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Under the background of the green maritime transportation, green investment and vertical alliances between port and shipping enterprises are effective ways to reduce maritime emissions. In this paper, we consider a maritime supply chain consisting of a port, a shipping company, and a forwarder. The port and shipping company determine individual green investment to reduce emission pollution. There are three vertical alliance strategies for the shipping company under green investment: no alliance, alliance with the port, and alliance with the forwarder. We obtain the optimal alliance strategy under the same green investment entity and the optimal choice for the investment entity under the same alliance strategy. In addition, we analyze the impacts of different alliance strategies and investment entities on consumer surplus and social welfare. The results show that whether the port implements the green investment or the shipping company implements green investment, when all three alliance strategies are feasible, there is always a higher green investment level, a higher demand, and a lower shipping service charge, and alliance strategies lead to greater profits for the maritime supply chain. Under the same alliance strategy, the choice of investment entity is affected by the green investment cost coefficient. If the green investment cost coefficient of the investor is too high, then the enterprise's green investment cannot improve the maritime supply chain profit. Therefore, port and shipping enterprises should reasonably set green input according to their own conditions to maximize the profit of maritime supply chain. Vertical alliances can improve environmental performance as well as increase consumer surplus and social welfare. In particular, under the shipping company green investment, alliance between the shipping company and downstream forwarder can precisely grasp the market demand and achieve the optimal social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since dual channel supply chain has become one of the main modes of supply chain, its research has acquired great significance. This paper constructs a low-carbon dual channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer produces low-carbon product and high carbon product with substitution relationship. The retailer sells high carbon product in traditional channel. The manufacturer also sells low-carbon product in direct channel. The government, manufacturer and retailer conduct a three-level Stackelberg game. This paper studies the optimal decisions of the government, manufacturer and retailer under the three modes of carbon tax + subsidy, carbon tax only and subsidy only. It has been found that for social welfare, the carbon tax + subsidy model is higher than the subsidy model and carbon tax model. For manufacturer profit, the subsidy mode is the highest, followed by the carbon tax + subsidy mode. For retailer profit, the carbon tax + subsidy model is equal to the carbon tax model. The increase in the proportion of consumers who prefer high carbon product in the total market or product cost of low-carbon product, will increase the profit of traditional channel and reduce the profit of direct channel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Port operations in an uncertain environment and compete with nearby ports in a same region to incentive carriers. In this paper, we consider a game-theoretical model to analyze the co-opetition between two ports with capacity sharing. Three competitive game interactions are discussed, namely, benchmark model, passive sharing, and proactive sharing to maximize the payoff by determining optimal berth quantity and service price. The observations show that when faced with a strengthened rival with sufficient capacity, the optimal ports' decision for the capacity sharing mode is determined by the tradeoff between the benefit that is gained from the sharing capacity and the losses that are caused by port competition. Moreover, our research comprehensively examines how the port operation cost and the difference between the potential capacity demand of two terminals affect ports' optimal strategy selection and presents a broad set of decision outcomes, which provides new insights for port coopetition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the restriction of sulfur content in fuel oil in the Emission Control Areas (ECAs), ships passing through ECAs have to adopt low-sulfur fuel oil (LSFO), and government will provide appropriate subsidies to shipping companies using LSFO. However, due to the different bargaining power between ports and shipping companies, it is necessary to study how the governmental subsidies affect the carriers' choices of using LSFO under different power structures. In this paper, a game model considering one terminal and two carriers is developed to study the equilibrium solutions of two carriers under different power structures (terminal-dominated game, carriers-dominated game, Nash game), and then we analyze the impacts of government subsidies on maritime supply chain. The results show that whether for terminal or carriers, being leader in the game can always bring them higher profits. With the increase of the government subsidy, the demand of the carrier using LSFO will increase while the demand of the carrier who doesn't use LSFO will decrease. High government subsidy not only reduces the profits of carriers not using LSFO but also puts the carriers more likely into the prisoner's dilemma. The total demands and social welfare are maximized under Nash game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zanoni, Mazzoldi, and Jaber [Zanoni, S., L. Mazzoldi, and M. Y., Jaber. 2014. Vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock agreement for single vendor–single buyer under the emission-trading scheme.International Journal of Production Research52 (1): 20–31] consider a joint economic lot size problem under the vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock agreement and an emission-trading scheme. They show that the total cost of the system is a jointly convex function by simply showing that every element of the Hessian is positive. Noticing this mistake, we analyse the same problem in this technical note. We first provide a closed-form solution when the production rate is given. In order to avoid a complete search over all possible production rates, we then develop an efficient continuous approximation algorithm. Computational experiment shows that the approximation algorithm is effective and efficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two-branch real-time semantic segmentation network can quickly acquire low-level details and high-level semantics. However, the large contextual gap between them results in adverse impact on their fusion, and limits the further improvement of real-time segmentation accuracy. This paper proposes a tripartite real-time semantic segmentation network with scene commonality (TriSCNet) to address this problem. First, we add a parallel scene commonality branch based on the current two-branch architecture to learn intrinsic common features in similar street scene images, such as the spatial location distribution of various objects and the internal connections between them at the semantic level. Further, with the guidance of commonality, we propose an external branch attention module to enrich and enhance the feature information of traditional two branches. Finally, we utilize an alignment and selective fusion module to correct the misaligned context in the semantic branch and highlight the essential spatial information in the detailed branch. Our proposed TriSCNet achieves an excellent trade-off between accuracy and speed, yielding 77.9% mIOU at 67.2 FPS on Cityscapes test set and 75.8% mIOU at 127.4 FPS on CamVid test set, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]