussed.

The UAE’s relatively open borders, economy, and society have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as prostitution and human trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive technologies acquired from the West. These concerns—as well as concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program—underscored dissatisfaction among some Members of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, and submitted to Congress that day. It entered into force on December 17, 2009. Despite its social tolerance and economic freedom, the UAE government is authoritarian, although with substantial informal citizen participation and consensus-building. Assessments by a wide range of observers say that members of the elite routinely obtain favored treatment in court cases, business opportunities, and influence on national decisions. The UAE federation president, Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, technically serves a five-year term, renewable by the Federal Supreme Council (composed of the seven heads of the individual emirates), although in practice leadership changes have generally taken place only after the death of a leader. After several years of resisting electoral processes similar to those instituted by other Gulf states, and despite an absence of popular pressure for elections, the UAE undertook its first electoral process in December 2006. The process was criticized as far from instituting Western-style democratic processes, because the electorate was limited and selected by the government, and it voted for only half of the membership of a body with limited powers. The other half of the body continues to be appointed. Partly because of substantial UAE federal government financial intervention, the political and social climate has remained calm through the ongoing global financial crisis and recession, which has hit Dubai emirate particularly hard and called into question its strategy of ambitious, investment-fueled development. Many expatriate workers left UAE after widespread layoffs, particularly in the financial and real estate sectors. During the crisis, there have been somewhat more criticism of and official crackdowns against expatriate social behavior that many UAE citizens have always considered offensive. For details and analysis of the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement and legislation concerning that agreement, see CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on ways of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government in handling youth activism. Among the ways include the political reforms, incentives for the poor, and cabinet reshuffle. Also mentioned are the effort of Prime Minister Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid to have cabinet reshuffle to address the effects of the decline in oil prices and to attract youth support.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. During 2008 and early 2009, the Bush Administration and the UAE government negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding and a proposed bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with the UAE January 15, 2009. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg signed a new version of the agreement May 21; the Obama Administration submitted the proposed agreement to Congress the same day. Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review such a proposed agreement for 90 days of continuous session, after which the agreement becomes effective unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. According to the Office of the Parliamentarian of the House of Representatives, the 90 days of continuous session for the proposed U.S.-UAE agreement expired October 17, 2009. The UAE cabinet approved the agreement October 26. The two governments need to exchange diplomatic notes in order for the agreement to enter into force. The agreement text states the intent of both governments to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, the development of the UAE’s “civilian nuclear energy use in a manner that contributes to global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation” and, “the establishment of reliable sources of nuclear fuel for future civilian light water reactors deployed” in the UAE. To date, some Members of Congress have welcomed the UAE government’s stated commitments not to pursue proliferation-sensitive nuclear capabilities, such as uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing. Other Members have signaled their intention to weigh the proposed bilateral agreement in light of parallel and specific concerns about the UAE’s cooperation with international efforts (such as sanctions) to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as well as the potential proliferation or safety risks inherent to exporting U.S. nuclear technology. In the 111th Congress, legislation (H.R. 364) has been introduced that would require President Obama to certify that the UAE has taken a number of steps to strengthen its export controls and stem illicit trade with Iran before any agreement could come into effect or related U.S. exports of nuclear technology to the UAE could be approved. In 2007, the UAE adopted a stronger export control law, but has yet to issue implementing regulations for the law or to fully staff a national export control body to enforce it. In the interim, export control enforcement functions remain the responsibility of authorities in the UAE’s individual emirates, in coordination with a new national interagency Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Control, established in April 2009. According to UAE officials, cooperation with the United States has resulted in a number of joint interdiction operations. This report provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options. See also CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UAE's open economy and society have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East, but lax export controls, particularly in the emirate of Dubai, are causing U.S. concern over proliferation of advanced technology; terrorist transiting; and human trafficking. These concerns—as well as concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program—underscore some congressional and other opposition to a recently-signed U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear agreement Despite its social tolerance and economic freedom, the UAE government is authoritarian, although with substantial informal citizen participation and consensus building. The UAE federation President, Shaykh Khalifah bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, technically serves a five year term, renewable by the Federal Supreme Council (composed of the seven heads of the individual emirates), although in practice changes usually only take place in the event of the death of a leader. After several years of resisting electoral processes similar to those instituted by other Gulf states, the UAE undertook its first major electoral process in December 2006, although with a small, hand-picked electorate and for a body with limited powers. There remains little evidence of unrest, despite a severe economic downturn caused by the global financial crisis and recession, which has hit Dubai emirate particularly hard. Many expatriate workers are reportedly leaving UAE after widespread layoffs, particularly in the financial and real estate sectors. This report will be updated. See also: CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]